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NOTES 


ON THE 


SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 





OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 


or) * Pee 


WASHINGTON: 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 
1900. 





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OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 
War Notes No. I. 


INFORMATION FROM ABROAD. 





BATTLES AND CAPITULATION 


OF 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA: 


BY 


Lrevtenant JOSE MULLER Y TEJEIRO, 


SECOND IN COMMAND OF NAVAL FORCES OF THE PROVINCE OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA. 


TRANSLATED FROM THE SPANISH. 





OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 


“WASHINGTON: 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICER. 


1399. 





OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 
War Notts No. I. 


INFORMATION FROM ABROAD. 


BATTLES AND CAPITULATION 


OF 


meen TTAGO DE CUBA. 


BY 


Lizutenantr. JOSE MULLER Y TEJEIRO, 


SECOND IN COMMAND OF NAVAI, FORCES OF THE PROVINCE OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA. 


TRANSLATED FROM THE SPANISH. 





rer liCh wor sNAVAL “INTELLIGENCE. 


WASHINGTON: 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 


1899, 


° 
- 
= 
. 
ey 





REeRS 


= oases 





INTRODUCTORY. 


The publication by this office of the partial translation of ‘‘ Battles and Ca- 
pitulation of Santiago de Cuba,” by Lieutenant Miiller y Tejeiro, was received 
with so much interest both in and out of the service that the small edition of 
1,000 copies was soon exhausted. The chapters there omitted were: 


I. 

Le 
Lit: 
LY: 
V; 
VI. 
VII. 
Aa bh 
XIV. 
XXX. 


XXXITI. 
XXXVII. 
XXXVIITI. 


Some Historical Antecedents. 

The United States and the Maine. 

The First Shots. 

The Scene of Events. 

Forces of the Jurisdiction (Santiago). 

Works of Defense. 

Artillery Set Up. 

The Cruiser Reina Mercedes. 

The Volunteers. 

Escario’s Column (being a description of General Escario’s march 
across the country from Manzanillo to Santiago). 

Suspension of Hostilities. 

Traders, not the Spanish People (responsible for the Cuban trouble). 

Gerona and Santiago de Cuba (comparison of the two battles). 


These have since been translated, and are given in this edition, excepting 
Chapters I, II, and III, which are again omitted, as they contain no original or 
new matter, and have no connection with the subject of the Jo0ok. 

Among the newly translated chapters, the one giving the diary of Genera: 
Escario’s march, with 3,752 men, from Manzanillo to Santiago, a distance of 
52 leagues through the enemy’s country, is one of great interest. Considering 
the nature of the country, which forced them generally to march single file, the 
heavy rains, and the continual harassment by the Cubans, the effectiveness of 
which is shown by the large number of killed and wounded on both sides, it may 
be classed as one of the most noticeable military feats of the war. It shows what 
the Cubans did toward the fall of Santiago, and a study of the situation will be 
interesting, considering what would have been the temporary effect if Escario’s 
march had been unopposed, and he had arrived at Santiago with his force unim- 
paired a day or two before that critical period—July 2—just previous to the 
departure and destruction of Cervera’s fleet. 
RICHARDSON CLOVER, 


Chief Intelligence Officer. 
December 31, 1898. 


(3) 


= 


EN 


ax 





Preface 


Chap. I-ITI. 


LY. 
ie 
VI. 
VII. 
VIII. 
x. 
X. 
XI. 
XII. 
XIII. 
XIV. 
XV. 
XVI. 
XVII. 
XVIII. 
XIX. 
XX. 
XXII. 
XXII. 
XXIII. 
XXIV. 
XXV. 
XXVI. 
XXVII. 
XXVIII. 
XXIX. 
XXX. 
XXXII. 
XXXII. 
XXXII. 


TABLE OF CONTENTS. 


Page. 
ee Or vINOUGS a oe ee ea ees aen es 8 
ne ee ee ee oes a cae acum aawe vi 
Omitted. 
BICONE OLUUVOlLAe re ne see Sea oa ae ead. owe co enaned 9 
Perea T LGR ILIGCICLION © = eee te le ee ee 14 
Duar EDO OlinG eee eee nee nan dae a ae ee aa ee OL 
oh 2 Wa VEW AG CD rl lg erm eee Nees A, eye ES ee 21 
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SSCP COS see en ti eas Ua a Sea awos 6S 5k dig Pee eee Oe. 
ees TONIC OURO: Ch Ly tte ee te en ee, a ae en OL 
EY SUIGESS ypc gia lae Sel Rega i gin pee a een ele pg een ee ES 
Opinions as to Why the Fleet did not go out----------....------ 37 
eT eRe LC ere Rete! nee ee es eee eek oe Cee 40 
AIT CEL ee tte cs ee ee ee a en ao Sao ene eae 45 
GP ES TIT? 2 cs co pin chee Sg a Se ae ara eee reas eer 48 
eer TL Cm ee ee. ak a les en ae oe boo ee a ees 51 
The Blockade Continues- ------ --. a etd ae oe eee ae bd 
Pi OMMOALOIIelALOCLOASOS toe wine e ol oe a an ee ee 58 
Airmen ogee IG Oh ome fe ne tes ae ee a ee oem OS 
ihe Vangmenaxpedinion Appears... .--..-+--.----=...-...... 69 
ies) eon vr AplOll se. ee Se ee eae il PSS BT ss 69 
HVE Ord Ne ed COS Ul oc ee: oon on ar an ook eee sok Ota a eclas aaa 74, 
CPOE Ge NOLL OR) UNO foes as See herent lan, Oke ee oe doe OL 
Baltics Om Oatley aud mall JUAN ose 2.6 a nae oe eee eae OO 
Berea eG eee Cea teen ree ee le ee 92 
ERIC aLItCe CCL Ume a anteater ee ee LOO 
Neavambatbiccof manbiaco de Gulbace=. 2-6-2672. sen eee ee 100 
Causes of the Loss of the Naval Battle of Santiago de Cuba- ---- 108 
PTT MOL LOOM eT COUR © ne, ett eens Ske teeta mie Gis em ap 113 
Pees RCE er CULL LIA NT eee ee ty eae hte en ee le anion 116 
Peter lle ANG stl DUG) DV een aes aoe ee wie cnins od a elo Ee le6 
Battles and Bombardments of the 10th ont EL Doe eee. ee 130 
SeSUCHSION OL CLOSULILIOS). 2 cess fae ae eee aes 2 San a oe aon 138 
PAULA LOU ree tee eee ea hee ine ene no a4 144 


XXXIV. 
XXXV. 
XXXVI. 
XXXVII. 
XXXVIITI. 


ree iieTAtlON LO PM Caney. ean. tee tee ee eon conte oe LAG 


STILEPeMGIeOl sta. 1 LV eter were eee nes oe een Ao aaa LOO 
Prater se Ob tie ODATLIS F CODLG ee. a. Gee ns poe eee = el 155 
RTerON AAO OAbIne Ode WU. soo meee pone Se ae 159 


(5) 





PREFACE. 


On the 18th of May, the first hostile ships were sighted from the Morro of 
Santiago de Cuba and the first gunshots were heard, which since that date, for 
the space of two months, have hardly ceased for a single day. 

On the following day, the 19th, the Spanish fleet, commanded by Rear Admi- 
ral Cervera, entered with very little coal, which it was absolutely necessary to 
replenish. 

It did not require great power of penetration to understand that, owing to 
the scant resources available at this harbor, it-would take more days to get the 
necessary fuel on board than it would take Admiral Sampson, Commander of 
the United States fleet, to find out that circumstance, and that consequently the 
Spanish fleet would be blockaded, as indeed it was; and as a natural and logical 
inference, that the enemy's objective would be the city and harbor of Santiago, 
where the only battle ships that Spain had in the Antilles, or at least in the 
Greater Antilla, had taken refuge. ; 

Thus, the arrival of the fleet gave this city a military importance which 
without that event it would never have acquired, and changed it to the princi- 
pal—not to say, the only—scene of operations in the island, the dénouement of 
which would necessarily be of great interest and of powerful influence on the 
result of the campaign and the war. Subsequent events have shown the truth 
of my assumption, which was also the assumption of everybody else in the city. 

From that time on, I have kept an exact diary, from day to day, from hour 
to hour, from minute to minute even—and when I say this I am not exagger- 
ating, for it is still in existence and may be seen—of everything I saw, or that 
came to my notice, or that passed through my hands in my official capacity, or 
that I knew to be accurate and trustworthy. 

When some official duty prevented me, I was ably replaced by my friend, Mr. 
Dario Laguna, aid of the captaincy of the port (ayudante de la capitania de 
puerto), who gladly rendered the service I asked of him, in spite of his 
constant and manifold obligations. 

If truth is a merit, these ‘‘Notes” (begging pardon for my want of modesty) 
possess it, though it may be their only merit. Whatever they contain has 
actually happened, and those who have returned from Santiago will testify to 
it. Not asingle fact, no matter how insignificant, herein related, is doubtful 
or hypothetical. Wherever I did not know the outcome of any event, or where 
its objects or consequences have remained a mystery, I have openly acknowl- 
edged it, without circumlocution, as any one may see who reads these notes. 
There is in them nothing of my own invention, and my imagination has had 
nothing to do with them, fortunately, for I do not possess the gift of invention, 
which I admire so much in others. My work has been confined to gathering 
data and obtaining as much information as possible, my only care having been to 
see that everything was correct, and I have made sure of this by comparing the 
data collected with the information obtained. 


(7) 


8 PREFACE. 


Feeling sure that the events which have taken place from May 18 to July 17— 
hence the true situation in which were Santiago de Cuba and the forces defend- 
ing it—can not be known in Spain in detail, but only in general, I am desirous 
of making them known in their whole truth, so that the country, to whom I 
think that we who were intrusted with defending its honor and interests at a 
distance of fifteen hundred leagues, owe the strictest account, may be able, 
with a complete knowledge of the facts, to call us to account, if it thinks that 
we have incurred any responsibility. 

Such has been my object, and I trust that my comrades of Santiago de Cuba, 
both in the Army and in the Navy, will approve of it. 


SANTIAGO DE CuBA, August 10, 1898. 


EN: 


THE SCENE OF EVENTS. 


In order to be able to form at least an approximate idea of the 
events which are taking place here, and of which no one knows as 
yet when and how they will end, it is indispensable to know the 
location of the places where they are occurring, and for that 
reason I will describe them as briefly as possible, referring the 
‘reader to the sketch at the end of this book and the explanations 
concerning the different places. 

Santiago de Cuba; the capital of the province of the same name, 
occupying the eastern part of the island, contained at the begin- 
ning of the present insurrection about 45,000 inhabitants; but the 
population has been reduced to about three-fourths of that, owing 
to emigrations and epidemics. The city is built on very hilly 
ground, at the head of a bay which is almost entirely closed in 
and very safe, so that, when seen from the city, it looks more like 
a lake than an arm of the sea. The distance to the mouth of the 
harbor in a straight line is about 4 miles. 

This mouth, which is extremely narrow, is bounded on the east 
by the heights of the Morro and on the west by those of the Socapa, 
both of which are very steep toward the south, that is, where they 
border on the sea. 

At Punta Morrillo, the western extremity of the Morro heights, 
which latter rise about 65 meters above the level of the sea, is sit- 
uated Morro Castle, which was at one time a very good fort, well 
built, but in these days of modern artillery it is not only useless, 
but even dangerous on account of the target which it presents, and 
this was the opinion of the junta of defense when they decided that 
whatever artillery was to be installed there should be erected on 
the plateau of the Morro and not inside of the castle. On this 
plateau are also situated the houses of the governor, the adjutant 
‘of the fort, the engineers and gunners, the lookout and the light- 
house keepers, also the light-house itself, which is a white light, 
fixed, flashing every two minutes, and visible 16 miles. Since 
May 18, in consequence of the events of that day, it has not been 
lighted. 

The heights of the Socapa, whose elevation is about the same as 
that of the Morro heights, bound on the west, as already stated, 
the mouth of the harbor, and contain no fortification nor defense 
of any kind. 

(9) 


10 


Ships wanting to enter Santiago Harbor must follow the Morro 
shore, which is bold and comparatively clear, while on the Socapa 
shore is Diamante Bank, consisting of rocks, leaving a channel 
whose depth varies between 6 and 11 meters. Between the place 
where Diamante buoy is anchored (in 30 feet of water) and Kstrella 
Cove the channel is not over 50 fathoms wide. At the head of 
this cove, which only small boats can enter, is the hut of the 
English cable. 

The course to be taken in order to enter the harbor is NE. 5° 
N. (true), until coming close to Estrella battery, an old fort 
which, like the Morro, was good in its time, but is now useless. 
From this point to Punta Soldado, which is on the eastern shore of 
the bay and which, with Punta Churruca, forms the entrance of 
Nispero Bay, the course is north, leaving to starboard Santa Cata- 
lina battery, which is abandoned and in ruins. 

From Punta Soldado the course is NNW. until coming close to 
Cay Smith, which is to be left to port; from there the course must 
be shaped so as to avoid the Punta Gorda Bank, whose beacon, 
marking 18 feet, is to be left to starboard. 

Cay Smith is a small island, or rather a large rock of small sur- 
face and great elevation, on the top of which is a small stone 
hermitage of modern construction; on its southern slope are 111 
houses and cottages belonging to pilots, fishermen, and private citi- 
zens, who have built them for the purpose of spending the hottest 
season there. In the northern part there are no buildings what- 
ever, the ground being inaccessible. 

After passing Punta Gorda, the course is to be shaped for Punta 
Jutias, leaving to port Colorado Shoals, containing a beacon, and 
Cay Ratones. The latter is a small low island devoid of all vegeta- 
tion. Inthe extreme north is a powder magazine, and in the south 
the guardroom of the same. 

From Punta Jutias, the course is NNE. until reaching the gen- 
eral anchoring place, which is 8 meters deep (oozy bottom). 

Santiago de Cuba has, besides many minor piers for boats and 
small craft, the Royal Pier and the piers of Luz and San José, 
all built of wood; only ships of less than 14 feet draft can go 
alongside of these. Between the city and Punta Jutias, at a place 
called Las Cruces, is the pier of the same name, built of iron with 
stone abutments, belonging to the American company of the Ju- 
ragua iron mines; it has a watering place, the water coming from 
Aguadores in pipes. Ships of large draft can go alongside of 
this pier. A narrow-gauge railroad from the mines, passing over 
26 kilometres of ground, goes to the extreme end of the pier. 

Santiago is an open city, with not a vestige of fortification in its 
precinct (I am speaking of the beginning of the present war), and 


11 


only at Punta Blanca, situated just south of it, is a battery of the 
same name, with a small powder magazine, intended only for 
saluting purposes and to answer salutes of war ships casting anchor 
in the harbor. 

From the above it will be seen that the mouth of Santiago Har- 
bor is defended by nature in such a manner that nothing is easier 
than to render it truly impregnable in a short time by installing 
modern artillery in batteries erected where it would be most 
necessary and convenient. The heights of the Morro and Socapa 
have a full view of the sea, and being difficult of access by land, 
they are easy to defend. Punta Gorda, owing to its admirable 
location and being high above the level of the sea, has entire 
control of the channel, and any ship trying to enter would neces- 
sarily be exposed to its fire and present her bow and port for at 
least twenty minutes. The very narrow entrance is well adapted 
for laying lines of torpedoes which could be easily protected by 
rapid-fire artillery erected on the western shore, preventing them 
from being dragged or blown up. Moreover, no matter how large 
a fleet might attempt to force the harbor, as but one vessel can 
pass through the channel at a time, and that only with the great- 
est care and precautions if it is over 80 meters long, nothing is 
easier than to sink it; and in that event, the channel would be 
completely obstructed and the harbor closed, until the submerged 
vessel is blown up. 

It is evident, and almost superfluous for me to mention it, that 
with the same ease that a fleet trying to force the harbor can be 
prevented from entering, another fleet can be prevented from leav- 
ing it. But since Spain, in spite of all that was being done in the 
United States, never for a moment believed that war would come, 
it has not occurred to her to fortify this harbor. There were no 
guns; but on the other hand, plenty of good plans and designs 
which the military authorities in Santiago have never been able to 
have carried into effect, for the simple reason that the Government 
never got around to ordering that it be done. 

Three miles west of the entrance of the Morro is the small har- 
bor of Cabafias, which, while accessible only for small vessels, is 
very safe and well suited for landing purposes. It has 6 feet of 
water at the bar and 5 fathoms inside. The distance by land from 
Cabafias to Cabafiitas on Santiago Bay is about a league. 

Six miles farther west, or 9 miles from Santiago, is Punta 
Cabrera, the headland extending farthest south and the last one 
which can be seen. It isa high cone-shaped mountain. As the 
coast is very accessible, vessels of great draft can approach it. 
At the small cove of Guaicabon, east of said point, boats can land 
and communicate with the shore, which, in fact, is being done at 


12 


this time by a steam yacht of the American fleet, which is proba- 
bly receiving confidential information from the insurgents. Guai- 
cabon is about 2 leagues from Santiago by land and the road is 
good. 

Three miles east of the Morro is Aguadores Bay; it is crossed 
by a high bridge, over which passes the railroad of the Juragua 
mines. Boats can enter the river which empties into this bay; it 
is an excellent place for landing. 

A quarter of a mile farther east is the roadstead of Sardinero, 
with a river emptying into it. 

Three-fourths of a mile from there is Jutici, a small roadstead 
with a watering place. 

Ten miles farther on is Juragua Beach, with a river that boats 
can enter. 

Fifteen miles from there is Daiquiri Bay, with a river and water- 
ing place. Boats can enter here. Daiquiri Bay has a very fine 
stone and iron pier, also a small one for minor craft. Ashore, a 
short distance from the pier, are the offices of the employees of the 
mines and railroad for the transportation of the mineral from the 
mines to the pier, about 6 miles long. Large vessels can go along- 
side the iron pier. 

Finally, 20 miles farther east is Punta Berracos, the last point 
which can be distinguished from the Morro, and the one projecting 
farthest south. Although it is possible to land here, with a great 
deal of work, it is not advisable to do so, there being no watering 
place and no road. A 

In all these places, east as well as west of Santiago, vessels can 
not remain with strong south or southeast winds, but must neces- 
sarily put to sea. 

Aguadores and Santiago are connected by the Juragua railroad. 
The road along the coast is bad; it is a little over a league long. 

From Sardinero to Santiago there are 2 leagues of good road. 

The road leading from Juraguacito to Santiago is the Gudsimas 
road, which is good, beginning at El Caney. It is 4 leagues long. 

From Juragua to Santiago is the Sevilla road, which also leads 
to El Caney. This road and the former meet at a place called Dos 
Caminos. It is a good road, and about 4 leagues long. Moreover, 
as has been stated, there is a narrow-gauge railroad from the mines, 
which passes through Aguadores and terminates at Las Cruces Pier. 

At Berracos there are no roads whatever, only paths, over which 
it is not possible to transport artillery. 

The railroad to San Luis, 32,460 meters long, starts from San- 
tiago and passes through the following points: Santiago, Cua- 
vitas (station), Boniato, San Vicente, Dos Bocas (station), Cristo, 
Moron, Dos Caminos, and San Luis. 


13 


From Cristo a branch line of 10,300 meters goes to Songo. Trains 
are now running as far as Socorro. 

These are the different places which form the scene of the events 
now claiming the attention of the island of Cuba, and probably 
- also of the Peninsula; and these events, whatever may be their 
outcome, will be of great importance and powerful influence on 
the result of the war. 


Vv. 
FORCES OF THE JURISDICTION. 


The present insurrection broke out on February 24, 1895, in the 
eastern provinces, but it soon invaded the western provinces and 
spread over the whole island from Cape San Antonio to Cape Maysi. 

In order to check it, or at least reduce it to narrower limits, Gen- 
eral Weyler conceived and carried out the plan of moving his forces 
from west to east, building trochas to prevent the insurgents from 
again invading the pacified provinces, or to inclose them between 
two lines of soldiers more or less difficult to force. 

Consequently the greater part of the forces of the army of Cuba 
occupied the provinces of Pinar del Rio, Havana, Matanzas, and 
Las Villas, for the purpose of carrying on active operations 
there, leaving a very small number at Camaguey, and still less 
in the eastern provinces. These latter provinces, therefore, could 
do nothing more than defend the country and the cities and 
towns and prevent the enemy from entering them. Hence, when 
the war with the United States broke out, the division of Santiago, 
consisting of two brigades, had to cover the districts of Santiago, 
Guantanamo, Baracoa, and Sagua; and it is only necessary to cast 
a glance at the map in order to understand how difficult it would 
be to control such an immense territory with such scant forces, 
which had to garrison many cities, towns, forts, and redoubts, 
cover four railway lines (from Santiago to Sabanillo and Maroto, 
to Juragua, to Daiquiri, and from Caimanera to Guanténamo), act 
as convoys, protect the mineral regions, and provide also for the 
formation of more or less numerous flying columns to harass the 
enemy incessantly. Fortunately this division was in command of 
General Linares, whose energy and zeal can never be sufficiently 
praised, and whose well-deserved promotion to lieutenant general 
was learned here by cable about the middle of May. 

As the events which I propose to relate are only those directly 
concerning Santiago de Cuba and its jurisdiction, where they have 
taken place and which I have had a chance to witness, they will be 
the only ones that I shall refer to. 3 

The first brigade of the division consisted of the following forces: 

Chief of division, Lieut. Gen. Arsenio Linares Pombo; 

Chief of staff, Lieut. Col. Ventura Fontdn; 

Military governor of Santiago and chief of the forces of that 
division, General of Division José Toral; 


(14) 


15 


Chief of staff, Luis Irlés; 

Chief of the San Luis brigade, General of Brigade Joaquin Vara 
del Rey ; 

Chief of staff, Captain Juan Ramos. 

It will be seen from the above that the brigade was really divided 
into two divisions, one under the orders of General Toral, and the 
other under the orders of General Vara del Rey. The forces com- 
posing both divisions were as follows: 

Twelve companies of mobilized troops; 

Two squads of the regiment of royal cavalry (less than 200 horse) ; 

Two battalions of the regiment of Santiago infantry ; 

One Asiatic battalion ; 

One provincial battalion of Puerto Rico, No. 1; 

One battalion of San Fernando; 

One battalion ‘‘Constitucion;” 

Also half a battery of artillery and a small force of the civil 
guard and engineers. 

To these forces must be added the battalion of Talavera, which 
General Linares ordered from Baracoa as soon as the present war 
was declared and in anticipation of coming events. 

These forces form at most a total of 8,000 men. 

General of Brigade Antero Rubin was under orders of General 
Linares. 

Colonel of Engineers Florencio Caula was commander of engi- 
neers of the city, and Lieut. Col. Luis Melgar commander of artil- 
lery; the latter turned his command over to Colonel Orddfiez on 
April 29 upon being appointed superintendent of the artillery 
park. 

Administrative chief, First-class Commissary Julio Cuevas. 

Chief of the civil guard, Col. Francisco Oliveros. 

Superintendent of the military hospital, Sub-inspector Pedro 
Martin Garcia. 

Governor of Morro Castle, Commander of Infantry Antonio Ros. 

When the first insurrection broke out in the Island of Cuba in 
1868, bodies of volunteers were formed which have rendered good 
services as garrisons of the fortified places. At Santiago, accord- 
ing to official statements, there were the following: 


Men. 

‘ First battalion: Col. Manuel Barrueco----..-.-.-------- 630 
Second battalion: Lieut. Col. José Marimén------------- A85 
Paremon: Col.mmulio Agnerrizabal.. 2.2202. sc tcl 324 
Company of guides: Capt. Federico Bosch ---....------- 200 
Company of veterans: Capt. José Prat .....--.---------- 130 
ee NOt Cri eee eee in ete ern ys, 100 





16 


Santiago de Cuba is the capital of the maritime comandancia of 
the same name, bounded on the south* by Junco Creek and on the 
north by Sagua de Taénamo, and divided into four districts: Man- 
zanillo, Santiago de Cuba, Guanténamo, and Baracoa. The com- 
mander of this maritime comandancia was Capt. Pelayo Pede- 
monte, of the navy. 

The prelate of the archdiocese was Francisco Sdenz de Urturi. 

Governor of the province, Leonardo Ros. 

President of the audencia territorial, Rafael Nacarino Brabo. 

Mayor, Gabriel Ferrer. 

The consular corps was represented by the following gentlemen: 

Frederick W. Ramsden, England; 

Hermann Michaelsen, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, 
Italy ; 

EK. Hippean, France; 

Pablo Bory, Mexico; 

Juan E. Rabelo, Santo Domingo; 

Temistocles Rabelo, Paraguay ; 

Juan Rey, Hayti. 

The vice-consuls were: 

Jacobo Bravo, United States of Colombia; 

Isidoro Agustini, Sweden and Norway; 

Leonardo Ros, Netherlands; 

Modesto Ros, Portugal; 

Eduardo Miranda, Venezuela; 

Robert Mason, China; 

José J. Hernandez, Argentine Republic. 

The United States consul left on April 7 in an English steamer 
bound for Jamaica, having turned over the archives of his consu- 
late to the British consul. 


VI. 


WORKS OF DEFENSE. 


The governments of Spain have thought more than once of 
fortifying the coasts of the Island of Cuba, and for that purpose 
committees have been appointed who have studied the matter and 
submitted many good, even excellent, plans, which have been 
approved, but never carried into effect. 

There was at Santiago a junta of land and marine defenses of 
the city, composed of the following persons: 

President, the military governor of the city, General of Division 
José Toral; voting members, the commander of marine, Capt. 
Pelayo Pedemonte; the commander of engineers of the city, 
Col. Florencio Caula; the commander of artillery of the city, 
Lieut. Col. Luis Melgar; and the chief of submarine defenses, 
First Lieut. José Miiller, of the navy. 

The latter officer, whose regular office was that of second com- 
mander of marine, was only temporarily chief of submarine 
defenses, in the absence of torpedo officers, he not being one. 

This junta held meetings whenever it was deemed necessary, 
until April 8, when a cablegram from the captain general of the 
island ordered that it become permanent, and that the commander 
of marine give his opinion as to the suitability of laying torpedoes. 
The junta, taking into account the grave situation, the imminence 
of war, and the scarcity of artillery material and applances and 
resources of every kind, expressed the unanimous opinion that the 
only defense that could be counted on for the harbor were the torpe- 
does, for which the material was at hand, and consequently that 
they should be given preference, and everything within human 
power done to protect them and prevent their being dragged or 
blown up; in a word, that the torpedoes should be placed as the 
only veritable defense and everything else subordinated to them. 

As early as the second day of the same month (April) the com- 
mander of submarine defenses, in compliance with orders received, 
had already commenced to charge the Latiner-Clark torpedoes, 
transferring them to Cay Ratones, where the powder magazine 
was located that contained the gun-cotton, also to place the buoys 
for the first row of torpedoes, and to carry out other operations in 


connection therewith. 
(17) 





10845 2 


18 


The junta of defense, in view of the poor condition of Morro 
Castle and Estrella and Catalina batteries and of the informa- 
tion which the American consul would probably give his Govern- 
ment, decided to remove the torpedo-firing and converging stations 
from said forts where they were and erect them at places on the 
bay where they would be protected and sheltered from the hostile 
fire, and this was done. 

On April 14 the second commander of marine turned over the 
submarine defenses to a torpedo officer, Lieut. Mauricio Arauco, 
commander of the gunboat Alvarado, who continued the work of 
laying the torpedoes; the first row, consisting of seven, with their 
firing stations at the Estrella and Socapa, was finished by April 21, 
and the second row, consisting of six, with stations at the Socapa 
and Cay Smith, on the 27th. 

By orders of the commander general of marine (Havana), the 
second commander of marine of the province, together with Col- 
onel of Engineers Angel Rosell and Captain of Artillery Ballenilla, 
left for Guantanamo on April 21, for the purpose of selecting the 
most suitable site for planting Bustamante torpedoes in that harbor 
so as to prevent ships from reaching Caimanera, returning to San- 
tiago on the 25th after finishing the investigation. The torpedoes 
were subsequently placed by First Lieut. Julién Garcia Duran at 
the site selected. ) | 

On the 23d, the gunboat Sandoval left for Guanténamo, where 
her crew was to plant the Bustamante torpedoes. She has since 
remained at that harbor. 

Two days before, on the 21st, orders were received from Havana 
to remove from the interior of the harbor all light buoys and bea- 
cons, which orders were promptly complied with. 

It was also agreed by the junta of defense to establish at Punta 
Gorda a battery composed of two 15-cm. Mata howitzers and two 
9-cm. Krupp guns, and the corps of engineers at once proceeded to 
clear the plateau of the mountain, build the road, and do other 
work preparatory to erecting such battery. By the 26th, the two 
howitzers were ready to fire, and the two guns by the 27th, all of 
them being breechloaders. This battery, which, as will be seen 
later, had two 16-cm. Hontoria guns, is the best of all the batteries 
erected, because it was done with less haste, and perhaps also be- 
cause the ground was particularly well adapted. It was placed in 
command of Captain of Artillery Seijas, who had previously had 
command of the Morro battery. 

On April 18 there arrived from Havana three 21-cm. muzzle- 
loading howitzers, and a few days later, in the steamer Reina de 
los Angeles, three more from the same city. 


19 


A cablegram from Havana stated that, according to information 
received, the steamer Margrave would try to cut the cable at San- 
tiago, thereby cutting off our communications, and it was there- 
fore ordered to erect on the esplanade of the Morro two old 16-cm. 
guns, more for the purpose of making signals than to attack the 
enemy. They were both taken up there; one of them was mounted 
on a wooden carriage and the other was not mounted. 

On April 21, two short 8-cm. Plasencia guns (breech-loading) 
were mounted at Estrella Cove. 

At the Estrella battery there had been installed some time ago 
an old 21-cm. rifled howitzer, and another partly installed. In 
view of the unfavorable location of the battery, it was decided to 
abandon both; but after the 28th, the second was mounted, also 
the two Plasencia guns that had previously been erected at Estrella 
Cove, together with two short 12-cm. rifled bronze guns. Nota 
single one of these pieces was fired. The battery was in command 
of Lieutenant of Artillery Sdnchez of the reserve forces; he was 
subsequently assigned to the artillery of the precinct. 

By May 28, five 16-cm. rifled muzzle-loading bronze guns had 
been mounted on the esplanade of the Morro. 

On June 21, a 21-cm. muzzle-loading howitzer was erected at 
the same place, and another on the 25th. | 

On the high battery of the Socapa were mounted: on June 13, a 
21-cm. muzzle-loading howitzer; another on the 16th; another on 
the 17th. / 


RESUME. 


Punta Gorda battery, in command of Captain of Artillery Seijas: 
Two 15-cm. Mata howitzers; 
Two 9-cm. breech-loading Krupp guns. 
Estrella battery, in command of Lieutenant Sanchez: 
— Two 21-cm. old howitzers; 
Two 8-cm. modern Plasencia guns; 
Two short 12-cm. rifled bronze guns (old). 
None of these were fired. 

Morro battery, first in command of Captain Seijas, later of Lieu- 

tenant Leén: 
Five old 16-cm. guns; 
Two old 21-cm. howitzers. 

High battery of the Socapa: 

Three old 21-cm. howitzers. 

It will be seen that this whole artillery includes only six breech- 
loading guns, four erected at Punta Gorda and two Plasencia guns 
at Estrella, which latter two, owing to the location of said bat- 
tery, could not be fired. All the others were old guns, and it is 


20 


well known that it takes a long time to load them and that their 
fire is very uncertain. 

The dates when these different guns were erected and ready to 
fire should be kept in mind, so as to know which could answer hos- 
tile attacks and which not on the different days when the enemy. 
bombarded the mouth of the harbor and the bay. 


iv elds 
ARTILLERY SET UP. 


It will be sufficient to remember what has been said in the pre- 
ceding chapter to understand that, in spite of the fact that Santiago 
has a harbor which is so easy to defend and the possession of 
which it was so imperative to maintain, in spite of its being the 
capital of the eastern half of the island and at such a long dis- 
tance from Havana, there were at Santiago at the time the present 
war broke out not more than six modern breech-loading guns, 
namely, two 15-cm. Mata howitzers, two 9-cm. Krupp guns, and 
two 8-cm. Plasencia guns. That was all the artillery worthy of 
the name, and even these guns, owing to their small calibers, were 
useless, or almost so, against armorclads and cruisers. 

The others, as has been seen, were old bronze and even iron 
muzzle-loaders which could not fire more than one shot to every 
twenty fired from one of the enemy’s guns, and all they sent us 
from Havana were six 21-cm. howitzers, likewise old muzzle-loaders, 
this being all the material received here to oppose a powerful 
modern fleet. These facts might appear exaggerated if there were 
not others that appear still more so, but which are shown in official 
statements and statistics of forces available, and these can not be 
doubted. For the service of all the guns, including those set up 
in the precinct, there were only 79 gunners; of course, it became 
necessary to complete the indispensable number with soldiers of 
the infantry. 

To mount this artillery, which was defective if not entirely 
useless, but which was nevertheless set up at the Morro, Punta 
Gorda, and the Socapa, endless difficulties had to be overcome and 
work done which only the intelligence, energy, and perseverance 
of the chiefs and officers and the subordination and good will of 
the soldiers could accomplish, when resources and aids of every 
kind were absolutely lacking. 

By simply looking at the esplanade of the Morro, one would 
realize the work it must have required to take guns up there 
weighing three or four thousand kilos, by a road which, I believe, 
has not been repaired once since the castle was first built. 

To install the guns at Punta Gorda everything had to be done 
from building the pier, where the guns were landed, to clearing 
the summit of the mountain, where they were set up, and opening 
a zigzag road by which they were taken there. ; 


(21) 


noe, 


To mount the howitzers at the Socapa was truly a piece of work 
worthy of Romans, and of the six received only three could be 
set up. | 

But where the corps of engineers never rested for a moment, and 
accomplished the most difficult work with the smallest force, was 
around the city in a line about 14 kilometers long. 

Closer to the city three lines of defenses were built, with trenches, 
breastworks, inclosures, wire fences, and whatever other obstacles 
the configuration of the ground might suggest; the so-called forts, 
already in existence, were improved and new ones built; in a word, 
an open city, which had no fortifications of any kind to oppose to 
the enemy, was, in the short space of a few days, placed in condi- 
tion of resistance with chances of success. 

From the moment that our fleet entered Santiago Harbor, it was 
not difficult to surmise that it would become the enemy’s objective, 
upon which all his efforts would be concentrated, and it was for 
that reason, always expecting the landing which was finally effected, 
that the work above described was carried out, and the rest of the 
artillery of the city, likewise old, mounted in the following posi- 
tions: 

June 12—One 16-cm. rifled bronze gun, at Fort San Antonio; 

One short 12-cm. rifled bronze gun at Santa Inés; 
Two short 8-cm. rifled bronze guns at Fort San 
Antonio. 
June 13—One 16-cm. rifled bronze gun, and 
One short 12-cm. rifled bronze gun at the entrance to 
El Caney. 
June 14-—-One 16-cm. rifled bronze gun; 
One short 12-cm. rifled bronze gun, and 
Two short 8-cm. rifled bronze guns at El Suefio. 
June 16—One 16-cm. gun, and 
Two short 8-cm. guns at Santa Ursula. 
June 17—One 16-cm. rifled bronze gun at Cafiadas. 
June 25—One short 12-cm. rifled bronze gun at Fort Horno; 
One short 12-cm. rifled bronze gun at Fort Nuevo. 

After the battle of July 1 the following were mounted: 

At Santa Ursula—Two long 12-cm. rifled bronze guns. 

At entrance of El Caney—Two guns of same type as above. — 

At Santa Inés—One long 8-cm. bronze gun (old). The breech 
pieces of this latter gun were missing. 

With General Escario’s column two 8-cm. Plasencia guns arrived 
from Manzanilo; but, likeallthose mounted since July 1, they did not 
get a chance of being fired, the battles having ceased by that time. 


23 


Hence the only modern artillery existing in the precinct of the 
city, namely, one 9-cm. Hontoria, two 75-mm. Maxim, and two 
8-cm. Plascencia guns, was not fired. 

All the 8-cm. guns had been pronounced useless by the central 
junta of Havana, and, far from being effective, they were even 
dangerous. 

The 12-cm. guns were mounted in carriages of other guns, and 
were therefore useless in themselves, without being disabled by 
the enemy. 


Vil. 
THE CRUISER “REINA MERCEDES.” 


It does not require a deep knowledge of artillery to understand 
that the batteries erected at the Morro and Socapa, and even at 
Punta Gorda, were powerless, or almost so, against armored and 
protected ships. As to the Estrella battery, I even refrain from 
mentioning it, because owing to its location it was not fired at all. . 
Of the only modern artillery, at Punta Gorda, the guns were of 
small caliber, and the howitzers, owing to their indirect fire, are 
very uncertain against ships which occupy comparatively very 
little space. As to the guns of the Morro and Socapa, when I say 
that they were old howitzers I think I have said enough. Having 
had no other artillery, it may well be supposed that we, who wit- 
nessed and sustained the blockade of Santiago, feel satisfaction 
and pride in being able to say that we kept the American fleet, 
notwithstanding its power and the number of its guns, for seventy 
days, namely, from May 18 to July 17, in front of the mouth of 
the harbor, on the sea, and at a respectable distance from our bat- 
teries, which they were unable. to silence, and not daring to force 
the entrance. 

It is only just to say, and I take pleasure in doing so, that this 
result is due, in the first place, to the cruiser Reina Mercedes, 
under the command of Captain Rafael Micén, and in the second 
place, to our fleet anchored in the bay, and which the enemy would 
have had to fight after forcing the harbor, provided they had suc- 
ceeded in doing so, but they do not appear to have thought of it. 

Owing to the very bad condition of the boilers of the Reina 
Mercedes, it was impossible for her to proceed to Havana, as most 
of the vessels cruising in these waters did sooner or later, and it 
was taken for granted that, in view of her condition, she would 
play but a very secondary part during the events here; it did not 
occur to anyone that the Mercedes might become, if not the salva- 
tion, yet the providence, so to speak, of Santiago Harbor, and that 
she was to be of such great assistance to the heroic defense made 
by the batteries. 

Her crew had been considerably reduced by detachments and 
sickness, but it was well disciplined and enthusiastic, and com- 
manded by chiefs and officers as intelligent as they were energetic 
and indefatigable. The vessel cast anchor at the Socapa on March 


(24) 


25 


23 and proceeded to send down her yards and topmasts and pro- 
tect her starboard side (the one she presented to the mouth of the 
harbor) with her light cables, thereby protecting the torpedo maga- 
zine as much as possible from the hostile fire. 

On the 26th, in obedience to superior orders, she had to undo 
everything that had been done and again anchor in the bay, return- 
ing to the Socapa a few days later, when she went to work once 
more sending down the masts, protecting her side, etc. 

Atthe same time one of her steam launches, with a crew from the 
Mercedes, rendered service at the comandancia de marina, where 
she became indispensable, and the other steam launch and the 
boats assisted in laying the torpedoes, towing launches, and.did a 
thousand other things, some of them not properly belonging to 
vessels, but all equally indispensable. 

On May 7 work was commenced on dismounting four of the 
16-cm. Hontoria guns, under the direction of Boatswain Antonio 
Rodriguez Diaz, a derrick having been erected for that purpose, 
which removed the guns with their mounts from the vessel. The 
latter now had only the two bow guns left to defend the mouth of 
the harbor and rows of torpedoes. 

All of the four guns were taken up to the Socapa by fifty sailors 
of the Mercedes and forty of Captain Mateu’s guerrillas. One was 
mounted and ready to fire by the evening of the 18th, the other by 
the 28th, the engineers having previously finished the trenches and 
cement foundations for setting them up. 

The third gun was mounted at Punta Gorda by a crew from the 
vessel by June 2, and by the 17th the fourth and last one had been 
mounted. These two 16-cm. Hontoria guns, erected on the western 
slope of Punta Gorda, were placed in charge of Ensign Vial, under 
the command of Captain of Artillery Seijas. 

The two Hontoria guns at the Socapa were placed in charge of 

Ensigns Nardiz and Bruquetas respectively. 
~The erection of the last gun mounted at Punta Gorda was super- 
intended by Boatswain Ricardo Rodriguez Paz, Boatswain Rod- 
riguez who had superintended the others having been wounded. 

These four guns were mounted for the purpose of directly attack- 
ing the hostile fleet. 

The crew of the Mercedes, besides defending the torpedo lines 
and preventing the approach of small craft that might attempt to 
disable them, also mounted at the lower battery of the Socapa, 
west of the channel of the harbor, the following guns: 

One 57-mm. Nordenfeldt gun; 

Four 37-mm. Hotchkiss revolving guns; 

One 25-mm. Nordenfeldt machine gun. 


26 


The latter belonged to the submarine defenses, the others to the 
Mercedes. Lieutenant Camino was placed in command of this 
battery. 

It seems almost superfluous to state that all the artillery from 
the Mercedes set up ashore was served by men and commanded by 
officers from the crew of the vessel and that the same difficulties 
were encountered in this work as in the land defenses, there being 
the same obstacles and the same lack of resources and appliances; 
moreover, two of the torpedo firing stations were manned by officers 
from the Mercedes; they actually seemed to multiply themselves 
to be able to render all these services. Words fail me to do justice 
to the officers and men for the work accomplished, Osea while 
the guns were being mounted in the batteries. 

Although it may be anticipating events, I can not help but say 
that some ships, like some men, seem preordained to be martyrs. 
When long afterwards the Mercedes returned to the bay, having 
left the anchoring place at the Socapa on account of the many 
casualties which she had suffered passively, if I may be permitted 
the expression, the American ships, by a singular coincidence, 
threw their projectiles at the very spot where she was at anchor, 
as though an invisible hand had been guiding them. 

Finally, when she had nothing left her but her hull to offer in 
sacrifice, she went down in the channel of the harbor, in order to 
oppose to the very last moment, and even after death, an enemy 
whom she had so fiercely fought during her life-time. Peace to 
her remains! 


IX. 


THE TWO FLEETS. 


When the war between Spain and the United States became a 
fact, itis hard to tell how much was said and written about the 
Spanish fleet, or rather, fleets; everybody knows of the thousands 
of items which appeared in the newspapers concerning the pur- 
chase of ships, to such an extent that, if all could have been believed, 
our navy would have been vastly superior to that of the United 
States, in number and quality. And this is so true that the least 
optimistic, the most reasonable people, those whom we considered 
best informed as belonging to the profession and who knew to a cer- 
tain extent what we could expect, counted on not less than eight 
battle ships leaving the Peninsula, to say nothing of the transports, 
torpedo boats, destroyers, etc. How much we were mistaken! 

On the 19th of May, at 5.50 o’clock a. m., the look-out signaled 
five steamers to the south; shortly after it was signaled that the 
five steamers were five warships, and a little later that they were 
Spanish. Sothe much wished-for fleet had arrived, which, accord- 
ing to the newspapers, was under the command of Vice Admiral 
Butler. 

At 7.15, the Infanta Maria Teresa, hoisting the rear admiral’s 
flag, was sighted from the captaincy of the port; a few minutes 
later, she cast anchor in the bay, some distance from the royal pier, 
her draught not permitting her to go nearer. Then the Vizcaya, 
Oquendo, and Cristdbal Coldén anchored one after the other, the last 
named with the flag of the second-in-command (brigadier); then 
the destroyer Plutén entered, went out again without anchoring, 
and returned an hour later with the Furor, of the same class, and 
both anchored at a convenient place. 

The day when the fleet entered Santiago harbor was one of those 
beautiful mornings that are so frequent in tropical countries; not 
the slightest breeze rippled the surface of the water, not the least 
cloud was to be seen in the deep blue sky, and still, notwithstand- 
ing all that the local papers have said, very few were the people 
who came down to witness the arrival of the ships. With the ex- 
ception of the official element and a small number of Peninsulars, 
the arrival of our warships inspired no interest, nor even curiosity. 


(27) 


28 


And I say this and want it understood, because it is the best proof 
of the sympathies which the country professes for us and of which 
it gives us constantly unquestionable proofs whenever opportunity 
offers. 

The fleet was under the command of the eminent Rear Admiral 
Pascual Cervera, who, as already stated, had hoisted his flag on the 
Infanta Maria Teresa, Captain. Joaquin Bustamente being chief 
of the general staff. The second in command was Captain José 
de Paredes, who had hoisted his flag on the Cristébal Colon. 

The Infanta Maria Teresa, built at the Nervidén shipyards, is a 
ship of 103.63 metres length, 19.81 beam, and 7,000 tons displace- 
ment, with a draught of 6.55 metres. Her engines develop 13,700 
I. H. P., giving her a speed of 20.25 miles. Her armament con- 
sists of two 28-cm. Hontoria guns (mounted in turrets, one for- 
ward and one aft); ten 14-cm. Hontoria guns; eight 57-mm. Nor- 
denfeldt rapid-fire guns; eight 37-mm. Hotchkiss revolving guns, 
and two 11-mm. machine guns. She was commanded by Captain 
Victor Concas. 

The Vizcaya, commanded by Captain Antonio Eulate, and the 
Oquendo, commanded by Captain Juan B. Lagaza, are exactly 
like the Maria Teresa and built at the same yards. 

The Cristobal Colén, under the command of Captain Emilio 
Diaz Moreu, was acquired in Genoa from the firm of Ansaldo. 
She is 100 metres long by 18.20 beam; her displacement is 6,840 
tons and her draught 7.75 metres; her speed is 20 miles and her 
engines develop 13,000 I. H. P. Her armament consists of two 
25.4-cm. Armstromg guns (in turrets); ten 13.2-cm. guns; six 
12-cm. guns; ten 57-mm. Nordenfeldt guns; ten 37-mm. and two 
machine guns. ; 

Important note: The last-named ship, hers 25.4-cm. or large 
calibre guns mounted in turrets not being ready, had to go with- 
out them. ' 

The destroyer Plut6n was commanded by Lieutenant Pedro V4z- 
quez, and the Furor, of the same class, by Lieutenant Diego 
Carlier; both of them were under the command of Captain Fer- 
nando Villaamil. 

The arrival of these six ships produced real enthusiasm among 
the better peninsular element in Santiago, especially as nobody 
wanted to believe that they were the only ones that Spain was 
going to send, since they were called the ‘‘first division,” and at 
least two more divisions were expected. The only ones who had 
no illusions, who knew what to expect, who were acquainted with 
the true condition of affairs, were those who had arrived in the 
ships. From the admiral down to the last midshipman, they 


29 


knew perfectly well that there were no more fleets, no more divis- 
ions, no more vessels, and that those six ships (if the destroyers 
may be counted as such) were all that could be counted on to 
oppose the American fleet, which consists of the following ships, 
not including those in construction, and taking into account only 
armored and protected ships—that is, those of the first.and second 
classes: 

Towa, 11,340 tons, steel, first-class battle ship, 18 guns. 

Indiana, 10,288 tons, steel, first-class battle ship, 16 guns. 

Massachusetts, 10,288 tons, steel, first-class battle ship, 16 guns. 

Oregon, 10,288 tons, steel, first-class battle ship, 16 guns. 

Brooklyn, 9,215 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 20 guus. 

New York, 9,200 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 18 guns. 

Columbia, 7,375 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 11 guns. 

Minneapolis, 7,375 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 11 
ouns. 

Texas, 6,315 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 8 guns. 

Puritan, 6,060 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 10 guns. 

Olympia, 5,870 tons, steel, first-class protected cruiser, 14 guns. 

Chicago, 4,500 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser, 18 
guns. 

Baltimore, 4,413 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser, 10 
cuns. | 
Philadelphia, 4,324 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser, 12 
guns. 

Monterey, 4,084 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser (with 
turrets), 4 guns. 

Newark, 4,098 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser, 12 guns. 

San Francisco, 4,098 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser, 
12 guns. | 

Charleston, 3,730 tons, steel, second-class protected cruiser, 8 
guns. 

Miantonomoh, 3,990 tons, iron, monitor, 4 guns. 

Amphitrite, 3,990 tons, iron, monitor, 6 guns. 

Monadnock, 3,990 tons, iron, monitor, 6 guns. 

Terror, 3,990 tons, iron, monitor, 4 guns. 

Cincinnati, 3,213 tons, iron, second-class protected cruiser, 11 
geuns. 

Raleigh, 3,213 tons, iron, second-class protected cruiser, 11 guns. 

Note: Before war was declared, they bought of Brazil the Ama- 
zonas, a magnificent protected cruiser of more than 6,000 tons, with 
perfect armament. She was one of the ships that blockaded this 
port. 

It is to be noted that in the first eleven ships enumerated, the 
number of guns stated is only that of the large-calibre guns, that 


30 


is, from 16-cm. upward, without including rapid-fire, revolving, 
machine guns, etc. 

The first four, namely, the Lowa, Indiana, Massachusetts, and 
Oregow, have four 32-cm. guns each, that is to say, larger guns 
than the medium-calibre ones of the Maria Teresa, Oquendo, and 
Viscaya, each of which had but two 28-cm. guns. The Cristdbal 
Colon, as has already been stated, did not have her large guns 
mounted. 

Shortly after the fleet had anchored, the civil and military author- 
ities went on board to pay their respects to Admiral Cervera. 

It will be remembered that these ships had been assembled at 
the Cape Verde Islands and that many notes were exchanged on 
that subject between the Governments of Spain and the United 
States, until finally the Spanish Government gave definite orders 
for the ships to proceed to the Island of Cuba. 

They arrived at Martinique, where they left the destroyer Terror, 
commanded by Lieut. Francisco de la Rocha, for the reason that 
the vessel had sustained injuries to her boiler and was no longer 
able to follow the fleet. From Martinique, the ships proceeded to 
Curagao, where only two ships could take a small quantity of coal, 
as the laws of that Dutch colony did not allow any more to enter 
the harbor. Finally, as stated above, the fleet reached this harbor, 
without having met Admiral Sampson’s fleet, whether accident- 
ally, or whether Admiral Cervera went by way of Curacao on 
purpose to mislead the American admiral, I do not know. 


xX. 
PROVISIONS OF THE CITY. 


So far my task has been, if not easy, at least pleasant, for in 
honor of the truth and deference to justice, I will say that all per- 
sons who have so far figured, directly or indirectly, in the events 
under discussion, deserve praise and congratulations. Unfortu- 
nately, Ican not say as much regarding the question of provisions, 
which is of such great importance, and has had so much to do with 
the capitulation of this city. | 

It is far from me to want to mention or censure any person or 
persons in particular. Iam citing facts which everyone knows, 
and I believe it to be a duty which I must not shun to set forth 
everything with perfect impartiality. I am making history, and 
_ with that I have said everything. 

The city of Santiago de Cuba has never been very well supplied 
and provisions have never been abundant there. 

It is only just to state that the whole military element of the 
province and also the hospitals were nine or ten months in arrears 
in the payment of consignments. They had been living on credit 
for some time, and the firms furnishing the supplies, not being 
able to order new ones and meet their obligations, had allowed 
their stores to run very low. We were passing through one of 
those crises which were so frequent in our last war, and which, 
unfortunately, are being repeated in this, owing to the parsimony 
of the Treasury. . 

But now, under the circumstances in which Santiago de Cuba 
was, the problem assumed more serious shape, for living became 
almost impossible. Everything was lacking: articles of food, 
prospects, money; our credit and purchasing resources were ex- 
hausted. And this was the case not only at the capital, but extended 
to the whole division. What happened at Santiago, also happened 
at Manzanillo, Holguin, Puerto Principe, Ciego de Avila, Morén, 
Spiritus, and other places of the island, namely, the cities supplied 
the people of the surrounding country and the latter had no pro- 
visions or stores to furnish in return. 

Moreover, the merchants of this city, little given to great enter- 
prises and risky speculations, did not have on hand any more than 


(31) 


32 


what they felt sure they could sell ina short time. And, there- 
fore, I repeat it, provisions, even those of first necessity, were cer- 
tainly not abundant, and everybody knew that when the hostile 
ships should arrive to blockade the city, as must happen sooner or 
later, these would soon give out. A few families understood it 
and laid in supplies in anticipation of what was to come, and they 
certainly did not regret it, for their fears were realized, although, 
be it said in honor of the truth, there was no motive or reason to 
justify such a condition of affairs. 

War was officially declared on April 21, and until the 18th of 
May not a single hostile ship appeared in sight of the harbor. 
There were in it five Spanish merchant vessels, which were pre- 
vented from leaving by the breaking out of hostilities, the Méjico, 
Mortera, San Juan, Reina de los Angeles, and Tomas Brooks. 
Jamaica is only 80 miles from Santiago, and yet not a single sack 
of flour entered the city since before the 21st of April, when a 
small English sailing schooner came from there with a cargo of 
butter, potatoes, onions, and corn meal, which she sold for a good 
price without landing it at the custom-house. The example was 
not followed; everybody saw the possibility of the conflict,which 
had to come, without trying to prevent it. 

Had it not been for the arrival of the German steamer Polaria, 
which, fortunately, left at Santiago 1,700 sacks of rice intended 
for Havana, there would have been an absolute lack of provisions, 
as neither the merchants nor anyone else attempted to import them. 

The last provisions entering the trading houses were brought by 
the steamer Mortera on the 25th of April, consisting of 150 head 
of cattle, 180,000 rations of flour, 149,000 of peas, 197,000 of rice, 
79,000 of beans, and 96,000 of wine. Now, without including the 
forces of Guantfénamo, Baracoa, and Sagua de Ténamo, the needs 
of the troops of Santiago de Cuba amounted to 360,000 rations a 
month. Thus it will be seen that the provisions on hand in the 
trading houses the last days of April were hardly sufficient for 
half a month. 

And this is not the worst; but the merchants, far from contrib- 
uting to the welfare of the army, which in reality was defending 
their interests, hid whatever they could and raised the prices in a 
manner which I do not wish to qualify, taking advantage of the 
gad stress to which the blockade had reduced the city. 

An example will show this better than anything I may say on 
the subject. The man who had the contract of furnishing water 
at the bay, relying on the letter of his contract, tried to charge the 
ships of the fleet for the water which they were getting at Las 
Cruces pier, this water being the property of the American com- 
pany of the Juragua mines, for which the Spanish Government 


38 


could therefore not contract, and was conveyed on board by means 
of the water pipes, which are there for that purpose, the pump 
being kept going night and day by the soldiers of Colonel Borry’s 
column. Nearly all the ships took over 500 pipes of water each, 
which, at 4 pesetas a pipe, amounts to several thousand dollars. 
The contractor in question, whose name I do not wish to remem- 
ber, is from the Peninsula, a captain of volunteers, and, as he says 
himself, ‘‘a better Spaniard than Pelayo.” 

I do not know what news may have reached the Peninsula about 
the conditions at SantiagodeCuba. Itis possible that people believe 
there that only certain articles of food were lacking; if that is the 
case, they are greatly mistaken. People here have suffered from 
actual hunger, and many persons have starved to death, although 
the population had been greatly decreased, since whole families 
had left prior to the 21st day of April. I, myself, saw a man who 
had died of hunger in the entrance of the Brooks House opposite 
the captaincy of the port—died because he had nothing to eat. 

Horses, dogs, and other animals were dying from hunger in the 
streets and public places and the worst thing was that their car- 
casses were notremoved. [also saw—this is significant on account 
of the fatal consequences that might follow—I saw, I repeat, a dog 
throw himself upon a smaller one and kill and devour him. The 
water from the aqueduct had been cut off, as will be seen, and 
the city was exposed to the danger of the dogs going mad, and we 
should have had that calamity to add to the many that were weigh- 
ing upon us. But why goon? What Ihave said is more than 
sufficient to show the immense responsibility incurred by those who 
might have supplied the city with provisions, and who neglected 
and eluded so sacred a duty. 

There were orders and decrees published regulating the price of 
articles of first necessity, but the merchants paid no attention to 
them, as though they did not concern them, and the raising of 
prices was the more unjustifiable and inexcusable, as everything 
that was in the city had been there prior to the declaration of war, 
and had cost no more freight or duty than in normal times. 

If there had been flour and bacon, the soldiers might not have 
become weakened and sick, and yet they fought as the Spanish 
soldier always has fought. What a contrast between him and the 
merchant of this city! But there are things which it is better not 
to air and this is one of them. 


10845——3 


XI. 


COALING. 


The fleet which left the Cape Verde Islands, which took no coal 
at Martinique where it touched, and which at Curacao took on 
only a few tons in two of the ships, arrived here, as was natural, 
with the bunkers almost empty. Admiral Cervera prepared to 
replenish them, and it may be easily imagined how imperative it 
was to hasten an operation without which the ships were unable 
to execute a single maneuver, even though their very salvation 
might depend on it. 

Unfortunately, the harbor of Santiago, where there is little 
movement of shipping, has but very scant means and resources, 
especially since the breaking out of the present insurrection. 

There were only four steamers—the Alcyon, Juragud, Esme- 
ralda, and Colén. The first two do not possess the necessary re- 
quirements for towing launches; the Hsmeralda does very well 
when the sea is calm and there is not much head wind; the only 
one that has all the necessary requirements is the Colén, but the 
Col6n was having her boiler overhauled and it required a week to 
finish the work, which was indispensable. Unfortunately, the 
gunboat Alvarado, which might have rendered good services, was 
in dock renewing her bottom planks, and the work was very slow. 

The army, in its turn, also had a great deal of work on hand 
which it could not possibly leave, such as taking supplies to the 
Morro, water to Punta Gorda, and war material and ammunition 
to both of these places and to the Socapa, and the chiefs and offi- 
cers were needed for directing all the work undertaken. 

The only launches and lighters in the harbor were those of 
Messrs. Ros, some of them useless, others in bad repair, and a few 
only in condition to be used; besides these there were those of the 
Juragué Company, which were good but few in number, and, as 
they belong to American subjects, it was not easy for the Govern- 
ment to get them. With such small resources and with so much 
that had to be done, it will be understood how difficult it was, not 
to say impossible, to accomplish everything. 

To give even an imperfect idea of the lack of appliances of every 
description, I will mention that the contractor of water, which ~ 


(34) 


OD 


latter is very bad and for which he charges exorbitant prices, had, 
for the purpose of supplying the ships, only two small rudder 
boats, each with two pipes (about four hogsheads), and there 
were four ships requiring 1,500 pipes each, without counting the 
destroyers. 

Naturally all the demands, requests, and complaints, everything 
the fleet needed, wanted or desired, went to the comandancia de 
marina, the personnel of which consisted of the commander, the 
second in command, the aide, the paymaster, three enlisted seamen 
(cabos de matricula), one of whom had charge of the provision 
stores, and two orderlies, and with this personnel everything had 
to be done that was asked for and everything furnished that was 
wanted. 

The army wanted a tug, the military government wanted a tug 
and launches, and the fleet wanted launches and a tug, and all 
wanted them badly, and all the services were important and urgent, 
and at the captaincy of the port we constantly had to solve prob- 
lems that had no solution, and furnish launches that did not exist 
and tugs that were not to be found. 

The coaling, which went on day and night, progressed very 
slowly, in spite of everything; for at the two piers where the coal 
was there was very little water, and at the end of each pier only 
one lighter could be accommodated without danger of running 
aground, in which case it would have been necessary to wait for 
high water to float it again. 

There is no end to the time and work which it took to put the 
Cardiff coal of the navy dépot on board the ships, and though 
laborers were hired for the Cumberland coal of the Juragué mines, 
the ships, which never stopped coaling as long as as they stayed 
at Santiago, never succeeded in filling their bunkers. One detail 
will show the lack of means available at the port. Although every 
store in the town was visited and any price offered for baskets, only 
a very limited number could be found for carrying the coal; it had 
to be put in as best it could. 

There is some work that can neither be understood nor appreci- 
ated, that passes by unnoticed and of which people do not even 
have an idea, because it does not constitute actions of war, more or 
less brilliant, and which yet can not be kept up nor stood for any 
length of time. We who belonged to the captaincy of the port 
finally dined, breakfasted, and slept there—or rather, did not sleep 
there, for there never was a night when it was not necessary to 
transmit to the admiral two or three urgent papers, orders, or other 
cablegrams, at all hours, and the telephone did not stop a minute 
and did not give us any rest. Still it was not the work that made 


36 


the situation unbearable; what soldier or sailor did not work des- 
perately at Santiago de Cuba? No, the sad, the lamentable thing 
was that, being so anxious to please all, we were unable to satisfy 
any body. 

The coal belonging to the navy, consisting of 2,300 tons of Car- 
diff, was taken on at the piers of Bellavista, situated in the western 
part of the bay. Besides this, General Linares placed at Admiral 
Cervera’s disposal about 600 tons of Cumberland coal from the 
Juragu4é mines and 600 tons from the Sabanilla railway. 

The water had to be gotten by the boats of the fleet in bulk at 
the piers of Las Cruces and at the faucet near the Royal Pier. 
Some of the ships got their own water by going alongside the first- 
named pier. 


ATT. 


OPINIONS AS TO WHY THE FLEET DID NOT GO OUT. 


In narrating the events of Santiago, it was not my intention to 
make remarks of any kind on them, nor to permit myself com- 
ments thereon, as I consider that I have neither the authority, nor 
the ability (and this I do not say from false modesty), nor the 
right to do so. My object has been to give a simple account of 
what I witnessed, what I saw, and what I heard from trustworthy 
sources, and of the authenticity of which I am certain, feeling 
sure that in Spain, though the facts are known as a whole, they 
are not known there in detail; but in the presence of certain insin- 
uations and certain doubts I can not remain silent and indifferent. 

Great was the joy caused by the arrival of the fleet among the 
peninsular element generally and some of the sons of Cuba who 
truly love us. But after a few days, a number of intelligent and 
prominent people, or at least recognized as such, showed great 
impatience and surprise that the ships should remain in port, and 
never got tired asking what the fleet was doing there and why it 
did not go out. 

It is easy to answer that question. 

If Admiral Cervera can be accused of anything, it is an excess 
of courage. One need only read his record of service to be con- 
vinced of that, and the third day of July proved it only too well. 
Admiral Cervera received many cablegrams and official letters; no 
one knew better than he did what was going on in Spain and in 
Cuba, and what was being ordered and required of him, and that 
Admiral Cervera acted as he should have done admits of no dis- 
cussion. My only object is to answer the question which so many 
were asking in Santiago: ‘‘What was the fleet doing there?” 
What was it doing? Well, a great deal. 

It is not always great battles or great fights that decide the out- 
~ come of a campaign. Napoleon I, by an admirable maneuver, 
closed in on the Austrian General Marck at Ulm, and the latter 
had to surrender with his whole army without having fired a single 


shot. 
(37) 


38 


When Admiral Villeneuve, who unfortunately commanded 
the allied fleets of France and Spain, learned that Admiral Ros- 
silly, appointed to relieve him, was at Madrid, he preferred to 
fight with Nelson rather than present himself before Napoleon. 
So he decided to leave Cadiz, and he called together the com- 
manders of both fleets on the ship Bucentaure. The Spanish 
objected, on the grounds that, in order to leave Cadiz, they needed 
time and a favorable wind, that the ships were in need of repairs, 
had to replenish their provisions and ammunition and complete 
their crews, that the season was far advanced, and that, if the 
English were compelled to blockade them in winter, it would be 
equivalent for them to the loss of a naval battle; that was the 
opinion of men like Gravina, Churruca, and Galiano. 

They added that, moreover, the barometer was very low and 
that a storm was imminent, whereupon Rear Admiral Magon replied 
‘that what was low was the courage in some hearts.” At this 
insult, the Spanish, losing all prudence and calm, decided to go 
out in search of the enemy to prove that they still retained their 
courage. That was all that the French admiral wanted. The 
combined fleets went out, and what happened at Cape Trafalgar 
is well known. 

Now, then, the question is answered already: the ships were 
compelling the enemy to sustain with superior forces the blockade 
of Santiago de Cuba, with all its difficulties and dangers. While 
our ships were in port, safe from the ordinary dangers of the sea, 
using hardly any coal, not exhausting their engines, and waiting 
for a favorable opportunity to maneuver, when and as best they 
could, the hostile fleet was obliged to cruise on the coast day and 
night, using a great deal of coal, constantly doing sea service, 
which is always laborious, especially in time of war, exhausting 
their engines, and exposed to the danger of having to abandon the 
blockade in case of a storm from the south or east, still more if 
the season of cyclones should come. 

It is certainly true that a victory can be achieved without the 
necessity of giving battle, so much so that, if it had been 
possible for us, besides the ships that were at Santiago, to have 
two at Cienfuegos, for instance, and two more at Nuevitas, which 
ports are well suited for placing lines of torpedoes, owing to their 
narrow entrances, there is no doubt but that the Americans, who, 
outside of the ships they had in the Philippines, had sent their 
whole fleet to the island of Cuba, would have had to blockade 
those three ports with forces superior to ours and to keep watch at 
Key West it they did not want to expose themselves to a serious 
disaster, or would have had to force one of the ports, thereby 
exposing themselves to a hecatomb; and we only need think of 


39 


the number of their ships to understand that they could not suc-— 
cessfully threaten so many points; though they only had to deal 
with Santiago and had almost all the ships of the fleet in front of 
it, they would have found it necessary to desist from taking the 
offensive. 

The foregoing shows that ships do not necessarily have to give 
battle in order to obtain results. Those in Santiago harbor suc- 
ceeded for forty-six days in keeping before the mouth of the har- 
bor a vastly superior fleet, which performed no special acts of 
prowess except to throw a hail of projectiles which comparatively 
did very little damage. One could not obtain better results with 
less work; and if provisions had not been wanting in Santiago, 
God knows, if our fleet had remained there, to what extremes 
impatience and despair might not have carried Admiral Sampson ! 


XITI. 


THE BLOCKADE. 


As I have already given a description, though very deficient, of 
the sites and places that were the scene of these events (IV: Scene 
of Events), and of the miserable resources we had for their defense, 
it will be easy to understand what follows by remembering and 
fixing the attention on what has been said. 

I have already: stated that on the 18th of May, the Saint Louis, 
equipped for war, and a gunboat whose name could not be ascer- 
tained, fired about 80 shots, which were answered by Punta Gorda, 
the only battery that was then in condition to answer the attack. 
If it had happened a few hours later, one of the 16-cm. Hontoria 
guns of the Socapa could have been fired, but as stated, it was not 
mounted until the night of the 18th. The hostile ships disappeared 
to the east. The next day, the 19th, the Spanish fleet, coming from 
Curacao, entered the harbor and commenced to coal on the 20th. 

21st.—This day, a ship coming from the south came close to the 
mouth of the harbor, then shaping her course westward. At 10.30 
p. m. the Morro telephone gave notice that two ships had been fir- 
ing on Punta Cabrera for 15 minutes, ten shots in all. Probably 
they were firing at Colonel Aldea’s forces, which covered that part 
of the coast. 

22d.—At 7 a. m. the look-out signaled a steamer to the east and 
another half an hour later. We learned from the Morro that one 
of them appeared to be the same that had been sighted the day 
before; the other was a three-master. Both of them were thought 
to be hostile vessels because they were going very slowly and 
reconnoitering the coast. The new one had three smokestacks. 

At 11.30 the vessels were south of the Morro (that is, in front of 
it), proceeding very slowly westward, where they disappeared at 
half-past four. 

28d.—At 5.45 a vessel was signaled to the south and an hour 
later two to the east. At 9 the Morro said that one of the three 
vessels had three smokestacks, the same that had been sighted the 
day before, and one was a battle ship, and that flag signals were 


being made. 
(40) 


41 


At 11.30 a vessel was signaled to the west; at 12.30 the Morro 
said that the vessel just arrived had three masts and three smoke- 
stacks. 

At 4.10 we learned by telephone that one of the four vessels had 
disappeared to the south and the others were coming closer to the 
mouth of the harbor. 

At % the three ships disappeared, one to the east and two to 
the south. 

24th.—At 2 o’clock the lookout signaled two steamers to the 
south. The sky was clouded and nothing could be distinguished 
beyond a certain distance. 

At 11.45 the destroyer Plutén went out. 

At 12.30 four hostile vessels were distinguished, though with 
difficulty, owing to the cloudy weather, to the east of the mouth of 
the harbor. 

When seeing the Plutén go out, one of them shaped her course 
to the westward and passed close to the destroyer without being 
able to attack her, then proceeded westward. The others started 
in the same direction, also in pursuit of her, but without success, 
as the Plutén had naturally eluded meeting them. 

The four vessels disappeared to the westward. 

At 2 0’clock, the Spanish flagship (Infanta Maria Teresa) started 
up and went alongside the Las Cruces Pier for water. 

At 5.30 two vessels were signaled to the south; they disappeared 
in that direction after dark. 

25th.—At 6 o’clock two steamers were signaled, one to the south 
and one to the west. 

At 7.30 the Cristébal Colén started up and shortly after cast 
anchor again. 

At the same hour, the Morro reported that one of the two ves- 
sels signaled was apparently heading toward the harbor at full 
speed, and the other seemed to be chasing her. Three-quarters of 
an hour later it was reported that the vessel appeared to have been 
captured at quite a distance from the mouth of Santiago harbor, 
and that both were going south, the captured vessel ahead and the 
other following. 

The Infanta Maria Teresa sheered off from Las Cruces Pier at 
1 o’clock p. m., and the Oquendo then went alongside, also to take 
water; the former anchored again in the bay. 

At 2 o’clock the Vizcaya cast anchor south of Cay Ratones, near 
Cajuma Bay. The Cristdbal Colén anchored south of Punta Gorda. 

26th.—At 2 o’clock p. m. the Oquendo left Las Cruces Pier and 
anchored again in the bay. 

The position of the fleet was as follows: The Cristébal Colon was 
at anchor south of Punta Gorda, close to it, presenting her broad- 
side to the mouth of the harbor, in line with the channel to which 


42 


she presented her guns, so as to be able to attack the enemy in case 
he should try to force it. 

The Vizcaya close to Cajumas Bay, facing the same as the Colon 
so as to unite their fire in case the enemy should succeed in passing 
Punta Soldado. 

The Maria Teresa and Oquendo south of Cay Ratones, so as to 
defend the channel of Punta Gorda as well as the general anchor- 
ing place and the city. During the day three ships were sighted 
to the south, and disappeared shortly after in the same direction. 

27th.—At 6 the lookout signaled two vessels to the south. 

At 11.30 it signaled five more ships. There were now seven in 
sight. 

At 12.15 General Linares went to the Morro in the steamboat of 
the captaincy of the port. 

At 12.30 four more ships were sighted; total, eleven ships. 

Of the eleven ships in sight, four are battle ships. 

At 2.30 p. m. another ship arrived. 

At nightfall General Linares returned from the Morro. The 
ships disappeared to the south. 

28th.—At 6.15 the lookout signaled a vessel within 5 miles of 
the Morro, and at noon she disappeared to the south. 

At 4.30 p. m. six large ships were signaled, disappearing to the 
south at nightfall. 

29th.—At daybreak the destroyers Pluton and Furor went out 
to reconnoiter, returning at 8. 

During the day they anchored in the bay; at night they cast 
anchor at the Socapa and at Nispero Bay in order to guard the en- 
trance of the harbor. 

General Linares went to the Morro in the tug Alcyon. 

At 7, seven hostile ships were sighted reconnoitering the coast, 
at a distance of about 8 miles; they withdrew to the south before 
dark. 

30th.—At 5.30 the hostile fleet was signaled approaching to within 
9 miles of the harbor. It consisted of seven ships. 

Atnoon three others arrived from the south and joined the former. 

$1st.—At 5.45 the lookout signaled eleven ships to the south. 

At 2 p.m. gun fire was heard. The lookout reported that the 
coast was being fired on. | 

At 2.40 Punta Gorda battery opened fire, ceasing again shortly 
after. | 

The ships of the Spanish fleet hoisted their battle flags and fired 
up their boilers. 

At 2.30 the firing was quite lively. 

By 3 it became slower and ceased at 3.30. 


43 


The enemy had been firing on the Morro and Socapa batteries, 
without any casualty in either. 

The ships disappeared, as usual, to the south before dark. 

Thus end the events of the month of May, insignificant on the 
whole and only a prologue to those that were to follow. 

During the days of May 20th to 22d, the insurgent chief Calixto 
Garcia, with a numerous contingent of troops and artillery, at- 
tacked the village of Palma Soriano on the Cauto river. General 
Vara de Rey, at the head of 1,000 men and two guns, repulsed the 
hostile forces, routing them and killing a great many. On our 
side we had 16 wounded. This operation of the soldier hero, sim- 
ulating a surrounding movement by crossing the Cauto at three or 
four fords, and pursuing the rebels 2 miles beyond Palma Soriano, 
was due to the skillful distribution of the scant forces of the line 
of observation. This line, as will be readily understood from the 
chart at the end of the book, was weak, very weak, in almost its 
whole extent. It was, indeed, work that deserves praise, to guard, 
patrol, and sustain strategic points, cultivated land, coasts, roads, 
and railroads, with such a small and weak contingent of troops. 
And the forces that we were expecting from Havana, and the arrival 
of which had been announced, did not appear. 

As a collier was being expected, it was supposed that the vessel 
captured on the 25th was the one. Itis possible; but, on the other 
hand, it may not have been. In any event, there was much sur- 
prise expressed at Santiago that, since the hostile fleet was not in 
sight, but only one or two vessels, Admiral Cervera had not pre- 
vented the capture, or at least recovered the prize. 

The reason why he did not is very simple. Our fleet had taken 
on board all the Cardiff coal that was at the navy depot, without 
succeeding, as has been seen, in filling its bunkers, and there 
remained only the 1,100 tons of Cumberland coal of which Gen. 
Linares could dispose; this latter coal is inferior to the former, and 
I believe it is hardly necessary for me to point out how important 
it is that a fleet should have good fuel; *t may be its salvation at 
a given moment; consequently the fleet, which haa the prospect of 
having extremely difficult maneuvers of the highest importance to 
execute, could not afford to waste even a single piece of coal to no 
purpose. 

The capture took place a long distance from the mouth of the 
harbor; before a ship could weigh anchor, clear the channel, get 
up full steam and traverse that distance, at least three hours must 
elapse, and where would have been the captor and the prize by that 
time? And even granting that the former could not bring the 
latter in safety, would he allow it to fall into our hands? Certainly 
not. Two gunshots would have sunk her very quickly, especially 


44 


if, as was believed, she had a heavy cargo; and the Coldn, or any 
other ship that had gone out on that errand, would have consumed, 
probably to no purpose, a quantity of coal which it was impera- 
tive to keep for much more important and less hazardous opera- 
tions than pursuing merchant steamers equipped for war and tak- 
ing or recapturing prizes. Moreover, from the 22d to the 28th, the 
swell of the sea prevented the ships from going out; the pilots of 
the harbor were not willing to take them out, saying that in view 
of the state of the sea, they might touch bottom, especially the 
Cristobal Colon. 


XIV. 


THE VOLUNTEERS. 


Although the comparison may perhaps not be considered very 
apt, | might say that the month of May was the paradise of the 
blockade, while the month of June was its purgatory, and the 
month of July its hell. 

The appearance of the first hostile ships before the Morro of San- 
tiago, as the natural result of the war decided upon by the Gov- 
ernment of the United States and accepted by ours, and the noise 
of the first gunshots caused both consternation and curiosity among 
the inhabitants of the city; but as man becomes accustomed to 
everything, so the situation, which at that time was, if not dan- 
gerous, yet certainly very unpleasant and disagreeable, was finally 
looked upon with indifference. 

The boats of the fleet were constantly going back and forth be- 
tween the ships and the piers to supply the innumerable wants of 
the former, and gave to the marina an aspect of animation which 
it never wore in normal times. The Alameda, where the music of 
the Santiago regiment played, as usual, on Sunday evenings, by 
order of the the military authorities who were desirous of raising 
the spirit of the inhabitants as much as possible, and the Plaza de 
Armas, where the drums continued to beat the tattoo every Thurs- 
day and Sunday, were always full of people, although so many had 
left the city. People fond of giving sensational news, especially 
those who took pleasure in inventing it, had a wide field and plenty 
material to satisfy their desire; and anyone having patience and 
curlosity enough to coilect the news floating through the city 
might have written a very original and amusing book. 

The children were playing war, pelting each other with stones 
inside and around the city, divided into parties in command of a 
Cervera of ten summers or a Sampson of twelve Aprils. 

The different corps of volunteers were considerably increased by 
the many men who came to swell their ranks, especially chiefs and 
officers; the city was full of sabers, machetes, stars, and galloons, 
and I believe not even in Berlin, the capital of the most military 
nation of Europe, are as many uniforms seen as we saw in this 
city, usually so quiet. Even the clerks of the guardhouse and 
employees of the civil guard armed themselves with carbines and 


machetes. 
(45. 


46 


And while I am talking of the volunteers I will finish their his- 
tory to the end, which is not without interest. 

After sunset and during the first hours of the night the volun- 
teers would gather at the Alameda, which they filled completely, 
divided into more or less numerous platoons, which officers of the 
regular army, or their own officers, undertook to drill, and at the 
first gun or the first blast of the bugle, they reported promptly, 
especially the chiefs and officers, at the posts which had been as- 
signed to them beforehand. 

Every night a guard of twenty-five men, commanded by an offi- 
cer, occupied the large shed of the Alameda and placed its senti- 
nels, and from that time until dawn the noise of musket butts 
striking on the wooden floor was constantly heard, and by many 
people mistaken for gunshots, and the ‘‘Who goes there?” ad- 
dressed to every moving object was an evident proof of the extreme 
vigilance observed, and showed that it would not be easy to sur- 
prise them. 

The firemen were always on hand whenever they were needed at 
the pier to take the wounded from the Morro and Socapa to the 
hospital on their stretchers, and their energy, good will, and zeal 
can not be sufficiently praised. 

On the 1st, 2d, and 3d of July, as will be seen later, a large num- 
ber of volunteers hurried to the trenches of the third line, where 
they fought the enemy like brave men, and where some of them 
were wounded. 

Unfortunately, after that day, with a few honorable exceptions, 
the spirit animating them underwent a complete change; their 
enthusiasm became indifference, their valor prudence; they left 
the trenches to which they never returned, and exchanged the uni- 
form for civilians’ clothes and the gun or machete for the measur- 
ing-stick or weighing scales. 

Why this change? There is an explanation for it. It is an 
error to suppose that the soldier is braver than the volunteer; 
there is no reason why he should be; they are both Spanish. But 
the soldier has military habits and discipline which the volunteer 
lacks; he has chiefs and officers whom he must needs respect and 
obey, the volunteer has not; and that is the whole explanation. 

As long as the enemy was making attacks which it was neces- 
sary to repel the volunteers fought with energy and enthusiasm ; 
but when the battle and excitement were over, when the period of 
trenches arrived, with the hot sun in daytime and dampness at 
night, with rains, sickness, privations, and want, in a word, the 
hour of suffering in silence and with resignation, the hour of sub- 
ordination, of sacrifice and duty, then, one after another, under 


47 


this pretext or that, they returned to the city, determined not to 
go back. 

The circle narrowed more and more, the probabilities of capitu- 
lation and death increased as those of triumph and success dimin- 
ished, and then it was that they remembered their familiés, their 
own interests, and themselves, that they took off their uniforms, 
which, in their opinion, might cause them trouble, and, not con- 
sidering themselves safe in the city, they went to hide at Cinco 
Reales, Las Cruces, and on board of merchant steamers, or any 
other place where they thought themselves safe from projectiles, 
and there were even those who emigrated to El Caney and Cuabitas, 
occupied by the Americans and the insurgents respectively. 

What I relate I do not know from hearsay; I saw it myself at 
Cinco Reales, upon my return from the cruiser Reina Mercedes, 
sunk in the entrance of the harbor, where I had gone by orders of 
the commander of marine in order to report to him on the exact 
position then occupied by the vessel. At Cinco Reales I found 
many in hiding, in civilians’ clothes, some with their families and 
others alone. 

But while men who had carried the gun did such things, others 
who had girded the sword, with a show of doing great things, did 
even worse. | 


~ 


XV. 


WAITING. 


The events of the month of May, although they are not, or rather 
do not appear to be, of great importance in themselves, because 
there were no special movements on the part of the enemy and no 
casualties of any kind on ours, are in reality of great importance, 
and their consequences have had great influence and weight on the 
result of the war, which has been decided, so to speak, in the waters 
of Santiago de Cuba and in front of the trenches in this precinct. 

If we take into consideration the position of Santiago de Cuba, 
situated at the southern extremity of the island, and therefore 
at a comparative distance from the United States and Key West, 
the base of operations of the Yankees; the topography of its harbor, 
difficult in itself to force; the absence of military importance of 
the city, which is not a stronghold or even a military city, and the 
scarcity of roads and railways so that it is almost cut off from com- 
munication with any important or strategic point, it is nottoo much 
to assume that the Americans had no idea of making great demon- 
strations or operations, but thought that it would be sufficient to 
blockade it, and throw in a few projectiles as they had done at other 
cities on the coast, and a proof of this is that, until the 18th of May, 
that is, nearly a month after the skin itain of war, not a single 
hostile vessel was seen, and the two that appeared then were a 
merchant vessel equipped for war and a small gunboat, which, after 
reconnoitering, disappeared to the east. 

But the arrival of the Spanish fleet, though composed of only 
four battleships, but these the only ones of that class which we had 
in theisland, and therefore the only ones that could inspire any 
fear, the absolute necessity of replenishing them with coal, which 
took a number of days, because, in view of the scarcity of facilities 
of any kind it could not be done in less time, compelled the enemy 
to make the city, and especially the harbor where the fleet was at 
anchor, their objective, although they had not taken much thought 
of it at first; to concentrate upon this objective all their forces on 
sea and on land, and to take for the scene of the war one which 
was least Pinnted for their plans and which they had least thought 


- of choosing. 
(48) 


49 


When did they learn that our ships had anchored in the harbor? 
I do not know; nor do I believe that anybody in Santiago knows 
it. If the St. Louis and the gunboat which has been mentioned 
several times returned from Guantanamo on the 19th, where they 
went presumably to continue the blockade when they left these 
waters, there is no doubt but that they could see our ships and 
some people think that they at once notified their admiral, but I 
doubt it, because it was not until the 27th that ships appeared in 
such numbers as would make it possible to check or defeat ours. 

It might be said in answer to this that the hostile fleet may have 
had a thousand reasons, which we could not know, for this delay 
in assembling and appearing at the harbor. It is possible, but in 
that case, if the enemy knew ever since the 19th, what had hap- 
pened, why did they continue to appear in small numbers before 
the mouth of the harbor, exposing themselves to serious trouble? 
I do not believe that the enemy received any information on the 
subject, or at least complete evidence, until the 24th, when the 
vessels which were cruising in Santiago waters, saw the Pluton 
come out and go back again, for they knew that she accompanied 
the fleet and formed part of it. It was three days later, the 27th, 
that eleven ships appeared, four of them, at least, battle ships. 
This interval of time was necessary, of course, to advise the hostile 
fleet, which was perhaps between Cape San Antonio and Havana, 
or Cape San Antonio and Cienfuegos. 

In any event, the operations of the month of May assumed great 
importance, for the harbor remained closed, where since before the 
declaration of war no provisions of any kind had entered, if we 
except those which the small English schooner already mentioned 
brought from Jamaica, and which are hardly worth taking into 
consideration. 

Another problem: Why did the hostile ships which remained 
all day long in front of the mouth of the harbor disappear at dark 
instead of continuing to watch it during the night? I do not 
know that either. The whole coast is accessible and the ground 
so high that it can be distinguished perfectly even in stormy 
weather, so that there was no danger in remaining there in calm 
weather such as we have had all this year (for even in that Provi- 
dence had favored them), and what I say is true, as shown by the 
fact that afterwards they never left the mouth of the harbor for a 
single moment, day or night, as will be seen. 

Was it perhaps because they had become convinced of the diffi- 
culty of forcing the harbor, especially with a fleet inside, and 
wanted, by opening a passage, give the fleet a chance to come out 
in order to take refuge in another harbor less difficult of access ? 
But such tactics might have had fatal results, because if our ships 


10845——4 


50 : 


should reach Havana harbor, a few hours from Key West, under 
the protection of its 300 guns, and united with the other warships 
that were there, the situation would have become materially 
changed, and the Americans might have had a chance to regret 
such tactics. That they should have made such a mistake is not 
to be thought of; besides, if that had been their intention, they 
would not have maintained such vigilance during the day. Were 
they simulating a retreat to return at night to the harbor, without 
lights, so as not to be seen? That is not probable; in order to see 
the mouth of the harbor they must have been seen themselves 
from the heights of the Morro or Socapa, where the strictest watch 
was also exercised. I suppose, for I can not think of anything 
else, that, not having been able as yet to unite all their naval 
forces, they did not want to run the risk of a battle at night with 
a fleet that had destroyers, the number of which they probably did 
not know, and did not learn until later, through the secret infor- 
mation which they probably received from the insurgents. 

But all this is only supposition and hypothesis, perhaps entirely 
erroneous. The incontrovertible, undeniable fact is that, on the 
2"th, the enemy appeared with forces much superior to ours and 
remained all day long opposite the Morro, retreating at night, or 
simulating retreat. Thus ended the month of May. 


XVI. 


THE MERRIMAC. 


June 1st.—At 6 o'clock the look-out signaled the hostile fleet in 
sight, consisting of thirteen ships; five battle ships and eight 
merchant and warships, among them one torpedo boat. 

At 7 o’clock gunshots were heard. 

At 12.30 the fleet started up, moving away from the harbor 
from which it was about 6 miles distant; half an hour later it 
reversed its course and came again closer. 

At night the Spanish fleet changed its anchoring place. 

The Maria Teresa and Vizcaya anchored south of, and with 
their broadsides toward Cay Ratones and were forming the first 
line for the defense of the harbor. The Colén and Oquendo 
anchored north of the same Cay and were forming the second line. 

2nd.—At 5.30 nineteen ships appeared at the mouth of the 
harbor, at a distance of about 5 miles. 

At 7% the Morro reported that they were going to fire a few 
shots to discharge some of the guns. 

8rd.—At 3.30 gunshots were being heard toward the mouth of 
the harbor and the firing became very lively. 

At 4 o’clock it was learned at the comandancia de marina that 
a merchant vessel had come very close to the mouth of the chan- 
nel; that the batteries had fired at her and she had not answered; 
and at that moment she was already inside; shortly after she 
passed by the bow of the Reina Mercedes, which, it will be 
remembered, was moored between the Socapa and Cay Smith, 
with her bow towards the channel which she was defending with 
her two 16-cm. Hontoria guns and Whitehead torpedoes. 

By 4.20 the firing, which had been very violent, ceased. 

At 4.30 it was learned that the hostile ship had gone down in 
the mouth of the channel, close to Punta Soldado, but without 
obstructing it. 

At 5.30, it now being daylight, very slow firing was again heard 
and ceased at 6. 

At 5.380 the commandant of marine went to the mouth of the 
harbor in the steam launch. 


(51) 


52 


When he returned, we learned that one of the merchant vessels 
forming part of the American fleet, called the Merrimac, with two 
masts and one smokestack, larger than the Méjico, had forced the 
entrance at 5.30; that she had been sunk in the channel close to 
Punta Soldado, by the guns of the Mercedes and the rapid-fire 
guns of the battery below the Socapa, and was lying in the direc- 
tion of the Socapa, without obstructing the entrance or preventing 
our ships from going out, and that one lieutenant and seven sailors 
forming her crew had been captured and were on board the Mer- 
cedes. 

Besides the firing on the vessel from the guns, the Pluton 
launched two torpedoes and the Mercedes two more. Two sub- 
marine mines were discharged from the first line and one from the 
second. 

During the events related above, General Linares was at the 
Morro, where he had repaired by land on receipt of the first news. 
At daybreak, General Toral, military governor of Santiago, came 
to assist the navy with a force of regulars and volunteers. 

At 7 a company went to reenforce the forces at the Socapa and 
the Morro. y 

At 7.30 the forces that had come to assist the navy withdrew. 

At 11 p. m. firing was heard at a great distance in a south- 
easterly direction; it ceased at 12.15. The fire was extremely slow. 

As may have been noticed, on June 1 the enemy appeared before 
the Morro with thirteen ships, five of them battle ships and eight 
merchant and war vessels; that is to say, with forces superior to 
ours, in number as well as caliber of armament, and also from the 
fact that they were better protected than ours, as may be seen 
from the report of the United States Navy, and as unfortunately 
we found out ourselves later. From that time on the hostile 
ships, which were afterwards increased in number, established day 
and night a constant watch, without withdrawing at nightfall, as 
they used to do. Probably they suspected—for they never lacked 
advices and secret information—that our fleet, for want of pro- 
visions, would before very long be compelled to go out, and that 
is what they were waiting for. 

On the 2d, nineteen ships were present. 

At daybreak of the 3d, the Merrimac forced the entrance of the 
harbor, at 3.30, with the result above set forth. 

In spite of the time that has elapsed, we, at Santiago, have not 
succeeded in ascertaining definitely—though it is probably known 
in Spain from American newspapers that are in the habit of pub- 
lishing everything—what was the real object that the Merrimac 
had in view. 


53 


She had guns and did not fire; she had torpedoes, though imper- 
fect and primitive, if I may be permitted the expression, or rudi- 
mental, which she did not use; if she was trying to explode our 
mines, she did not accomplish her design; and, finally, she had 
2,000 tons of coal on board. The leutenant who commanded her 
refused to state the object of his maneuver, saying only that it wag 
made by order of Admiral Sampson; later, he said to Mr. Rams- 
den, British consul, that if the vessel were examined, it would be 
found that she carried torpedoes, as indeed was the case. There: 
fore, it may be reasonably supposed that the object was to sink the 
vessel across the channel, so as to obstruct it and prevent our ships 
from going out; and having made sure of that, to use part of their 
ships in other operations; and if the vessel did not come to lie 
across the channel and did not obstruct it, it was because she lost 
control of her movements, her rudder having been disabled by 
some projectile, so that she went down where it suited her least. 

There is another fact in this connection which may and should 
arrest the attention of experts in that subject: The Plutén launched 
two torpedoes, the Mercedes two more, all of them Whitehead; two 
mines were discharged from the first line and one from the second; 
and yet the vessel was not blown up and passed both lines in safety, 
which shows that the effect of torpedoes is moral rather than 
material, and that it is not easy to discharge them at the right 
moment. To doso requires a degree of experience, a range of sight, 
and a presence of mind not easily found united in a single man. 
The occurrence to which I have reference demonstrates this very 
clearly. 

During the day the officer and seven men of the Merrimac, who 
had first been taken on board the Mercedes, were temporarily 
transferred to the Morro. 

From 11 to 12.30 in the night, the hostile ships were firing, 
though slowly, outside of the harbor and towards the southeast. 
The object of this has never been ascertained. 

I have several times spoken with General Ros, governor of the 
Morro, and he has always repeated these and similar words: 
‘*Ffrom the beginning of the hostilities to the end I have remained 
in the castle, from where, as you know, everything can be seen 
and observed. Sooner or later I have always learned the object of 
everything the enemy has done and the reason for it; but the firing 
of that night, though I saw and heard it myself, I have never 
understood. I believe they were firing on some ship they saw, or 
thought they saw; but it may be that they were firing on the land; 
but I believe in that case the object and result of the firing would 
have become known sooner or later.” 


D4 


That same day Captain (General) Paredes, second in command 
of the fleet, disembarked from the Cristébal Colon and embarked 
temporarily on the Mercedes, where he remained until the 21st, 
taking command of all the defenses at the mouth of the harbor. — 


XVII. 


THE BLOCKADE CONTINUES. 


June 4Jth.—There were to be seen at the mouth of the harbor 
seventeen ships: Six battle ships, five war ships, and six merchant 
vessels. 

At 11.30 a. m., the second commander of the local naval forces 
(being the writer of this book), as judge, accompanied by the aid 
of the captaincy of the port, Mr. Leguina, as secretary, and the 
Government interpreter, Mr. Isidoro Agostini, went to the Morro 
in the steam launch of the captaincy of the port, for the purpose 
of taking the depositions of the lieutenant and seven men who had 
been taken prisoners. 

The former, Mr. Hobson, 27 years old, born in the State of Ala- 
bama, is a lieutenant in the corps of naval constructors, who, in 
the United States, study in the naval college, and those first pro- 
moted are assigned to that corps; I state this so that it may not 
seem strange that he commanded the Merrimac, for, as they are 
officers of the Navy, they can both build and command ships. 

Upon learning the object of the visit, the prisoner, from whose 
room a great extent of the sea and part of the blockading fleet 
could be seen, asked why the British Consul, who was in charge. 
of the United States Consulate, was not present when his deposi- 
tion was to be taken, and he wanted to know whether I belonged 
to the army or the navy; what might be the consequences of his 
statements; by whose authority he was being examined; and he 
stated that, since he had been taken prisoner by Admiral Cervera 
himself in his own boat (as was true), it was his understanding 
that he could and should answer only Admiral Cervera, or some 
one delegated by him. And although all this was said in the very 
best form and with a thousand protestations of his respect and 
deference for me, it did not prevent our positions from being 
reversed, and far from my asking the prisoner questions, it was 
he, on the contrary, who asked them of me. I told him so, asking 
him through the interpreter to state categorically whether he was 
disposed to answer. He replied he was ready to answer the ques- 
tions which he thought he ought to answer, but not those which 


(55) 


D6 


he deemed untimely. Therefore, and in order not to lose time, I 
at once asked him one question which I knew beforehand he would 
refuse to answer, namely, by whose order and for what purpose 
he entered the harbor; he replied: ‘‘ By order of Admiral Samp- 
son; the second part I can not answer.” Ithen deemed my mis- 
sion at an end and had the fact set down. 

A few days later, this officer was transferred to quarters on the 
Reina Mercedes that had been prepared for him, and the seven 
men to others on the vessel, where they remained until they were 
released. 

As I left the Morro and stood on the esplanade in front of it, I 
had an opportunity for the first time to admire the spectacle that 
presented itself to my eyes; I say ‘‘admire,” for the picture was 
truly worthy of admiration. 

The evening was most beautiful; the sea was as smooth as a 
lake, there was hardly any wind and the sky was perfectly clear. 

At a distance of about five miles, seventeen ships could be seen: 
eleven war ships, among them seven battle ships and one torpedo 
boat, and the other six merchant vessels, the nearest one about six 
miles from the harbor, formed a large arc, one extremity of which 
was at Aguadores and the other at Punta Cabrera. The largest 
and most powerful ships were in the center. Among them were 
the Lowa, Indiana, Brooklyn, and New York; the latter two may 
be easily recognized by their three smokestacks. The fifth was 
presumably the Massachusetts; and finally the Texas and Ama- 
zonas. The New York and Brooklyn, taking advantage of the 
state of the sea, had a merchant steamer alongside and were coal- 
ing. All of them had their engines stopped and their bows in dif- 
ferent directions according to the current. From time to time, one 
of them would move a short distance forward and then return again 
to her place. Among the merchant vessels were specially notice- 
able the Saint Lous (the first vessel that had been seen at Santiago), 
a huge transatlantic steamer of over 10,000 tons, which looked larger 
than any of the other ships, including the armorclads, and a steam 
yacht of great speed, very small, on the contrary, and which looked 
like a ship’s boat. This is the yacht that was in constant com- 
munication with Punta Cabrera. There also was a torpedo boat 
or destroyer. A few days later, I saw the same spectacle from the 
high battery of the Socapa, and I shall never forget it. 

Before I continue, I will state that on May 26, the cable had been 
cut at Cape Cruz, so that communication with Manzanillo was 
interrupted until June 17, when the connection was reestablished. 

5th.—The American fleet could be seen at the mouth of the har- 
bor, being the same ships we had seen the night before. 


57 


General Linares returned from the Morro at 8 o’clock p. m. and 
ordered the launches and a tug to be gotten ready to take 150 men 
to the mouth of the harbor. 

At 10.30, a chief, two officers, and 120 soldiers embarked and 
went out in a launch towed by the Coldn, assisted by the Aleyon; 
the tugs returned at 1 o’clock at night. 

At 2 o’clock in the morning, through the fault of a collier coaling 
near the hut of the English cable at’ Las Cruces, said hut was 
burned; it was an accident, but none the less deplorable. 


XVIII. 


THE BOMBARDMENT INCREASES. 


June 6th.—-Eighteen ships were visible at the mouth of the har- 
bor. At 7.30 the lookout reported that the ships were starting up 
and approaching. 

At 8.30 ten ships—the [owa, Indiana, Massachusetts, Brooklyn, 
New York, Texas, Amazonas, Minneapolis, and two other war- 
ships—forming two divisions, opened fire, the first division, on 
the Morro and Aguadores, the second on the Socapa; one ship was 
detached from the latter division to bombard Mazamorra and 
adjoining points on the coast, where the column of Colonel Aldea 
(Asiatic battalion) had detachments and was operating. 

When the American fleet opened fire, it was so intense and the 
shots followed each other in such quick succession that it might 
have seemed like a fusillade if the mighty thunder of guns can be 
compared with the crackling of small arms. 

By 9 o’clock it became somewhat slower, shortly after reaching 
again the same intensity, then decreasing once more at 10.15, and 
again becoming terribly intense at 10.30. 

At 11.2 it ceased. 

Punta Gorda battery fired only 7 shots. 

At 12.15 intense firing was heard again in the distance to the 
east; it ceased at 1.45. 

At 2p. m. there arrived at the royal pier a boat from the Reina 
Mercedes, towed by her steam launch, with Lieutenant Ozamiz, 
bringing three seriously wounded sailors, who were taken to the 
military hospital. This officer reported the death of Commander 
Emilio de Acosta y Kyermann, second in command of the cruiser, 
and of five sailors; also, that Ensign Molins, one boatswain, and 
several other sailors had been wounded; their names could not be 
ascertained owing to the condition of the ship, nor could even the 
exact number of wounded be stated, as it had been necessary to 
extinguish two fires on board. 

At 2.45 a private boat arrived at the pier, carrying a sergeant 
and a wounded soldier from the Mazamorra detachment. They 
were also taken to the military hospital. 

There were no more remarkable events during the night. 


(58) 


59 


Ten warships, eight of them battle ships, divided into two divi- 
sions, opened fire shortly after 8 a. m., on the batteries at the 
mouth, and by elevation on the bay. During the first moments, 
the firing was so intense that it resembled one prolonged thunder. 
In fact, I had no idea that any firing could be as terrific as that of 
those ten ships. Much has been said of the bombardments of 
Sebastopol and Alexandria, but I do not believe that they could 
have been as terrible as the bombardment we suffered that ¢th day 
of June—a day which the inhabitants of Santiago will never for- 
get. I might write pages about it, and even then would probably 
not give the faintest idea of what it really was. 

The hostile ships (see list of ships and armaments) had at least 
120 large guns, that is to say, of 14, 20 and 32-cm. calibers, and 
about 80 small-caliber guns, thatis to say, of 57 and 42-mm., or a 
total of 192 guns, for they fired with guns of all sizes; and as I 
am far from wanting to exaggerate and since the guns of the two 
sides of a ship can not be fired at the same time (those mounted 
in turrets forward and aft can), I will say that 91 guns were 
firing upon four 16-cm. muzzle-loading guns at the Morro and two 
16-cm. breech-loading Hontoria guns of the Socapa battery. 

I do not count the guns of Punta Gorda battery, which fired 
only seven shots; for the Americans, in spite of their enormous 
superiority, still had the prudence of avoiding it and not 
engaging it so as to keep outside of itsrange. Before the eloquence 
of numbers, anything else that I might say becomes unnecessary. 

How did it happen that the Morro was not razed to the ground 
and that its guns and those of the Socapa were not dismounted ? 
How did it happen that those who served these guns were not 
buried under the ruins? I do not know; that is all I can say; and 
those who were in those forts may be sure that, since they were 
not killed that day, they will die of old age. 

Captain Concas, who is very clever at computations of a certain 
nature, counted at different times the number of shots fired ina 
minute, and his deduction is that about 8,000 projectiles were 
fired; though this figure may appear exaggerated at first sight, it 
is not so in reality; the firing lasted 175 minutes, which would 
give an average of 45 shots per minute. I believe, if anything, 
the computation falls below the truth. 

I have always believed that the hostile fleet, which, by means of 
the yacht referred to, communicated with the insurgents on the 
coast by way of Punta Cabrera, knew everything that was going 
on in Santiago as well as inthe harbor and the position of our 
ships. Butif I had had any doubts on that subject, they would 
have been dispelled that 6th day of June when I saw the aim of 





60 


their projectiles. Most of them dropped in the bay in the direc- 
tion of the Maria Teresa and Vizcaya, which were covering the 
first line, and it was a miracle that both of them were not seriously 
damaged; for the large-caliber shells fell all around them; there 
were moments when it seemed as though some had hit them, especi- 
ally the Vizcaya. 

They were also perfectly acquainted with the position of the 
Mercedes, which is proved by the fact that the ships to the east, 
being the division which bombarded the Morro, were firing their 
projectiles right at the cruiser, and though protected by the hill of 
the Socapa, she received in her hull and rigging 35 shells, causing 
two fires, one of them quite extensive, being in the paint locker 
forward. 

Commander Emilio Acosta y KEyermann was directing the extin- 
guishing of the fire in the forecastle, when a large shell cut off his 
right leg at the hip and also his right hand, mutilating him horribly. 
But he lived for half an hour after that and kept on looking after 
the fire, as I was told by Mr. Ozamiz, who was close to him in 
those critical moments. I do not like to think of it; he had been 
a fellow-student of mine at college and our old friendship had 
always remained the same. As there was no safe place in the 
ship, his body was placed on a cot and taken to the Socapa coast; 
five soldiers who had been killed the same day were also carried 
there, and all of them were covered with the flag which they had 
been defending and for which they had died. May he rest in peace, 
this first chief of the navy killed in this war. 

The large projectiles shot through the space across the bay, 
causing a tremendous noise which only those who heard it can 
understand; some fell on the opposite coast (to the westward), 
raising, as they exploded, clouds of dust and smoke; others could 
not be seen falling, which proves that they must have dropped in 
the hills at a great distance. This shows that they did not only 
reach the city, but went thousands of meters beyond. 

Toward evening, the ships also fired twice on Daiquiri, probably 
at the forts and the detachments in the mineral region and at Fir- 
meza, but without any effect worth mentioning. The high bat- 
tery of the Socapa (two 16-cm. Hontoria guns) fired 47 shots; that 
was all they could fire, because during the bombardment the ships 
were hidden most of the time through the smoke. 

The inhabitants of Cay Smith had to take refuge in the northern 
part, which is very abrupt, and many were in the water up to the 
waist; if they had not gone there most of them would have been 
killed, for nearly all the dwellings which were located on the south- 
ern slope suffered from the effects of the shells. The following day 
the Cay was abandoned and the inhabitants transferred to the city. 


61 


Lieutenant Julidn Garcia Duran was appointed second in com- 
mand of the cruiser Reina Mercedes; he had arrived a short time 
before in command of the merchant steamer Méjico, with torpedo 
supplies, which he landed at the port of Guantanamo. 

Later, after the Mercedes sank, this same officer was placed in 
command of the naval forces that occupied the Socapa; and finally, 
of the whole navy encampment, until they were embarked and 
taken back to Spain. 


XIX. 


THE FIRING CONTINUES. 


June 7th.—At daybreak nineteen ships in front of the mouth. 

At 9.15 the body of Commander Emilio Acosta was brought on 
shore. 

At 9.30 the funeral procession started, headed by Admiral Cer- 
vera and Generals Toral and Rubin, and including, in spite of the 
rain, the civil and military authorities of the city, delegations from 
all the different divisions, and a great many private citizens. On 
both sides of the body walked the battalion of volunteers and the 
company of guides, the only forces that were in the city, with the 
music of the Santiago regiment. 

At 6.30 p.m. the ships increased the distance that separated 
them from the coast. 

The French cable had been cut, and we were not in communica- 
tion with Guantanamo. 

dth.—Nineteen ships were in sight at daybreak, about 6 miles from 
the mouth. 

During the night the fleet had constantly thrown its search- 
lights on the coast. 

5th.—At daybreak eighteen ships, at a distance of about 7 miles. 

The steamer Tomas Brooks delivered 25 planks at the mouth of 
the harbor, which were attached to a steel cable stretched from Cay 
Smith to Punta Soldado, the object of the planks being to keep it 
at the surface of the water; the cable was laid to prevent the pas- 
sage of any torpedoes which the enemy might attempt to send into 
the harbor with the entering tide. 

10th.—At daybreak the eighteen ships of the preceding day were 
to be seen about 10 miles distant. At o’clock another one, a mer- 
chant vessel, arrived from the south. | 

The Pluton and Furor went alongside the steamer Méjico, one 
at each side, to rest from the service of the night. 

At 11 the lookout made a signal, taking it down shortly after, 
that fire was being opened. Nothing was heard in the city. 

The Morro said that the enemy had fired upon Punta Berracos, 
but had stopped very soon. 


(62) 


63 


During the night the American fleet continued to examine the 
coast by means of the searchlights. 

11th.—Seventeen ships, some 6 miles distant, others 10. 

12th.—The same seventeen ships, from 5 to 6 miles distant from 
the Morro. 

18th.—Fifteen ships, 6 miles from the harbor. 

LU4th.—At 5.15 the enemy opened fire on the mouth of the harbor; 
it ceased at 6.50. 

The projectiles fell toward Cajuma Bay, close to the Vizcaya. 

Only one ship kept up the fire on the Morro and Socapa, both 
batteries answering it. 

At the latter battery Ensign Bruquetas and two sailors were 
slightly wounded. 

At 10 General Linares went to the Socapa and the Morro, re- 
turning at 12.30. 

The enemy continued the fire during the night, aiming his pro- 
jectiles upon the coast, especially above the mouth of the harbor. 

16th.—At daybreak seventeen hostile ships in sight, among them 
the Vesuvius, this being her first appearance before the harbor. 

The Vesuvius is a vessel of 900 tons displacement and of peculiar 
construction, being very long, narrow, and low. She is the only 
one of her class in the world, and throws, by means of guns or 
pneumatic tubes, dynamite bombs or projectiles a distance of 
about 2 miles; they are probably provided with a screw; nobody 
knows them exactly. Ido not believe this vessel, though it may 
cause serious destruction, would be able to sustain a fight with 
another, even though smaller, for the reason that the range of her 
projectiles is very short and she has no protection. 

From the 7th to the 15th the hostile fleet hardly threatened the 
batteries which defended the harbor, nor the coast either, contenting 
themselves with watching it incessantly day and night. 

In the city nothing appeared to have changed, and yet the situ- 
ation was very far from being what it was a month ago. 

In the stores many articles were wanting, and those that could 
be had brought fabulous prices. Unfortunately, one of the first 
articles that gave out was flour, and no bread could be baked. 
Hardtack (galleta) was used instead, but only a few people could 
pay for it; there was no milk to be had, indispensable for the sick 
and for babies. The soldiers commenced to eat bread made of rice 
and rice boiled in water, which weakened them very much; and 
though they were not suffering actual hunger, everybody knew 
that calamity was not far off and was inevitable, for no provisions 
could be expected, either by land or sea. 

Fortunately, the sailors of the ships and defenses, thanks to the 
foresight of the general commandant of the naval station, were 


64 


still receiving full rations and had them for some time to come, 
thanks also to the interest taken in this matter by the Comman- 
dant of Marine. 

The music continued to play at the Alameda and in the market 
place, but the people, who had nothing to eat, had no desire to go 
walking, and the market place and Alameda were deserted. 

Horses and dogs were dying before our eyes. Carriages stopped 
going about for want of horses, which the scavenger carried off at 
night, and gradually the city acquired that stamp of sadness and 
absence of life which is seen in places into which cholera and 
plagues carry sorrow and death. The situation became more 
serious every day, and the discouragement was general, for every- 
one knew thatif the blockade should continue, the ruin of the city 
was imminent. 

I must state that while the ships of the hostile fleet were firing 
on Punta Cabrera and Mazamorra on the 7th, 9th, and days fol- 
lowing, insurgent bands, commanded by their principal chiefs, 
sustained a continued musket fire on land. In these attacks they 
were repulsed with great losses. 


xX. 


THE LANDING EXPEDITION APPEARS. 


June 16th.—EKighteen ships in sight. 

At 5.45 the hostile fleet opened fire. 7 

At 6.15 Punta Gorda commenced firing, but stopped shortly after. 

The greater part of the projectiles dropped close to the Spanish 
fleet. ' 

At 6.30 the fire became more intense. 

At 6.35 smoke was seen for a few minutes issuing from the In- 
fanta Maria Teresa. It was learned afterwards that a fragment 
of shell had caused a slight injury in the starboard gallery. 

At 6.40 Punta Gorda again opened fire; ten shots. 

At 7 the firing ceased. 

At 7.15 the Furor and Plutén, which had their steam up during 
the firing, went alongside the steamer Méyico. 

It was reported from the Morro that the ships which had been 
firing were eight in number; that the fire had been directed against 
the castle and the Socapa, both of them answering; that at the 
Morro battery a gunner had been killed and an officer and five 
soldiers (all belonging to the artillery) wounded; that at the Socapa 
two sailors had been killed and four sailors and Ensign Bruquetas 
wounded, the latter for the second time; and that one of the Hon- 
toria guns had been put out of action by débris obstructing it, but 
that the enemy had not succeeded in dismounting a single gun. 

At 11.45 the four sailors who had been wounded at the Socapa 
arrived in a boat at the royal pier and were taken to the military 
hospital, one of them, who was seriously wounded, on a stretcher 
from the firemen’s headquarters, the other three in carriages. 

At 12 a second lieutenant and a gunner arrived from the Morro 
and were also taken to the hospital. 

During the night the ships continued to illuminate the coast with 
their search lights. 

The débris was removed from the Hontoria gun, which was 
again made ready for firing. 

17th.—At 5.30 steady gun fire commenced in the distance to the 
west. It was learned that one ship was firing on Punta Cabrera. 
A few minutes later another opened fire on the Socapa. 

Thirteen ships in sight. 


4) 
10845——5 (69) 


66 


The ship firing on Punta Cabrera was also firing on Mazamorra. 

At 7.30 the firing ceased. 

There was nothing further of importance during the day and the 
following night. 

18th.—Fourteen ships in sight at daybreak. The Jowa left and 
the Massachusetts, which had been absent for several days, took 
her place. 

At 7.45 p. m. gun fire was heard. 

It was learned that it was from the Socapa firing at a ship which 
had passed within a short distance and had answered. About 20 
shots were exchanged. 

19th.—Fifteen vessels in sight. 

At 7 two battle ships arrived from the south; total, 132 | 

At 2.30 p. m. General Linares went to the mouth of the harbor, 
returning at 7 p.m. 

During the night the ships were again running their search lights 
along the coast and the entrance of the harbor. 

20th.—At daybreak there were 21 vessels in sight, 7 of them 
battle ships. 

The Oquendo changed her anchoring place and went farther to 
the north. 

At 12 the Morro reported that 39 hostile vessels had arrived; 
shortly after 3 more came, so that, with the 21 that were already 
opposite the Morro, there was a total of 63. 

At 12.05 a loud detonation was heard and a great deal of smoke 
was seen at the piers of Luz and San José; it came from the schooner 
Trafalgar, where a shell had exploded eiiteee fired, killing-a 
sailor of the steamer San Juan and wounding three of the Mortera, 
one of whom died a few minutes later. The schooner had to be run 
ashore to prevent her going down. 

Orders were received for the formation of the fourth army 
corps, in command of General Linares, composed of the division 
of Santiago, which was already under his command, and the 
division of Manzanillo. | 

Another cable was stretched between the Socapa and Cay Smith, 
like the one stretched between Cay Smith and Punta Soldado, and 
twelve Bustamante torpedoes were planted, half of them between 
Cay Smith and the Merrimac, and the other six between the latter 
and Punta Soldado. ¥ 

21st.—It was learned that the 42 vessels that had arrived the 
previous day had proceeded in an easterly direction during the 
night, leaving only the former 21, most of them war ships. 

At 2.30 p.m. the Morro stated that the 42 vessels were again 
returning from the south. 


67 


The cruiser Reina Mercedes left her anchoring place at the 
Socapa and cast anchor in the bay, west of the captaincy of the 
port. 

On the 16th the American fleet had again opened fire on the 
batteries at the mouth of the harbor, and although it could not be 
compared with that of the 6th, either in intensity or duration, yet 
it had caused us two deaths at the Socapa, and two officers and 
several sailors and soldiers had been wounded there and at the 
Morro. <A 32-cm. shell, which exploded at the former of said 
batteries, raised such a quantity of earth that it partly buried one 
of the Hontoria guns, making it useless for the time being, and 
came near burying also the men serving it. During the night the 
earth covering the gun was removed, so that it was again ready 
for service. 

The names of the Morro and Socapa have been repeated many 
times, and it has been shown that these two poor batteries were the 
main objective of the hostile fleet and had to withstand the fire of 
over 90 guns, most of them of large caliber, which they always 
answered; yet, I can not help but speak once more of the heroism, 
truly worthy of admiration, displayed by those who served them, 
constantly exposing their lives and having to watch after fighting, 
without a moment’s rest or sleep; for the enemy was always on 
the lookout for the least remission in watchfulness in order to sur- 
prise them and attempt a coup de main on the harbor. 

Hach one of them, and the governor of the castle first of all, 
earned the gratitude of the country every day for two months. 
Their self-denial and valor kept a powerful fleet in check for sev- 
enty days. The resistance which the Morro and the Socapa offered 
under the prevailing circumstances is a true feat of heroism. 

On the 17th the ships reconnoitered along Punta Cabrera and 
Mazamorra, firing on the detachments of the Asiatic column. 

On the 20th, the day when the 42 vessels of the convoy appeared 
with the landing expedition, a shell exploded in the hold of the 
schooner Trafalgar, causing several deaths and injuring the hull 
of the schooner, which had to be run SIMON in order to prevent 
her from sinking. 

I shall not speak at length of a matter which is of no importance, 
but will mention it briefly, because it gives an idea of the craze 
reigning at Santiago, to which the frequent bombardments, which 
must have cost at least a million dollars, gave rise. 

Whether by reason of the type of their fuzes, or because many 
of the shells did not have the requisite powder charge (I have dis- 
charged a 57-mm. shell myself, which had only one-eighth of it), 
certain it is that many did not explode and remained intact as 
though they had not been discharged; as they were being thrown 


68 


in such large numbers, many people wanted to keep one as a curi- 
osity or as a souvenir of an event which does not happen often in 
a lifetime. Some wanted them of small, others of large caliber; 
others wanted to make a collection of all sizes. I have a friend 
who called on me one evening to show me a 20-cm. shell which had 
been discharged and had not suffered the least deformation. The 
fad had cost him 20 pesos, and he was as happy over it as a child 
over anew toy. But I was thoughtless enough to tell him that 
there were 32-cm. ones, and he wasinconsolable. It will be under- 
stood from the above that the fad was being paid for dearly; and 
as capital is always made out of everything, many people made a 
business of gathering up and discharging projectiles and selling 
them. That was the cause of the unfortunate occurrence on board 
the Trafalgar; a shell had been discharged without the necessary 
care, and what happened was but the natural consequence. 

Another monomania of this period: As the Americans kept up 
the bombardments all through the month of June, so that there 
hardly was a day when gunshots were not heard at a greater or less 
distance, people were hearing them all the time; the falling of a 
chair, the closing of a door or window, the noise of carriage wheels 
in the distance, the crying of a child—everything was taken for 
gunshots, and gunshots was all that was being talked about. 
When they finally ceased, Santiago had become so identified with 
them that people almost missed them and were surprised to hear 
them no longer. 


XXI. 


LINE OF OBSERVATION. 


We have now reached a period when the events acquire the 
greatest interest and assume exceptional importance. So far it 
was only the fleet that had been antagonizing us; and numerous 
and powerful though it was, it had threatened only one point, 
which experience showed us it did not dare attack or force. Hence- 
forth we shall find ourselves menaced also on land by an army 
equipped with numerous modern artillery, which, supported by 
the ships that had control of the sea and could therefore, without 
trouble, communicate with their dépots and base of operations, 
and further supported by the insurgents who had control of the 
field, was constantly receiving reenforcements of men and material 
and had at its disposal everything which we, unfortunately, were 
lacking. 

From this time on the events are precipitated, so to speak, and 
lead with dizzy rapidity to a dénouement which it is not difficult 
-to foresee. In view of the exceptional location of the island of 
Cuba, we can not hope for help either from within or without; we 
can not hope for provisions nor ammunition, and without these the 
soldier can not be fed and can not fight—a sad and desperate 
situation for men who ask for nothing else and whom fate seems 
to pursue. 

When speaking of military operations and movements of troops, 
it is not always possible to give a full account of them as they 
happen; there is danger that some of the occurrences, the situation 
of the forces, and the points they defend or attack, may not be 
known. In order to obviate this, and to give the reader a better 
understanding of the events that took place later, I will give an 
outline, though perhaps incomplete, of the distribution which 
General Linares made of the forces he had at his disposal. 

It has already been stated that on the 20th the Fourth Army 
Corps was organized, consisting of the Santiago division and the 
Manzanillo division. General Linares was made commander in 
chief, and Lieutenant Colonel Ventura Fontan, who had been chief 
of staff of the latter division, retained the same position relative to 


the corps. 
(69) 


70 


General Toral, though in command of the division of Santiago, 
remained at the head of the military government of the city, with 
the same chief of staff. It may, therefore, be said that nothing 
was changed. 

From telegrams received, the enemy’s plans could be, if not aceu- 
rately known, at least surmised, and as it was supposed that they 
might effect a landing at a point on the coast more or less close to 
the city, General Linares ordered the concentration of his forces so 
that they might be assigned to convenient positions. First of all, 
orders were sent from Havana to Manzanillo, by telegraph, for 
General Escario to proceed with all the forces available, and with 
the least possible delay, to Santiago de Cuba. Said general left 
Manzanillo on the 22d with 3,300 infantry, 250 cavalry, two Plas- 
encia guns and 60 transport mules. The infantry was composed 
of the battalions of Alcdntara, Andalusia, Puerto Rico chasseurs 
and two battalions of the Isabel la Catélica regiment. These 3,300 
men who, from the time they left Manzanillo, had encounters every 
day with the insurgents, who killed and wounded 97 of them, could 
not arrive here, in spite of forced marches, until the evening of 
July 3; this should not be lost sight of. 

At another place I have spoken of the scarcity of provisions in 
the city. The authorities, in order not to diminish the chances of 
assistance which they might obtain from the region under cultiva- 
tion, for the men as well as the horses and mules, combined the 
operations and position of the troops with the object of attempting 
to preserve that region and looking out for the enemy in all di- 
rections. 

With this object in view, a line of observation was established, 
as follows: To the north, from Palma Soriano through San Luis, 
Kl Cristo, and Socorro; to the west, from Punta Cabrera through 
Monte Real and EH] Cobre, on the roads which lead to the city on 
that side, and to the east, from Daiquiri through Vinent and Fir- 
meza to the harbor of Escandell. 

On the 22d the first companies of the Spanish fleet disem baeeeen 
_with a force of about 130 men each, under orders of the third com- 
manders of the ships respectively; two companies were stationed 
at San Miguel de Paradas, to guard the coast west of the bay and 
assist the Socapa or the city; the third company at the Socapa, to 
reenforce that point, and the fourth and last company at Las Cruces, 
to assist the Morro, Aguadores, or the city. 

At night of the same day, the second companies disembarked, 
including men from the Mercedes and the destroyers, a total of 450, 
who, under command of Capt. Joaquin Bustamante, went the fol- 
lowing day to occupy the line from Dos Caminos del Cobre to the 
Plaza de Toros; that is, south and southwest of the precinct. 


71 


The only forces in the Santiago district prior to the declaration 
of the present war were nine companies of mobilized troops and 
two of the Santiago Regiment, to garrison the city and the forts of 
the precinct, besides a small number of the Civil Guard and a few 
artillerymen, and as much cavalry as was indispensable for convoy 
and other services properly belonging to the cavalry. 

When war was declared, six more companies of the Santiago 
regiment came forthe purpose of commencing the fortification works 
of the precinct of the city, under the directions of the chiefs and 
officers of the corps of engineers; another company was occupying 
the position of Ermitafio (east of the city) and another was at 
Socorro. 

I believe I have already stated that by orders of General Linares . 
the Talavera battalion had come from Baracoa and was stationed, 
with three companies of mobilized troops, along the coast to watch 
the same, occupying Daiquiri, Siboney, the railroads, and the forts. 

The Asiatic battalion, in command of Colonel Aldea, took up its 
position of observation west of Santiago: Four companies, with 
the colonel at Punta Cabrera, covering the coast road; another, 
with one mobilized company, occupying Mazamorra, both to be 
ready to reenforce the former four or the forces at the Socapa, if 
necessary, and to prevent in due time a landing at Cabafias; 
another occupied the camp at Monte Real, and finally another, 
with one mobilized company, garrisoned El Cobre. With these 
forces all the roads leading to Santiago from the west had to be 
covered. 

Gradually, as information was being received concerning the 
enemy’s plans, the available forces of the San Luis brigade, in 
command of General Vara del Rey, were concentrated in the 
district. 

First, four companies of the Provincial Battalion of Puerto Rico 
(No. 1) arrived, one company remaining at El Cristo and one at 
Songo, both of them occupying also the forts on the railroad of 
both towns. Later came three companies of the San Fernando 
battalion, one remaining at El] Cristo and two at Palma Soriano. 
Finally, General Vara del Rey, with three companies of the twenty- 
ninth regiment (Constitucién), one company of guerrillas on foot, 
and two Plasencia guns, occupied El Caney, where there were only 
40 men of the Santiago regiment and 50 of the mobilized troops, 
leaving three companies of the twenty-ninth regiment at the towns 
of San Luis, Dos Caminos, and Morén. Two squads of cavalry 
were distributed in said three towns. 

It is only necessary to cast a glance at the chart, without much 
study, to understand that the line which our troops occupied was 
too extensive to be solidly covered and effectively defended by such 
small forces. 


(2 


Why did General Linares not limit it and occupy positions closer 
to the precinct and more susceptible of effective defense? Fora 
reason which outweighs all others. He could not do so without 
condemning its defenders from the outset to an inevitable disaster. 

I will repeat once more—for to this must be attributed the 
reverses we suffered—that there was nothing left in Santiago 
except rice, and only 500,000 extra cartridges outside of the regu- 
lar supply of the soldiers, namely, 150 each; for although there 
were many more included in the surrender of the Park, they are 
of the Remington, Argentine Mauser, and other types, and of cali- 
bers differing from those of the Spanish Mauser, which is the 
weapon carried by almost all of our forces. Of course, 150 car- 
tridges are used up very rapidly. It was the scarcity of provis- 
ions, confined almost entirely to rice, which, more than anything 
else, compelled General Linares to defend the line which, begin- 
ning at Ermitafio and passing through El Caney, San Miguel de 
Lajas, Quintero Hill and the hills of La Caridad and Veguita, 
would protect the railway to Sabanilla and” Morén and the aque- 
duct. Ifthe troops could have maintained this line, they would not 
have suffered for lack of water, as they did in some positions, nor 
would the food, as long as we remained in possession of the culti- 
vated region, have been reduced to rice bread and rice boiled in 
water, which the soldiers could not stand and which made them 
unfit for the active operations necessary in war. 

The Morro and the Socapa had to be not only occupied, but well 
protected; they were the key to the harbor. If the enemy had 
taken possession of them, it would have been easy to remove the 
torpedoes and force the bay, and then the city and its defenders 
would necessarily have had to surrender. 

It was equally necessary to occupy Daiquiri, Siboney, and Agua- 
dores, so as not to allow the enemy to make a landing at any of 
them with impunity (as they did after all, supported by the war 
ships, at the first-named place) and gain possession of the railroad. 
For the same reasons also, it was necessary to cover the landing 
places of Cabafias and Guaicabén (near Punta Cabrera), as also 
the west coast of the bay, and preserve the railroads leading to 
the city. 

All this proves that it was not only desirable, but absolutely 
necessary to defend said line. To give it up would have meant to 
be resigned from the outset to perish from hunger, and perhaps 
from thirst, which is worse. 

If Kl Caney and the San Juan position had not been taken we 
should not have lost our communications with the cultivated 
region, nor would the aqueduct have been cut, and it is easy 
enough to understand how much these two things had to do with 


73 


later events, and how different the situation would have been with- 
out them. Unfortunately the small number of our forces made 
it impossible to save these positions. 

The ships would no doubt have reduced the city to ashes and 
ruin, but there would have been water and more provisions, and 
the army would have been able to maintain itself and fight, at 
least until the last cartridge was gone. 

Unfortunately the insurgents, firing from ambush, as usual, 
on General (then Colonel) Escario’s column, succeeded ‘in delaying 
its march long enough so that it could not arrive before the 1st of 
July. Fate is not always just. 


XXII. 


EVENTS OF JUNE 22p TO 27 Tu. 


The reader being acquainted with the number of our troops, the 
positions they occupied and the sites they covered and their object, 
it will not be difficult to understand and appreciate the operations 
carried on and the events taking place here. 

On the evening of the 21st it was learned, as has been stated, 
that the enemy was effecting a landing at Punta Berracos. 

June 22d.—At 6.30, the usual ships were opposite the mouth of 
the harbor; in Aguadores Bay there were two yachts and one 
monitor; at Punta Berracos, the 42 vessels of the convoy, among 
them the Saint Louis, with the Indiana. <A steamer, with tugs, 
could also be seen. We therefore knew that the landing was being 
effected. We also saw the house on fire that the English had on 
San Juan river. 

At 8 the enemy opened fire and Punta Gorda answered. 

At the same time, one ship fired upon Aguadores. 

The Brooklyn, Iowa, and Texas were firing on the Morro and 
Socapa, and the batteries were answering. 

At noon the firing ceased.in the mouth of the harbor. 

Punta Gorda only fired five shots. 

The firing continued on the coast toward the east. 

During the day the first companies of the Spanish fleet (4 com- 
panies, about 520 men) disembarked. At midnight the second 
companies (about 450 men) disembarked. It has already been 
stated what part of the ground they were to cover. 

At 11 o’clock p. m. two shots were heard and a loud detonation, 
followed by a noise resembling that of a screw revolving in the 
air. Shortly after, another similar detonation was heard. 

238d.—Opposite the Morro entrance, and at a distance of about 6 
miles from it, 8 battle ships, 2 destroyers, the Vesuvius, and 8 
merchant vessels. The rest, as many as 63, continued the landing 
on the coast, protected by some of the war ships. 

At 2.30 a yacht, with a white flag, left the fleet and approached 
the Morro. The tug Col6n went out to speak with her. At this 
time there were 24 ships opposite the harbor. 

During the night the enemy examined the coast again by means 
of search lights. 

24th.—EHight battle ships, 2 destroyers, the Veswvius (which, at 
11 o’clock on the previous night, had thrown two dynamite bombs 


(74) 


75 


on the port, fortunately without doing any harm) and 12 merchant 
vessels, are guarding the mouth of the harbor, stretched out from 
Aguadores to Punta Cabrera. The others, as many as 63, among 
them six war ships protecting them, continued the landing at 
Daiquiri. 

The yacht that came up yesterday with a flag of truce was sent 
by Admiral Sampson, who inquired whether the lieutenant who 
had been made prisoner was being kept in the Morro. Mr. Concas, 
who was delegated to parley, answered evasively, as was natural, 
that the prisoner was in a safe place. 

At 11.55 the Brooklyn opened a slow fire on Daiquiri and adjoin- 
ing points on the coast. 

At 1.30 the firing ceased. 

At 1.55 it was again heard in the same direction, ceasing at 2.30. 

At night the hostile fleet used the projectors again. 

25th.—At 4 a.m. 14 shots were heard in the direction of Daiquiri. 
It was presumed that they were firing on General Rubin’s column. 

At daybreak there were at the mouth of the harbor 8 battle ships 
and 12 merchant vessels. 

From 12.30 to 2 o’clock the hostile fleet kept up a slow fire on 
the coast from Aguadores to Daiquiri. 

It was noticed that the vessels landing troops or material were 
going back and forth, so we felt sure that new reenforcements 
were constantly arriving from the United States. 

26th.—At daybreak the New York, Brooklyn, Indiana, Oregon, 
Massachusetts, Texas, Vesuvius, 1 monitor, and 6 merchant ves- 
sels were in front of the harbor. To the east, in the direction of 
Berracos, 11 steamers could be seen, and 8 at Daiquiri, inside of the 
roadstead. 

The Vesuvius had discharged two bombs the preceding night, 
one completely destroying the house of the lighthouse keeper, the 
other seriously damaging the fortress, wounding three sailors of 
the Mercedes and a soldier of the garrison. 

27th.—The same ships blockading the harbor®as the preceding 
day. 

During the night the Vesuvius threw 3 dynamite bombs, doing 
no damage, as they fell in the water, although inside of the harbor. 

The search lights were going again during the night. 

On the evening of the 21st the enemy had commenced to effect 
the disembarkation of the landing expedition (which according to 
New York newspapers consisted of 50,000 men), and in order to do 
so in perfect security, even though they had in all 63 vessels, count- 
ing both merchant and war ships, they landed them at Punta Berra- 
cos, 20 miles from Santiago, in spite of there being no water and 


76 


no roads, because our troops, few in number, could not cover such 
an extensive region. 

To assist the landing, the ships were firing on the whole coast 
from Berracos, east of Santiago, to Punta Cabrera, 27 miles west. 
How could we cover so many threatened points and occupy so 
extensive a territory? Impossible, even if we had had much supe- 
rior forces than we did. 

The battle ships, always in imposing numbers, remained in front 
of the harbor so as to keep our fleet in. The war ships were pro- 
tecting the landing, and as they controlled the sea it was impossi- 
ble for soldiers with small arms to prevent it. 

How many men did the Americans disembark ?: 

As Santiago was cut off from the rest of the world, or almost so, 
it was not easy to ascertain the exact number, nor was it neces- 
sary. The vessels of the convoy, as soon as they had landed men 
and material, returned to the United States and came back with 
fresh contingents. But it may be safely stated that the first 
expedition consisted of at least 15,000 men, with more or less war 
material. 

I base this estimate on the fact that forty-three vessels arrived, 
including six war ships apparently convoying them, and although 
the latter can, and generally do transport troops, I do not count 
them, nor do I count five small tugs; hence there remain thirty- 
two of all sizes, and modern steamers can surely carry on an aver- 
age not less than 1,000 men each, especially in view of the short 
distance from Key West to Santiago and the fine weather prevail- 
ing. But taking into consideration the circumstance that they 
had to carry war material as well, I will reduce the figure to one- 
half, namely, 500 men to each steamer, and there would still be 
16,000. There can be no doubt, as everybody will admit, that, if 
I err in my calculation, my figures are below rather than above 
the actual number. Moreover, as I have said, this matter is not 
of great importance, for new contingents kept constantly arriving, 
and the American® also knew that the insurgents, who were await- 
ing their arrival, would swell their forces. | 

Every night, with great regularity (between 11 and 3), one 
Vesuvius threw her three dynamite bombs on the batteries at the 
mouth of the harbor, with the greatest humanity possible, for it 
will be remembered that such was the pretext of this war. For 
that purpose she would come close to the coast, accompanied by 
another ship, usually a battle ship—for the mission of the Vesu- 
vius is only the offensive, she has no defensive qualities—and as 
soon as she was within convenient distance she would discharge 
three tubes at regular intervals. If the projectiles dropped close 
to a battery its ruin was certain, for one must see the effects of 


igre 


one of these projectiles to understand them. Fortunately, they 
do not appear to be very sure, either in range or in aim. 

On the sea, matters continued in the same condition. Let us now 
see the operations carried out on land by the Army forces during 
this period, the latter events taking place at diametrically opposed 
points. 

On the 22d Daiquiri and Siboney were bombarded by the ships. 
At the same time the enemy appeared at the former place. As the 
force guarding it could not cope with the ships, it retreated by way 
of Vinnent to Firmeza, gathering up all the detachments from the 
forts. 

General Rubin, with three companies of the provisional battalion 
of Puerto Rico, three of San Fernando, and two artillery guns 
(Plasencia), proceeded to Siboney. There he received orders to 
proceed with his column and with the whole force in the mineral 
region to the heights of Sevilla before daybreak, where they were 
to take position in three echelons, the foremost one under Com- 
mander Alcafiiz, formed of the three companies of Puerto Rico and 
one mobilized company. 

On the 23d this echelon alone checked the enemy’s advance in 
the morning, and again in the evening, the echelon having been 
reenforced by one company from San Fernando, half engineers, and 
two guns. When the battle was over the forces withdrew to their 
former positions, the echelon remaining on the same site. 

At daybreak on the 24th the echelon was reenforced by two com- 
panies from Talavero, and not only resisted a strong attack of the 
enemy, but also forced the latter to retreat. 

In spite of this advantage they received orders to withdraw be- 
cause the enemy was approaching the Morro by rail, and as there 
“were not forces enough to oppose him, it would have been sur- 
rounded. In compliance with the order received the column with- 
drew to the city. 

The official report of this battle is as follows: 

‘“General Rubin’s column, under orders of the commander in 
chief of the Fourth Army Corps, was attacked yesterday at noon 
and in the evening. 

‘This morning considerable forces with artillery guns made a 
resolute attack and were repulsed, losing many men. 

‘On our side we had in the two days seven dead; José Lancés, 
captain of the provisional battalion of Puerto Rico, and Zenon 
Borregén, second lieutenant of the same battalion, seriously 
wounded; Francisco las Tortas, first lieutenant of the regiment of 
Royal Artillery, slightly wounded ; two privates seriously wounded, 
two slightly wounded. Various contusions.” 


78 


Later on it was learned that the forces which attacked General 
Rubin’s column, or rather the echelon of the same, under Com- 
mander Alcafiiz, were as follows: 

The seventh, twelfth, and seventeenth regiments of United States 
infantry, the second Massachusetts, the seventy-first New York, 
and 16 dismounted squadrons. 

On the 26th the following was published: 

‘““General order of the Fourth Army Corps, dated June 26, at 
Santiago de Cuba: 

‘‘Soldiers: We left the mineral region because I did not wish to 
sacrifice your lives in vain in unequal battle, with musket fire, 
against the pompous superiority of the enemy, who was fighting 
us under cover of his armored ships, armed with the most modern 
and powerful guns. 

‘“The enemy, rid of our presence at the points referred to, has 
already landed his troops and proposes to take the city of Santiago. 

‘The encounter is at hand and it will take place under equal 
conditions. 

‘“ Your military virtues and your valor are the best guarantee of 
success. 

‘Let us defend the right, ignored and trampled upon by the 
Americans, who have united themselves with the Cuban rebels. 

‘“The nation and the army look to us. 

‘*More than a thousand sailors, disembarked from the fleet, will 
assist us. Volunteers and firemen will take part in the task of 
repulsing and defeating the enemies of Spain. 

‘The other division of this army corps is hastening toward us 
to reenforce us. 

‘*T make no recommendations, because I feel sure that all will vie 
in the defense of their posts with firmness and resolve; but I will 
say that those assigned to any position, be it in the precincts of 
the city or at the foremost points, must stand firm at any cost, 
without vacillating, without thinking of retreating, but only-of 
saving the honor of our arms. 

‘“‘T shall comply with my duties, and, in conclusion, I say with 
all, Long live Spain! 

‘* LINARES. 


‘“The foregoing was published to-day, by order of His Excellency, 


for the information of all. 
‘VENTURA FONTAN, 


‘* Treutenant Colonel, chief of staff.” 


In order to convey a better understanding of the foregoing oper- 
ations of General Rubin’s column, I will give below a copy of the 
instructions and orders which said general received from General 


19 


Linares, all of which were drawn up in camp and written with 
lead pencil. 

They are as follows: 

‘*Pozo, June 28, 1898. 

‘Civilians have handed to me the paper which you wrote to me, 
and we have heard firing since a quarter to five, and afterwards 
gun fire. 

‘‘T have impressed upon Colonel Borry to guard well the path 
or road to the Redonda, where he is encamped, so that the troops 
of the line, if they should find Sardinero occupied, can take that 
road to the Redonda. 

‘‘T have sent to Santiago for all the transport mules and ten 
carts, which will be at your camp by 7.30 or 8 o’clock. You will 
have the sick ready, and also the ammunition, so that they may 
at once be taken to Santiago, with the same convoy that will go 
with the mules. 

‘Make arrangements to have the first mess of the morning taken 


there and then you will receive further orders. 
‘© LINARES. 
‘To GENERAL ANTERO RUBIN.” 


(Seal: ‘‘Army of Operations of Santiago—4th Army Corps— 
General Staff.’’) 

‘‘After eating the first mess you will march with the whole 
column to Santiago, effecting a retreat from that point by eche- 
lons as carefully and slowly as may be necessary, so as to be in 
good condition to repulse any attack of the enemy. 

‘‘The Talavero Battalion will go to Suefio and will there meet 
the chief of the town, who will indicate to it the points to be 
occupied. 

“The Puerto Rico Battalion, with the two mobilized companies 
from the mineral region, will proceed to Cafiadas and will there 
receive orders concerning the points it is to occupy, and the San 
Fernando Battalion is to proceed to Central Benéfico, and will also 
receive instructions. The section of artillery will go to the quar- 
ters at Dolores. The section of engineers will proceed to Cruces, 
taking quarters in the offices of the mineral company. 

** LINARES. 

‘Pozo, June 24, 1898. 

‘‘Nore: The captain of engineers is to return to Santiago with 
the convoy of sick and to report to Colonel Caula. 


‘“T,> GENERAL ANTERO DEL RUBIN.” 


80 


(Seal: ‘‘Army of Operations of Santiago—4th Army Corps— 
General Staff.”’) 


‘“You have already received orders to retreat, which is to be 
done when the convoy of sick has started under the protection of 
two mobilized companies and one Talavero company. 

‘*The whole train will retreat first, and upon arriving at San- 
tiago, they will go to the points designated, and with the three 
echelons of Puerto Rico, San Fernando, and Talavero, you will 
make the retreat, alternating by echelons in such manner that 
when the forward echelon leaves a position the other two will be 
in position, until arriving at Santiago. There I shall await you. 


‘* LINARES. 
‘“*To GENERAL RUBIN.” 


XXITI. 
END OF THE MONTH OF JUNE. 


June 28th.—The Morro said that the Massachusetts, which had 
been gone, had returned; that the Jowa had left instead, and that 
at 7 a. m. a merchant vessel was embarking the sick of the fleet, 
estimated at about 50, judging from what could be made out with 
the help of glasses; that to the east, at a distance, the ships were 
firing slowly. 

During the night they continued to watch with search lights. 

29th.—The Iowa returned. 

In the evening, firing on Daiquiri was heard. 

30th.—The same ships are blockading the harbor. 

The Morro said that at 3 p. m. a steamer was sighted to the 
south; that, when she saw the American fleet, she shaped her 
course eastward at full speed; that a yacht and a battleship went 
out to chase her; that the latter returned with the steamer which, 
with the American flag hoisted, joined the convoy at Daiquiri. 

At 8 p.m. a few musket shots were heard in the direction of 
Campo de Marte (east of the city). 

Later the sound came from the Plaza de Toros (northeast). 

At 9 firing was again heard at the cemetery (to the north). 

Nothing further occurred. 

The last three days of the month of June are devoid of interest 
and we enjoyed unusual quiet. So much had the people of San- 
tiago become accustomed to the sound of gunshots that they almost 
missed then. 

' But how true it is that when a calm comes after a storm, it is 
often only the precursor of another storm. The enemy was prepar- 
ing to begin the month of July ina manner that Santiago de Cuba 
will remember many a day. 

The hostile fleet continued to antagonize the coast as usual. 
But without neglecting their main objective and their constant 
care, that of watching our fleet, which, being short of provisions, 
would sooner or later be compelled to take some decisive action, 
they were gathering at the entrance of the harbor a large number 
of their most powerful ships, and the army, no doubt intrenching 
itself at Daiquiri, so as to have another shelter besides that of the 


10845——6 (81) 


82 


ships, and a safe base of operations, was preparing to attack the 
city, supported by the insurgents who had joined them in large 
numbers under their leaders Calixto Garcia, Demetrio Castillo, 
Cebrecos, and others less known. 

This is proved by the musket fire which was heard a short dis- 
tance from the city, to the northeast, on the night of the 30th. 

From the news we had received from the Morro it might have 
been inferred that about 3 o’clock in the afternoon of that same 
day, the hostile fleet had captured a merchant vessel, which, after 
the American flag had been hoisted upon her, joined the convoy; 
but thisis not probable. Aside from the fact that the flag of a ship 
is not changed as easily as that, the truth would have become 
known sooner or later. It is more probable that it was a vessel that 
was not expected and they went out to reconnoitre. Thatismy 
opinion about this incident, which, in reality, is not of much 
importance. 

A few words more about the Vesuvius that gave us so much 
trouble for a few nights—that time, it seems, suiting her best to 
carry out her exploits. This ship is the only one of her class; her 
projectiles and the apparatus throwing them are not known, and 
shehasmadeherdébuthere. One of the projectiles which fellon the 
northern slope of the Socapa, tore up trees right and left for a dis- 
tance of about 20 metres. From a certain distance, as I could see 
the day I went to the Mercedes, it looked as though a road had 
been opened across the mountain. 

Another, which fell a short distance from the one just referred 
to, made an excavation, not very deep, but very wide; I was told 
thatit would hold twenty horses. This would seem to indicate that 
the screw with which they are provided keeps on revolving even on 
solid ground.* 

Still another dropped in the water, but close to one of the destroy- 
ers, which was violently shaken, as also the Mercedes, anchored at 
a short distance. I heard this from the commander of the former 
and the officers of the latter. 

The forces of the army which, as has been stated, abandoned the 
mineral region, not being able to maintain it, concentrated in the 
city, preserving, as was indispensable, the line from Aguadores to 
Cruces, after destroying the bridge at the former point. The line 
(4 kilometers) was covered by six companies of the Santiago regi- 
ment and two of mobilized troops, a total contingent of about 800 
men. 


* The reference to the ‘‘screw” in this paragraph probably refers to the vanes 
or feathers on the rear end of these shells. They are for the purpose of giving ~ 
the shell rotation in its et and being fixed to the shell they have no inde- 
pendent motion.—O, N. I 


83 


The advance post of El Caney (a league and a half, about 6 miles, 
from the city), in command of General Vara del Rey, was defended 
by three companies of the battalion ‘‘Constitucién” (the 29th), 
one company of guerrillas on foot, in all 430 men, 40 soldiers of 
the Santiago regiment and 50 of the mobilized troops, being a total 
of 520 men. 

The line of the precinct (9 kilometers), extending from Dos 
Caminos del Cobre, west of the city, to the fort of Punta Blanca, 
to the east, on the seashore, was defended by the following forces: 





Corps of sailors from the fleet (four second companies) .---------- 458 
Four companies of the Provisional Battalion of Puerto Rico----- 450 
amunvera battalion, No. 4 (Peninsular) ---_ 2.-2-22-2- 22 2. 850 
Four companies of the San Fernando Battalion, No. 11.--------- 440 

SAL, SRT ull ha IRN igs Ages AE LAR gle a gene ae ees SN ae eee’! 
Three companies of mobilized troops-----.-.-------------------- 330 
(NES eg enh APES Ppa anes eee ei een eee eee eeces ere it] 

es es eee ee ees eee ee en ee ane oan co en Geen 2, 968 


Also a small number of gunners, for there was not a sufficient 
number to serve the guns installed, the number and place of which 
has been mentioned. It may therefore be said that there were, in 
round numbers, 3,000 men. 

This was the fighting force. Within the city was the cavalry 
force (for which the ground, being hilly and cut up by trenches, 
was not adapted), and a small force of the civil guard assigned to 
duty in the city, and the firemen with their engines in readiness. 

This line is divided into sections in command of colonels. 

Of the 3,000 men defending it, two companies, one of the Pro- 
visional Battalion of Puerto Rico and the other of the Talavera 
Battalion, defended the advance position at San Juan, one being 
assigned to the right, the other to the left side of the road. 

Finally, at the Socapa, that is, at points in an opposite direction 
from that line, there were 400 men, 450 at the Morro, and 120 at 
Punta Gorda. It must be remembered that these three positions 
overlook the entrance of the harbor, and are its key, and must for 
that reason be maintained at any cost; and these forces were in- 
dispensable there, as the enemy might attack them, as indeed he 
did attack them the next day. 

The same day, the 30th, the following telegram, addressed to 
the aid of marine (ayudante de marina) of that district, was re- 
ceived at the comandancia de marina from Manzanillo: 
‘*COMMANDER MARINE, Santiago: 

‘*Last evening, for about an hour, we sustained in the waters of 
this harbor a battle against three hostile vessels of medium ton- 
nage, which passed, at a distance of about a mile from the head of 
the piers, in a northeasterly direction, under low steam. 


84 

‘“‘The following took part: Gunboats Guanténamo, Estrella, and 
Delgado-Parejo, under my command, and a group,of vessels that 
were disabled, consisting of the pontoon Maria and gunboats Cuba 
Espaftola and Guardian. With the former three we arrived in 
time at the other group, as the enemy passed by, who, finding him- 
self attacked, stopped his progress only a short time on account of 
an injury which our vessels had inflicted on the second of theirs, 
which made it necessary for the third one to tow her to windward, 
and then, with slow speed, though keeping up a steady fire during 
the retreat, they doubled the headland northeast of the Manza- 
nillo Cays, heading north, and soon disappeared from sight. The 
city cooperated efficiently with the few guns it has. We had two 
dead, two slightly wounded, and one bruised, on the Delgado- 
Parejo; two slightly wounded and two contusions on the other 
ships; in the city, a few wounded; injuries to all the ships, but - 


not material. 
‘““BARREDA.” 


XXIV. 


BATTLES OF EL CANEY AND SAN JUAN. | 


July 1st.—At % gun and musket fire were being heard in the 
direction of the Plaza de Marte (east of the city). 

According to the Morro the Minneapolis arrived to reenforce 
the hostile fleet. 

At the commandancia de marina we could hear a slow gun and 
steady musket fire in the direction of Campo de Marte. 

The enemy had a captive balloon, from which he observed our 
positions; from the Reina Mercedes headquarters (converted into 
a hospital) it could be plainly seen. It was in the direction of 
Sevilla. 

The American fleet is firing from Aguadores, the greater part 
of the projectiles passing over the city. Others fall inside, some 
exploding and some not. Many have already fallen in the houses, 
among others a 20-cm. shell, which fell in the house of the chief 
pilot of the port, but did not explode. The ships firing from 
Aguadores are the New York and the Oregon. 

The streets of the city are almost deserted; only soldiers and 
volunteers are seen as they go to their posts. As usual, many 
projectiles are falling in the bay near our fleet. 

The firing from the ships ceased at 11. 

At 2 intense musket-fire was heard in the direction of Hl Caney; 
at 2:30 also gun-fire. 

By 8 o’clock the musket-fire became steadier; constant volleys 
were being heard; at 4 it became less intense. 

At 10 p. m. General Cervera left his ship, returning at 12. 

On July 1st, at 6 a. m., the nucleus of the hostile army under 
command of General Shafter, and which must have consisted of 
at least 15,000 men, with many modern guns, without including 
the insurgent parties, attacked the lines of the precinct east and 
east-northeast of the city, that is El Caney, defended by General 
Vara del Rey with 520 men and two Plasencia guns, and the position 
of San Juan, occupied by two companies comprising 250 soldiers. 

The attack which the Americans made with 12,000 men, as stated 
by themselves, was commanded by General Wheeler, second in 


command of the army. 
(85) 


86 


A brigade of 3,500 men, also under the orders of said Genera, 
Wheeler, and supported by another, directed its efforts upon El 
Caney, while Colonel Chaffee with 2,000 men attacked the hill and 
fort of San Juan. 

The Americans, it must be acknowledged, fought that day with 
truly admirable courage and spirit. The houses of El Caney, 
which General Vara with his 520 men converted into as many 
fortresses, threw forth a hail of projectiles upon the enemy, while 
one company after another, without any protection, rushed with 
veritable fury upon the city. The first company haying been deci- 
mated, another appeared, then a third, and still another, and those 
soldiers resembled moving statues (if I may be permitted that 
expression for want of a better) rather than men; but they met 
heroes,-and although the houses had been riddled with bullets 
by the artillery and musketry, and although the streets were 
obstructed with dead and wounded, El Caney had been converted 
into a veritable volcano, vomiting forth lava and making it impos- 
sible to go near it. 

Both sides being short of forces and out of breath, almost with- 
out having stirred from their relative positions, the battle ceased 
for some time, and General Vara del Rey took advantage of this 
circumstance to have his soldiers re-form the lines and again get 
ready for the battle. 

General Linares, who was repulsing the attacks at the position 
of San Juan, upon learning the result of these assaults, warmly 
congratulated the handful of lions in these words: ‘‘When the 
American army attacked El Caney they had not counted on a 
general of Vara del Rey’s stamp and on troops as fiery and inured 
to warfare as those he had under his command.” 

The fight commenced once more and the enemy attacked again 
and again, being always repulsed, but as we had no reserve forces, 
and the Americans, on the contrary, had a great many, the battle 
was no longer possible under these circumstances. The General 
was wounded almost simultaneously in both legs by two musket 
balls, and as he was being carried away on a stretcher, the bullets 
falling around him like hail, he was killed by a third one, at the 
same moment as two of the men who were carrying him. The 
greater part of the commanders and officers (among them two rela- 
tives of the General) were dead or wounded, as also the majority 
of the soldiers. Finally, at 7 p. m., the commander being dead 
and those 520 men having been reduced to less than 100 and most 
of these slightly wounded and bruised, that handful of heroes, for 
want of forces and a commander, retreated from the site, which 
for ten hours they had been defending without being able to get 
any reenforcements, for there were none to be had, and the enemy 


87 


occupied the position on which he, in his turn, had made such a 
bold attack. 

Of the 520 defenders of El Caney only 80 returned, most of them 
crippled and bruised. The Americans acknowledged that they 
had 900 casualties. 

As has been stated, 2,000 men under the command of Colonel 
Chaffee, well protected, attacked in the morning the position of 
San Juan with the same spirit and enthusiasm with which Wheel- 
er’s men made the attack on El Caney. ; 

Our headquarters were situated in an excellent position, at the 
crossing of the roads to El Caney and Pozo. General Linares had 
no available reserves; he therefore formed the echelon close to the 
‘ positions of San Juan where he could observe the movements of 
the enemy and assist personally at points where his presence might 
be necessary. 

With him was General Ordofiez with two rapid-fire guns. 

In the foremost echelon at San Juan was Colonel José Baquero, 
of the Simancas regiment of infantry, who had come from Guan. 
tinamo with a message, and could not return on account of the 
blockade. This echelon was two companies strong, and before the 
Americans opened fire, it was reenforced by another company. It 
is here that Colonel Ordofiez was, with the rapid-fire division; the 
position being defended by 300 infantry and two guns. 

The echelon nearest San Juan consisted of three companies of 
Talavero, one company with General Linares to the right of the 
Pozo road, forming an angle, in order to prevent a surrounding 
movement on the part of the enemy from the right of San Juan; 
another at the angle of the two roads referred to, and a third at 
Veguita toward El Caney, crossing their fire with that of the forces 
at Suefio. 

In view of the small numbers of our forces and the ever increas- 
ing numbers of those of the Americans and their war material, we 
reenforced our positions by some trenches, under shelter of which 
we might be able to prolong the fight for a longer time. 

The cavalry formed the third line at the fort of Canosa, pro- 
tected by a small hill. 

After the cannonade of the morning, in which our guns with 
accurate aim succeeded in causing the enemy many casualties and 
silencing the fire of one of his batteries erected at Pozo, and when 
the Americans had brought together considerable forces of infantry, 
they attacked about noon with cannon, machine-gun, and musket 
fire. 

The situation of the line commanded by Baquero was critical. 
Colonel Ordofiez and the commander of the Puerto Rico battalion, 
Mr. Lamadrid, had been wounded. One-half of the officers had 


88 


also fallen under the action of the lead that was pouring down 
upon the line. The enemy was advancing in large and compact 
masses, firmly resolved to take the positions, but Baquero, the 
brave soldier, who had distinguished himself so highly in the cam- 
paign, was there, keeping up by his example the spirit of the 
troops, almost annihilated by hunger and fatigue, and decimated 
by the clouds of bullets and grapeshot. 

At this critical moment the cavalry was ordered to advance rap- 
idly in order to protect the retreat of Colonel Baquero’s forces and 
save the artillery if possible. Lieutenant Colonel Sierra hastened - 
to carry out the order, as Commander Arraiz had done before him 
at San Juan. : 

The line which General Linares commanded personally now 
formed the vanguard. With his assistance the General’s aids and 
his chief of staff had to organize the remnants of the first line. 

It was necessary to maintain that position at any cost, for its 
loss would give the enemy free entrance into the city. The brave 
men of the first line were retreating. Colonel Baquero had dis- 
. appeared, killed, no doubt, when he led that retreat under the hail 
of grapeshot and lead. ‘The enemy was advancing in compact 
masses, and rushing upon what was now the first line. Fortunately 
the fire of our infantry, accurately aimed, compelled the Ameri- 
cans to recede, and they retreated behind the positions of San 
Juan. At that moment General Linares and the brave com- 
mander of infantry, Arraiz, fell wounded; the latter officer, who 
had already shed his blood at Cacarajicara, was one of the most 
beautiful examples of the army. 

While these cruel battles of El Caney and San Juan were carried 
on the enemy sent forces against our whole line, for the purpose, no 
doubt, of harassing us and making the attack more general. 

The San Juan forces tried once more to recover themselves. 
Others came to their assistance, among them the company of 
marines which had been stationed at the Plaza de Toros with Cap- 
tain Bustamante; but the enemy was already strongly occupying 
the position, our forces were scant, and success was impossible. 
Our artillery was steadily firing at many points of the line, load- 
ing the guns (old ones, as has been stated) without any protection, 
but the fire was extremely slow and therefore of little efficacy. 

At 3.30 p.m. I went toward the Campo de Marte, impatient to 
learn what had happened. At the Plaza de Dolores I met General 
Linares. His arm, which had been seriously wounded in the first 
trenches, as stated, had been dressed at the military hospital and 
he was now being taken to his house on a stretcher, escorted by a 
few horsemen, 


89 


When I arrived at the end of Enramadas street and was only a 
few feet from a trench of the third line, covered by a section of 
volunteers, I saw a part of the battlefield. The musket fire was 
very slow, and although Santa Ursula fort, situated to the right 
and somewhat in the rear of the trenches referred to, was firing 
as rapidly as its muzzle-loading guns permitted, it will be easily 
understood that there was no new attack that day. 

I then went to the headquarters of the cavalry, at the entrance 
of El Caney road, where a section of the cavalrymen were ready to 
‘hasten wherever they might be ordered. 

It may be said that the battle was at an end and many com- 
manders and officers were arriving, all tired out and almost dying 
from thirst. Among others, I saw Commander Irlés, of the 
general staff, who had had either one or two horses killed under 
him, and there I learned that the number of commanders and offi- 
cers wounded had been comparatively very large. Mr. Molina, 
lieutenant colonel of the civil guard, arrived and said that Com- 
mander Bustamante of the navy had been seriously wounded and 
was being carried on a stretcher. My consternation may be 
imagined. I hurried out to meet him and found him a few min- 
utes later. In spite of the heat, he had been wearing his blue- 
cloth suit in the fight, by which he could be easily distinguished 
from all others. He was covered with blood, pale and disfigured, 
his eyes closed, and without his saber and revolver. I learned 
that before he was wounded his horse was killed under him and 
his hat shot through. I accompanied him to the military hos- 
pital. In spite of his insignias of a commander, nobody paid 
much attention to him. This can be readily understood, for that 
day, in a short time, over 300 wounded had been received, and 
they were still coming. It was difficult to find beds and the 
attendant personnel, although increasing, was not sufficient to 
look after all. 

I succeeded in finding Antonio Cafiaz, the surgeon of marine, 
whom I know, and in whom I have unlimited confidence, and 
thanks to him, the wounded man was placed on a bed and his 
clothes taken off. They had to be cut with scissors. The wound 
was in the right side of the abdomen; his legs were covered with 
blood. The position of the bullet, the aspect of the wounded man, 
and above all the look with which Dr. Cafiaz answered mine, left 
meno doubt. I knew that he had only a few moments to live and 
I left the hospital deeply affected. 

I will add that, as the hospital was situated in the sector 
attacked by the enemy and near the trenches, being outside the 
city, musket balls were falling in great quantities in the court 
and on the roof; later on, shells were flying over it in all 
directions, 


90 


As has been seen, two battle ships from Aguadores were throw- 
ing projectiles upon the city and the bay, causing victims among 
the inhabitants and damages to the buildings. As I went to the 
captaincy of the port in the morning when the firing commenced, 
I saw at the ambulance improvised at the Bottino pharmacy, a 
woman who was having her head dressed, which had been struck 
by a fragment of shell. The wound, although not deep, was wide, 
and looked as though made with a razor. 

At nightfall the firing ceased along the whole line. 

Such were the battles of that day, so serious by reason of the | 
blood that had been shed, as well as by their results. 

With the loss of El Caney, we lost the line which it had been 
so imperative for us to keep, and also the aqueduct and the region 
under cultivation—that is, provisions and water. We had to con- 
fine ourselves to the defense of the precinct, knowing full well 
that, though the sad end might be held off for a day or two longer, 
there was no possibility of avoiding it. 

Our casualties were as follows: 

Killed: Brigadier General Joaquin Vara del Rey,3 commanders, 
12 officers, and 78 men. 

Missing: Colonel of Infantry José Baquero, 4 officers, and 116 
men. The colonel was probably killed, but this could not be 
verified. 

Prisoners: Two officers. | 

Wounded: Lieutenant General Arsenio Linares Pombo, 6 com- 
manders, 30 officers, and 339 men. 

(Among the wounded officers was Colonel of Engineers Caula 
and Colonel of Artillery Ordofiez.) 


TOTAL CASUALTIES. 


Grenerals teideens. 220 BSS See. Se Mi 2 
COMMBNGOTSS =. 22 23s 3 sacs ok eee eos eee eee 10 
OTA COTS oo Sin oo wl ooo Se ee es ee 48 
MG ek be oun woe eh ae ee ee 533 

Total ue... 1. Aawigeh tek aaa bie ele teense ae ae 593 


Almost one-fifth of the combatants covering the whole line, and 
the whole line was not even attacked, but only a sector of it; con- 
sequently not all of them fought. 

The casualties of the enemy, as acknowledged by themselves, 
were: 





Inithe‘attack on El Caney 2222 Jo ee ee eee 900 

In the-attack on San Juani.J. 0 Leet. ie Le ee 

At other points of/attack. (4:00! 312. 36 Le) ere ee 
Totals. 025 eee wee 1, (008 





Re ee is the figure of the original Spanish but is probably intended for 1,660,— 


91 


In these cruel battles the army inspired the enemy with respect 
and true admiration, perhaps because he had supposed that they 
fought in the same manner as the insurgents. The foregoing is 
my firm conviction, because I have seen and observed the events 
which I narrate and have dwelt much upon them. 

On the 1st day of July the Americans fought, as I have stated, 
without protection and with truly admirable courage, but they 
did not fight again as they did that day. They entrenched them- 
selves and set up their artillery as fast as they received it, and did 
not again come out from behind their fortifications. Did they 
think on that first day that all they had to do was to attack our 
soldiers en masse to put them to flight? God knows. 

It was difficult to convince them that only 520 men had been 
defending El Caney for ten hours. When doubt was no longer 
possible their admiration had no limits. When they entered San- 
tiago de Cuba, the American soldiers and ours looked upon each 
other without any prejudice or jealousy, perhaps because they 
knew that both had fought lke brave men, and whenever the 
Americans saw one of our men of the twenty-ninth (the number 
of the battalion ‘‘Constitucién,” which had defended the city, 
and has been referred to so many times) they would call him, 
look at him, and treat him with great admiration, wondering 
perhaps, how so simple a soldier could do such great things. 

The men of the twenty-ninth, known to have done something 
worth doing, were loved and feasted by everyone and spent whole 
hours with the Americans, who did not understand them, but 
applauded everything they said, on the assumption, perhaps, that 
he who is brave must also be bright. 

Incidents like these I saw, not once, but a hundred times, and 
they have made me believe and say what I have stated. I may be 
mistaken, but I do not believe it, because I have also noticed that 
the Yankees treat the insurgents, although they are their allies, 
very differently. Besides, I am only citing facts, and anyone can 
construe them to his own satisfaction. 

From the foregoing, it is reasonable to believe that when 520 men 
maintained themselves at El Caney for ten hours, and 250 at San 
Juan for four hours, if Escario could have been there that day, so 
that there had been 3,000 men more in our lines, neither El Caney 
nor San Juan would have been lost, though attacked by almost the 
whole hostile army. 

General Linares surrendered the command to General Toral. 

In the battle of July 1, General Rubfn, who commanded the 
forces of San Juan and Portillo del Canev, had his horse killed 
under him at the latter place at 5 o’clock p. m. 


XXV. 


ACTIONS OF THE 2p AND 3p. 


July 2d.—At 5 o’clock gun and musket fire commenced, well 
sustained in the direction of the land. 

At 6 the hostile fleet opened fire on the Morro and the Socapa. 
The greater part of the projectiles fell in the bay and on our fleet. 

The firing ceased at 8.30. 

Punta Gorda, which also opened fire, discharged 8 shots. 

The musket fire was intense. 

At 8.15 Punta Gorda again opened fire. At the same time the 
Plutén started up toward the mouth of the harbor. The musket 
fire ceased. 

At 9.30 the military governor said by telephone: “I ask your 
excellency to send a boat, so that by going as close to the coast as 
possible, the enemy may be checked at San Antonio and Plaza de 
Toros.” At this time the enemy opened musket fire in the same 
direction. It ceased shortly after. 

The companies of the fleet embarked again. A pilot was sent 
to each one of the ships. 

The body of sailors that disembarked was protected in a line of 
trenches by Colonel Aldea’s column (Asiatic battalion), which 
withdrew from the coast to the city. 

At 8 o’clock four wounded from the Socapa were brought to 
the pier. A shell which exploded on one of the guns killed three 
men and wounded six, completely disabling the mount of the 
Hontoria gun, which could no longer be used. Among the 
wounded was Ensign Fernandez Pifia, who was in command of the 
battery. 

At 1.30 a slow gun fire was heard in the distance. 

The French consul, on horseback, with a flag of his nation on a 
very long pole, left for Cuabitas, followed by many people. 

During the firing several projectiles of all calibers fell on the 
city. 

At 3.15 musket and gun fire was being heard in the direction of 
Campo de Marte. The line of fire was very extensive and the 
musket fire intense. 


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93 


At 4 o’clock the musket fire ceased, only the gun fire being 
heard now. 

At 4.40 musket fire was again opened; volleys could be heard at 
intervals. 

At 6 the firing ceased. 

At 7 musket fire broke out again; ceasing at 7.30. 

At 8.30 two blazes could be seen at the top of Monte Real to the 
west. 

At 9.45 the enemy opened a violent musket and gun fire from 
the Plaza de Toros to the Campo de Marte (from east to east-north- 
east). To the left (Plaza de Toros) frequent volleys could be 
heard. 

At 10.30 the musket and gun fire ceased. 

The night was extremely dark. From 10 to 11.30 the ships of 
our fleet spoke by means of the Ardois (light signals). 

The enemy, during the night of the battle of El] Caney, and after 
burying the dead, not without paying due honors to General Vara 
del Rey, commenced work on the trenches, which they never left 
again, continued to surround our lines with the new reenforce- 
ments constantly arriving, and installed modern artillery and ma- 
chine guns on the heights. The insurgents were covering Cuabitas 
and adjoining points, although in second line. We were decidedly 
surrounded and all our communications by land cut off, as they 
had been by sea for over a month and a half. Each hour that 
elapsed the enemy fortified the circle that inclosed us. 

During the night the enemy kept up most incessantly a violent 
musket and terrific gun fire which we hardly answered, so as not 
to waste the little ammunition that we had left, which was, no 
doubt, what the enemy intended. 

The Asiatic column (Colonel Aldea) arrived from the coast and 
occupied in line the post vacated by the companies of the fleet, sit- 
uated on the road to El Caney (in the entrance). 

In the meantime the fleet was once more bombarding the Morro 
and the Socapa, where, after killing several men, they finally suc- 
ceeded in dismounting one of the two Hontoria guns, which they 
had been constantly antagonizing since the 18th of May. At the 
same time they were bombarding the city from Aguadores, wound- 
ing several persons and ruining several houses. 

The cruiser Reina Mercedes changed her anchoring place and 
remained at the head of the bay as much as possible, awaiting’ 
orders to open fire on Quintero Hill to check the enemy if he should 
appear there. 

The French consul was the first to leave the city, which was 
abandoned by almost the whole population a few days la 


94 


A little before 10 a. m. the enemy, who no doubt intended to 
surprise us, furiously attacked our lines, and was repulsed with 
great loss. 

The events of the second of July may be summed up as follows: 

Lively bombardment by sea and land, killing several men and 
disabling one of the only two guns with which we could attack the 
enemy from the mouth of the harbor; bombarding with impunity 
the defenseless city; a battle from trenches, the fire of which we 
hardly answered, and finally a night surprise that resulted in 
failure. 

The companies of the fleet embarked rapidly in spite of the pre- 
vailing conditions. A pilot was sent to each one of the ships, which 
latter took in their boats and steam launches and loosened the spring 
on their cables, and the gunboat Alvarado, which had come out of 
the slip and was afloat, raised at night the six Bustamante torpe- 
does that were obstructing the channel to the west. Everything 
indicated, without leaving room for doubt, that the fleet was about 
to go out; but when and how? 

It occurred to me (and nobody could have dissuaded me from it) 
that a fleet from the Peninsula was on its way to Santiago; that it 
would pass in sight of the semaphore of Puerto Rico; that conse- 
quently Admiral Cervera would know, given the distance and the 
speed of the former and allowing for the difference in time, when 
it would reach Santiago; and when fire was opened on the enemy 
it would leave the mouth free, he would go out and the two fleets 
combined would defeat the enemy. JI remembered everything I 
had read in newspapers about the purchase of ships, and the date 
when those building had been launched. Everything became clear 
tome. Wehad ships and they were coming. No doubt they were 
quite near, or perhaps only a few miles distant, but where had the 
ships come from? Ido not know—from heaven, from earth, from 
the air, from nothing at al—I do not know. But everything ap- 
peared possible to me, except that our fleet should go out alone to 
fight the ships that were assembled at the Morro. 

The aid of marine, Mr. Dario Leguinia, even more optimistic 
than I (and that is saying a great deal), could not rest a minute. 
I shall never forget how during that night of the 2d we were sitting 
on the doorsteps of the captaincy of the port, making calculations 
as to the number of ships that might arrive and the probabilities 
of success that we could count on. Our ships communicating by 
means of the Ardois were another proof of this. The event 
announced was near, and we were to see great things happening. 
At times we even thought we heard firing out there on the sea at 
a great distance and in a southeasterly direction. How much 
desire and imagination can do! 


95 


At 1 o’clock at night there was nothing special to be seen, and 
so, feeling sure that important events were to take place the fol- 
lowing day, I retired, not without repeatedly impressing upon the 
seaman (cabo de matricula) to notify me at once at the first move- 
ment of the fleet, or the first gun shot. It would not have been 
necessary. My impatience and anxiety would have taken care of 
that much better than the cabo. 

The next day it was learned that the blazes we had seen on the 
Monte Real were from the burning of the forts and the heliograph, 
which the detachment there had abandoned to hasten to Santiago, 
in order not to be cut off and surrounded. During the march, 
which was full of hardships, it became necessary to kill a horse 
for food. 


XXXVI. 


SORTIE OF THE FLEET 


If I were to live a thousand years and a thousand centuries, never 
should I forget that 3d day of July, 1898, nor do I believe that Spain 
will ever forget it. The day dawned beautifully. One of those 
summer days when not the slightest breath of air stirs the leaves 
of the trees, when not the smallest cloud is visible in the skies; 
when not the slightest vapor fills the atmosphere, which was won- 
derfully transparent, so that the horizon could be observed at a 
creat distance. 

Nothing special was to be noticed among the ships of our fleet; 
motionless on the quiet waters of the bay, that reflected their hulls, 
though inverted, with wonderful accuracy, they looked as though 
they ought not to leave an anchoring place where they could 
remain in such perfect safety. 

It was 8.30. Feeling sure that the ships would not go out, and 
taking advantage of the chance of getting a horse, for the distance 
was great, I went to the military hospital to see Mr. Joaquin Bus- 
tamante, whom I found a different man, as the saying is. His 
voice was strong, his eyes bright, and his cheeks flushed. He 
moved with ease and did not appear to experience any difficulty in 
doing so. I was agreeably surprised. 

Why does one remember things that are really not of great im- 
portance? Is it perhaps because they are connected with others 
that are? I cannot explain it. I only know that I remember, 
word for word, the conversation that took place between us. It 
was as follows: 

‘Ts the fleet not going out?” heasked, without giving me a 
chance to say anything. 

‘‘Not just now, I believe, though itis ready to go out. Is it 
known when the other fleet will arrive?” I said. 

‘‘What other fleet?” 

‘“The one that is supposed to come from Spain; they probably 
know at about what time it may be expected at the mouth of the 
harbor.” 

‘“Don’t be simple.” (I don’t remember whether he called me 
simple, or innocent, ora fool.) ‘‘There is no other fleet; the ships 


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2if; 


are going out and that is all there is to it. I have a letter from 
Don Pascual (Admiral Cervera) in which he tells me so.” 

I remained thunderstruck. I could doubt no longer. I know 
Admiral Cervera sufficiently well, as does everybody else, to know 
that he does not say, and still less write, what he does not intend 
to do. 

‘Do you think he will go out to-day?” I said. 

‘*T thought he was going even now.” 

I could not answer. <A gunshot which, judging from the direc- 
tion, could only be from one of the two fleets, left me motionless. 

Two or three minutes later a terrific cannonade commenced, 
such as I have never heard, nor will probably ever hear again, a 
cannonade more intense than that of June 6, a thing which I be- 
lieved impossible, shaking the building, thundering through the 
air. I could not think coherently. I kept looking at Mr. Busta- 
mante like an imbecile, and he looked at me and didn’t say a word. 
I felt something that commenced at my feet and went up to my 
head, and my hair must have stood on end. Then suddenly, with- 
out taking leave, I went out, got on my horse and rode down the 
hill at breakneck speed, and I hardly understand how it was that 
I did not break my neck. I arrived at the captaincy of the port, 
where I found them all, from the commander of marine to the last 
clerk, with emotion painted on every face, and all looking in the 
direction of the mouth of the harbor, the mountains of which, that 
had been such a protection to us, and which now prevented us 
from seeing what was going on outside, we should have liked to 
grind to powder. 

The noise caused by the gunshots which the mountains and 
valleys echoed was truly infernal and comparable to nothing. 
An idea may be gained of what it was when it is remembered 
that over 250 guns, most of them of large caliber and all breech- 
loading, were firing incessantly. The earth trembled, and very 
soon Punta Gorda, the Morro and the Socapa took part in the 
frightful concert, adding the thunder of their guns to the noise 
of those of the two fleets. 

But the firing continued and that is what puzzled me. I 
thought, taking into account the number and class of hostile ships 
and of our own, that the catastrophe of the latter must necessarily 
take place in the very channel of the harbor, which is such a 
difficult one, even for ships of less length and draft than those 
which formed our fleet, under normal conditions; how much more, 
then, when sustaining a battle. A deviation, a change of course 
ahead of time, an injury to the rudder or the engine, even though 
slight and momentary, the least carelessness, in a word, might 
run a ship aground, and such a disaster would cause also the 


10845——7 


98 


destruction of the other ships that were coming after and which 
would have collided with the first; the hostile ships might sink 
the first right there and then; for the same reasons, the disaster of 
the others became inevitable. 

To my mind, the going out from Santiago harbor under the cir- 
cumstances Admiral Cervera did, and as confirmed by the command- 
ers of the ships of the fleet, constitutes the greatest act of valor 
imaginable, for it meant to go out to certain death, not only with 
fearlessness, but with a clear head, for a man must be completely 
master of himself in order to command a ship without becoming 
excited nor losing his head. One may form an idea of it from the 
horror which I experienced, who was not in any of the ships, but 
I knew perfectly well the dangers of the enterprise, which, in my 
opinion, was impossible. 

The day, as I said, was most beautiful and the calm perfect. 
Therefore, the smoke, far from vanishing, rose up in a straight line. 
When the first moments of excitement were over and we had some- 
what cooled down, we could see perfectly that the smoke from the 
firing formed four groups more or less distant from each other, 
but what group did our fleet form? If the one farthest to the 
west, then no doubt it was not surrounded and had the open sea 
before it, and this was a great advantage. If, on the contrary, it 
formed the second or third, then it was between two fires. 

Later on it was noticed that the firing was at a greater distance 
and decreased in intensity, and that the columns of smoke were 
moving farther to the west. Had they succeeded in escaping and 
outwitting the hostile fleet? For the present one thing was cer- 
tain: Our ships had not gone down in the entrance of the harbor, 
nor even close to it, and that was of great importance, for the great- 
est danger was in the channel. Imagine our joy when the Morro 
advised us by telephone that our fleet was fighting in wing forma- 
tion and that the enemy did not have the range. Evidently the age 
of miracles is not over. I will not try to describe what we felt that 
day—we, at Santiago, who have the honor of belonging to the 
navy. 

I still had the horse at my disposal, and as I remembered the 
anxiety in which I had left Mr. Bustamante and his delicate state 
of health, I hastened to bring him the news, which I thought 
would do him a great deal of good. When I arrived, he knew it 
already, as everyone else did in Santiago. It had spread all over 
the city. I found him radiant with satisfaction. 

I may safely say that the 3d of July was a day of true rejoicing, 
for, as will be seen later when I relate the events of that day, 
it was believed that our ships had accomplished their object, 
although at the cost of the destroyers, the loss of which was 


99 


already known. And although we felt very sad over the victims 
there must have been, the result, on the whole, was so brilliant 
that it surpassed all reasonable expectations. 

How great were my consternation and sorrow when, at 6 o’clock 
in the evening, I saw the pilot Miguel Lopez arrive, his appearance 
changed and his clothing and shoes wet from the drizzling rain, 
with the news that he had at his house at Cinco Reales five ship- 
wrecked from the Maria Teresa and Oquendo, worn out and weak; 
that both ships, on fire, had run aground on the coast close to each 
other west of Punta Cabrera and about 8 miles from the harbor of 
Santiago, and that a great many more, some wounded and all tired, 
were on the road. | 

The Teresa and Oquendo lost, besides the: Plutén and Furor! 
What a horrible contrast and what a sad awakening! In the 
morning I had believed the ships safe and was already thinking of 
a telegram from Havana announcing their arrival at that port. 
At night the news of the catastrophe, the full extent of which I 
did not know even then! 

But as my comments and lamentations do not explain what had 
happened, I will give the news as it was received in the course of 
the day at the captaincy of the port. It will explain why, for 
eight hours, we believed at Santiago de Cuba that the Spanish fleet 
was in safety. 


XXVIII. 


NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA. 


July 3d.—The hostile fleet in sight, about 5 miles distant. 

At 9.45 the Spanish fleet went out. Shortly after, a violent 
bombardment was heard. 

At 10.40 the Morro said: ‘‘ The Spanish fleet is fighting in wing 
formation at Punta Cabrera; the enemy does not have the range 
and it seems as though they would succeed in escaping. The 
American fleet is composed of the Brooklyn, Indiana, Iowa, Texas, 
Massachusetts, Oregon, and one yacht. The ships from Aguadores 
have come to assist in the battle.” 

At 11.15 no more firing was heard. 

At 12.30 the Morro said: ‘‘When the fleet went out it did so 
slowly. After the four large ships had gone out the destroyers 
went, and all of the American ships fell upon them. Our fleet 
opposed the attack and the destroyers hurried to join them, but 
near Punta Cabrera one of them took fire and ran ashore. The 
other continued to fire and when she saw herself lost she lowered 
two boats filled with men; one reached the coast, the other was 
captured. On leaving the destroyer they set it afire and she ran 
aground burning.” 

So they are both lost. When our fleet passed Punta Cabrera one 
of the ships, apparently the Teresa, went close to the shore and a 
great deal of smoke was seen. The Jowa and New York were pur- 
suing her and the others followed them. By this time the hostile 
ships from Aguadores were already taking part in the fight. 

At 2an English warship was signaled to the south. 

At 3 the Morro said that the ships which pursued our fleet were 
24 in all; 15 warships, armored and unarmored; the others mer- 
chant vessels equipped for war. 

At 6.30 the pilot, Miguel Lépez, said that at his house at Cinco 
Reales, he had five shipwrecked from the Teresa and Oquendo, and 
they said there must be others at Cabafitas. 

The tug Hsmeralda, with the second commander of Marine and 
Ensign Nardiz, with the pilot, Lépez, and ten armed sailors, went 
out to gather them up. Forces of the army also went out in the 


(100) 


101 


steamer Coldn to protect those who might be returning by roads 
and paths along the coast. 

At nightfall Colonel Escario’s column arrived from Manzanillo. 

My friend, Mr. Robert Mason, Chinese consul, who is interested 
in naval matters, and has a good understanding of everything 
concerning them, witnessed the battle from the Vigia del Medio, 
which is the highest mountain in the bay and overlooks a great 
part of it. But we must take into account that, as it is quite dis- 
tant from the coast, the ships that pass close to it can not be seen. 
As soon as he arrived he told me what had happened as he had 
seen it, and I put it down as he dictated it to me. The following 
is what I heard from his own lips, word for word, without chang- 
ing anything in this interesting account: 

“The Teresa went out first, then the Vizcaya and Colon; after 
a somewhat longer interval, the Oquendo, then the destroyers. 
The Admiral passed the Morro at 9.45. A little to windward of 
the Morro (west) was the Brooklyn. Opposite the Morro another 
ship, apparently the Massachusetts, and I could distinguish no other 
war ships from the Vigia. When the Admiral passed the Morro 
the hostile ships and the Morro and Socapa opened a violent fire 
simultaneously; the hostile ships that could not be seen and that 
were at Aguadores also opened fire at the same time. After pass- 
ing the Morro, the Admiral went west and was lost from sight on 
account of the Socapa. The Vizcaya followed, and then the other 
two. In the meantime the destroyers remained in the bay. The 
Spanish ships were now visible again, the Vizcaya in the lead, the 
Colén, Oquendo, and Maria Teresa in line ahead at a certain dis- 
tance from the American fleet. The Spanish fleet was firing slowly, 
the American ships lively, so that I did not lose sight again of the 
Spanish ships, but often of the American ships on account of 
the smoke. In the meantime the American war ships and two 
yachts were gathered opposite the Socapa, and when the destroyers 
came out it seemed impossible that they should be able to escape. 
The fire was horrible from the large guns, as well as from the 
rapid-fire guns. Nevertheless, the destroyers were lost from sight, 
but they appeared again, firing from their stern guns. As long as 
the ships could be distinguished it could not be estimated whether 
they had received injuries of any kind. When they disappeared 
from sight, at 10.30, we could see no injuries in the masts or smoke- 
stacks, or anything special. At this time we saw all the American 
ships firing in a westerly direction, and at that hour the New York, 
which had not yet entered the fight, passed the bay headed west- 
ward. When I left the battle I had not seen any ship run aground 
nor on fire, either Spanish or American.” 


102 


Before I continue, in order to give a better understanding, I will 
recall the fact that the coast between Santiago and Punta Cabrera, 
a stretch of about 6 miles, forms a kind of bay on which are situ- 
ated Cabafias and Guaicabén; that Punta Cabrera projects south 
and is very high land, consequently the ships which are west of it 
and close to the coast can not be seen. It is absolutely necessary 
to remember this in order to understand why it was that the final 
result of the battle was not seen. 

At 9.30 the Spanish fleet started up; first the Maria Teresa, 
Admiral Cervera’s flagship, the Vizcaya, then the Cristdbal Colén, 
and Oquendo. Behind these the Plutén and Furor. This was the 
order of sortie as I learned from the pilots, Lépez and Ntfiez. 

The Brooklyn, Lowa, Indiana, Texas, Massachusetts, Oregon, 
and one yacht were waiting at the mouth of the harbor. The 
others arrived soon from Aguadores, where they had been, with 
their engines going and under steam. One of the last ones to 
arrive was the New York, which, the same as the Brooklyn, has a 
20-mile speed. 

The Spanish ships, which necessarily had to go out in line-ahead, 
received, as each went out, the fire of all the American ships, 
which they could not answer until they had passed the bank of 
Diamante, because they could not present the broadside, conse- 
quently their guns, to the enemy. Therefore, as long as they 
were inside of the harbor, they all sustained a terrible fire. 

Nevertheless they came out without serious injuries and reached 
the open sea. 

The Vizcaya, which was the fastest ship, but had not had her 
bottom cleaned, was making only 13 miles, and the other ships had 
to regulate their speed by hers in order to preserve the line. 

I suppose from what happened and taking into account the order 
of the sortie that Admiral Cervera intended to protect the retreat 
of the Vizcaya, accompanied by the Colén (which did not have her 
turret guns mounted), with the Oquendo and Maria Teresa, and 
then have the latter, by putting on forced draft, rejoin the former, 
but both were set on fire by the stern, which they presented to the 
hostile fire, and they were soon converted into one immense blaze 
and went aground on the coast, the Teresa about 7 miles from San- 
tiago harbor, west of Punta Cabrera, then close to her the Oquendo. 
These events I learned at nightfall from the shipwrecked who had 
arrived. The fate of the Vizcaya and Cristébal Colén I will antici- 
pate, in order to complete the account of what happened to the 
whole fleet as it was told me by an officer of the Austrian cruiser 
Maria Teresa (same name as ours) the next day. 

When the Oquendo and Teresa had been lost, two or three 
American ships remained there to consummate the surrender and 


103 


gather up the shipwrecked and wounded and take the others pris- 
oners. . The other ships continued to pursue the Vizcaya and the 
Colén. The first of the two also took fire at the stern and stranded 
at a distance of about 20 miles (toward Aserradero); the second 
did not take fire. Probably her engine was damaged and she ran 
up on the coast about 60 miles distant (off Turquino). 

Such was the hecatomb (for there is no other name for it) of 
our ill-fated fleet, and I do not believe that history records 
another like it. Nota single ship was saved from the catastrophe. 
The commanders and officers of all the ships knew well what was 
going to happen, when, calm and serene in spite of everything and 
ready to do their duty fully, they took leave of each other and of 
their comrades who remained on shore, as they did not belong to 
the fleet. 

A person who has witnessed and seen with his own eyes an 
event like the one which I have in vain tried to describe, must 
necessarily be of interest, even though of little prominence and 
education. For that reason I have had the pilots Miguel Lédpez 
and Apolonio Niijiez, who took out the Teresa and Oquendo 
respectively, repeat to me a hundred times what they had seen. I 
shall not copy everything they said; that would be too much of a 
task, but only what relates to the battle and which gives an idea 
of that veritable hell, for that is what the mouth of Santiago 
harbor was for fifteen minutes. 

Miguel Ldépez, who is cool-headed and daring on land as well as 
on the sea, said to me about as follows: 

‘‘T was in the forward tower by the side of Admiral Cervera, 
who was as calm as though he had been at anchor and in his own 
cabin, and was observing the channel and the hostile ships and 
only said these words: 

‘¢<Pilot, when can we shift the helm?’ He had reference to 
turning to starboard, which could only be done after we had passed 
Diamante Bank. After a few seconds he said: 

‘¢< Pilot, advise me when we can shift the helm.’ 

*¢¢T will advise you, Admiral,’ I answered. 

‘*A few moments later Isaid: ‘ Admiral, the helm may be shifted 
now.’ 

‘In a moment the Admiral, without shouting, without becom- 
ing excited, as calm as usual, said: ‘To starboard,’ and the next 
minute, ‘Fire!’ At the same moment, simultaneously, the two guns 
of the turret and those of the port battery fired on a ship which 
seemed to me to be the Indiana. I thought the ship was sinking. 
I can not tell you, Don José, all that passed. By this time there 
were already many dead and wounded in the battery, because they 
had been firing on us for some time, and I believe that in spite of 


104 


the water that was in the ship she was already on fire then. The 
Admiral said to me: 

‘“<Good-by, pilot; go now; go, and be sure you let them pay 
you, because you have earned it well.’ And he continued to give 
orders.” 

These were, more or less, the words that Miguel Lépez spoke to 
me, and which he repeats to anyone who wishes to hear them. 

Apolonio Nufiez, who took out the Oquendo, is very different 
from Lopez, not daring, but rather easily frightened. These were 
his impressions: 

‘‘When we arrived at Santa Catalina battery, they were already 
firing. There was a hailof bullets on board which can not be com- 
pared to anything. I was in the tower looking after the course of 
the ship. The commander, who is very kind, and who knew me 
because I had taken the ship in on the 19th, said to me: 

““¢Vou can go, pilot; we can get along now, and later on per- 
haps you will not be able to go.’ I thanked him and should have 
gone gladly enough, I can tell you, but I was afraid they might 
shift the helm before they passed Diamante, and you can imagine, 
Don José, what would have happened. I remained on board, and 
when we had passed the bank I said to him: ‘Commander, you can 
shift the helm.’ 

““¢Go, pilot, go,’ he said, and then he commanded to put to star- 
board and shouted, ‘Fire!’ The noise caused by the big forward 
gun and the shaking of the ship made more impression on me than 
the fire of the Yankees. I thought the Oquendo had been cut in 
two. Ido not even want to remember it. Iwas lowered in a boat 
and then I thought Iwas adead man. The bullets were falling all 
around me. Finally I reached Estrella Cove, where Miguel L6pez 
had already arrived. I did not even dare look at the battle, which 
was now outside of the harbor.” 

These two accounts, which perhaps, do not inspire the interest 
which no doubt they possess, because I have not been able to 
remember the exact words of the men, although in substance they 
are the same, may give an idea of that never-to-be-forgotten sortie 
which had such fatal consequences. 

I supposed that the American fleet would await the Spanish 
fleet at the mouth of the harbor and absolutely prevent it from 
going out, under penalty of having the ships attacked. But that 
requires a great deal of courage and presence of mind. Neverthe- 
less, it would have been the safest means for accomplishing it. 
By not doing so they exposed themselves to being outwitted and 
this is proved by the fact that our ships succeeded in getting out 
of the harbor and as far as Punta Cabrera (about 6 miles), so that 


105 


they really accomplished the most difficult part, and there is no 
doubt that if they had not been set on fire and if they had had a 
speed of even 18 miles they would have run the blockade. 

It will also have been noticed that the three ships built in Spain 
all had the same fate; they were burned. The one built in Italy, 
although not having the turret guns, and which had suffered from 
the hostile fire much longer, because she ‘‘died” later than the 
others, was not burned; she had a different fate, but not that. I 
believe I am not bold in affirming that if the four ships had been 
protected like the Colén, they would have eluded the enemy’s pur- 
suit. In that event they might have reached Havana, for as the 
whole, or nearly the whole, American fleet was in front of Santiago, 
they would have met no one to prevent them and the situation 
would have been very different. 

A few of the shipwrecked arrived in the tug Coloén and were 
embarked by order of the commander of marine in the cruiser 
Reina Mercedes. 

The tug Esmeralda, with Ensign Nardiz, ten armed sailors, 
and the pilot Ldépez, went to Cabafiitas Cove to gather up ship- 
wrecked; but, although they made a careful search, they found 
none. 

At night Colonel Escario’s column, whose forces have already 
been mentioned, arrived from Manzanillo. The next day General 
Escario told me that when he heard the fire of the battle in the 
morning, he proceeded with a small vanguard to the heights of 
the harbor of Bayamo, and that the detachment there told him the 
same thing, viz, that they saw our ships run the blockade and dis- 
appear past Punta Cabrera. 

To my mind there is nothing so interesting and eloquent as the 
account of a naval battle by persons who have taken part in it. 
Lieutenants Bustamante and Caballero, second in command of the 
destroyers Furor and Plutén, respectively, who escaped by a mira- 
cle from the horrible hecatomb, in which the greater part of their 
crews perished, told me two days after the catastrophe, still sick 
and tired, of the battle which their ships sustained. Their accounts 
follow: 

Mr. CABALLERO: ‘‘The last ships were already outside of the 
harbor when the destroyers, which had stopped between the Socapa 
and Cay Smith for the purpose of getting up steam, proceeded and 
passed through the channel as far as Punta Morrillo, where the 
Furor, which was in the lead, put to port as though trying to go 
east, but when she discovered the Gloucester and other ships which 
were near Aguadores, she put to starboard, following the lead of 
our fleet, which was already at some distance, opening fire on the 
Gloucester which we (the two destroyers) had left astern. And 


106 


the Indiana, Oregon, Iowa, and Texas, which we had passed in 
the order named on the port hand, continued to fire very rapidly, 
which made it extremely difficult for us to serve the guns. After 
we had passed Cabafias we commenced to gain on the Furor, and 
when we came up with her and were about 50 meters to starboard, 
she listed rapidly on that side, her rudder having been disabled, 
and passed astern of us at a distance of 1 meter, and sank by the 
stern, standing up almost vertically, and was buried in the sea a 
moment later, before reaching Punta Cabrera. 

‘‘As we (the Plutén) were making a great deal of water we con- 
tinued close to the shore to reach Punta Cabrera, and when we 
were close to the headland which it forms, we received a 32-centi- 
meter projectile which exploded the forward group of boilers, 
blowing up the whole deck and cutting off communication between 
the two ends. She then veered to starboard and struck on the 
headland, tearing off a great part of the bow. The shock threw 
her back some distance, then she struck again. I jumped into the 
water and reached the shore. 

‘“‘T climbed up on the headland of Punta Cabrera and lay there 
for about fifteen minutes, during which the fire continued. When 
it was at an end I went into the mountains and gathered up such 
personnel of the ship as I met—about 20 or 25—and with them I 
went around a small hill for the purpose of hiding from the coast 
and took the road to Santiago de Cuba, avoiding the roads and 
seeking the densest thickets and woods. The pilot, on pretext that 
the road which I was following was not a good one, left us and did 
not again put in an appearance. We continued walking in an 
easterly direction—some clothed, others naked, and the rest half 
clothed—for two hours, resting now and then, and trying to keep 
close to the coast. When we reached the beach we met Lieutenant 
Bustamante with a group of shipwrecked from the Furor (his ship) 
and some from the Maria Teresa. We saw a yacht with the 
English flag close to the coast maneuvering back of Punta Cabrera, 
as though trying to gather up the shipwrecked there. We madesig- 
nals to her with a shirt, and seeing that she paid no attention to us 
we walked on, avoiding the formation of large groups and hiding 
ourselves as much as possible. | 

‘About 3.30 we reached the harbor of Cabafias, which we had to 
cross swimming, and on the opposite shore, about 9 o’clock at 
night, we reached the trenches of the Socapa, where at last we 
could rest for the night, with the assistance of some guerrillas, 
who supplied us with what they could.” 

Mr. BusTaMANTE: ‘‘ When we (the Furor) reached the mouth of 
the harbor and saw the Spanish fleet, we thought that by shaping 
our course westward we could seek the protection of the Spanish 


107 


fleet, which was already at some distance, and we maneuvered 
accordingly. One of the projectiles struck one of the hatches of 
the boiler ventilators, thereby reducing the pressure and conse- 
quently the speed of the ship. By this time the projectiles were 
falling on board in large numbers. One of the shells struck Boat- 
swain Duefias, cutting him in two; one part fell between the tiller- 
ropes, interrupting them momentarily, and it was necessary to 
take it out in pieces. Another projectile destroyed the engine 
and the servo-motor, so that the ship could neither proceed nor 
maneuver. Another had struck the after shell room, exploding 
and destroying it. 

Our torpedoes had their war-heads on aud were ready to be used, 
but we did not launch them because we were never at a convenient 
distance from the enemy. Under these circumstances the com- 
mander of the destroyers, Captain Fernando Villaamil, gave 
orders to abandon the ship, and I with part of the crew jumped 
into the water, about 3 miles from the coast. In the water, one of 
the men near me, I believe the first boatswain, was struck by a 
bullet in the head and was buried in the water forever. The ship 
in the mean time, after a horrible series of explosions, went down. 
When we reached the land we went in an easterly direction 
towards Santiago. Shortly after we met Lieutenant Caballero and 
with him and his men we reached Santiago, and following the 
game road and the same fortunes; as they are identical, I will not 
here relate them.” 

To what has been said it is useless to add another word. 


XXVIII. 


CAUSES OF THE LOSS OF THE NAVAL BATTLE 
OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA. 


Words fail me to describe the painful impression produced upon 
me by the disaster of the four cruisers and two destroyers under 
Admiral Cervera’s command, and by what I may call the hecatomb 
of their crews, which was not complete for the only reason that the 
battle had taken place so near the shore, where the ships, all on 
fire, could run aground, rather than surrender to the enemy. In 
less than two hours the ships were destroyed, and yet, this is not 
strange. Iam surprised, on the contrary, that they were not sunk 
in the channel. 

The loss of the fleet had been foretold by all its commanders, 
with whom I have talked more than once, and was prophesied, so 
to speak, as soon as the order was received at the Cape Verde 
Islands to start for Cuba, and the admiral who was in command 
advised the Government to that effect several times; these official 
communications are still in existence. But it seems that public 
opinion in the island of Cuba, especially at Havana, required the 
presence of the fleet in those waters, and between that and the very 
sensible and logical reasons advanced by the admiral, the Govern- 
ment decided in favor of the former, and the fleet departed, shaping 
its course to the west. From that moment the loss of the fleet 
became inevitable, and it was only a question of time, as will be 
easily understood from what follows. | 

The fleet left the Cape Verde Islands with no more coal than was 
in the bunkers, the greater part of which must necessarily be used 
up during the voyage across the Atlantic Ocean. The three de- 
stroyers, Plutén, Furor, and Terror accompanied it and had to be 
convoyed and supplied with cdal, which involved difficulties and 
delays. 

At Martinique (where the Terror was left, being no longer able 
to follow the fleet) the ships could not coal; and at Curagao, in 
spite of the government’s promise that they were to find a ship 
there with fuel, which did not put in an appearance, only two of 
the ships could get a small number of tons. 


(108) 


109 


The order to proceed to the island of Cuba was there; what could 
they do under such circumstances? The only natural and logical 
thing: go to the harbor that was nearest and for that reason offered 
the least dangers, go to Santiago de Cuba, which Admiral Cervera 
believed well defended, as the harbor is suited for that purpose, 
and supplied with provisions. How great was his surprise when 
he found that only two guns worthy of the name defended its en- 
trance, and that provisions were lacking in the city, as well as 
ammunition and everything else. 

I have already stated, and will here repeat it, that during those 
days of May, before the hostile fleet appeared with forces superior 
to ours (that is, from the 20th to the 27th) the ships could not go 
out, not only because they did not have coal enough, but also be- 
cause there was considerable swell in the sea, which prevented them 
from going out, as was stated by all the pilots of the locality, who 
said that the ships were almost sure to touch bottom, especially 
the Colén, which drew more water than the others. 

We must take into account, for it means everything for a fleet, 
that they had not cleaned their bottoms for a long time and their 
speed was therefore far from what it should have been; the Vizcaya, 
above all, was not able to make 13 miles, and later, after being in 
Santiago harbor for 46 days, her speed was reduced to even less. 

But even if there had been no swell in the sea to the south and 
the ships could have gone out, where would they have gone? To 
Havana by the shortest route? They would have met Sampson’s 
fleet, as Admiral Cervera knew only too well, and that was just 
what he wished to avoid. Perhaps he might have succeeded by 
taking a course which he would have been least expected to take, 
through Providence Channel, for instance; and this did occur to 
Admiral Cervera, but it was impossible, for the simple reason that 
he did not have fuel enough for so many days of navigation. 

Moreover, when the fleet reached Santiago harbor, everybody 
there, as well as in the Peninsula, believed it safe and congratu- 
lated its commander on his success and his clever maneuver; and 
when I say ‘‘ everybody ” I do not mean the common people only, 
but the official element. Could there be a better proof that Ad- 
miral Cervera complied with the wishes of the Government? 

_ The fleet received definite order from the Captain General of the 
Island of Cuba to leave the harbor of Santiago, which he reiterated, 
in spite of Admiral Cervera’s remonstrances. After that, what 
was to be done? Only one thing: go out, as indeed they did, 
resigned, but calm and serene, those heroes; for all those who went 
out with the fleet to certain death, as every one knew, deserve that 
name. And I say that they went out calm and serene, and shall 
say it a thousand times, for only thus can ships be maneuvered in 


110 


so narrow and dangerous a channel, without any of them running 
aground, which can happen so easily even under ordinary circum- 
stances, when it is not necessary to oppose the fire of a hostile 
fleet, and with ships of less draught and length. The sortie from 
that harbor, under the circumstances under which those ships 
effected it, I do not hesitate in calling the greatest act of valor, 
fearlessness, skill, intelligence and practical experience in seaman- 
ship that can be conceived. This was stated repeatedly and with 
great admiration by the commanders and officers of the English 
corvette Alert and the Austrian cruiser Maria Teresa, who, it may 
be said, witnessed the battle. | 

The number of ships that were awaiting ours at the mouth of 
the harbor, and with which the latter had to fight, as well as their 
nature and the kind of armament they mounted, was given in one 
of the first chapters, from statistics of the American Navy. This 
alone is more than sufficient to demonstrate that, in view of the 
inferiority of ours in quantity and quality, it was wee to 
sustain the battle. 

But there is more, much more, to be added in order to explain 
what happened in the naval battle of Santiago de Cuba, the greater 
part of which is not known by the people in Spain. 

I have already stated that the Coldn, the only really protected 
ship of the four that composed the fleet, did not have her turret 
guns. Of the 14-cm. guns of the Teresa, Oquendo, and Vizcaya, 
which are the ones that do most of the firing in a battle, six had 
been declared useless; and while the Teresa could change hers, the 
Oquendo and Vizcaya could not do so, and had to fight, the former 
with one, the latter with two useless guns, as I have stated. 

Moreover, the supply of ammunition for all of the ships was 
inadequate, and the Teresa had 70 useless charges. The greater 
part of the primers were no good, and consequently the guns did 
not go off. The breech-plugs were imperfect, so that after the 
second or third shot they no longer closed. The firing-pins blew 
out, and from many of the survivors of the Oquendo and Teresa 
I have learned that a number of the men serving the guns were 
wounded by their own pieces. Therefore, if the whole thing were 
not so sad and serious, it might be said that the guns of our ships 
were like the ‘‘carbine of Ambrosius,” which went off at the 
breech; that is, that far from injuring the enemy, they were a 
danger to those who had charge of firing them. 

The majority of the cartridge cases did not have the required 
diameter, and on the Maria Teresa it happened that seven had to 
be discarded before one good one could be found. Under these 
conditions, it will be readily understood that the armament, which 
was intended to be converted into rapid-fire artillery, was instead 


111 


converted into artillery—I do not know what to call it, but it was 
certainly entirely useless. 

After what has been stated, can the result of the battle of San- 
tiago be wondered at? Certainly not. The only thing that may 
appear strange is that, under such conditions, a fleet should have 
been sent to the scene of war. 

It was under these circumstances that the sortie was made from 
the difficult harbor of Santiago by those commanders and officers 
who, convinced that they would all perish, contented themselves 
with saying farewell to the comrades who remained on shore and 
whom they never expected to see again. 

We Spanish are very proud of the disaster of Trafalgar on 
account of the heroism which our navy showed on that occasion, 
when they placed honor above everything else, though our ships 
were buried in the sea. The battle of Santiago de Cuba is much 
more glorious even than that of 1805. In this latter battle, thirty- 
two allied ships of 64, 80, and 120 guns fought with twenty-eight 
English ships, also of 120, 80, and 64 guns; the forces, therefore, 
were almost equal; and if the battle was lost, while it might very 
well have been won, it was because our fleet was commanded by 
Villeneuve, and the hostile fleet by Nelson. In the battle of San- 
tiago, six ships (if the Plutén and Furor may be called such), had 
to fight against twenty-four* that were better protected and armed. 
After these figures, anything else that might be added would — 
appear to be useless. 

I have never been able to understand the reason why there 
was sent to the Island of Cuba a fleet that was in no manner 
able to cope with that of the United States and which therefore 
could in no wise prevent the ships of the latter from blockading 
our ports and controlling the sea; but since it was sent, without its 
arrival being able to prevent the loss of the island, which was lost, 
as experience has shown, from the very moment when war was 
accepted, owing to the conditions prevailing there, then it should 
have been prevented from being destroyed, as it was, without 
resulting in any advantage whatever. 

The only way of gaining any advantage would have been, in my 
opinion, taking advantage of the fact that all the hostile ships were 


* The writer makes a strange error in the number of the American ships en- 
gaged in this fight. He has evidently counted all those enumerated in Chapter 
IX. Those ships, however, were scattered among the fleets at Manila, Havana, 
Key West, and Santiago. Thoseactually engaged were asfollows: Brooklyn (flag), 
Oregon, Indiana, Iowa, Texas, and yachts Gloucester and Vixen. The flagship 
New York, with the torpedo boat Hricsson, took part toward the latter end of 
the engagement, the battle being practically fought by the six ships first named. 
Counting only numbers of ships, therefore, the Americans had five fighting 
ships against the Spanish four, with two armed yachts against the two Spanish 
torpedo-boat destroyers.—O. N. I. 





112 


in Cuba, to send a few ships of great speed, more or less well 
armed, to the commercial ports of the United States and bombard 
them, even though not very effectively. It is probable that public 
opinion, especially of those who did not participate in the war, would 
have exacted the return of the ships, and then the Spanish fleet 
could have left Santiago in perfect safety, and a catastrophe would 
have been avoided which has brought us no advantage. At the 
same time, the ports of the island, freed from the blockade, could — 
have supplied themselves with provisions; and although the final 
result would probably have been the same, it would not have been 
so immediate. 

But all this is nothing more than hypothesis and supposition, 
and not timely; besides, it was not my object in writing this book. 
I have told how Admiral Cervera’s fleet started from the Cape 
Verde Islands, how it arrived at Santiago, and how it went out to 
fight with Admiral Sampson’s fleet, convinced that the greater 
part of the people living in Spain are ignorant of what I have set 
forth, and also convinced that, when the facts are known, the 
results will be judged differently. 


XXIX. 


SINKING OF THE MERCEDES. 


July 4th.—Opposite the mouth of the harbor, the New York, 
Brooklyn, Indiana, Massachusetts, Minneapolis, Vesuvius, one 
yacht, and seventeen merchant vessels. 

At 7 an English corvette arrived and asked for a pilot. 

At 9 the Austrian cruiser Maria Teresa arrived. 

The boats of both ships entered the harbor. 

At 4 they departed with subjects of their respective nations. 

At 8 p. m. the cruiser Reina Mercedes started up. 

At 11.30 two gunshots were heard in the entrance at the foot of 
the Morro; afterwards many more. 

At 12.45 the fire ceased. It was answered by the Socapa. 

There was hardly a day when the hostile fleet and the Morro’ 
and Socapa did not exchange shots, or when some information was 
not received of injuries to one or more of the hostile ships, even of 
their having been burned and sunk, but as this has never been 
proved I have said nothing on the subject, being resolved to say 
nothing except what has been positively proved and what everybody 
knew who remained at Santiago during the time when the events 
that are the object of these notes occurred. It is natural that the 
ships which sustained the fire so many times (the opposite would 
be improbable) should have suffered some damages and casualties, 
although they were stationed at a considerable distance, but there 
is no doubt that they were not serious; if so, they would have been 
clearly seen. , 

On the day of the battle of the two fleets I was assured by sailors 
_ from the Socapa and by those shipwrecked that they had seen such 
and such a ship sunk, or such other one on fire, and such and such 
a tug had taken off some other ship. It seemed probable, but noth- 
ing of the kind happened. The nextday the ships that had fought 
with ours were all at Daiquiri, at Aguadores, or opposite the mouth 
of the harbor; that is the reason why I have never spoken of the 
damages done to the blockading ships. 

The English corvette Alert and the Austrian cruiser Maria 
Teresa could, of course, not enter the harbor, because we had 


10845——=8 (11 3) 


114 


planted Bustamante torpedoes (although only a part of them) and 
stretched wires across. The tug Colén went out with a flag of 
truce to notify them to that effect, and they sent in their boats, 
towed by steam launches. 

From the Austrian officers it was learned at the commandancia 
de marina what had happened to the Vizcaya and Oquendo in the 
battle of the preceding day, for they had arrived just in time to 
hear the gunshots and to see the ships stranded and lost on the 
coast. All agreed, of course, that our fleet had fought admirably, 
and, above all, that the sortie of the ships from the harbor under 
the circumstances under which they executed it, showed a courage, 
skill, and practical seamanship truly admirable. It is always a 
comfort to see that justice is being done, and that comfort I had at 
that time. 

As the interior of the harbor did no longer have the safeguard 
of the fleet, as the Bustamante torpedoes (six of them) had been 
taken up so that the fleet could go out and had not yet been 
replaced, and as, finally, the first line of mines no longer existed, 
the commander of marine decided—General Toral also being of 
his opinion—to sink the Mercedes (the only ship that was suitable 
for that purpose) in the narrow part of the channel; consequently, 
the commander of the cruiser received orders todo so. Hurriedly, 
for time was pressing, the wounded and sick from the lost fleet 
were transferred to the steamer Méjico, which had been converted 
into a hospital and hoisted the flag of the Red Cross. Important 
papers that had been saved, memoranda, portable arms, beds, and 
the most necessary things, were taken off the Mercedes, and at 8 
p. m., with her commander, Ensign Nardiz, a few engineers, the 
necessary sailors, and Pilots Apolonio Nufiez and Miguel Lopez, 
started toward the entrance, with her bow anchor and stern spring 
on the cable ready. 

At 11.30, as soon as the enemy, who was watching with search 
lights, sighted her, he opened a continuous fire on the ship. In 
spite of this the ship was sunk at the intended place, a very diffi- 
cult operation under any circumstances and especially under fire, 
as will be readily understood. Unfortunately the ship did not 
come to lie across the channel, because it seems a projectile cut 
the spring on the cable; the sacrifice was useless and the harbor 
was not obstructed. Yet it was not entirely useless, since the 
enemy could not take possession of her, as she is all riddled by 
bullets which she received that night, and I do not believe she can 
ever again be used. 

And since so much has been said of this ship, I will give an 
account of all the victims of her crew, some on board, some at the 
Socapa, Punta Gorda, and the Morro, from the beginning to the 
end of the war. 


115 


Commander Emilio Acosta, second in command, was killed. 
(Here follow the names of the killed and wounded. The list 
includes 5 dead, 11 seriously wounded—two of them fatally—16 
slightly wounded.) 

The enemy cut off the aqueduct so that there was no water left 
in the city, except in the wells and cisterns. 

The shipwrecked, who have arrived from the fleet, are Lieuten- 
ants Bustamante and Caballero, second in command of the destroy- 
ers, respectively; Midshipman Navia; several engineers and about 
150 sailors. ; 

Many were murdered by the insurgents with guns and machetes. 
I say murdered, because I believe there is no other name for kill- 
ing with guns and machetes men who were not only disarmed, but 
almost naked, sick, and many of them wounded. Irealize the seri- 
ousness of such an accusation, but it is the statement of all who 
have succeeded in escaping. : 


XXX. 


ESCARIO’S COLUMN. 


As the column which the commander in chief had ordered by 
telegraph from Manzanillo took such an active part in the military 
events from the time of its arrival at Santiago on July 3, it seems 
proper that I should give an account of its difficult and laborious 
march, covering a distance of 52 leagues over territory which had 
been abandoned two months ago and was in the hands of the enemy 
and where no help or support could be looked for anywhere. 

In order to give an idea of this march, which reflects great honor 
on the general at the head of the column, the chiefs and officers 
accompanying it, and the patient soldiers, I will state that of the 
52 leagues the only distance where the column could march two 
abreast was from Almirante to Santa Rita; all the rest of the dis- 
tance they had to march single file, opening the road with machetes 
as they went along, as everything was overgrown with manigua. 
In order that the reader may better understand this march, I will 
copy the diary of operations of the column. 

This diary is as follows: 


FROM MANZANILLO TO SANTIAGO DE CUBA BY LAND. 


[Diary of the operations of campaign of the forces of the Manzanillo division 
from June 22 to July 3, 1898. | 


‘STROM MANZANILLO TO BAYAMO. 


‘‘In compliance with orders from the lieutenant general, com- 
mander in chief of the fourth army corps, in his cablegram of the 
20th instant, ordering that the forces of the Manzanillo division 
should proceed to Santiago de Cuba, Colonel Federico Escario, 
for the time being commanding general of said division, having 
made the necessary preparations for such a long journey, properly 
equipped the troops and rationed them for six days, commenced the 
march on the 22d at the head of a column composed of the first 
and second battalions of the Isabel la Catdélica regiment of infan- 
try, No. 75; the first battalion of the Andalusia regiment, No. 52; 
the Alcdntara Peninsular battalion, No. 3; the battalion of Puerto 
Rico chasseurs, No. 19; the second section of the first battery of — 
the fifth mountain regiment; part of the eighth company of the 
first regiment of sappers; mounted guerillas from Calicito, Bay- 
amo, and Manzanillo; five medical officers and thirty men of the 


(116) 


itis 


medical department destined for the Santiago hospitals, and the 
tenth company of the transportation column in charge of 13,000 
rations of hardtack (galleta), and 15,000 extra rations loaded on 148 
mules, and 50 private beasts of burden properly loaded. 

“This column, comprising a total of 3,752 men, left Manzanillo 
at 5 o’clock p. m., and at nightfall reached Palmas Altas, where 
its commander gave orders to encamp for the night, which, how- 
ever, did not afford the soldiers the rest that it was intended. it 
should, owing to a steady downpour, so that only a few could lie 
down. | 

‘<The 23d dawned more brightly than the preceding day; the 
camp was struck, the column reorganized, and the difficult march 
continued at 5.30; high weeds had to be cut down to open a road 
on the left bank of the Yara River, which route the commander 
chose in order to obviate passing through towns which might be 
occupied by the enemy, thereby complying with the order to 
avoid encounters, contained in the cablegram of the 20th, above 
referred to. 

‘‘The column passed through the Don Pedro plain and arrived 
at dark at the ford of the Yara River, near the town of the same 
name. Orders were given to encamp here. The column had 
been harassed all day, especially while preparing to occupy the 
camp, when the enemy opened a steady, lively fire, which lasted 
ten minutes, killing one of our men and wounding three. The fire 
was answered by the vanguard of the column. The usual recon- 
noissance having been made by the mounted force, which reported 
that the enemy had withdrawn, the column encamped and the 
night was spent without further events and under more favorable 
conditions than the previous night, for a clear sky and a dense 
grove allowed our soldiers comparative rest until daybreak of the 
24th, when the column, rising at the sound of the reveille, and 
after drinking coffee, was again formed and organized by 6 
o’clock, when it continued its march through Arroyo Pavon, Ana 
L6pez, and Sabana la Loma, sustaining slight skirmishes, in which 
the column had one man killed and one wounded. The column 
encamped on the banks of the Canabacoa River. 

“On the 25th, at the usual hour, the camp of the preceding day 
was struck and the column reorganized while heavy showers were 
falling; the march was continued through Las Peladas, Palmarito, 
and across the Buey and Yao rivers. The camp was pitched at 
Babatuaba. The same as yesterday, the column was harassed all 
day, always repulsing and dispersing the enemy. One man was 
killed during the skirmishes. 

“The night’ passed quietly, and at 6.30 a. m. of the 26th the 
march was recommenced. The day was eventful and of excellent 


118 


moral and material results for the Spanish cause, as will be seen 
from the fact that our forces entered the city of Bayamo after a 
long march and pursued and scattered hostile detachments through 
the heights of San Francisco, Peralejo, across the Mabay River, 
and at Almirante, where the camp was pitched, not without some 
resistance from the enemy, who was severely punished by the 
accurate fire of the column, without causing us the least damage. 

‘““The diary of those days would not be complete without an 
account of the entrance into Bayamo above referred to. This 
maneuver was undertaken, contrary to the orders to avoid encoun- 
ters contained in said cablegram of the 20th from the commander in 
chief of the fourth army corps, for the reason that the commander 
of the column thought it would be discouraging to the soldiers to be 
so near said city without entering it, and that their spirits would 
rise, on the other hand, if they were allowed to do so and show the 
enemy and the ungrateful people of Bayamo that there were still 
Spaniards left in Cuba, and to disperse the enemy, for which pur- 
poses there was strength and time enough left that day. The com- 
mander therefore decided to explain these reasons to the commander 
in chief and ordered that Colonel Manual Ruiz, second commander 
of the column, should occupy the city with the cavalry and 600 
infantry, the latter to be divided into two columns and the cavalry 
to form the third. Interpreting faithfully the wishes and orders 
of Colonel Escario, Colonel Ruiz left the camp at Almirante at 3 
o’clock p. m., after the troops had taken their first mess, and 
divided his forces into the three groups mentioned, himself taking 
command of one of the groups of infantry, placing the other in 
charge of Lieutenant Colonel Baldomero Barb6n, iirst commander 
of the Alcantara battalion, and the mounted force in charge of 
Luis Torrecilla, commander of the first battalion of the Isabel la 
Catélica regiment. These three columns of attack, advancing 
steadily on three different points, succeeded in approaching the 
city without disturbance or interruption. Evidently the enemy 
was desirous of saving his fire, for alarm signals were heard and 
_ groups were seen running from one place to another of the pre- 
cinct, leaving no doubt that the enemy was near. 

‘‘The columns in the meantime continued to advance rapidly 
and in silence, deployed in perfect order of battle, and thus they 
arrived at the banks of the Bayamo River, where hostile forces 
tried to check them by a steady musket fire from the city. But 
this attempt became futile when the signal of attack was given, at 
the sound of which our soldiers, arms in hand and without firing 
a single shot, crossed the river at arun; with only one casualty 
and without further resistance, they triumphantly entered the 
stronghold of. the enemies of Spain. In disorderly and precipitate 


119 


flight that savage tribe retreated. Our forces went to occupy the 
forts and principal avenues, and in separate groups they recon- 
noitered the whole city, gathering up at the military command- 
ancia of the insurgents several packages of their records and cor- 
respondence, and the station and part of the telegraph line which 
the rebels had established with Jiguani and Santa Rita were 
wrecked. 

‘“‘No information concerning the enemy could be obtained from 
the people of Bayamo, who, as usual, kept silent; a few only opened 
their doors from sheer curiosity, plainly showing in their faces the 
disgust they felt at the presence of Spanish soldiers on that soil 
where it had been believed that they would never again set foot. 

‘*Our forces then returned to the camp at Almirante. The result 
of that day’s work was not known at first, but it was afterwards 
learned that the enemy had 19 casualties, 10 killed and 9 wounded. 
The night at Almirante passed without further incidents, and thus 
ended the first part of what may well be called the glorious march 
from Manzanillo to Santiago. 


‘“FROM BAYAMO TO BAIRE. 


‘‘At daybreak of the 27th the camp at Almirante was struck 
and the column continued its march across the plain of Guandbano, 
through Chapala and across the Cautillo River, destroying on their 
way the enemy’s telegraph line from Bayamo to Santa Rita, where 
the camp was pitched for the night, which was spent without any 
further incidents. 

‘‘At 6 a. m. of the 28th the march was resumed, the column pro- 
ceeding to Baire via Cruz Alta, Jiguani River, Upper Jiguani, 
Piedro de Oro, Granizo, Cruz del Yarey, and Salada.. The enemy, 
in greater number than on preceding days and in control of the 
heights which overlook the ford of the Jiguani River, tried to pre- 
vent our forces from crossing; but their intention was foiled by 
timely flank attacks ordered by the commander of the column, 
protected by accurate artillery fire. After the river had been 
forded, the march was continued without interruption to Cruz del 
Yarey, where the rebels appeared again, offering less resistance, 
and we defeated them once more. They seemed inclined, however, 
to continue to impede the march, which was apparent upon the 
arrival of our column at the ruins of what was formerly the town 
of Baire; they were waiting there, and as soon as they espied the 
column they opened a galling musket fire, which was silenced by 
the rapid advance of our vanguard, who compelled them to retreat 
in shameful and precipitate flight. In this encounter Colonel 
Manual Ruiz, second commander of the column, was wounded and 
his horse killed under him; four soldiers were killed and five 
wounded. The column encamped and spent the night at Baire. 


120 


‘The high weeds which during almost all those days completely 
covered the soldiers and hampered their progress, causing at the 
same time a suffocating heat, which made it almost impossible to 
breathe, and cutting off the road, which had to be opened by dint 
of hard work, rendering the march extremely laborious and often 
making it necessary to proceed in single file; the frequent rains, 
which not only soaked the clothing, but also the ground, making 
it slippery and difficult to walk on for such large numbers; the 
sickness caused by the inclement weather and the hard work of 
these operations; the ever-increasing convoy of stretchers; the 
consideration that one-half of the journey had been accomplished, 
and the further very important consideration that the column had 
arrived at a place where it would be easy to throw the enemy off 
the track, as they would not know what direction our forces might 
take, there being three roads leading from here to Santiago; all 
these were reasons which the commander of the column took into 
consideration when he decided to suspend the march and rest dur- 
ing the day of the 29th. It was so ordered owing to fatigue; but 
the enemy kept harassing us and we had three more wounded. 


“STA MANTONIA. 


‘“‘At daybreak of the 30th the camp at Baire was struck and the 
column proceeded to Palma Soriano, where the wounded and dead 
were left, and continued its march via Ratonera, Doncella Creek, 
and the Contramaestre River to La Mantonia, where the camp was 
pitched and the night spent. 

‘‘Before the column was deployed on the road to Ratonera, the 
enemy from intrenched positions opened fire, which was answered 
and silenced by the first forces leaving the camp. The commander 
of the column foresaw that such attack would be repeated, and in 
order to obviate casualties, thus further complying with the order 
of the aforesaid cablegram from the commander in chief of the 
fourth army corps, he changed the route, and our forces, thus 
eluding the ambuscades, arrived at the slopes of Doncella Creek, 
the ford of which was reached by a narrow pass and difficult 
ravine. The rebels occupied positions here; our vanguard brought 
them out without answering their fire. When the column had 
been reconcentrated after fording the Doncella, they prepared to 
ford the Contramaestre River, where the enemy was awaiting us, 
which fact they had announced themselves by written challenges 
and threats which they had left along the road. Lieutenant 
Colonel Baldomero Barbén, of the Alcdntara battalion, who since 
Colonel Ruiz was wounded had been in command of one-half of 
the vanguard brigade, deployed his forces in perfect order of bat- 
tle and advanced resolutely. Commanding positions overlooked 


121 


the clear and unobstructed road which the column had to follow 
after coming out of the mountains through the narrow valley of 
the Contramaestre, and moreover they had to scale the steep and 
tortuous ascent of the opposite bank. Without other shelter than 
the high weeds which, as usual, impeded the march, without other 
trenches than their own hearts, these brave soldiers, with their 
commander at their head, advanced calmly and in perfect order, 
accepting the challenge which had been addressed to them. The 
enemy had told the truth; there they were in large numbers occu- 
pying those favorable positions which would have been impregna- 
ble if they had been held by any one who knew how to defend 
them; but not expecting that we would accept the challenge, they 
allowed themselves to be surprised by a lively musket fire and effec- 
tiveartillery discharges, which demoralized and dispersed them, and 
the rapid advance of our forces rushing upon them arms in hand 
did not give them a chance to rally. The enemy, being unable to 
do much firing, retreated with little resistance and having suffered 
a number of casualties, leaving the field and their positions to 
those who, understanding the sacred duty imposed by honor, had 
known how to pick up the glove that had been thrown to them, 
and regardless of danger and without measuring their strength 
had marched on unflinchingly in search of the death with which 
they had been threatened. Having crossed the Contramaestre 
and passed through extensive pastures, the column arrived at a 
_ farm (finca) known as La Mantonia, where. a number of huts of 
all sizes and many recent tracks indicated the proximity of a large 
hostile force. And indeed, soon after the first forces of the van- 
guard had entered that large encampment, the enemy tried to 
check our advance by a galling fire from the slope of a mountain 
where they were intrenched, controlling a line of 1,200 meters, 
through which it was necessary for us to pass unprotected, as the 
high weeds made any deployment of the column and advance of 
cavalry impossible. By order of Lieutenant Colonel Barbon, the 
two companies of the vanguard of the Alcantara battalion, in 
command of Francisco Gonzdles, who rendered himself an exact 
account of the hostile position, advanced steadily and without 
answering the fire, following the only passable trail, and engaged 
the hostile position on the left flank, compelling the enemy by 
repeated discharges crossed with the few that the column was able 
to fire, to abandon the trenches, leaving us a great deal of ammu- 
nition, mostly of the Remington type. 

‘Tn the fierce battles of that day Captain Jenaro Ramiro, of the 
Alcantara battalion, and 9 privates were wounded and 5 killed. 


122 


*¢ AGUACATE. 


‘* At daybreak of July 1 the column resumed the march and 
reached the ford of the Guarinao River, after passing through Las 
Lajas, where the enemy held advantageous positions from which 
our vanguard routed them without much resistance. After cross- 
ing the Guarinao, small detachments sent out surprised two ambus- 
cades; the column sustained insignificant skirmishes with outposts 
and small reconnoitering parties, which indicated that large hostile 
forces were not far off. Subsequent events showed that this theory 
was correct. When the column arrived at a rugged place dom- 
inated by steep heights forming an amphitheatre, they discovered 
in its center a camp of recent construction, sufficiently large to 
accommodate 2,000 men. A rapid glance convinced us that the 
site was specially adapted for an ambuscade. Colonel Escario, 
realizing this and taking precautions accordingly, gave orders for 
the column to proceed in its advance and for the artillery to take 
positions. The enemy did not wait to be surprised, but opened 
fire at once from Aguacate hill, the station of our heliograph, and 
adjoining hills to the right and left in an extensive intrenched 
line. Our soldiers maneuvered as though on drill, and advancing 
steadily, two-thirds of the column entered the battle, and that hail 
of lead which strewed death in its path was not sufficient to make 
them retreat or even check them. Calmly, with fearless heroism, 
they advanced, protected by the frequent and sure fire of the artil- 
lery, and skillfully guided by their chiefs, and with the cry ‘‘ Long 
live Spain!” and charging with bayonets, they simultaneously took 
those heights which were so difficult and dangerous to scale, beat- 
ing the enemy into precipitate retreat, so that they could not gather 
up their dead and wounded. Seventeen dead were left on the field, 
also ammunition of various modern types. There were moments 
during that battle when the tenacity of the enemy and the order 
with which they fought gavetheimpression that they might belong 
to our own column. This report spread rapidly and reached 
Colonel Hscario’s ears, who, fearing that this might really be the 
case, gave orders to suspend the fire, and tried to make himself 
known by bugle signals. But this precaution was useless, and the 
commander becoming convinced that he was fighting rebel forces, 
ordered the attack to be renewed and the hostile positions to be 
taken. To do the enemy justice it must be stated that they 
defended these well-chosen positions with persistency and in good 
order, and that they rose to unusual heights that day, making this 
the fiercest battle which we sustained on the march from Manzanillo 
to Santiago and one of the most remarkable ones of the present 
campaign. Our casualties consisted of 7 dead and 1 lieutenant and 
42 privates wounded. Large pools of blood on the battlefield 


123 


showed the severe chastisement which the enemy had suffered at 
our hands. When the column had been reorganized, the march 
was continued to Arroyo Blanco, where the night was spent. 


‘“FROM ARROYO BLANCO TO SANTIAGO. 


‘“‘Hrom Arroyo Blanco, where the column had camped during 
the night, it proceeded to Palma Soriano, fighting the enemy all 
along the road, on both sides of which the latter occupied good 
positions and endeavored to detain the column at any price. 
Engaging the enemy in front and on the flank, a passage was 
forced and the column reached Palma Soriano at 3 o’clock p. m. 
The battle of that day caused us 4 dead and 6 wounded. 

‘‘Hrom Palma Soriano the commander of the column, by helio- 
gram sent to San Luis, announced his arrival to the commander 
in chief of the fourth army corps at Santiago, and in reply he was 
notified that large United States forces had landed and were sur- 
rounding a part of the city, and that it was, therefore, of urgent 
necessity to reenforce the place, the defenders of which were few, 
and to force the march as much as possible. Desirous of comply- 

ing with this order, Colonel Escario, who realized that the soldiers 
must be prepared to accomplish the rest of the journey with the 
greatest possible speed, had the following order of the column, 
dated at Palma Soriano, July 2, 1898, read to the companies: 

** «Soldiers: We left Manzanillo because the enemy was threat- 
ening Santiago de Cuba. We must hasten to the assistance of our 
comrades; our honor, which is the honor of our fathers, calls us 
there. 

‘¢*T, who am proud of having been able to be with you in these 
days when our country requires of us twofold energy and courage, 
address these few words to you in order to tell you that I am 
highly pleased with your behavior and to point out to you the 
necessity of making a supreme effort to save the honor of our 
beloved country, as we have done so far. 

‘‘<Then say with me, ‘Long live Spain!’ and let us go in search 
of those who are desirous of finding out what each one of you is 
worth. The victory is ours. 

‘¢*Your Colonel, : ESCARIO.’ 


‘After a plentiful and nourishing meal the troops were ordered 
to rest. At 2 o’clock in the night the reveille was sounded, and 
the column, organizing immediately, resumed its march, which the 
soldiers tried to hasten as much as possible, with no other stimulus 
than that imposed by duty, of which they were constantly reminded 
by the cannonades that could be heard in the distance in the direc- 
tion of Santiago. With slight skirmishes, and without eating nor 


124 


resting, these brave soldiers reached the pass of Bayamo, where 
they had the first view of the city of Santiago. Hereit was learned 
that on the same day our fleet, forcing the entrance of the channel, 
which was blockaded by the American ships, had gone out in 
search of death, which is the fate reserved for heroes. 

‘Tt was now between 10 and 11 o’clock in the morning of the 3d, 
and when Colonel Escario noted the intense cannonade in the 
direction of the city, he organized a flying column which was to 
march as fast as possible, leaving the rest of the column with the ~ 
train, in command of Colonel Ruiz Rafioy, to follow at once. 

“The flying column was formed of the first battalion of the 
Isabel la Catélica regiment, in command of Commander Torrecilla, 
with 30 of the strongest men of each company, the whole cavalry, 
and the two artillery pieces. The command of this column was 
placed in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Baldomero Barbén of the 
Alcantara battalion. 

‘This column advanced toward Puerto Bayamo, from which 
point Colonel Escario proceeded to the city with a section of cay- 
alry, arriving there at 3 o’clock p.m. The rest of the flying col- 
umn reached Santiago between 4 and 4.30, and the nucleus of the 
column with the train between 9 and 10 o’clock p. m. 

‘“Those worthy chiefs, officers, and long-suffering soldiers, that 
handful of brave men, constantly defeating the enemy who per- 
sistently tried to check them, rising superior to the inclement 
weather, to sickness and fatigue, had arrived at the post of honor 
after a supreme effort and after victoriously crossing the Alps of 
Cuba. It is not to be wondered at that, when they came in sight 
of the city, they took off their hats, and with tears in their eyes 
opened their lips in a unanimous shout of ‘ Long live Spain!’ which 
rose spontaneously from those noble hearts. 

‘<The casualties during the whole march were 1 colonel, 2 officers, 
and 68 privates wounded and 27 killed. Twenty-eight thousand 
six hundred and seventy Mauser cartridges had been used and 38 
rounds of artillery fired. 

‘‘At 10 o’clock the last rear guard entered the city of Santiago 
de Cuba, and the battalions at once repaired to the different trenches 
assigned to them by the chief of staff, and from that time on they 
formed part of the forces defending the city. 

‘‘SANTIAGO DE Cusa, July 8, 1898.” 


The column went to occupy the following positions: 

Canosa: Lieutenant Colonel Baldomero Barbén at the most ad- 
vanced point; the Alc4ntara battalion which relieved the Asiatic 
battalion. 

Match factory: The Isabel la Catdlica regiment, under Com- 
mander Luis Torrecilla. | 


125 


Campo de Marte: The other battalion, under Commander Eu- 
genio Bricefio. 

Dos Caminos del Gobre! The Puerto Rico chasseurs, under Lieu- 
tenant Colonel Arana. 

Plaza de Toros: The Andalusia battalion, under Commander 
Julian Llorens. 

9th.—The Alcantara battalion was relieved from the difficult 
position it occupied by six companies of the Isabel la Catdélica regi- 
ment, one of the Asiatic regiment, one company of guerrillas, all 
under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Barbén. On the morn- 
ing of the 10th this line was reenforced by two companies of the 
Alcantara battalion. 

10th.—The Puerto Rico chasseurs receded to the city. 


XXXI. 


INS THE CITY A NDSUNS DED reys 


July 5th.—The usual ships blockading the harbor. 

The greater part of the population has left the city, fleeing from 
the bombardment. 

The merchant steamers are firing up. 

The Morro says that there are 28 merchant and war vessels in 
sight. The Oregon and Brooklyn are missing. 

In the city the streets are deserted and nearly all the houses 
locked up. 

6th.—The two 9-cm. Krupp guns at Punta Gorda were taken 
down to be installed in the precinct of the city. 

A German war ship was signaled to the south. 

Mr. Mason, with a flag of truce, went out in the tug Colon to 
communicate with her. When he arrived at the mouth of the 
harbor the ship had already left. 

At 5 General Toral was advised by General Shafter that the 
suspension of hostilities was at an end. 

Lieutenant Hobson, of the Merrimac, and the seven men were 
exchanged. 

In the American fleet there are 1,100 Spanish prisoners, among 
them over 300 wounded. 

7th.—It was learned that the prisoners of our fleet are being sent 
to the United States. 

The two 42-centimeter guns of the Méjico were disembarked for 
the purpose of being erected in the precinct of the city. Forty 
Mauser rifles were also taken off the ship. The former could not 
be set up. 

8&th.—The hostile fleet continues the blockade. 

Orders were given by the commandancia de marina to the cap- 
tains of the merchant steamers to sink their ships. 

A private house was prepared to receive the sick and wounded 
of the fleet. The convalescents were sent to the quarters of the 
firemen. 

9th.—The hostile fleet in sight as usual. : 

Order of Generai Toral to have the merchant vessels refill their 
bunkers at the piers of Las Cruces and the Railway. 


(126) 


127 


The wounded and sick of the fleet were transferred from the 
Méjico to the house fitted out for a hospital by the Navy. 

On the 4th General Shafter notified the consuls that the city 
would be bombarded, so that all those might leave who did not 
form part of the garrison. At their request for more time in order 
to take away their families, the term was prolonged twenty-four 
hours. 

The panic became general, and at daybreak of the 5th the pop- 
ulation almost en masse left in the direction of El Caney, so as to 
avoid a bombardment which all supposed would be horrible and 
not leave one stone upon the other. 

The steamers, full of people, were ready to proceed to Las 
Cruces, Cinco Reales, and all the coves on the eastern coast of the 
bay, where they thought they would be better protected and safer. 

All along the coast regular camps were established within the 
shelter of the mountains. It may be safely said that there were 
not 5,000 inhabitants left in the city. All the windows and doors 
were closed, and Santiago presented the same aspect that Pompeii 
and Herculaneum must have offered. Not a single store was 
open, not even the drug stores. The desertion and solitude wera 
complete. 

A few horses were running through the city, pulling up the . 
grass growing along the sidewalks. Many dogs are staying at the 
entrances of the houses, which their masters have abandoned, 
without having anything to eat, nor anything to drink, which is 
worse. Atnight they bark incessantly, which makes the scene 
still more impressive. I have several times gone from the cap- 
taincy of the port to the military hospital, that 1s, across the city 
from one end to the other, without seeing a single door open or 
meeting a single person in the streets or public places, except a 
guerrilla or one or two couples of the civil guard. The solitude 
and the silence were absolute. 

At night the city was truly impressive. The streets, the lamps 
not being lit, were as dark as wolves’ dens, and it was not possible 
to cross them without being in constant danger of stumbling. A 
few guerrillas, taking advantage of the circumstances, were break- 
ing into abandoned stores and houses, which they ransacked; for 
instance, the house of my friend, Commander Ros, governor of 
the Morro, situated in San Tadeo street, which I saw with my 
own eyes. They left nothing whole, and him only with the cloth- 
ing he wore and 20 pesos which he had with him. The criminals, 
who were caught in the act, were four guerrillas. I speak with a 
perfect knowledge of what happened, and, as will be seen, I cite 
examples of well-known persons. 


128 


There is no excuse for such actions, and I shall not try to exten- 
uate them; but it is also just to say, in honor of the truth, that the 
soldiers, who had hardly anything to eat and little water to drink, 
and who spent day and night in the trenches, were not to be found 
in the city, and when on rare occasions one would go there to see 
whether he could not get a glass of water or buy a box of sardines 
or a piece of hardtack, which the merchants were hiding, the latter 
asked him six times what it was worth, and fleeced him (I find no 
other word for it) without shame or compassion. 

I must also add that such abuses, which were repressed as soon 
as they were commenced—thanks to the civil guard and patrols, 
who walked through the city day and night—were not committed 
by the troops, except in isolated cases, as in that of Mr. Ros. 
They were committed by citizens, although they were imputed to 
those who knew how to enter the houses without forcing the prin- 
cipal door. I might cite a thousand examples which would con- 
vince the most incredulous and which I omit for the sake of brev- 
ity. Thanks to the energy displayed by General Toral, the street 
lamps were finally lighted, so that it became possible to venture 
into the streets at night. As a proof of the proportions which 
this plundering reached, I will copy a decree which the General 
_ found it necessary to promulgate. The decree was as follows: 


‘“*T, José Toral y Velazquez, General of Division, Commander 
General of the Division of Santiago de Cuba, and Military Gov- 
ernor of the City and Province, - 

‘‘In view of the frequent robberies which are being committed 
-in this city, by reason of the peculiar circumstances in which it 
finds itself, in order to repress them, and by virtue of the author- 
ity vested in me under Article 670 of the Campaign Regulations, 
issue the following: 

“* DECREE. 


‘‘Article 1. All soldiers who, in disobedience of this decree, shall 
destroy or set on fire buildings or property, or commit any acts 
of violence on persons, shall be punished by confinement in the 
penitentiary for life, after previous degradation, in conformity 
with Article 239 of the Code of Military Justice. 

“The penalty of death shall be imposed upon the instigators, or 
persons employing soldiers for this purpose. 

‘Criminals caught in the act of committing these offenses shall 
be summarily judged in conformity with Article 649 of the Code 
of Military Justice. 

‘‘Article 2. Civilians who shall commit the same offenses shall 
be adjudged in conformity with the Civil Code in force in this 
island, and the law shall be applied in its whole rigor by the 
respective Council of War, 


129 


‘‘Article 3. Anyone surprised in the act, who shall not give 
himself up at the first intimation, shall be fired upon. 


‘‘JosE TORAL. 
‘“SANTIAGO DE CuBA, July 16, 1898,” 


As it is my object to relate everything that happened at Santiago 
de Cuba, without omitting even the most insignificent events, so 
that an exact idea may be formed of everything, I must also state 
that, as I was told by Mr. Romero, captain of the civil guard, who 
was wounded at El] Caney on the evening of the 1st, where he had 
arrived in the morning to take charge of the military commandancia 
of that place, and taken prisoner by the Americans, he was nursed, 
attended, and treated with all the attention due to his rank and 
condition, as also others who were in the same case. This proves 
that only the Government of the United States and the jingoes are 
the authors of the unjust war that is being carried on, but not the 
people in general, and still less the Army, which, as its own officers 
and soldiers have assured me, is desirous of having it terminated 
as soon as possible. 


10845——9 


XXXIT. 


BATTLES AND BOMBARDMENTS OF THE 10th AND 11th. 


July 10th.—The usual ships opposite the harbor. The general 
staff of the fourth army corps has asked for a statement as to the 
personnel and armament of the navy, which was forwarded to him. 

General Shafter gave notice that hostilities had again broken out 
since 4 in the afternoon. 

At 3 the hamlet of Dos Caminos was burned. 

At 5 a gunshot was heard which had been fired by the fleet; 1m- 
mediately after a sustained musket fire, which became very intense. 

The artillery on land is firing, ours is answering. 

At 5.15 the fleet opened fire on the coast. 

At 6.30 the firing ceased by sea and by land. 

The enemy has abandoned two trenches. 

11th.—The fleet is guarding the harbor and Aguadores. 

At 6a slow musket fire commenced on land; a few volleys are 
heard. 

At 8.30 two ships opened fire on the city from Aguadores. A 
few projectiles fall at the head of the bay, where the Alvarado is 
at anchor. 

During yesterday 46 wounded were received at the military hos- 
pital. There were seven dead. 

At2p. m. the bombardment ceased. 

At 2.30 firing ceased in the precinct. 

At 5 the enemy hoisted a flag of truce on the Fort San Juan. 

At night many fires were seen on the heights near the cemetery 
and atthe head of the bay (to the northwest). 

The gunboat Alvarado asked for permission to fire; it was 
denied on account of the truce. 

On the 10th the enemy, already in the trenches and being in 
possession of all the adjoining heights where he has installed 
numerous modern guns, opened a lively musket and gun fire, at 5 
p. m., upon a great extent of our line. The artillery answered 
firmly, but there was hardly any musket fire, because orders had 
been given and complied with to economize ammunition at any 


cost. 
(130) 


131 


Two hours previously, our advance forces had withdrawn to the 
city, abandoning the foremost position at Dos Caminos del Cobre, 
first setting it on fire. 

The fleet at the same time opened fire on Aguadores and sur- 
rounding points on the coast, and on our lines. The battle was 
limited to firing from the trenches. Nevertheless, as the enemy 
was very numerous and his lines only a few meters from ours, we 
had 7 dead and 47 wounded. During the engagement the Ameri- 
cans abandoned two trenches which they could not hold because 
they were flanked by ours. 

At 8.30 the following day the fleet bombarded the city from 
Aguadores, having given notice to that effect as early as the 4th. 
As I said, the ships of the fleet, taking turns two by two, fired 
rather slowly, and only until 2.30 p. m., but notwithstanding, there 
were 59 houses that suffered considerable damage. One shell went 
through a foundation in San Basilio street, where it dropped and ex- 
ploded, and a shell cut an iron column of a provision store in two, 
penetrating into a house in Marina street, after piercing the wall. 
Another shell penetrated at No. 9 Santa Lucia High street, destroy- 
ing the hallandoneroom. Inthe provision store of Messrs. Brauet, 
in Fundicion street, two 20-cm. shells (nearly all were of this cali- 
bre, or of 16 centimeters) fell; one only exploded, causing great 
havoc. The most remarkable case of all was Mr. Marcané’s house, 
in Santo Tomas Place. A single shell ruined it completely. It is 
hard to understand how a single projectile can do what that one 
did. 

Between the garden of the Alameda and the railway station, 
being a distance of about 800 meters, 23 projectiles fell. Many of 
them did not explode. One of them went through a tree, as though 
it had been a gimlet. At the ice factory two fell, and three at the 
railway station. A great many fell near the piers, and still more 
near the place where the gunboat Alvarado was at anchor. 

As the city was almost abandoned, there was no loss of life. 

In the meantime the enemy continued to antagonize our lines 
in order to compel the soldiers to consume the scant ammunition 
that remained, but orders had been given not to answer the fire, 
and so there was hardly any musket fire. Gun fire only answered 
very slowly, asis necessary with antiquated guns. The enemy, on 
the other hand, was constantly receiving modern guns and setting 
them up rapidly. We were within a circle of fire, and although 
that phrase has been somewhat abused, I find no other that better 
describes the situation. 

At5 p.m. the enemy hoisted a white flag on Fort San Juan 
and a spokesman was received. 


132 


Though this may not be the right moment, I want to make an 
observation. It has been asked many times why Admiral Cer- 
vera’s fleet, whose object was to run the blockade and elude the 
hostile fleet, did not go out at night. 

Of course, the Admiral did not tell me his reasons, but it is easy 
to understand them. 

The hostile fleet was constantly watching the entrance of the 
harbor with its search lights, making it as light as though it were 
day. There the ships would probably have been seen just the same. 
On the other hand, the sortie, which even in daytime is extremely 
difficult, would have been short of impossible at night, when 
blinded by the search lights, and would necessarily have resulted 
in a catastrophe. The sortie at night was impracticable. It was 
absolutely necessary to effect it in daytime; at least, if the enemy 
saw us, we also saw him, and the chances for not running aground 
in the channel were much better. From the foregoing I believe 
that anyone, even though not acquainted with naval matters, will 
understand why Admiral Cervera did not go out at night. 

As a proof of this, I will say that on the night when the cruiser 
Reina Mercedes was sunk the hostile ships fired upon her with the 
same accuracy as though it had been daytime. 

For a better understanding of the events and engagements of the 
10th and 11th of July, I will copy below the official report of Lieu- 
tenant Colonel Barbdén and that of Lieutenant of Artillery Moreno 
to General Escario, as also a statement of the shots which our guns 
fired during those days. One need only glance at the statement 
referred to to see at once that on the first day 167 shots could be 
fired, and the next day, being the 11th, only 35, because the enemy 
had dismounted and disabled some of our guns. A simple calcu- 
lation is sufficient to understand that the following day not a sin- 
gle gun could probably have been fired. Before such proofs, com- 
ments are unnecessary. | 

‘‘ Having been placed in charge of the forces on the right hand 
of the plantation called El Suefio, on the heights and in the 
glens which border on the avenues of El Caney and Canosa, and the 
roads of Pozo and San Juan, composed of six companies of the 
Isabel la Catdélica Regiment, two of the Alcdntara Battalion, one 
of the Asiatic Battalion, and one of guerrillas as stretchermen, I 
have the honor to report to you that at 4.30 a. m. yesterday the 
enemy opened machine-gun and musket fire on our positions, with- 
out daring to make any forward movement; such prudence being 
founded, no doubt, on the respect inspired by our sepulchral silence 
before the thunderous noise of their many guns, for only 10 marks- 
men, in convenient positions, had orders to fire on a trench which 
they attacked on the flank and dislodged at the end of 15 minutes. 
At nightfall, 7.30 p. m., the enemy ceased firing. 


138 


“To-day, at 6.30 a. m., the enemy again opened fire, while our 
side did not waste a single cartridge, the enemy continuing with 
the same activity as yesterday, without coming out of his trenches, 
until 4.30 p. m., when he ceased firing and asked for suspension. 

‘¢The casualties on our side were, on the 10th, 6 dead and 29 
wounded, and to-day, one dead, 5 wounded, and one bruised; total 
casualties during the two days, 42. 

‘¢You will see from the above that [have exactly complied with 
your orders not to fire until the enemy should come out of his 
trenches to attack. 

‘“<T only need add that all the forces without exception did their 
duty as brave men, full of enthusiasm, and I had to recommend 
repeatedly that they should conceal in order to avoid needless 
casualties, which seemed difficult, and there is nothing strange 
about it, as our men, for the first time in three years of campaign, 
were enclosed in trenches and on the defensive. 

(Here follow special recommendations for bravery of three 
officers, being 1 commander and 2 lieutenants.) 

(Signed) ‘‘BALDOMERO BARBON.” 


‘SANTIAGO DE CuBA, August 11, 1898.” 


Copy of the report made by the first lieutenant in charge of the 
artillery of the sector: 


‘¢ ARTILLERY, CITY OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, 
SECTOR FROM THE PORTILLO DEL CANEY TO SAN ANTONIO. 

‘CHONORED Sir: Fire was opened by the enemy yesterday at 4.45 
p. m., and the batteries of this sector made it their business to 
silence it, or at least diminish it as much as possible, given the 
limited effectiveness of the guns which formed them—most of them 
muzzle-loading—and the reduced caliber of the only four which 
are of modern types, and can therefore keep up an accurate and 
rapid fire. The enemy’s batteries, as has been observed on pre-. 
vious days by means of glasses, and as we have experienced practi- 
cally to-day, are quite numerous, very well installed without leav- 
ing any space uncovered, and occupy positions overlooking ours, 
and are for that latter reason well adapted to train successfully, 
and to be of great moral effect on our troops, who are harassed 
almost vertically by the grapeshot (shrapnel ?) inside the trenches. 
The guns of these batteries are of small and medium caliber, as 
may be seen from the size of their projectiles, and the shape of 
the latter shows that they are breech-loading guns, and for that 
reason alone, of the greatest advantage over ours. <A few fire 
dynamite projectiles, but it was noticed that they are of little 
accuracy, although very effective when they explode. At the 
same moment when the musket and machine-gun fire was opened, 


134 


which was hardly answered from the city, gun fire also commenced, 
and as the effect of the shells began to be felt at the first shots, it 
became necessary for us to do what we could to decrease the can- 
nonade. Firing was commenced on the whole sector at the same 
time and with such rapidity as each gun permitted, except the 
Plasencia guns, forif we had continued to fire them with the same 
rapidity as the gunners, anxious to injure the enemy, had com- 
menced, we should have consumed the whole of the ammunition in 
two hours. All the shots were made under the action of a constant 
musket and machine-gun fire, aimed particularly at the batteries, 
for the apparent purpose of not allowing us to come out of the 
trenches to load and train our guns. In view of the sustained 
artillery fire from the city the enemy moderated his somewhat, 
especially in the sector between Nispero and San Antonio, and 
by 6 p. m. the only guns that were doing any firing worthy 
of mention were those installed opposite the Portillo del Caney. 
This circumstance was very favorable for us. The ostentatious 
artillery fire which we did during the first moments checked the 
enemy’s rapid fire along the greater part of the line, and if this 
had not been the case we should have been compelled to keep silent 
before his batteries, for of the 12 guns of different calibers of the 
batteries of Nispero, Suefio, Santo Inés, and San Antonio, we had 
left at the hour mentioned only three 8-cm. and two 16-cm. guns; 
the others had been put out of action, the carriages of most of 
them having been disabled. The batteries of Portillo del Caney 
continued to answer the fire, which was aimed at’ them partic- 
ularly without a moment’s cessation, and in one of them I was 
an eye witness of an incident worthy of mention. A training 
gunner of one of the 8-cm. Plasencia guns, whose captain 
had been previously wounded, was shot through one arm, and he 
continued to train, for fear that there would be no one to relieve 
him, until, a relief having been effected, he was obliged to go to 
the nearest hospital. At the same moment an artillerist came out 
with a mule and ran in the direction of the headquarters at Con- 
cha, passing through the musket and machine-gun fire, shouting, 
‘Long live Spain!’ through the streets. He was on his way to get 
another supply of common shells for the gun, its supply having 
been consumed during the first shots. These incidents, and similar 
ones which no doubt occurred all along the line and in the trenches, 
show, honored General, that while the enemy had succeeded, owing 
to the superior position of his batteries, in acquiring greater accu- 
racy of fire, he had not been able to quell the courage of our sol- 
diers, always cool-headed before the greatest danger, even to the 
very last moment. 


135 


“At 7p. m. the firing ceased, leaving us in bad condition for 
to-day, because, as I have already stated, only two 16-cm. and three 
8-cm. guns, and two 8-cm. Plasencia, and two rapid-fire Krupp 
guns, are all that are available for the defense, and the majority 
of the mounts for the old ones are somewhat defective. * * * 

‘At 5.30 a. m. to-day fire was opened by a few musket shots, 
and a few minutes after the artillery battle commenced. The bat- 
teries with which the enemy fired yesterday are not the only ones 
he has; he also has large-caliber guns, or perhaps howitzers, which, 
being installed at a considerable distance from the city and covered 
by the hills, keep up a constant fire upon us, which we are not able 
to answer. Yesterday we could distinguish the flashing from the 
batteries erected between the Portillo del Caney and San Antonio, 
and to-day we can see only three opposite the said Portillo; the 
others were firing completely under cover, and we were not even 
able to disturb the composure with which they were trained. It 
is known that we did them some damage yesterday, and that is 
perhaps the reason why they have taken this position to-day. Only 
two shots were fired in the morning at Santa Inés and two more at 
San Antonio. And the rest of the day we have been able to fire only 
from the 8-cm. Plasencia battery and the 7.5-cm. rapid-fire Krupp 
battery, erected at the Portillo del Caney and Palomar, respect- 
ively, which had opposite them three 9-cm. batteries of the enemy 
at a distance of 1,100 meters from the former and 1,600 meters 
from the latter. From the first moment it could be seen that the 
enemy’s objective was to bombard the city, and his fire was aimed 
entirely at that target. Yesterday they took the exact distance 
from their batteries to the principal points of the city, and to-day, 
making use of yesterday’s notes, they put the shells just where 
they wanted, and the trajectories of those from the same battery 
were almost identical. I repeat that there were only three in sight, 
and upon these three we opened fire at 6 a. m. with the rapid-fire 
guns. When the first shot was discharged the enemy partly 
changed his objective, and soon the battery mentioned and one of 
the hidden ones aimed their fire at Palomar, but were not able to 
hit the rapid-fire guns until 10 a. m., because these guns, being of 
reduced dimefisions, in sunken battery, and with hardly any smoke 
from the discharge, were hardly visible to the enemy. For four 
hours we fired without knowing where we were, but very slowly, 
because the number of ordinary shells and grapeshot for the guns 
referred to is already very small. After these first four hours were 
over, the enemy answered each shot with 8 or 10 of his, which, with 
almost mathematical precision, were aimed at the battery. About 
the same thing, but on a greater scale owing to the proximity of the 
opposing batteries and the good target formed by the smoke which 


136 


developed at each shot, happened at the Plasencia guns. Since 8 
o’clock in the morning, when the fire was opened, until 3 in the after- 
noon, the places where the guns were erected were veritable centers 
of impact, since we had only two batteries and the enemy a great 
many. And when a shot was fired, all concentrated their fire on 
the one that had discharged. In order to fire at all, it was neces- 
sary to make the enemy believe, by using artificial means, that the 
gun had been put out of action. When this did not succeed, the 
gun fire aimed at the battery was incessant, and made it impossible 
for us to load and train. As I have stated, at 3 p. m. the firing 
ceased, and yesterday as well as to-day I noticed the greatest order 
among the officers and men in charge of the different batteries. 
At the Plasencia guns, the second gunner, Antonio Escriba Escriba, 
belonging to the 2d section of the 1st battery of the 5th Mountain 
Regiment, was wounded. The total number of shots fired yester- 
day and to-day is as follows: 16, with the rapid-fire guns; 33, with 
the 8-cm. Plasencia guns; 29, with the 8-cm. guns; 63, with the 
8-cm. short breech-loaders; 10, with the 16-cm. and 10 with the 
12-cm. bronze guns. 
‘“May God guard your excellency for many years. 
“JUAN MORENO, 
** First heutenant, 
Commander of artillery of the sector. 


“SANTIAGO DE CuBA, July 11, 1898.” 


The guns which the Americans had in the batteries of the circle, 
were all of modern type, with calibers of 8,9, 7,and 7.5 cm. They 
fired mostly grapeshot (shrapnel ?) with 10 per cent ordinary shells. 
They also made use of dynamite shells, but the number of these 
projectiles did not exceed 5 per cent of the total number thrown 
upon the city. 

The batteries that were most persistent in firing on the 10th 
were those erected in the vicinity of the Caney road, and they fired 
only about 150 shots, with an average rapidity of 14 or 16 shots 
per hour and battery. The others, which ceased firing an hour 
earlier, discharged about 100 shots. 

On the 11th the gun fire was more sustained, but slower. All 
the batteries fired about alike and discharged in all about 700 shots. 


137 


BATTERIES OF THE PRECINCT OF THE CITY OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, 























No. of shots. 
Batteries and guns. 
10th. 11th. 
Fuerte Nuevo: 
One 12-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun----------------------- 5 OR BB he 
Cafiadas: 
One 16-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun--.-.......-.-------.--- Pi ar aie nt 
Santa Ursula: 
Battery No. 1: Two 8-cm. muzzle-loading bronze guns -----.-| 10  |------- 
Battery No. 2: Two 8-cm. long muzzle-loading bronze guns- - ro Ws Rec ace 
Battery No. 3: Two 9-cm. long muzzle-loading bronze guns--| 16 6 
Portillo Caney: 
Battery No. 1: Two 8-cm. short breech-loading bronze guns 
MER MEV ALOUI foe eee Ree es ee et een eae nsf 10 
Battery No. 2: Two 8-cm. long muzzle-loading bronze guns--| 24 |------- 
Nispero: 
Battery No. 1: One 16-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun-.------- Ti BS cere 
Battery No. 2: One 12-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun-_-.------ pA EA Se 
Battery No. 3: Two 8-cm. short breech-loading bronze guns--| 30 |- .----- 
Sueno: 
Battery No. 1: One 16-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun---- .--- RE ee rad 2 
Battery No. 2: One 12-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun .------- PAS ee gee ge 
Battery No. 8: Two 8-cm. short breech-loaders -...--.-------- 25 eee 
Santa Inés: 
Battery No. 1: One 16-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun-------- 2 2 
- Battery No. 2: One 12-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun-.------- RS base ee 
Battery No. 3: Two 8-cm. short breech-loading gums --------- 10) oR 
San Antonio: 
One 16-cm. muzzle-loading bronze gun-.-...-..---.---------- 2 1 
Palomar: ; 
Two 7.5-cm. short breech-loading rapid-fire Krupp guns--.----|/------- 16 











During the firing on the 10th, the following guns were put out 
of action: The gun of the battery of Fuerte Nuevo; one of each of 
the Santa Ursula batteries; the two of battery No. 2 of the Portillo 
del Caney; those of the Nispero batteries Nos. 2 and 3; those of 
batteries Nos. 1 and 2 and one of battery No. 3 of Suefio; and that 
of Battery No. 2 and one of Battery No. 3 of Santa Inés. 

To sum up, there were disabled: four 12-cm., one 16-cm., eight 
8-cm. guns, old systems, and one 9-cm. breechloader. 

The 9-cm. gun was disabled by the enemy, as also one of the 
12-cm. guns of Suefio, the cause being that the 12-cm. guns were 
mounted on ‘‘skeleton” carriages that did not belong to them, and 
broke at the first or second shot, and that the 8-cm. old guns, 
although mounted in their own carriages, these being of wood and 
in bad repair, they had the same fate as soon as a few shots were 
fired. The 16-cm. gun was disabled by the cartridge sticking in 
the chamber. 


XXXITI. 


SUSPENSION OF HOSTILITIES. 


July 12th.—The hostile fleet is still in sight. 

The archbishop, escorted by a detachment of the mounted civil 
guard, left the city, returning soon after. 

General Linares has forwarded to the commander in chief and 
to the minister of war the following cablegram, which I copy 
literally : 

‘‘OFFICIAL CABLEGRAM, JULY 12. 


‘*To the commander in chief and the minister of war: 

‘“Though confined to my bed by great weakness and sharp pains, 
Iam so much worried over the situation of these long-suffering 
troops that I deem it my duty to address your excellency and the 
minister of war for the purpose of setting forth the true state of 
affairs. : 

‘* Hostile positions very close to precinct of city, favored by 
nature of ground; ours spread out over 14 kilometers; troops 
attenuated; large number sick; not sent to hospitals because 
necessary to retain them in trenches. Horses and mules without 
food and shelter; rain has been pouring into the trenches inces- 
santly for twenty hours. Soldiers without permanent shelter; rice 
the only food; can not change or wash clothes. Many casualties; 
chiefs and officers killed; forces without proper command in crit- 
ical moments. Under these circumstances, impossible to open 
passage, because one-third of the men of our contingent would be 
unable to go out; enemy would reduce forces still further; result 
would be great disaster without accomplishing the salvation of 
eleven much-thinned battalions, as desired by your excellency. 
In order to go out under protection of Holguin division, it would 
be necessary for the latter to break through the hostile line, and 
then with combined forces to break through another part of the 
same line. This would mean an eight days’ journey for Holguin 
division, bringing with them a number of rations which they are 
unable to transport. The situation is fatal; surrender inevitable; 
we are only prolonging the agony; the sacrifice is useless; the 
enemy knows it, fully realizing our situation. Their circle being 
well established, they will exhaust our forces without exposing 
theirs as they did yesterday, bombarding on land by elevation 
without our being able to see their batteries, and from the sea by 


(138) 


139 


the fleet, which has full advices, and is bombarding the city in 
sections with mathematical accuracy. 

‘Santiago de Cuba is not Gerona, a city inclosed by walls, on 
the soil of the mother country, defended inch by inch by her own 
sons, by old men, women, and children without distinction, who 
encouraged and assisted the combatants and exposed their lives, 
impelled by the sacred idea of independence, while awaiting aid 
which they received. Here solitude, the total emigration of the 
population, insular as well as peninsular, including public officials, 
with a few exceptions. Only the clergy remains, and they intend 
to leave to-day headed by their prelate. 

‘“‘These defenders are not just beginning a campaign, full of 
enthusiasm and energy; they have been fighting for three years 
with the climate, privations, and fatigue; and now that the most 
critical time has arrived their courage and physical strength are 
exhausted, and there are no means for building them up again. 
The ideal is lacking; they are defending the property of people who 
have abandoned it in their very presence, and of their own foes, 
the allies of the American forces. 

‘<There is a limit to the honor of arms, and I appeal to the judg- 
ment of the Government and the whole nation; for these long- 
suffering troops have saved that honor many times since the 18th 
day of May, when they sustained the first bombardment. 

‘‘Tf it should be necessary to consummate the sacrifice for reasons 
which I ignore, or if there is need of some one to assume the re- 
sponsibility of the dénouement anticipated and announced by me 
in several cablegrams, I offer myself loyally on the altar of my 
country for the one purpose or the other, and I will take it upon 
myself to perform the act of signing the surrender, for my humble 
reputation is worth very little when it comes to a question of 


national interests. 
‘* LINARES.” 


13th.—The ships are still blockading the harbor. 

By order of the commander of marine, I went to the cruiser Reina 
Mercedes in order to ascertain her exact position. 

In crossing the channel we saw two hostile ships, but at a great 
distance. 

The cruiser which I visited is aground on the Morro shore. The 
port side is completely under water, the starboard side above water ; 
here the effects of the hostile shells may be observed. She lies in 
the line of the channel, and therefore does not interfere with the 
entering or going out of ships. I do not believe that the enemy 
will be able to use her; besides the injuries caused by the shells, 
the sea has commenced to destroy the bottom. 


140 


Upon returning I saw and spoke to many volunteer officers who 
have taken refuge there, dressed in civilians’ clothes. 

The conferences with the enemy have come to nothing, and it was 
decided that the suspension of hostilities and the armistice should 
cease and the bombardment be continued. 

The sailors from the fleet, 98 in number, who were at the fire- 
men’s headquarters, have gone, under the command of Ensign 
Goémez, to protect the match factory near the gasometer. 

There was a suspension of hostilities during the days of the 12th 
and 13th, and conferences were held with the enemy, which evi- 
dently have come to nothing, and from General Linares’s eloquent 
cablegram, setting forth so graphically and accurately the true 
state of affairs in this unfortified city and the situation of its 
defenders, it may be inferred that the capitulation was objected 
to, although it was absolutely necessary and further resistance 
impossible. 

14th.—The chief pilot of this harbor, Apolonio Ntifiez, was taken 
prisoner by the insurgents at Renté, situated west of the bay. The 
commander of marine at once notified General Toral, and as the 
suspension of hostilities had been extended, the latter, in his turn, 
advised General Shafter, commander in chief of the American 
forces operating at Santiago. 

15th.—Pilot Nuifiez was delivered up and escorted to the city by 
American soldiers. 

At night the chiefs of the army assembled in the apartments 
occupied by the staff of the division, and as a result of the meeting 
the following memorandum was drawn up: 


“On the 15th day of July, 1898, in the city of Santiago de Cuba, 
the following-named persons assembled, previous notice having 
been given of such meeting: General of Division José Toral y 
Velazquez, for the time being commander in chief of the fourth 
army corps, as president; General of Brigade Federico Escario; 
Colonel Francisco Oliveros Jiménez, of the civil guard; the follow- 
ing leutenant colonels of the different battalions: José Cotrina 
Gelabert, of the Asiatic battalion; Juan Pufiet, of the battalion 
‘Constitucién ;’ Pedro Rodriguez, of the Talavera battalion; Ven- 
tura Fontan, of the staff; Baldomero Barbén, of the Alcantara 
battalion; Segundo Pérez, of the San Fernando battalion; José 
Kscudero, of the provisional battalion of Puerto Rico No. 1; Luis 
Melgar, of the artillery; and Ramoén Arana, of the Puerto Rico 
chasseurs; Julio Cuevas, commissary of war; Pedro Martin, sub- 
inspector of the medical department of the army, and Juan Diaz 
Muelas, captain of engineers, all as voting members, and the last 
named as secretary. 


141 


“The president stated that although he did not consider Santiago 
de Cuba a stronghold of war, and though he was in direct commu- 
nication with the commander in chief, from whom he received pre- 
cise instructions, so that it was not necessary to proceed to the 
convocation of the council of defense referred to in Article 683 of 
the Regulation of Campaign, he desired nevertheless to learn the 
opinion of said council, constituted in accordance with the provi- 
sions of the regulation referred to, and of the lieutenant colonels 
of the battalions, as to whether, in view of the condition of the 
forces defending the city, it would be advisable to prolong the 
defense, or, on the contrary, to capitulate on the most favorable 
terms obtainable. 

“The junta, considering that Santiago has no other works of 
defense of a permanent nature than a castle without artillery at the 
mouth of the harbor and a few forts in the precinct, none of them 
substantial, so that its only real defense consists in the trenches 
which have been dug in suitable positions in the circuit of the city, 
and other earthworks in said circuit and in more advanced posi- 
tions, all effected hurriedly and with scant resources ; 

‘‘Considering further that for the defense of this line of trenches, 
about 14 kilometers long, not continuous, there are available only 
about 7,000 infantry and 1,000 guerrillas, all of whom have been 
doing constant service in the trenches, with hardly any troops to 
support them and without any reserves of any kind, the rest of the 
forces (the total forces consisting of about 11,500 men), belonging 
to other arms and garrisoning the Morro and the batteries of So- 
capa and Punta Gorda, or being assigned to other services, such as 
supplying all the posts with water, patrolling the city, etc., which 
services would have been rendered by the inhabitants if the city 
had remained loyal, but which must now be performed by the 
army, the inhabitants having abandoned the city ; 

‘‘Considering further that, in view of the great extent of the 
line referred to, the position of the forces on the same, the difficulty 
of communication and the proximity of the hostile positions to 
ours, it is difficult for the troops stationed at one part of the line 
to render prompt assistance to those stationed at another part 
which might be more seriously threatened ; | 

‘‘Considering further that at the present time the only available 
artillery of the precinct consists of four 16-cm. rifled bronze guns, 
one 12-cm., one 9-cm. bronze gun, two long 8-cm. rifled bronze 
guns, four short ones of the same caliber, two 8-cm. Plasencia and 
two 75-mm. Krupp guns; that the 12 and 16-cm. guns, according 
to reliable information, are about to give out and will admit of 
only a few more shots, and that the 75-mm. Krupp guns have 
hardly any ammunition, and that the above is all the artillery we 
have to oppose to the enemy’s numerous modern guns; 


142 


‘*Considering further that the million Spanish Mauser cartridges, 
being the total available, counting those at the artillery park and 
the spare cartridges of the troops, will be used up in two or three 
attacks made by the enemy; that the Argentine Mauser cartridges 
can hardly be used, and the Remington only by the irregular forces; 

‘‘Considering further that, owing to the failure of the commer- 
cial element to lay in supplies prior to the blockade which had 
long been foreseen, there is a great scarcity of meat and of all 
other articles of food for the troops, it being necessary to reserve 
for the military hospital the few heads of cattle now on hand, so 
that the only available food for the soldiers consists of rice, salt, 
oil, coffee, sugar, and whisky, and this only for about ten days 
longer ; 

‘Considering further that, if the food of the 1,700 sick at the 
hospital is inadequate, the food furnished the soldiers is still more 
so, and yet they have to spend night and day in the trenches, after 
three years of campaign, the last three months without meat except 
on rare days, and for some time past reduced to the rations above 
enumerated ; 

‘‘Considering further that with such inadequate rations the sol- 
diers, whose physical strength is already considerably shaken, far 
from being able to repair their strength, must necessarily become 
weaker every minute, especially since, in spite of their poor nour- 
ishment, the greatest fatigues are required of them; 

‘Considering further that there is an ever-growing contingent 
of soldiers among the troops who, though not in hospitals, are sick 
and who are enabled to remain at their posts only by their superior 
courage, which circumstances, however, can not fail to weaken the 
resistance of the only line of defense we have; 

‘Considering further that, since the cutting of the aqueduct, 
great difficulties are experienced by the small forces available for 
furnishing water to the majority of the forces in the trenches of 
the precinct, especially those near the coast, which difficulties 
must naturally increase when the city is bombarded by sea and 
by land, so that there is well-founded fear that the soldiers who 
are unable to leave the trenches may find themselves without the 
water of which they are so much in need; 

‘* Considering further that, in view of the location of the hostile 
positions, mostly in the immediate vicinity of ours, completely sur- 
rounding the city and in control of all the avenues, there is no 
possibility of abandoning the city without a fierce battle under the 
most unfavorable circumstances for us, owing to the impoverished 
condition of the soldiers and the fact that it would be necessary to 
effect the concentration of the forces in sight of the enemy; 


143 


“Considering further the great superiority of the enemy who, 
besides a contingent of men said to exceed 40,000, possesses 70 pieces 
of modern artillery and a powerful fleet; 

‘‘ Considering further that no supplies can reach the city except 
by sea, and that there is no prospect of receiving any as long as a 
powerful hostile fleet completely closes the entrance of the harbor; 

‘‘Considering further that, under these circumstances, to con- 
tinue so unequal a fight would lead to nothing except the sacrifice 
of a large number of lives; 

‘‘And considering, finally, that the honor of our arms has been 
completely vindicated by these troops who have fought so nobly 
and whose behavior has been lauded by our own and other na- 
tions, and that by an immediate capitulation terms could be 
obtained which it would not be possible to obtain after hostilities 
have again broken out: 

‘The junta is of unanimous opinion that the necessity for capitu- 
lation hasarrived. In witness thereof they sign these proceedings.” 


(Signatures of members.) 


XXXIV. 


CAPITULATION. 


July 16th.—The people have returned from El Caney. 
Negotiations for the capitulation having been opened, we think 
it proper to give the following important document: 


‘* NEUTRAL CAMP NEAR SANTIAGO DE CUBA, 
UNDER THE FLAG OF TRUCE, July 14th, 1898. 


‘“Recoguizing the nobleness, valor, and bravery of Generals 
Linares and Toral and of the Spanish troops who took part in the 
actions that have recently occurred in the vicinity of Santiago de 
Cuba, as shown in said battles, we, the undersigned, officers of the 
United States Army, who had the honor of taking part in the 
actions referred to, and who now constitute a committee, duly 
authorized, treating with a similar committee of officers of the 
Spanish Army for the capitulation of Santiago de Cuba, unani- 
mously join in asking the proper authorities that these brave and 
gallant soldiers may be granted the privilege of returning to their 
country carrying the arms which they have so nobly defended. 

(Signed) ‘* JOSEPH WHEELER, 
Major General U.S. V. 
“WW. H. Lawton, 
Major General U.S. V. 
Md POUR EN pe, 
First Ineutenant, Second Artillery, Aide.” 


Under a giant cotton tree the following capitulation was signed: 

‘ist. The hostilities between the Spanish and American forces 
shall cease absolutely and finally. 

“2d. The capitulation shall include all the forces and war 
material in said territory (territory of the division of Santiago). 

“3d. The United States agree to transport all the Spanish forces 
in said territory to the Kingdom of Spain with the least delay pos- 
sible, the troops to be embarked, as early as can be done, at the 
nearest ports they occupy. 


(144) 


a 


145 


‘4th. The officers of the Spanish army shall be permitted to 
carry their arms with them, and officers as well as men shall retain 
their private property. 

‘5th. The Spanish authorities agree to raise, or assist the Amer- 
ican Navy in raising, all the mines and other obstructions to navi- 
gation now existing in the bay of Santiago de Cuba and its entrance. 

“6th. The commander of the Spanish forces shall deliver, with- 
out delay, to the commander of the American forces, a complete 
inventory of the arms and munitions of war in the district above 
referred to, as also a statement of the number of troops in the same. 

“7th. Thecommander of the Spanish forces, upon leaving said dis- 
trict, shall be authorized to take with him all the military archives 
and documents belonging to the Spanish army now in said district. 

“8th. All that portion of the Spanish forces known as volun- 
teers, mobilized troops, and guerrillas who may desire to remain in 
the Island of Cuba shall be allowed to do so, on condition that they 
will deliver up their arms and give their word of honor not again 
to take up arms against the United States during the continuation 
of the present war with Spain. 

‘9th. The Spanish forces shall leave Santiago de Cuba with 
honors of war, afterwards depositing their arms at a place mutu- 
ally agreed upon, to await the disposition which the Government 
of the United States shall make of them, it being understood that 
the United States Commissioners shall recommend that the Spanish 
soldiers be permitted to return to Spain with the arms which they 
have so gallantly defended. 

“10th. The clauses of the foregoing document shall go into effect 
immediately after having been signed. 

‘*Hntered into this 16th day of July, 1898, by the undersigned com- 
missioners, acting under instructions of their respective command- 
ers in chief, and with the approval of their respective governments. 


‘* JOSEPH WHEELER, ‘*FEDERICO ESCARIO, 

Major General U.S. V. Brigadier General. 
“WW. H. Lawton, | ‘“VENTURA FONTAN, 

Major General U.S. V. Ineutenant Colonel, 
fo D2 MILEY, General Staff. 


Furst Lieutenant, 
Second Artillery. 
‘*ROBERT Mason, 
Interpreter.” 

The reason why the archbishop went out of the city on the 12th 
was to ask General Shafter to permit him and thirty priests to 
leave Santiago. The American general refused to grant this request 
as long as the negotiations were pending. 


10845——10 


XXXV. 


THE EMIGRATION TO EL CANEY. 


I will here speak of a matter which, though not directly related 
to the military operations, nor the movements of troops, nor the 
attack or defense of positions, is yet so graphic and typical and so 
remarkable and far-reaching in the consequences which it entailed 
and still entails, that to omit it would be to omit one of the most 
important episodes of this eventful period, an episode that has been 
much commented upon and discussed. I have reference to what 
may well be called the emigration to El Caney. 

At daybreak of July 5, a compact crowd,composed for the greater 
part of old men, women, and children, though strong, robust men— 
some of them volunteers, now in civilians’ clothes—were not want- 
ing, started from the city toward Hl Caney, about a league and a 
half distant, where they were going on foot, there being no car- 
riages, nor wagons, nor vehicles of any kind, nor even horses, 
which the enemy, moreover, would not have allowed to pass. All 
these people were crossing the ditches and trenches by which the 
whole road was cut and obstructed, all anxious to escape from the 
dangers of a bombardment of which notice had been given to the 
consuls. 

Many of those who emigrated were people of wealth, women not 
accustomed to such fatigues and hardships, which fear and terror 
alone enabled them to bear. 

Being convinced, though I do not know why they should have 
been, that their absence would not be for more than sixty or seventy 
hours at most, the majority of them had nothing with them but 
the clothes on their backs and a little underclothing, and no pro- 
visions except what they could carry themselves. 

I have been told, not by one person alone, but by many he 
were there and with whom I have talked, that there were no less 
than eighty people in any one house, and in some of them as many 
as two hundred. As in the cemetery, each person had no more 
space than he or she occupied; and thus they were housed together, 
men and women, children and old people, white persons and black. 


(146) 


. 


147 


The provisions which were calculated for three days at most were 
naturally soon exhausted, and this is probably the only instance in 
the nineteenth century when money was looked upon with disdain 
and when gold was of no value. Trading was going on, it is true, 
but it was exchanging rice vi coffee, hardtack for beans, or sugar 
for codfish. 

The bodies of those who had been killed on the 1st of July had 
only partly been buried, and the houses in that portion of the 
town which had been shelled were riddled with bullets and there- 
fore leaking everywhere. Carcasses of horses and other animals, 
even corpses of persons, were thrown into the river, and people 
washed their dirty clothes and bathed in the water, which was all 
there was to drink. Most of the people lived on mangoes and 
mamoncillos, and it is no wouder that malaria, fevers, and dysen- 
tery broke out and assumed alarming proportions. 

The houses had no sanitary provisions of any kind, and as the 
doors were kept closed in order to prevent new invasions, the 
atmosphere was terrible. The children, sick from lack of nourish- 
ment or from taking food which they could not digest, were cry- 
ing day and night, and quiet or rest became impossible. 

The faces of those who died were covered with a sheet or hand- 
kerchief, and the living remained by the side of the dead bodies, 
knowing that, if they should leave their places, others would 
come to occupy them. 

Why goon? I might write a hundred chapters and still not 
give an idea of the suffering during those days; suffice it to say 
that El Caney, which was a town of 200 houses, was invaded by 
20,000 people, who had counted on being there two days and 
who remained eleven, namely, until the 16th. 

Those eleven days at Kl Caney have caused more victims in 
Santiago than the three years of war; for the epidemic that broke 
out still continues. When the inhabitants of the city numbered 
45,000 there were, on an average, not over five deaths a day; and 
now, that the number of inhabitants is reduced to 30,000, there 
are not less than fifty a day. The house that does not contain one 
or more sick is an exception, and people who are well and hearty 
one day are buried a day or two later. The physicians can not 
attend all the sick, and the dead are carried to the cemeteries by 
members of their own families. The city wears that stamp of 
sadness and absence of life which is the mark of great calamities, 
and we hear nothing but wailing and sobbing. 

A bombardment, of course, inspires women with the greatest 
horror, and yet, they preferred its dangers and consequences to 
the sadness and miseries of E] Caney and asked, as the greatest 


148 


of blessings, to be allowed to return to Santiago, and to that end 
they signed a petition drawn up by the British consul, Mr. Fred- 
erick Ramsden, a literal translation of which follows: 


‘We, the undersigned women, in the name and at the request 
of all the women and children who are staying in this town with- 
out food or shelter, set forth to your excellency as follows: 

‘‘At 3 o’clock in the afternoon of the 3d instant, the consuls of 
Santiago de Cuba were notified that your excellency intended to 
bombard the city the following day at 10 o’clock in the morning, 
unless the Spanish army should surrender by that time, and that 
your excellency had ordered that the women and children should 
leave the city prior to that hour. 

‘“The same evening, at the request of the consular committee, 
your excellency consented to defer the bombardment until noon 
of the 5th, and it was agreed upon that the noncombatants should 
proceed to El Caney, Cuabitas, and other places on the line of 
railway. 

‘In conformity therewith, the civil governor of Santiago de 
Cuba issued a decree permitting all noncombatants to leave the 
following morning, between the hours of 5 and 9, on foot, and 
without vehicles or beasts of burden. Consequently, old and 
young, rich and poor, sick and invalid, went out int confusion, 
without extra clothing and with only the food they could carry 
themselves, fleeing from certain death, and firmly convinced that 
the city would be bombarded that same day, and that in two days 
they would be able to return to what might be left of their homes. 
Far from this being the case, it is now ten days since they came 
here; many are without a roof over their heads and the others 
housed together like hogs, without even having room enough to 
lie down on the floor, which is all the bed they have; the scant 
supply of food is exhausted and no more can be had at any price. 
The praiseworthy efforts of the army and of the Society of the Red 
Cross are inadequate to better the situation; they are perishing 
themselves of hunger; the old and the sick are dying for want of 
care and medicines and as a result of so much suffering. And 
still the city has not yet been taken or bombarded, except a partial 
bombardment last Sunday and Monday, by which no result appears 
to have been attained, nor does there seem to be any probability 
of a change in the horrible situation for the near future. 

‘“They now invoke that same hwmanity which has been the 
motive of this war, to ask that something be done as soon as possi- 
ble to put an end to this terrible state of affairs, or that arrange- 
ments be made with the Spanish authorities permitting us to return 


149 


to the city, where we would rather die from the shells or be buried 
under the ruins of our homes than perish slowly from hunger and 
disease, and the privations we are suffering. 


(Here follow signatures.) 
““CANEY, July 14, 1898. 


“To His Excellency GENERAL SHAFTER, 
Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army.” 


This document, remarkable under all aspects, describes the situa- 
tion better than anything that I might say. 


XXXVI. 


SURRENDER OF THE CITY. 


July 17th.—In conformity with the terms of the capitulation, 
the surrender of the city to the American army took place to-day. 

At 9a.m. the Spanish flag was hoisted on Punta Blanca Fort 
and saluted by 21 guns; shortly after it was lowered. 

At 9.30 Generals Toral and Shafter, commanders in chief of the 
Spanish and American forces, respectively, the latter accompanied 
by his staff and many of the commanders and officers of the Ameri- 
can fleet, witnessed the marching by, under arms, of a company 
of the former, representing all the Spanish forces, as it was difficult 
to assemble them. The American forces presented arms and beat 
a march. 

The heights of Conosa were the theater of this sad scene. The 
morning was very beautiful, and the clearness of the sky formed 
a singular contrast with the gloom that enwrapped the spirit of 
our troops. 

When the march was ended, the American forces remained at 
their posts, while ours left the trenches and proceeded to the city 
for the purpose of depositing their arms. 

The forces of the Socapa and Punta Gorda were taken by sea, in 
the steamer Reina de Los Angeles, to Las Cruces pier, and from 
there they marched to the Artillery Park, where they delivered 
arms and ammunition. Without them, they proceeded to the 
camp outside of the city, where all the forces were to assemble 
until the arrival of the vessels which, as agreed upon, were to con- 
vey them to Spanish soil. The other troops did the same thing, 
after depositing their arms at the points designated beforehand. 

The troops having evacuated the city, 1,000 men of the United 
States Army entered it, hoisting the flag of that nation at the Pal- 
ace and Morro Castle. It is the only flag that has been raised in 
the city. No insurgent forces, nor individuals belonging to the 
same, have entered the city with arms. The situation remained 
the same till the day wher the army embarked for Spain. 

As the operations at the Park lasted several hours, it was curious 
to see the avidity with which the Americans were looking for num- 
bers worn by the 29th battalion (Constitucién), sabres, buttons, and 


(150) 


151 


decorations of our officers and soldiers. It was noticed with what 
satisfaction they kept whatever articles and arms they could 
gather. Some of them put on the crosses, covered with dirt and 
blood, that had adorned the breasts of the Spanish. There were 
so many incidents on the same order that it would really be tedious 
to enumerate them. They showed the high conception which the 
American forces had of the valor of ourarmy. | 

One incident, in conclusion, relative to this matter: When a 
Yankee officer of artillery and another of engineers took possession 
of the Morro, they inquired about the defenses and artillery of the 
fort. ‘‘There they are,” said the governor, pointing to the land 
batteries and old guns. The American officers did not believe 
him; personally they went all over the place in search of guns 
and more important works of fortification. And when they had 
convinced themselves that they had been told the truth, they 
exclaimed: ‘‘That fleet” (pointing to Admiral Sampson’s) ‘‘has 
no excuse for not having gained possession of the harbor and 
defeated the city and its defenses in so many days.” * 

The Commander in Chief of the American Army is General 
Miles. (Here follow the names of the different commanders in 
chief of the United States Army and Navy.) 

At 10a. m., an officer of the American Army, delegated for that 
purpose, took possession of the comandancia de marina and cap- . 
taincy of the port, which were surrendered to him, after we had 
gathered up such documents and communications as should be 
preserved, and destroyed the others, or made them useless. 

The forces are still depositing arms and ammunition, preserving 
excellent order, which has not been disturbed fora moment. Then 
they march to the camp outside the city. The arms were all 
deposited at the park, and not surrendered to the enemy. In order 
to form an idea, though only approximately, of the number of the 
forces defending the city, I give below a statement which gives 
the number at the hospitals, several having been fitted up. 

On the 17th of July there were— 


Sreenenmniitary NOSPitali+.. ~~) o-<2<2 a<ncicnn on 800 sick and wounded. 
At the Concha headquarters -_......---.-----. 500 sick and wounded. 
At the Mercedes hospital ...........-----._..- 500 sick and wounded. 
PEEArTACONCS 2°1Ge. ecules. cee tL ee 300 sick and wounded. 
Pobalieas tee). Se oe 2,100 sick and wounded. 

*On July 2, Admiral Sampson wrote General Shafter: ‘‘It was my hope that 


an attack on your part of these shore batteries from the rear would leave us at 
liberty to drag the channel for torpedoes.”—O. N., I. 


152 


Notes 2: At the hospital, only the seriously wounded and sick 
were admitted; those who could stand on their feet were refused 
and sent back to thetrenches. If this had not been the case, there 
would not have been beds enough in which to put them nor phy- 
sicians to attend them. Therefore, the number of sick was in 
reality much greater than shown by the statement furnished by 
the hospital. 

The soldiers had but little to eat, and that little was bad, and not 
enough water. The latter was scarce, and means were lacking for 
transporting it to all the points on the extensive line they covered 
and which it-was indispensable to maintain. 

The horses of the cavalry, as well as the animals of the artillery 
and military administration, had had no corn to eat for a long time, 
and the hay, their only food, was very difficult to get and caused 
sickness, which was worse. 

In conclusion, I will give a statement of the stock on hand which 
the artillery park turned over to the American officer commis- 
sioned to receive it: 


ARTILLERY PARK OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, 


Statement of stock on hand, in arms and ammunition, of which the officer of 
the American Army, commissioned to receive it, takes charge. 


Kind. Number of Rounds of 











arms, ammunition. 

Mauser rifles, Spanish model, 7-mm., No. 1893..------.-- 7, 902 1, 500, 000 
Mauser rifles, Argentine model, 7.65-mm., No. sini ef gr9 1.471.000 
Mauser rifles, Turkish model, 7.65-mm., No. 1892 .-_-_--- ‘ e 
Reminetonrifies, 1i-mm), No.i1425. 3.2 Ace, os 6. 118 ( 345, 000 
Remington rites, 1d i-mm)Nowi189 sa) 7-222 4s : 1, 335, 000 
Mauser carbines, Spanish model....2.- 2. cacku oe eee 833 | 
Mauser carbines, Argentine model ..-...--.---.-------- 84 
Renisietoniear pines S25) oye ee ee oe eee 330 ay 
ReOlyerarnetetit stn bss. gh eral oe oo Pe ees ee a 84. 
SADGIS S205 PES 958 ce OP eh re 0 at ee er ee ce 267 
WMACDEUOR yet ai ae enact ee 692 

SANTIAGO DE CuBA, July —, 1898. Luis MELGAR, 


Lieut. Col., Commander of Artillery. 


Found correct by the officer commissioned. Errors and-omissions excepted. 
A. D. Borup, 


Lieut. Col., U. S. V., Chief Ord. Officer. 


It will be seen that nearly the whole armament with which the 
Spanish army was equipped consisted of Mauser rifles, Spanish 
model (the Remington was that of the volunteers and a few 
mobilized companies); hence the ammunition for those was all 
{hat could be used and should be counted; the rest was useless. 


b., 


153 


Therefore, the number of cartridges on hand and surrendered was 
1,500,000, and the number of rifles 7,902. .Hence there were 191 
cartridges for each soldier. Every army man will know the time 
it takes to use them up. 

Here end the events and military operations that took place at San- 
tiago de Cuba, and which are the subject of these notes. I should 
therefore stop here, but I do not wish to do so without venturing 
a few ideas suggested to me by certain scenes of which I was an 
unwilling witness (for I have naturally avoided sights in which 
there could be nothing pleasant), and without making a compari- 
son between two sieges, upon one of which judgment has already 
been passed and which has become a matter of history known to 
every one, and upon the other of which judgment can not yet be 
passed because we are not as yet in possession of the necessary data 
and information which would make a just and impartial sentence 
possible. 

I give below the official statement of all the casualties sustained 
by the forces of Santiago de Cuba in the different bombardments 
and battles from the 18th of May to the date of the signing of the 
capitulation. Those caused by sickness are not included. 


CASUALTIES IN THE BOMBARDMENTS AND ATTACKS ON THE CITY OF SANTIAGO. 


















































KILLED. WOUNDED. py ctiiamese 
Darr. - . a [ : 
a a 2B z 5 

3 Bes ley Saas SE TSE oaRe f | @ g 

cd) is) © A S 6) co) A is) ° = 
0 UTS ae ie Sd Cees aeons earns 7 Aig eee I 4 As Saad eerie PaaS eh 
a ee ee eee ae) fa nl ere (ene al oo aie eee 
oe STEW es ogi SIS aN aoe a 2 eR | ie dee Vas Pe Re Wee Fas Be 2) Ree ae ee 
Derry ae | a a wets et | en [oe a eee ee tee 
REA ZNO CI gee ere ee ee eee al oe ee | Pe ea ae J | Sn ee 
Cruiser Reina Mercedes__|______ Lee Oa eee 1 1 10)0 |2o2 2 | Soe 
MITER OCA tiem ee ae ee | ee ee Oc eee ae 1 6 ¢.|2 222 Ne ee 
Vem Ge NLOULO I. een a se oe | ea ed LAR Sees ont |e ee 1 10.) (23222. eee 
OCA) i Meee ree ears | eee eee, S| ee Pipe eer al 1 6 | eee eee 
LE Se 2 ye lee FS (2S al he a eee ee Re a Se Bo Wee ea 
NN SY are le seein re ee fe fel ee Eh crersrsns MMM pee BES on a 
[VEN Cel te ae aaa ERE (Se (Oa Fear aN a, el a 1 Oy |S too ee ee 
Dain Termeni lee = alee ee | oe Ly Saree | ees hae Oc Fiala eee 
Miners a 24——Sevilla — 2 =). =| Tete 2 a |e ee pee ee 3 CE eee 
EARN ROOT OS Naeem n ae | eee a | cea (sees sola Soe 2 1 | 2 -=.|(Ue e 
Se Es ae ne as Ce en a ae a eee ieee a eee Pee Et 
RE NELOCING ee Ht een ee Pe eee 1 OL | re 
July 1,2, 3—Caney and Santiago_| 1 3 12 78 1 6 30 | 339 1 6 116 
Dee DE LOS ie enn aan | wcitnceen|atrenerel Sane sie | Eee se 1 2 15 > | 
ON TES a ee ee ae See Re US eee een 1 1B n= a oc ee 
POCA es ee oe 1 4 ya a Kaye 1 9 49 | 556 1 6 116 























XXXVIT. 
TRADERS, NOT THE SPANISH PEOPLE. 


I was sent to the Island of Cuba for the first time in 1868 and 
have remained there, if not constantly, yet quite long enough to 
understand, even though I am but a poor observer, that one of the 
most important causes which have led to the deep aversion which 
the sons of Cuba generally show for the mother country is the con- 
duct of a certain number of people who come from the Peninsula 
with no other object in view than to accumulate a fortune in more 
or less of a hurry, the majority of them having no education or 
knowledge of any kind. 

In order to better attain their desires and ambitions, they inces- 
santly boast of everything Spanish, whereby they must necessarily 
come into conflict with the Cubans, whose feelings and dignity they 
hurt and offend. When they have acquired money, they aspire to 
lucrative and important offices, which they obtain because they are 
Spanish, to the prejudice of others, who by their intelligence and 
ability are better fitted to hold them; and the aversion is intensi- 
fied into hatred, which, always latent, though concealed, was only 
waiting for an opportunity to break out openly. This opportunity 
presented itself for the first time in 1868, and the battle cry of Yara 
became the signal of vengeance and extermination, to which these 
Peninsulars responded by organizing the corps of volunteers. 

To deny that they have since rendered important and constant 
services to the cause of Spain, would be both unjust and useless; 
but it must also be acknowledged that they have committed many 
serious errors, often becoming overbearing and having compelled 
more than one captain general to resign his command—a fatal 
example which hurt us in our country and impaired our reputation 
in other countries. 

The first Cuban insurrection and all those which we have had to 
fight since have acquired that stamp of cruelty and extermination 
which is a characteristic of savage people, but not of civilized 
nations, and the war has given an opportunity to satisfy vengeances, 
which have given rise to reprisals and furnished the Government 
of the United States with a pretext—both unjust and hypocritical, 
as I know only two well, but still a pretext—for deciding on armed 
intervention, in the name of humanity, or which is the same, on 
war, which could not help but be its natural outcome. 


(155) 


156 


If all those errors and offenses which have been attributed to 
Spain and the country had really been committed by them, such 
intervention would have been justified and even worthy of com- 
mendation. But events have shown very plainly that to them 
(the Peninsulars referred to) the nation was but a pretext and that 
the object was quite a different one, namely, the attainment of 
their aspirations and the realization of their desires. And this is 
further evidenced by the fact, previously mentioned, that, taking 
advantage of the scarcity of provisions, the natural consequence 
. of the blockade, they hid such provisions as they had on hand or 
asked exorbitant prices for them, without any reason to justify 
such proceeding, after taking good care to place their funds 
abroad, in anticipation of what might happen. I need hardly 
state again that those who were so enthusiastic and loyal in 
normal times were the first to strip off the uniform and hide 
where they believed themselves safest. Finally, when they 
became convinced that the sun in whose light they had been 
living, and in whose rays they had thrived, was yielding his place 
to another sun, larger in size, but not in luster, they sought its 
protection and benefits, without remembering any longer the one 
which their eyes had seen when they opened them for the first 
time. ‘‘The King is dead—long live the King!” 

They advertised their merchandise in ‘‘The Times,” of Santiago 
de Cuba, a newspaper of recent publication, printed in Spanish 
for the information of the Cubans, the hatred of whom does not 
prevent their fleecing them, and in English for the purpose of 
doing the same thing with their new masters, whom they did not 
hesitate in recognizing. And so great is their love and affection 
‘for Spain, of which they were so proud, that where they ask one 
dollar of American silver they require two in Spanish coin of 
the same metal. They consider the latter worth one-half of the 
former. Perhaps this may seem exaggerated, the same as many 
other truths contained in my ‘‘Notes;” but a letter signed by a 
Peninsular, published in number 7 of said ‘‘Times,” of Santiago 
de Cuba, of August 8, will convince the most incredulous. The 
following is a literal copy of the letter: 


‘EMIGRATION AT PRESENT IS FOLLY. 


“Your southern race has many vices, but it also possesses great 
virtues. Its weak point is that it is extremely impressionable. 
Any orator speaking to you carries you completely away, and with 
childlike weakness you accept everything just as it is painted and 
described to you. 

‘* During the six months last past the Spanish race at Santiago 
de Cuba has lived in this fictitious atmosphere; I say ‘fictitious’ 


157 


because the bitter reality has not realized our patriotic and enthusi- 
astic aspirations. 

‘‘How many useless sacrifices! How many illusions destroyed! 
But that should not discourage us, because history, when dealing 
with the events and the suffering of this poor people, will take 
good care to transmit them to posterity with impartial rudeness. 

‘* At present, as long as we are acquainted only with the occur- 
rences that have taken place in this province alone and know abso- 
lutely nothing of what is going on in the rest of the world, includ- 
ing our mother country, why do we not wait until the black clouds 
hanging over us have passed away and until the horizon has cleared 
up so that we may be able to judge of our true situation and decide 
what is to be done? Be calm, very calm, peninsular residents of 
this city; let us condemn right here the voluntary desertion which 
prejudices your sacred interests, and whose current you have fol- 
lowed without considering whether it would lead to your happi- 
ness or to your ruin. However much you may think about the 
extremes which I have just pointed out to you, it will still be little 
enough. 

‘*Let us suppose for a moment that the dismemberment of our 
poor Spain becomes a fact, a thing which we do not know. What 
painful scenes are you going to witness? What business will you 
resort to to recover from the ruin of your interests? Unfortu- 
nately none, for your long absence will keep you in ignorance of 
everything, and the radical change of climate, when winter is 
almost at hand, will affect your health and that of your families. 

*“If you remain here, in this locality which is occupied by sol- 
diers of a strong nation, until we shall learn definitely what has 
happened, you will lose nothing either in your business or your 
independence. 

‘“The noble and farsighted chiefs who are at present ruling the 
destinies of this country have shown you plainly that all they wish 
is that peace and order may reign in all the branches of our public 
administration ; 

“That they have called upon you as well as the industrious 
Cubans to cooperate in the work of progress and social recon- 
struction ; 

‘‘That they have neglected nothing in order that the inhabitants 
may have cheap and wholesome food; 

‘“That they have established banks for the development of our 
agriculture and commerce. 

“They have also shown us, and have so far proved it, that they 
have not come here in the interest of any faction or political party, 
but are desirous only of promoting the progress of this island and 
the well-being of its inhabitants. 


158 


“Since the situation which I have just described to you is the 
undeniable truth, why should you want to join this insensate and 
shortsighted emigration which can cause you nothing but expense? 

‘“‘Do you not understand that by remaining here where you are 
well known by the people and the local trade, you have an ample 
field for rebuilding your deteriorated business and provide for 
your families and secure for them a bright future? 

‘Whatever may be the final fate which Providence reserves for 
this country, whether we remain Spanish or pass over to foreigners, 
our hard-working and honorable race will always remain desery- 
ing. There are instances in the Spanish-American Republics of 
fellow-countrymen of ours who are holding the most prominent 
places in those nations and who have been honored by their gov- 
ernments. 

‘‘Tf all that I have set forth is tangible truth, why should you 
abandon the field, why flee from this beautiful country where you 
have spent the years of your youth, raised families and acquired a 
good standing? If you consider my disinterested advice you can 
not help but become convinced that, as matters now stand, your 


voluntary emigration is an absurdity. 
‘‘A PENINSULAR.” 


[have copied the letter literally, and it must be admitted that it 
is remarkable in every respect for diction, aspiration, and intention. 
I believe this example is quite sufficient, so I will refrain from cit- 
ing others. 

Those who to-day call and sign themselves Peninsulars, who have 
always called themselves Spaniards, what will they call themselves 
to-morrow ? 


XXXVITI. 


GERONA AND SANTIAGO DE CUBA. 


When sieges are spoken of in Spain, those of Numancia and 
Sagunto, Saragossa, and Gerona are always mentioned specially 
as instances worthy of imitation. 

As twenty centuries have elapsed since the first two took place 
and I do not know what happened there, and am not sufficiently 
acquainted with the facts to venture on a comparison, I will leave 
them entirely out of the question; for since the customs and usages 
of warfare, as well as international law, and the rights of the peo- 
ple were, and could not help but be, very different from those of 
our days, there is nothing remarkable in the fact that, as capitu- 
lations were not respected, people should have preferred to die like 
lions rather than be butchered like sheep. 

Therefore I shall refer only to the siege of Gerona (no doubt 
quite as glorious as that of Saragosa) of which all Spaniards, my- 
self included, are justly proud; and judging from General Linares’s 
telegram, somebody had evidently had that siege in mind as a 
pattern or model to be followed here at Santiago de Cuba. 

Everybody is acquainted with the circumstances of the siege of 
Gerona, but probably no one in the Peninsula with those of the 
siege of Santiago. All that Iam going to say concerning it is pure 
truth, as can be testified by the 30,000 inhabitants of the city and 
the 40,000 Americans and 8,000 or 10,000 insurgents who laid siege 
to it. 

It is true that Gerona in 1809 was far from being a Metz ora 
Sebastopol; but after all, it was a city surrounded by walls, with 
forts and redoubts on the outside communicating with the main 
precinct by open roads. For that reason the city could not be en- 
tered by surprise, but had to be regularly besieged, which made it 
necessary to construct parallel lines, set up batteries, cut off com- 
munications with the outside to prevent assistance from reaching 
the city, open a breach, or determine upon the assault, all of which 

‘costs time and lives. 

Great was the anger caused in Spain by the invasion of Napoleon 
the First, and especially by the means which he employed to effect 
it. The Spanish believed their religion and independence threat- 
ened, and like one man they rose up in arms with an enthusiasm 
and energy not often paralleled in history. 


(159) 


160 


Thus it was that the garrison of Gerona, which at the beginning 
of the siege consisted of about 6,000 men, enthusiastic as well as 
being Spanish, was not the only garrison that did the fighting. 
For all its inhabitants fought as well; the young and the strong with 
arms, the old and the weak by carrying cartridges and ammuni- 
tion, the women by gathering up and caring for the sick and 
wounded, the clergy by absolving the dying, burying the dead, and 
stimulating the zeal of all. There everybody fought, everybody 
toiled, all were heroes, because it was their own property they were 
defending, their own hearths, their families, the soil where their 
forefathers were buried, their religion, their independence—in a 
word, their native country, and that is saying everything. They 
well earned their country’s gratitude, from Mariano Alvarez de 
Castro to the last woman, the last child. 

The troops which surrounded the city under Verdier and the 
Saint-Cyr troops protecting them and occupying the roads which 
lead to the city did not exceed in all 30,000, and although their 
artillery was more numerous and better manned, Gerona had artil- 
lery of the same caliber and the same range; that is to say—and 
this should be well borne in mind—that the Spanish projectiles 
carried as far as the French projectiles. 

The firearms of that time are well known; the small arms were 
loaded in eleven movements, and I do not know how many it took 
to load the guns; the effect of the bombshells was moral rather 
than material, for it will be remembered that, in order to avoid 
them as much as possible, men were stationed in church steeples 
and other high places where they indicated the direction of such 
bombshells by prearranged signals. Besides it was easy to elude 
them in caves and cellars. If the powder gave out, the supply 
could always be renewed by burning a few doors and windows to 
obtain charcoal and mix it with a little saltpeter that could be 
found in any damp place, and a little sulphur. Any blacksmith 
could make cannon balls, and soon. Such were the firearms at the 
beginning of this century and their effects were accordingly. 

Moreover, Gerona was aware that all Spain looked upon her 
with admiration and compassion; that each month, each week, 
each day that the resistance was prolonged and the French were 
kept outside the walls of the city, armies were being organized, 
regiments improvised, and armed bodies raised, and that there 
was but one idea and one desire in Catalonia, namely, that of 
helping Gerona, as, indeed, it had been helped once by getting in 
a convoy with provisions and over 3,000 men, and a second was 
ready. The city also knew that all assistance which it could get 
did really help to prolong the resistance, and the garrison was 
well aware that, if it should go out en masse and break through the 


161 


hostile circle at any time, they would be safe and free, on their 
own soil, where they would have found all the resources and 
supplies they could wish for. 

When they were not fighting, and did not have to be at the 
breach to repulse the columns of attack, or at the walls to force 
back an assault, they stationed their sentinels, guards, and patrols 
to keep watch, while the others could go where they were under 
shelter from the sun, the rain, and the dampness; in a word, they 
could take turns about in the service, and although they did not 
have much to eat, they could at least rest when the enemy per- 
mitted. Finally, Gerona preserved the remembrance and the 
pride of two former sieges which those same French forces had 
been obliged to give up, and there was well-founded hope of simi- 
lar success if they received reenforcements, which was not at all 
improbable. 

At the end of a six months’ siege Gerona had to capitulate owing 
to starvation, but capitulate after all; and that capitulation, far 
from causing us to blush or be ashamed, is one of the most brilliant 
pages in our history, of which we are justly proud. 

Those were the conditions of Gerona during that famous siege; 
now let us see the conditions of Santiago de Cuba. 

Santiago de Cuba, as has been seen, isan open city, without forts, 
redoubts, or walls—in a word, without defenses of any kind. At 
the time the present conflict was declared the precinct of the city 
was surrounded by a wire inclosure which had been deemed suffi- 
cient, and indeed had proved so, to check the insurgents; but any- 
one not acquainted with Santiago and the kind of warfare we had 
been sustaining, would have laughed at it, and with good reason. 

Then the war with the United States broke out. I will not again 
mention the work effected for the protection of the precinct by the 
corps of engineers, without resources and appliances and with a 
‘scant personnel, which, though both enthusiastic and intelligent. 
had to confine itself to constructing trenches and protecting by 
earthworks the forts surrounding the precinct (if the name of forts 
can be given to a few blockhouses, built with a view to resisting 
musket fire, but surely not gun fire), erecting palisades and obstruc- 
tions of every nature, for which purpose all the sinuosities and 
windings of the ground were utilized with remarkable skill. But 
all these works were only works of campaign, and left the soldiers 
exposed to the rays of the July sun of the Island of Cuba, to almost 
daily torrents of rain, and at night to heavy dew; anyone acquainted 
with the island would know that, if these conditions had continued 
for a month, not a single soldier could have remained in the 
trenches. 

10845——-11 


162 


Here at Santiago, as well as in the rest of the island, the soldiers, 
poorly clothed and still more poorly fed, had been sustaining for 
three years a fierce and thankless war, fighting with the enemy, 
the climate, with sun and dampness, with sickness, with the roads 
(or rather for want of them), with rains and drouth, with the 
mountains and plains—in a word, with everything, for here in 
Cuba everything is hostile to the army. Besides, there was more 
than eight months’ pay due the soldiers, and I believe is still due 
them. 

Before the destruction of our fleet, and still more so after it, the 
enemy had complete control of the sea, and from Daiquiri, where 
the landing was made, to Punta Cabrera, the American fleet, con- 
sisting of over seventy vessels, including both war and merchant 
vessels (many of the latter armed with guns), did not permit us to 
even think of receiving reenforcements or help of any kind, unless 
it were from the interior of the island. 

After the arrival of General Escario, who might perhaps have 
checked the progress of the enemy for a little while longer if he 
had reached here prior to July 1, though he could not have changed 
the final result, provisions and ammunition, already scarce, became 
still more so, because there were twice the number of mouths to be 
fed and twice the number of muskets-to be supplied. 

Eight or nine thousand men, many suffering with fever and all 
of them tired and exhausted, who had been day and night in the 
trenches, which they could not leave for the simple reason that 
they were far from the city, with water reaching up to their waists 
whenever it rained, who for only food had rice bread and rice 
boiled in water, and for only artillery a few muzzle-loading guns, 
had to resist 40,000 Americans and 8,000 or 10,000 insurgents, with 
machine guns, also intrenched, and 68 breech-loading guns in 
advantageous positions and well manned. 

The inhabitants, far from helping the soldiers or encouraging 
them, had left the city as soon as notice of an intended bombard- 
ment had been given, and the few who remained closed their doors 
and windows, even at the drug stores. The merchants, far from 
furnishing provisions to the army, or even to the hospitals, which 
stood so much in need of them, hid them carefully and official 
searches had to be made, the result of which was as I have stated 
above. 

The situation of Santiago de Cuba from a military standpoint is 
probably unique in history. 

Without any prospect of receiving help by sea, which was in 
control of a powerful fleet, the city was surrounded on land by an 
army five times as large as ours in number, with excellent artillery, 
which was increased every day and was constantly receiving pro- 
visions and war supplies. 


163 


Our forces, being without these latter, have no longer even the 
pleasure or comfort of fighting, for the enemy knows their situa- 
tion better than they do themselves; knows that they have no food 
left but rice, and but very little ammunition, which they dare not 
use up for fear of becoming entirely disarmed and placing them- 
selves completely at the mercy of the victor; knows that they can 
not expose themselves to another fight like that of July 1, which 
they remember with fear and terror; that they will be compelled 
to capitulate, and that it is only a question of days. Knowing all 
this, the hostile forces intrench themselves, train their artillery on 
the city, and also prepare to bombard it with their ships, which, 
from Aguadores, more than 4 miles from here, will soon reduce it to 
ashes and ruin, hurling upon it a hail of 16, 20, and 32 cm. shells, 
the effects of which will be seen only too well, even though we may 
not be able to see where the projectiles come from that are causing 
the ruin. 

The enemy, as has been stated, had cut the aqueduct, thus depriv- 
ing the city of water. There were a few wells and a number of 
cisterns, it is true, but the transportation of the water to the Socapa, 
Punta Gorda, and especially the blockhouses on the line from Las 
Cruces to Aguadores (4 kilometers), was not only extremely labori- 
ous and difficult, but quite inadequate. 

But what makes this siege an exceptional one more than any- 
thing else is the fact that the reenforcements which could only 
have come by land would have had the opposite effect of what 
they were intended to have, as I will demonstrate. 

Where could such reenforcements come from? From Holguin, 
Manzanillo, Guanténamo, or Havana. Holguin could have fur- 
nished five or six thousand men under Colonel Luque, but with 
only rations enough for the march, for there were no more at 
Holguin, nor means for transporting them. From Manzanillo all 
those who could come had already arrived in command of General 
Escario. From Guantanamo none could come for lack of provi- 
sions. That left only those from Havana. 

But I will go even further: I will suppose that all the reenforce- 
ments, including those from Havana under General Pando or any 
other general, had arrived, and that there had been forces enough at 
Santiago to rout the enemy, which is the most that could be con- 
ceded. What would have happened then? The enemy would have 
receded as far as the coast in less than an hour and their armor- 
clads and other war ships would have checked the progress of our 
army and would have made its victory and efforts useless, leaving 
it in worse condition than before the arrival of such reenforce- 
ments, since there would be many more men to feed; and every- 
body knows that the fields of Santiago have produced nothing 
during these last three years of warfare. 


164 


Some may say that there was one last recourse left: to force a 
passage through the hostile lines and march to Holguin. That is 
more easily said than done. 

One can not break through lines and walk over armies equipped 
with modern muskets and guns. Metz and Sedan have proved 
that, and it must be admitted that the French did fierce fighting at 
these places. We had to reconcentrate ata given point all our 
forces, scattered along an extensive line, and how could that be 
done without the enemy, whose lines were only a few meters from 
ours, seeing it all? 

But I will concede even more: I will concede that it had been 
possible to accomplish the reconcentration; that the cavalry had 
been able to make a successful charge, which I do not believe 
would have been possible, for the horses were starving; I will 
grant, for the sake of argument, that the mules, which were in 
the same condition as the horses, had been able to transport the 
spare ammunition, provided there was any left, and the supplies 
of rice required for the march. Let us suppose that, after leaving 
two or three thousand dead and wounded on the field, the others 
had opened a road to Holguin; how could soldiers who were weak 
and sick accomplish the forced march which would have been 
absolutely necessary in order to escape the enemy’s pursuit? It 
was an impossibility. The insurgents would have harassed us on 
the march, fighting for every inch of the ground, and would have 
wounded a more or less considerable number of our men, thereby 
delaying a march which it was so imperative to hasten, and the 
Americans, who would no doubt have followed our tracks, would 
thereby have gained time to overtake us with overwhelming num- 
bers, and we should have been compelled to surrender to them at 
their pleasure for want of ammunition, or to perish to the last 
man, and such a sacrifice would have profited Spain no more than 
had the sacrifice of the fleet, and would have deprived the nation 
of 8,000 soldiers who by three years of fighting had become inured 
to war. 

if the hostile fleet had bombarded the city, as it doubtless would 
have done, it would have reduced it to ruins and ashes in a short 
space of time, and while, from a military standpoint, such a con- 
sideration should not influence a general and impel him to capitu- 
late on that account alone, in this case the ruin of the city meant 
also that of its defenders; for if it was difficult to supply enough 
water in normal times it would have become altogether impossible 
under such circumstances; the soldiers, exposed to the sun all day, 
would have been without anything to drink, which is worse even 
than being without anything to eat. 


165 


Finally, what and whom were we defending in Santiago? The 
Cubans, after three years of fighting, preferred to become Yan- 
kees rather than remain Spaniards, and the Peninsulars, far from 
assisting the soldiers who were defending them, took advantage 
of the situation to raise in the most outrageous manner the price 
of. all articles, even those of first necessity, or hide them, giving 
the impression that they had been confiscated, and when the time 
of danger arrived they left the city, taking off the uniform of 
volunteers, in which they had always taken good care to shine at 
reviews and in processions, and went to hide at El Caney, in 
merchant steamers, and at Cinco Reales. 

Such were the situation and circumstances which, at Santiago, 
led to the signing of the capitulation, by virtue of which we Span- 
iards, who happen to be here, are to return to Spain. 

I do not wish to make comparisons, nor express my opinion on 
events in which I have taken a more or less direct and active part, 
as such opinion might appear impassioned or dictated by interest 
or egotism. I have stated what happened at Gerona and what 
happened here, like Bertrand du Guesclin, without omitting or 
adding anything. Now, let the country, knowing the circum- 
stances, judge us. With a calm mind and a clear conscience I 
await its sentence. 


Ee aed 


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OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, 
Wark Notes No. II. 
INFORMATION FROM ABROAD. 


COMMENTS 


OF 


REAR-ADMIRAL PLUDDEMANN. 


GHRMAN NAVY, 


ON THE 


MAIN FEATURES OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 


TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN. 





- WASHINGTON: 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 
1899, 





OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, 
Wak Notss No. II. 
; INFORMATION FROM ABROAD. 


COMMENTS 


OF 


REAR-ADMIRAL PLUDDEMANN, 


GHRMAN NAVY, 


ON THE 


MAIN FEATURES OF THE WAR WITIL SPAIN, 


TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN, 





OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 


WASHINGTON : 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 
1899. 


i 


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INTRODUCTORY. 


This able analysis of the main features of the Spanish-American 
war by M. Pliiddemann, Rear-Admiral, German navy, presents in a 
comprehensive form many of the technical deductions of the late war. 
He comments on the high quality and endurance of our navy ordnance 
and on the defective results from the navy fuse now in use. 

As regards the question of the importance of the Navy controlling 
the transport service, his reference to the landing of the army at 
Daiquiri is instructive. Referring to the want of control and dis- 
cipline on board the merchant steamers chartered as transports for 
service under the Quartermaster’s Department of the Army—that 
control and discipline at sea which foreign military authorities have 
long since by experience recognized can only be obtained through the 
navy—he states: 


Under these circumstances it is not strange that the landing of the provisions, 
guns, and ammunition, and the entire equipment, all of which were so much 
needed: in this locality, which offered no resources, was effected with such slow- 
ness that the troops were reduced from the outset to the meager rations which 
each man carried with him. 


RICHARDSON CLOVER, 
Chief Intelligence Officer. 


DECEMBER 21, 1898. 
3 





MAIN FEATURES OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 


By M. PLUDDEMANN, Rear-Admiral, German Navy. 
[Translated from the Marine-Rundschau, November, 1898. ] 


While the events of the war just ended show nothing which might 
lead to a radical revolution of present ideas as to rational warfare 
and the use of modern war material, and while no essentially new 
appliances have been made use of which might cause us to anticipate 
a change in the floating material or the weapons of the sea powers, 
still the war has enriched former experiences. But, on the other hand, 
it might lead to erroneous conclusions, as many good devices did not 
have a chance to be tested, the weakness of the adversary making 
them superfluous, and others not good did not have bad results, 
because they were counterbalanced by the defects and mistakes on 
the part of the enemy or by other favorable circumstances. 

The following is a discussion of the points which are of special 
interest to the naval officer: 


I. BATTLES OF THE FLEET. 


Aside from the moral qualities of the personnel, which constitute 
the prerequisite of success, there are five main factors on which the 
result of a battle depends—the construction and equipment of the 
ships, the artillery, the torpedo, the ram, and speed. 

The torpedo and the ram have not been used in the late war, for the 
reason that the hostile ships have never come close enough to each 
other. It is claimed, it is true, that two Spanish torpedo boats 
attempted an attack at Cavite on May 1. But these two vessels were 
so entirely covered by the rapid-fire artillery of the Olympia, even at 
a distance of 2,000 meters, that they could only save their crews by 
running ashore as fast as possible. It is doubtful whether they were 
really torpedo boats. If so, the attack could only have been made 
owing to entire inexperience with torpedo-boat attacks and complete 
ignorance of modern rapid-fire guns. 

The other two factors, artillery and speed, have proved to be of 
much more essential and indeed of a very powerful effect. The 
superiority of the American artillery as to number, caliber, and kind 
of guns is well known. The general opinion is also that the shooting 
of the Americans was very good, while that of the Spanish was miser- 

5 


2 


6 


able. This was the more essential for the Americans at Cavite, owing 
to the fact that a large number of their shells did not explode. If 
nevertheless they achieved such a complete success and caused such 
destructive fires, it was because of the comparatively large number 
of hits; there were still quite a considerable number of shells that 
did explode. Evenas early as at the bombardment of San Juan it was 
discovered that many of the shells did not explode; but this fact was 
most noticeable at the naval battle of Cavite. It is true that at the 
end of the battle all the Spanish vessels were under water to the upper 
deck, so that the really mortal injuries could not be verified; the parts 
above water showed a number of hits, and there is no reason for the 
assumption that the ratio of exploded shells to that of unexploded 
ones was essentially different in the lower parts. 4 

The Reina Cristina showed ten shots that had gone entirely through 
the vessel; the after smokestack had been torn down by the falling 
of the mainmast; no explosive effect could be noticed. However, the 
whole ship had been burned out, which made accurate observation 
difficult. 

The Castilla showed considerable explosive effects. The smoke- 
stacks and metal bulkheads of the upper deck were pierced in differ- 
ent places by fragments and splinters. The conning bridge and super- 
structure deck were completely destroyed and torn down. 

On the Don Antonio de Ulloa the masts were pierced in several 
places; a 5.7-centimeter shot had gone clear through a 12-centimeter 
gun shield; the chart house and the starboard side aft showed two 
hits each, in which there had been failure to explode. 

The Don Juan de Austria was burned out; effects of firing could 
not be observed. 

On the Marquis del Duero the tube of the 12-centimeter starboard 
gun was bent upward; the cause of this could not be ascertained. 
Two shots had pierced the ship’s side. The upper edge of the smoke- 
stack had been indented by a projectile. No splinter effects were 
noticeable. 

On the General Lezo the demolition of the smokestack was appar- 
ently due to an explosion. 

The Isla de Cuba showed no injuries. 

On the Isla de Luzon the 12-centimeter forward gun, with its whole 
pivot and shield, had fallen over backward in firing. Two shots 
(presumably 4-centimeter) had gone through the bow; one of the 
masts had been grazed bya small-caliber shot. The engine telegraph 
and superstructures had been demolished; the helm upturned by 
splinters. 

On the Argos nothing could be observed. | 

The Velasco had the foremast pierced and slightly burned, the 
mainmast torn down, and the anchor stock shot off. 

When the American fleet advanced for the attack it was fired upon 
by a battery at Manila. The Olympia answered with two shots; both 


q 


shells were afterwards found unexploded near Luneta. The govern- 
or’s house at Cavite also showed a shot without explosive effect. 

In this respect better results appear to have been achieved at San- 
tiago. This may be gathered from the details known, although the 
reports refer only in a few instances to the explosive effects attained ; 
but even here a number of cases of nonexplosion have been noticed 
on the Spanish ships, as well as the fortifications. 

The following table gives some data concerning the hits in the naval 
battle of Santiago: 


AMERICAN GUNS. 









































American designation. 
= Total. 
1-pounder.| 6-pounder.| 4-inch. | 5-inch. | 8-inch. pes 
Caliber, in centimeters- --- 5 Ay 5.7 10 12.7 20 30 Oo inser ees 
Number of guns on board. 22 84 6 12 32 6 8 170 
HITS. 

Merrit lOresas..-.<-5->-+--- 1 ily 1 4 3 ae 28 
Miminrante. Oquendo .2.- ==. |. -2-0-.-22- 46 6 3 (Ghd sah 2 Bl eras 62 
Sse tret Vets aa S a ee | Bee cee ian 1 4 6 AG eis eee apne 66 
ie ON 68 Gs a are Silene casted Mid te ee ee eee See 7 
Ch OSs SF ee ee i 79 iil 15 55 VA" ECE 163 




















This is not quite 1 hit per gun, or, leaving out the 1-pounders, 
which have only a short range of fire, 9 hits to 8 guns. 

The Jowa is the only ship that has 10-centimeter guns, the Brooklyn 
the only one having 12.7-centimeter guns. These data can not lay 
claim to absolute accuracy, owing to the extent of the destruction. 
The calibers of the hits also admit of some margin. 

Special mention should be made of the following points: The fallen 
foremast of the Maria Teresa showed 2 hits; 10 hits from 3 ships 
went into the smokestacks. 

On the Almirante Oquendo a 20-centimeter shell went through the 
forward turret roof, exploding, and killing the whole crew in the 
turret. If the turret had had no roof the shell would have passed 
over it. 

The superstructures on the deck of the Vizcaya had been almost 
completely destroyed by the end of the battle. Whether the torpedo 
which lay ready for firing in a bow launching tube was detonated by 
a hostile projectile could not be definitely established. It has also 
been said that the forward ammunition magazine had exploded. 

A 20-centimeter shell hit the protective shield of the second 14- 
centimeter gun of the Maria Teresa, exploded in the rear of it, and 
killed and mutilated everyone in the vicinity, as did also another 
shellof the same kind which struck the battery deck aft. Still farther 
aft two 30-centimeter shells struck so close together that their shot 
holes were merged into one. Explosive fragments from them had 
torn a hole 4 feet square in the ship on the opposite side (starboard). 


8 


The Cristobal Colon, although having received but seven shots, gave 
up the game, seeing that there was no possibility of escape, as even 
the Oregon and Texas had caught up with her after a three hours’ 
chase. 

In no ease has an armor belt been pierced. The greatest destruc- 
tion comparatively was wrought by the 5.7-centimeter projectiles, 
while the efficacy of the 3.7-centimeter projectiles was very small, 
their range not exceeding 2,000 meters. They are therefore to be 
done away with, perhaps a little overhastily, since they were con- 
structed primarily as against torpedo boats and for use at compara- 
tively short distances. 

In connection with the hits, a few figures as to the consumption of 
ammunition may be of interest, while the total consumption of am- 
munition is not yet known. Smith, a seaman on board the Lowa, fired 
135 aimed shots from a 10-centimeter rapid-fire gun in fifty minutes. 
During the same period of time two 5.7-centimeter guns of the same 
ship fired 440 shots. The Oregon used in all 1,775 shells, but 1,670 of 
this number were used for the twenty 5.7-centimeter guns alone (or 
perhaps only for the ten of one side of the ship), while the four 30-cen- 
timeter guns fired 31 shots. 

The American material has demonstrated not only its efficacy but 
also its durability, as only four guns were in need of repairs at the 
end of the war, in all of which projectiles had burst in the bore. 
This fact, taken in connection with other frequent failures of fuses, 
shows that the construction of the fuse in America is still far from 
perfect. 

It is well known that the extensive fires on board the Spanish ships 
were due principally to the fact that the Spanish had not sufficiently” 
considered modern experiences and principles by removing every- 
thing combustible from the ships. One circumstance should be 
mentioned in this connection which has perhaps not been fully appre- 
ciated, namely, the danger of wooden decks with pitch in the seams. 
The danger of these decks was still further increased in the Spanish 
ships by the circumstance that the planks were not even resting on 
an iron deck. An iron lining excluding the air and being a con- 
ductor of heat naturally decreases the danger of a fire spreading, 
though it does not obviate it, as the splinters of exploding projectiles 
pierce the deck, thereby causing drafts of air from below. On the 
Maria Teresa, Almirante Oquendo, and Vizcaya the upper decks 
and all the woodwork were completely burned, other decks partially. 

The Americans had avoided all combustible material in the con- 
struction and equipment of their ships; and moreover, special orders 
were given at the beginning of the war that all the ships should be 
examined and everything combustible that might have been left or 
accumulated on board through carelessness should be removed. 
Besides, the Spanish appear to have relied entirely on their steam 


9 


pumps and water mains for extinguishing fires. When these had been 
destroyed or injured by hostile projectiles, they had no other means 
to fallback on. Even the most primitive means for fighting fires, such 
as fire buckets and tubs filled with water, are indispensable in connec- 
tion with our modern fire-extinguishing equipment which is very 
effective indeed, but also very complicated. 

The thick powder smoke sometimes suffocated the Americans and 
almost blinded them. They sought to remedy this by tying wet cloths 
over their heads with small holes cut into them for the eyes. Smoke- 
less powder would probably have had still more troublesome effects. 

The range-finders, to which the good firing results of the Americans 
were often attributed in the beginning, were not of much use. Owing 
to their delicate construction, their usefulness was soon impaired. 
The distances were then estimated from the height of the masts of the 
hostile ships. 

While the Spanish were inferior in every other respect, they might 
have averted the whole sad catastrophe of Santiago by preserving and 
taking advantage of their greater speed, which they had shown, at 
least, at the trial trips of their ships. In this respect the Americans 
were at a great disadvantage from the outset. 

The speed of the two armored cruisers, New York and Brooklyn, was 
superior by 1 knot.to that of the Spanish cruisers, but these were 
the only ones; the speed of all the other vessels was inferior by from 
24 to 5 miles. The American ships, aside from previous services 
required of them—the Oregon, for instance, had not reached Key 
West on her return from San Francisco until May 26—had been block- 
ading Santiago for five weeks. Their boilers were in constant use and 
could not be properly cleaned; the bottoms of the ships were badly 
fouled. It is claimed that in order to make 11 knots an hour the 
ships had to use as much coal as they required to make 16 knots, when 
in good condition, and even then they could not attain their original 
speed. The Spanish, on the other hand, had a good opportunity dur- 
ing their six-weeks’ stay in Santiago harbor to put their boilers and 
engines in first-class condition and to clean the bottoms of the ships. 

Here, again, the moral qualities of the personnel are of the greatest 
importance. Technical perfection is but an auxiliary in warfare—a 0 
which acquires value only by the figure placed before it, namely, the 
mental qualities of the warrior. It is doubtful, however, whether the 
Spanish ships ever actually possessed the speed officially claimed for 
them. At trial trips it is easy enough to use means by which the 
efficiency attained appears greater on paper than it is in reality, espe- 
cially if the personnel accepting the ship is not of the highest moral 
and technical standing. In any event, the Spanish engine personnel 
was not equal to its task. 

It did not need this war to establish the value of an efficient engine 
personnel for success in war; but the immensity of the catastrophes 


10 


must make it plain even to the most superficial mind that it would 
be very wrong to deny the importance of the services of the men 
who give life and motion to the ship by the most arduous kind of 
work simply because they do not handle shell and lanyard, but coal 
Shovel and fire hook. The very best of human material, strong in 
body and mind, is the only kind suitable for this work, and a navy 
should spare neither trouble nor expense to secure it. 

On the subject of the efficiency of monitors opinions in United 
States naval circles were much divided at the beginning of the war. 
The North Americans are the only ones who still continue to build this 
type of ship. Little has been heard of their services during the war. 
Two of them went from San Francisco to the Philippines, the greater 
part of the way in tow of their colliers. The Monterey, accompanied 
by the collier Brutus, left San Diego, Cal., on June 11 and arrived 
at Manila on August 4. The distance is 7,600 miles, 3,725 miles of 
which she was towed. Twice she had to touch at anchoring places, 
namely, at Hawaii and Guam. She was towed from the 8th to the 
23d of June, 712 miles; from the 5th to the 22d of July, 2,541 miles, 
and from the 25th to the 28th of July, 472 miles; average speed 
while in tow, 6.76 knots. The weather was fine during the whole 
time, with the exception of a slight storm on July 31. The voyage 
took in all two months less seven days. The Monadnock took 
exactly the same length of time, having left San Francisco on June 
23 and arrived at Manila on August 16. 

These voyages are quite remarkable as far as sea efficiency is con- 
cerned, but when it comes to war efficiency they had better not be 
relied upon. The confidence in the efficiency of the monitor for war 
purposes has been considerably shaken. Captain Mahan, who used 
to argue in favor of a defensive navy composed of monitors, has 
recently expressed the opinion that the inefficiency of the monitors 
had now been proved; that they had been a constant impediment to 
the fleet owing to their lack of speed, limited coal capacity, and 
unstable platforms, which completely excluded effective firing in a 
bombardment. For harbor defenses also he prefers land fortifica- 
tions to monitors. 


Il. BOMBARDMENTS. 


What might be the results of a serious battle between armor elads 
and coast forts the war has not demonstrated. The Americans in 
these instances have never gone close enough to make it possible to 
note decisive results on either side of the belligerents. They should 
not be blamed for this. If they could obtain their object without 
taking greater risks, it would have been a mistake to take such risks, 
and they certainly did attain their object. The great injuries, how- 
ever, which the Americans claimed to have inflicted at different times 
have subsequently proved to be exaggerations and delusions. Even 
at target practice we believe only reluctantly the statements of ‘‘too 


el 


short” or ‘‘too far” made by an observer favorably stationed. The 
claims that the forts had been silenced, which would presuppose that 
the guns had been dismounted, were also founded on delusion. 

There is no doubt that the Americans had better guns than the 
Spanish in their land batteries and could fire at distances which the 
Spanish guns could not reach. When this was recognized ashore and 
the firing stopped, the ships thought they had silenced the batteries. 
It has therefore been demonstrated that the ships were unable to 
seriously injure the land fortifications at great distances. After all 
the bombardments of Santiago there was but one gun dismounted in 
each of the batteries at the Morro and the Socapa. It has not been 
demonstrated whether with equal armaments and skill in firing on the 
part of the Spanish the ships would not have seriously suffered. Still 
less has it been demonstrated what the relative situation of the bel- 
ligerent parties would have been if shorter distances had been chosen. 

The employment of torpedo boats for bombardments, as at Car- 
denas, must be designated as entirely unsuitable. Torpedo boats are 
expensive and delicate vessels, equipped for launching torpedoes and 
for great speed. Their guns are intended to be used only in extreme 
eases. When the torpedo weapons can not be used their other princi- 
pal quality, speed, in connection with the circumstance that they 
draw little water, may be utilized for the transmission of orders and 
information; but bombardments, even in narrow and shallow waters, 
had better be left to the most primitive gunboats, ete.; they can dc 
better work and are less expensive, but can never take the place of a 
disabled torpedo boat. 

The so-called dynamite cruiser, Veswvius, was a failure. Her pro- 
jectiles can be fired only at medium and short distances, and can not 
be aimed. The terrible effects claimed for hits can not be considered 
as counterbalancing this. It is true that an accidental hit may cause 
great havoc, but in this age of accurate firearms we should no longer 
reckon with such uncertain factors. The Americans have utilized 
the vessel accordingly. They used to send her at night against the 
coast defenses, counting on accidental hits, while the vessel, pro- 
tected by the darkness, did not betray her presence by any flash at 
the discharge nor by smoke or detonation. Nothing has been heard 
of any particular result. No attempt was made to carry out the idea, 
so much talked of at first, of destroying the mine obstructions by 
systematic bombardments of the harbor entrance. In order to do 
this it would have been necessary for the vessel to approach the shore 
in daytime, when she would have been exposed to the very dangerous 
fire of the coast forts, and a systematic bombardment could hardly 
be spoken of in view of the uncertainty of fire. 

The Americans consider this vessel a failure, as also the ram Katah- 
din, which, aside from four rapid-fire guns, has no other weapons but 
her ram. 


12 


Ill. COAST DEFENSE. 


Some obstructions by means of vessels and mines were laid out by 
both belligerents, but have not come into play. The Spanish had 
attempted to close the entrance of San Juan Harbor in Porto Rico 
and that of the Pasig River at Manila by sunken vessels. In the lat- 
ter case it was the opinion of German officers that it did not consti- 
tute a military obstruction, although it interfered considerably with 
the movements of shipping. 

The two mines which were blown up in front of the Olympvza at the 
beginning of the battle of Cavite were not intended as a regular 
obstruction of the channel, but represented only a small mine field 
for vessels that might accidentally pass over them. They were fired 
prematurely. . 

In the entrance of Guantanamo Bay the Americans found quite a 
number of mines. These might have caused considerable damage if 
they had operated, for the Americans entered the bay without any 
precautionary measures, and the screws of the Marblehead tore two 
of the mines loose from their anchorages so that they rose to the sur- 
face of the water. Then the whole bay was systematically searched 
for mines. This was done on June 21 by the boats of the Marblehead 
and Newark. Four steam launches, under the fire of Spanish infantry 
hiding on the shore, fished up thirteen mines on the first day with 
light chains they were towing. The ships, of course, fired on the 
hostile position, which was soon abandoned. During the next few 
days thirty-five more mines were found and taken ashore. These 
proved to be charged with 120 pounds of gun cotton each. Many of 
them showed evidences of having been in contact with ships’ bottoms 
or screws, but the firing mechanism was not capable of operating. 
The fuses showed such grave defects that it was quite evident that the 
work of constructing them had not been done under the supervision 
of a superior. 

The mines raised in Santiago Harbor after the surrender of the 
place proved on the whole to be in better condition. Still, the outer 
row containing contact mines was of doubtful value. One mine was 
found, for instance, in which half of the gun cotton had been burned, 
leaving no doubt that it had been in contact with some object—prob- 
ably the Merrimac—and that the fuse had acted, but that the gun- 
cotton charge had become spoiled. 

The second row of mines (electric) was in pretty good condition and 
might easily have destroyed one or more ships if an attempt had been 
made to force the entrance. These latter mines contained a charge 
of 200 pounds of gun cotton each. All the mines in Guantanamo as 
well as Santiago Bay were thickly overgrown with barnacles and 
seaweeds. 

As a curiosity, it may be mentioned that lightning struck an Amer- 
ican mine in the lower Mississippi and exploded it, and that several 


: 13 


mines in the Potomac were exploded by lightning at a few seconds’ 
interval without causing any disturbance in the rest of the mine sys- 
tem. They blew up exactly as it was intended that they, should be 
blown up in war. 


IV. BLOCKADES AND CRUISER WARFARE. 


Both of these were applied by the belligerents in the mildest pos- 
sible form. Spain can hardly be considered in this connection. She 
could do no blockading, and it is somewhat doubtful whether it was 
quite voluntarily that she abstained from capturing hostile merchant- 
men. The Americans were enabled to maintain quite an effective 
blockade on the coasts, which they designated as blockaded, by means 
of the large number of yachts and other steamers which they had 
incorporated into their Navy as auxiliary vessels, while their large 
ships were giving their attention to the hostile naval forces. 

It can hardly be said that the Americans carried on systematically 
any destructive warfare as against Spanish merchantmen. Those 
they did capture almost ran into their hands, so to speak. This was 
especially the case at the beginning of the war, mostly with vessels 
which, owing to the usual Spanish carelessness, had received no warn- 
ing of the fact that hostilities were about to break out. This was 
even the case with the Spanish gunboat Callao in the Philippines. 
Still a few prizes may be mentioned which were captured while mak- 
ing a direct attempt to run the blockade, also a few cases where ves- 
sels were chased till they ran ashore, while a few fast Spanish vessels 
succeeded in running the blockade. But neither the successful nor 
the unsuccessful attempts at running the blockade were of much 
importance. 

A number of neutral vessels were also captured, but nearly all of 
them were released again, for the American Government, in adju- 
dicating their cases, showed a liberality which was quite unheard of 
in former naval wars and which probably had a political background. 
About thirty vessels in all were considered good prizes. 

As the United States as well as Spain have refrained from priva- 
teering, although they were the very countries which reserved that 
right at the time of the Paris declaration, it may be assumed that 
privateering is definitely at an end. 

During the blockade of Santiago the harbor entrance was at night 
kept constantly under the light of the projector of some ship desig- 
nated for the duty and boats were stationed at intervals between the 
other vessels and the shore, so that any attempt of the Spanish ships 
to go out might at once be perceived. It has been commented upon 
that the ship so illuminating the harbor entrance was hardly ever 
fired upon by the fortification works. It would seem as though tele- 
graphically connected observation stations at the Morro and Socapa 
could have ascertained the exact distance of the troublesome watcher 
and made her work, if not entirely impossible, yet extremely difficult 
by firing upon her. 


14 


V. LANDINGS. 


The landing of the Americans at Daiquiri is the largest landing 
effected since that of the western powers at Balaklava in the Crimean 
war. Yet the total forces landed did not exceed 15,000 men, embarked 
in fifty-three steamers. It took a long time before the troops were 
ready to start, for everything required for an army anda landing had 
first to be procured. When the expedition finally did start it was 
found that a great deal had been overlooked or was incomplete, or 
had been lost in the chaos, or could not be secured. For instance, no 
cavalry horses—except for one troop—could be taken along because 
there had not been time to fit out the vessels for the reception of 
horses. The voyage and the landing were effected in the most beauti- 
ful weather; the Americans had good luck, as they always did. The 
forces were landed unmolested. 

The disembarkation was effected almost entirely at a small landing 
bridge where but two boats could go alongside at a time. Attempts 
to have boats run ashore on the small sandy beach, at one end of 
which was the bridge, had to be abandoned after the loss of several 
boats, which were wrecked in the surf on the projecting rocks and 
stones. The report that the United States war ships had first fired on 
the open strip of land back of the landing place and routed the 
Spanish should not be taken literally. No such open strip of land 
exists there. The rocks reach close to the sea, offering hundreds of 
sheltered places from which the bridge might have been fired upon. 
Authorities in military matters state that 300 men, though they might 
not have been able to prevent the landing entirely, could have caused 
great losses. But on this occasion, as on so many others, the Spanish 
Showed that they had no appreciation of military situations, and as 
soon as the bombardment commenced they retreated. They need not 
have paid much attention to the Cubans. The Spanish ought to have 
‘known that now that the Americans had arrived the Cubans would 
avoid danger even more than before. 

With the landing of the army all operations on the part of the 
Americans ceased for a while. In spite of the most exhaustive use 
of all the boats and auxiliaries of the warships, including the armor- 
clads guarding the entrance to Santiago Harbor, it took several days 
before the field guns and luggage could be brought ashore, to say 
nothing of the siege guns. It was found that there ought to have 
been many more lighters, especially such as are equipped with lifting 
apparatus. ‘There was only one of these—a second one had disap- 
peared during the voyage. There were no devices for landing horses 
and mules which were intended for drawing the guns. The animals 
were hoisted overboard, and it was taken for granted that they would 
Swim ashore. But in a number of instances this did not happen. 
Many of the frightened and bewildered animals swam out to sea and 


15 


were drowned. As all the boats were being used in the landing and 
were crowding each other for hours at the landing place, there was 
none available to go after the mules and lead them in the right direc- 
tion. The few men in charge of landing the animals had all they 
could do to get those that swam ashore out of the surf and in safety. 
About 50 animals perished. 

There was lack of management generally. No one in authority had 
been appointed commander of the landing place. The commander 
in chief, General Shafter, did not trouble himself about the landing. 
Admiral Sampson had only made arrangements as far as the war ships 
and their boats were concerned. The only landing bridge was but 
partly covered with loose boards. No material nor tools were at hand 
to build other bridges, and little attention was given to the one bridge 
in existence, as is evidenced by the fact that three weeks later the 
loose boards were still loose. 

The conditions at Siboney, where part of the troops and supplies 
were landed a little later, were quite similar, except that there was 
no bridge at all. But in calm weather a few boats could be run 
ashore side by side. No bridge was built here for the landing of the 
voluminous luggage. 

The relations between the military authorities and the officers of 
the transport steamers had not been regulated. The latter had only 
their own advantage and that of the ships’ owners in view, and did 
not pay the least attention to the wishes and plans of the officers of 
the troops. The greater part of the time they kept at a distance of 
from 3 to 20 miles from the shore, to make sure not to go too near or 
to get into collision with other vessels, and if at times they did assist 
in unloading their cargoes, they would return to the sea as fast as 
possible as soon as fire was opened ashore, often taking with them 
the most indispensable articles of the army equipment. An Ameri- 
can reporter even calls them insolent, un-American, mutinous cow- 
ards. The army authorities were unprepared and powerless before 
such conduct on the part of the officers of the transports. Under these 
circumstances it is not strange that the landing of the provisions, 
guns, and ammunition, and the entire equipment, all of which were 
so much needed in this locality, which offered no resources, was 
effected with such slowness that the troops were reduced from the 
outset to the meager rations which each man carried with him, and 
where these had been thrown away, as had been done in many 
instances in order to lighten the weight, the soldiers suffered hunger. 


VI. COALING. 


The late war will give a new impulse to the important question of 
supplying coal. Ships and fleets carrying on war in a region where 
they do not have available bases of supplies and coal depots in their 
immediate vicinity, or whenever they are not certain that there may 


16 


not be oceasion for their having to leave such region temporarily, 
should have their own colliers along. The colliers should have the 
same speed as the squadron. The ships should not be compelled to 
rely on rendezvous or the uncertainty of colliers sent after them. But 
not only should care be taken to have a sufficient supply of coal, but 
also to provide appliances for taking coal on board under all cireum- 
stances in the shortest possible time. The lack of such appliances has 
contributed not a little to the disasters of the Spanish. The coaling 
of Admiral Camara’s ships at Port Said was nothing but a comedy. 
Admiral Cervera intended to coal rapidly at Santiago and proceed. 
But the appliances for that purpose proved so defective that the 
United States fleet had shut him up in the harbor before he could 
finish coaling, which operation took several days. At present not 
many ships are being built with that end in view, nor are they being 
equipped with appliances for coaling in the shortest possible time. 
This will be absolutely necessary in future, so that the ships may be 
enabled to take on coal or other fuel either from a wharf or from a 
lighter or collier at sea. 


VII. AUXILIARY WAR SHIPS. 


What can be done with money and a practical mind in the matter 
of securing naval war material the Americans have done since the 
war cloud first appeared on the horizon. It is true that the purchase 
of foreign war ships before the beginning of the war proved almost a 
failure. The United States bought the folowing Brazilian war ships: 
The protected cruiser Amazonas, of 3,450 tons, afterwards called the 
New Orleans; the protected eruiser Almirante Abreu, same size, 
afterwards called the Albany, and the cruiser Nictheroy, of 7,080 tons, 
afterwards called the Buffalo, which, aside from her good rapid-fire 
armament, had a 38-centimeter dynamite gun; from other sources, 
the cruiser Diogenes, of 1,800 tons, renamed the Topeka, and a tor- 
pedo boat purchased in Germany, called the Somers. The only ones 
of these that were assigned to the active fleet were the Topeka and 
the New Orleans. The Albany and the torpedo boat Somers, which 
were still in England after the breaking out of the war, were not 
allowed to leave there on account of England’s neutrality. The 
Buffalo did not leave the navy-yard during the war. The United 
States had better luck with the merchant steamers they purchased 
and converted into auxiliary cruisers and gunboats. 

They bought 60 yachts and other steamers as auxiliary gunboats 
and scouts, 4 large fast ocean steamers as auxiliary cruisers, 11 tugs, 
subsequently armed. The following were chartered: Four large ocean 
steamers aS auxiliary cruisers. Placed in commission: Fourteen 
revenue cutters as auxiliary gunboats and scouts. In all, 93 steam- 
ers for warlike actions, more or less armed and fitted out for that 
purpose. 

There were also purchased as adjuncts of the fleet 20 transport 


17 


vessels, 9 colliers, 1 repair ship, 2 water-distilling ships, 2 ice-manu- 
facturing ships, 3 hospital ships; in all, 37. This does not include 
the temporarily chartered steamers for the larger troop transports. 

The large auxiliary cruisers were also occasionally utilized for the 
rapid transportation of troops. The auxiliary gunboats were indis- 
pensable for the blockade of the extensive stretch of the coast. The 
names of several of these, even of tugs, have been specially mentioned 
in several of the battles. A few of the auxiliary vessels, as, for 
instanee, the St. Louis and the Zafiro, were equipped with special 
devices for dragging for cables, which they have used with good 
Success. 

As for the adjuncts of the fleet, the distilling ships were intended 
especially to furnish fresh water to the blockading auxiliary vessels. 
and the transports of the landing army. As most of these vessels had 
inadequate distilling apparatus, some of them none at all, this was 
necessary, so that they might not be compelled to leave the blockade 
for the purpose of renewing their water supply. The repair ship— 
Vulcan was also equipped with a powerful distilling apparatus. 

The ice-manufacturing ships supplied the vessels not equipped with 
ice machines, also the hospitals of the invading army of Cuba. The 
object of the other adjuncts of the fleet is self-evident. 

The repair ship Vulcan has proved extremely useful, even indis- 
pensable for the blockading fleet at Santiago. She supplied 31 vessels 
with extra engine parts, material, and tools. Twenty-six vessels were 
repaired, and a number of repairs were also made on guns and their 
equipments. The Vulcan also rendered important services in connec- 
tion with the raising of the Maria Teresa and is now doing the greater 
part of the work in temporarily repairing said ship for the purpose of 
transferring her to one of the United States navy-yards. 

How important it is to own transports specially fitted out for the 
transportation of troops and war material has been demonstrated in 
this war, though principally by the lack of vessels equipped for such 
service. Of the transports. purchased during the war, the Navy 
Department intends to retain 16, which are to be refitted for service 
as regular marine transports, namely, the Panama, Port Victor, Rita, 
Mohawk, Mobile, Massachusetts, Manitoba, Minnewaska, Mississippi, 
Michigan, Rowmania, Obdam, Berlin, Chester, and Britannia, 
employed on the Atlantic Ocean, and one on the Pacific coast. Dur- 
ing the war they were used not only for the transportation of troops, 
but also for supplying provisions and material. 

It would have been very desirable to have had even more of these. 
The blockading fleet, for instance, complained of the very defective 
mail service, as also of the fact that, although it was comparatively 
but a short distance to the United States ports, so few fresh provi- 
sions were received, which circumstance impaired the health of the 
troops. 


10846—No. 2 2 





18 


Vessels built for special purposes are in times of peace, at ma- 
neuvers, stepchildren of the Navy; they are considered expensive 
and troublesome adjuncts which have to be taken into consideration 
in maneuvers and impede their rapid execution; and yet how useful 
they are and how much relief they are able to furnish in actual war! 
Whenever mobilizations show that there is not a sufficient number of 
suitable merchant steamers which would be unquestionably at the 
disposal of the Navy at the beginning of a war, provision should be 
made to have vessels set apart which can be easily equipped for such 
purposes, and, if necessary, to own and keep in constant readiness a 
number of such special vessels even in time of peace. 


2) 


OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 
Wak Notss No. III. 


INFORMATION FROM ABROAD. | 


SKETCHES 


FROM THE ~ 


SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 


COMMANDER J....... 


TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN. 





OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 


ae ES 2 NE I We 


WASHINGTON: 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, — 
1899. : 





OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 


Wark Nortss No. III. 


INFORMATION FROM ABROAD. 





SKHTCHES 


FROM THE 


SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 


BY 


Cervelo NG ey ie J 2 ws 





TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN. 








OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 


—____—_-_} >_< ____—_- 


WASHINGTON: 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 
1899, 





INTRODUCTORY. 


During the recent war the German protected cruiser Geier, Com- 
mander Jacobsen, was stationed in the West Indies, in the vicinity of 
Cuba, and was permitted to pass in and out of the blockaded ports. 
There has lately appeared in the Marine-Rundschau, of Berlin, an 
official publication, a series of ‘‘Sketches from the Spanish-American 
Wate Dy COMmanderJ....... ” Their translation complete is 
given in this number of the War Notes. 

RICHARDSON CLOVER, 


Commander, U. S. N., Chief Intelligence Officer. 


NAvY DEPARTMENT, January 16, 1899. 


Approved: 
A. 8. CROWNINSHIELD, 
Chief of Bureau of Navigation. 





SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 


By CommanderJ....... 


[Translated from the Marine-Rundschau, October, November, and December, 1898.] 


The following considerations constitute the opinions of the author 
as acquired by him on the scene of war. He wishes to call special 
attention to the fact that until authentic data are available as to the 
strength of the two opponents in the different battles, the tactical 
situations and intentions, and the losses in personnel and material, 
the reports can be but incomplete. Nevertheless it will be desirable, 
even without awaiting official statements, which may not be published 
for years by the two belligerent parties, to sift the confused mass of 
material which has come to us through the newspapers and to try 
and describe the most important operations, at least approximately, 
as they have taken place. To that end I have partly made use of 
reports of Germans who were eye witnesses of the events., It is 
hardly necessary to emphasize the fact that the author has observed 
the strictest impartiality in his estimates of the situation. He has 
the same high regard for Spanish and Americans. 


I. THE CAUSE OF THE WAR. 


1. Much has been said and written about the cause of the war; 
but, even at the risk of offering nothing new, I believe I ought not 
to avoid entering into this question, in order to make the sketch com- 
plete. 

As early as 1890 Mahan’s sharp eye discerned what course the poli- 
ties of his country ought to follow, and in vigorous language he 
pointed out that course to his nation, from a military standpoint, in 
his essay entitled ‘‘ The United States looking Outward, ” and in 1893 
in ‘‘The Isthmus and Sea Power.” But not only strategic interests, 
commercial interests also, play a powerful part in this historical 
drama. Almost nine-tenths of all the sugar from Cuba is already 
going to the American market. If. America succeeds in getting 
Cuba into her hands, either by autonomy or by annexation, it will 
insure an immense advantage to the American market and drive all 
other kinds of sugar (Germany is interested to the extent of many 
million marks) entirely out of America. Moreover, only a small part 
of Cuba is as yet being cultivated, and there are good prospects for 
harvesting from this beautiful country immense wealth in sugar and 
tobacco. Upon calm consideration it is therefore not astonishing 
5 


6 


that the Government of the United States, pressed by the wishes of 
the people and by speculators having only their own interests in 
view, should finally have yielded and resolved to lay aside the 
peaceable attributes of commerce and industry and take the sword 
in hand. It should further be mentioned that the Maine affair 
threw the last spark into the powder barrel, and that the conduct of 
American officials at Havana toward the Spanish officials subse- 
quently added further fuel to the flame. 

The United States of America has done what other nations in 
its place might perhaps have accomplished long ago. According 
to the old adage that a war arises out of the needs of nations, the 
Union has taken advantage of the opportunity to secure for herself 
the first place in the West Indies. 

2. Very different from the United States, the power of the Spanish 
Empire, which at one time ruled the world, has been gradually under- 
mined. The flourishing colonies of Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, 
etc., have suffered severely during the last few years from fanatic 
conflicts between the inhabitants and Government troops as a result 
of the injudicious policy followed in the government and treatment of 
the former. Owing to the corruptibility of the officials, fostered by 
the merchants, the actual revenues from the colonies never reached 
the hands of the Spanish Government. The principle of the Spanish 
to compensate themselves first of all out of the rich profits of the 
country has brought about the catastrophe. It was precipitated by 
the fact that repeated changes in the highest positions were approved 
by the Government at Madrid, which necessitated not only a change 
in the majority of the lower officials, but entailed an entirely new 
system of oppression and systematic robbing of the inhabitants. 
When the Government at last realized the true state of affairs it 
was already too late. Blanco, the last Captain-General and governor 
of Cuba, as well as Martinez Campos, are well known as men of 
unimpeachable character. But although General Blanco had an 
intimate knowledge of Cuban conditions and enjoyed great popularity, 
he did not succeed in stopping the rolling ball. Steadily it was 
approaching the abyss, and even the autonomy proclaimed by the 
Government could not save it from the catastrophe. That catastrophe 
was the war with the United States. The Spanish, itis true, consider 
it an entirely unwarranted interference with rights that have been 
theirs for centuries and an act of violence on the part of a neighbor- 
ing nation. But that is a characteristic of the Spanish nature and 
will serve to explain subsequent situations during the war. Even up 
to the very last day Spain thought it utterly impossible that war could 
break out with the United States. This is proved by the conditions 
in Cuba immediately after the sending of the ultimatum by the 
United States and the rejection of the same by the Spanish Govern- 
ment. he 


7 


If the Spanish had not been so blinded, and had had eyes for what 
was going on in their immediate vicinity and in the country of their 
powerful neighbors during the last few years, they could not have 
hesitated to set aside their pride, and even to give up their right to 
the colonies. The United States would have paid Spain a handsome 
sum for the Atlantic colonies. The Spanish army, which had been 
fighting for years with great valor and under endless privations, 
would have honorably returned home, the Spanish merchants would 
have continued their business under safe protection, and the pur- 
chase price would have helped the mother country in her financial 
troubles. That would have been practical. But fate and the obsti- 
nacy, or rather the pride, of the Spanish willed differently. The 
ball keeps on rolling, and nothing will stop it until the Spanish power 
is deprived of its colonies and, utterly broken, without any prospect 
for the future, retires to its exhausted mother country. But that will 
not prevent the people from proudly raising their heads and exclaim- 
ing: ‘‘We have defended our honor and have fought trusting in our 
just cause. Ours is the glory !” 

3. Thus the struggle for existence is ever the same, even as between 
modern nations. And each country which, by reason of its commerce 
and industry, is entitled to a voice in the politics of the world, should 
learn a serious lesson from this struggle between capital and anti- 
quated heroism. Germany, above all, should never forget that 
nothing but a naval force will keep her safe from adversaries—a 
naval force strong enough to guarantee, or at least not to preclude, 
success under all possible circumstances. 


II. THE BELLIGERENT PARTIES. 


4, I will not go into particulars as to the formation and strength 
of the belligerent parties, as this work is not intended to discuss the 
course of the whole war, but merely to select a few important and° 
interesting events. Besides, the reader will have an opportunity of 
gaining information on these points by many other discussions on the 
subject. There has lately appeared in the Marine-Rundschau a 
review on the events of the Spanish-American war, giving the 
strength of both parties, together with a discussion by Rear-Admiral 
Pliiddemann, which is especially well adapted for that purpose. I 
‘shall take the liberty, however, of inserting a few remarks as to my 
personal observations while on the scene of war. 

5. As the United States of North America does not constitute a 
military nation and has troubled itself very little about the organ- 
ization of militia and volunteers, it would not be proper to make 
the same requirements of American soldiers that we are in the 
habit of making of our soldiers in Europe. Preparatory training 
need not be looked for, except in the case of regular troops, and even 


8 


there such training in time of peace is very defective. The com- 
panies of militia and volunteers are drilled for a short time; officers 
and men become acquainted with each other, and as soon as an officer 
is able to lead his company or division and the men have learned to 
handle their guns, which is at most four weeks, the troops are 
considered ready for war. 

This system naturally precludes the exercising together of large 
bodies consisting of several regiments. First of all, trained officers 
are lacking for that purpose, and besides, it is not deemed necessary. 
These troops do not fight, like European armies, in close ranks, but 
rather on the order of guerrilla warfare. It will be readily under- 
stood that under such circumstances there can be no question of 
great discipline under fire or in camp on the part of the men, nor of 
high tactical conceptions and corresponding leadership on the part of 
the officers. It is very praiseworthy, therefore, that with such primi- 
tive means such great results were attained as evidenced, for instance, 
by the capitulation of Santiago. As for the individual qualities of 
the American soldier, he is brave, too impetuous perhaps, and as 
long as there is fighting to be done and the hardships are not too 
great he is easily guided. A: few volunteer regiments fought with 
considerable valor. But not in that respect alone have they shown 
military efficiency, but also in the manner in which they have 
endured fatigues in the extremely unfavorable climate. I am prob- 
ably not mistaken in the assumption that the good results attained by 
some of the volunteer regiments are partly due to the circumstance 
that outdoor sport is carried on with great zeal in the United States. 
Polo, football, athletic exercises in running, walking, and jumping, 
tennis, bicycling, rowing, ete., are excellent preparations for military 
service, because they harden the body and strengthen self-confidence. 
And if the volunteers further know how to handle their guns and are 
good marksmen, which is also included among the sports, they have 
very nearly all the qualities which the Americans require of their 
soldiers. 

6. The United States Navy has been diligently at work ever since 
the war of the rebellion, 1861 to 1865, and has put to profit the lessons 
derived therefrom. That the American naval officers are intelligent 
and energetic as well as brave and self-possessed leaders, and the 
American sailors cool-headed and good marksmen, was demonstrated 
by many examples during the above-mentioned war. The naval bat- 
tle between the Kearsarge and Alabama, such deeds as Farragut’s at 
Mobile, will never be forgotten and go to prove that the first founda- 
tion for a warlike and efficient navy—an able personnel inured to the 
sea—was in existence. Nor does the Union need fear a comparison 
with other nations as far as matériel is concerned. Since the year 
1888 it has been the endeavor of the Navy Department to take the 
construction of ships, armor plate, and ordnance into its own hands, 


/ 


9 . 


so as to render itself entirely independent of other countries in that 
respect. The increase of the fleet has kept pace with such efforts. 
The battle ships [owa, Indiana, Oregon, and Texas possess all the 
requirements of modern ships.” Their heavy artillery is unusally 
strong, and the medium and light artillery consists of rapid-fire guns 
in larger numbers. The newarmored cruisers New York and Brook- 
lyn are fast and powerful ships, entirely on.a level with the same class 
of cruisers in England and France. It can not be denied that a certain 
weakness regarding the personnel lies in the fact that so many different 
nationalities are represented on board; but I believe this circumstance 
is not of very great weight. Europeans are too much inclined to see 
everything only with their own eyes and judge matters according to 
their own usages. On board of a ship, where very strict laws prevail, 
especially in time of war, it can not be difficult, even among mixed 
nationalities, to maintain the necessary discipline as long as the 
officers have a correct understanding of how to handle the crews, 
and that faculty the American naval officers do possess, as has already 
been stated. Moreover, the reports of the Naval War College at 
Newport show that it is the endeavor of the Navy Department to 
have the officers gain also the necessary knowledge of tactical and 
strategic questions. During the last few years fleet maneuvers have 
taken place, the training of the crews has been carried on in a sys- 
tematic manner, and, finally, target practice has been given the 
importance which is absolutely necessary for the attainment of the 
final end, namely, the annihilation of the enemy in war. I do not 
want to be misunderstood and do not mean to give the impression 
that the American Navy is above all censure and should be taken as 
a model in every respect. Not at all. Many weaknesses have come 
to light everywhere. I will only call to mind the taking off of the 
armor plates of the Jowa, several faulty gun constructions, which 
are withheld for publication. And the boilers were probably not free 
from objections either. Butin what navy are such defects not found? 
It is therefore deserving of sincere praise that the Navy, immediately 
after the breaking out of hostilities, was ready for service with all 
the ships: in commission and has continued such service successfully 
for several months. Furthermore, the vessels of the merchant marine 
which were required for the blockade were fitted out and armed with 
rapid-fire guns in a very short space of time. This latter cireum- 
stance especially might well serve as an example to several other 
navies. 

7. As compared with the United States, Spain has a large regular 
army. But. when we remember that so many colonies have to be 
defended and that the struggles with the insurgents, which have been 
going on for years, and the hardships connected therewith, have 
claimed many victims, the importance of this army shrinks consider- 
ably. It should further be remembered that the troops in Cuba and 


q : 10 


Puerto Rico are distributed along the coasts for protection and that 
communications between them and concentration of these troops by 
railway are possible only in few places. Hence it can hardly be said 
that the Spanish troops are superior to the American fighting forces 
as far as strength is concerned. As to their military qualities, the 
Spanish soldiers are highly thought of everywhere. They are very 
brave, of great power of endurance, always sober, and extremely frugal. 
The officers present a good military appearance, but their education 
is said to be superficial. Their patriotism and readiness to sacrifice 
themselves can not be questioned. Moreover, officers and men have 
become inured to warfare through their fights with the insurgents and 
are acquainted with the difficult topography of the country. Outside 
of the regular army volunteer regiments have been organized every- 
where. ‘To see those people of all conditions and ages devote them- 
selves indefatigably to the duties of their new ealling, after their 
regular day’s work is done, can not fail to arouse a feeling of admira- 
tion. But, on the other hand, it is questionable whether the volun- 
_ teers, when it comes to actual fighting, will prove efficient. In the 
first place, their equipments are very defective, and, besides, their 
training is not sufficient to fit them for war. It may be stated as a 
general thing—and this applies to the regular troops as well—that the 
training is not adapted to war purposes. I witnessed, for instance, a 
drill of coast artillery where the movements of loading and firing were 
practiced. Projectiles, cartridges, etc., were lacking at the drill. The 
guns were not aimed, there was no sighting. That was one day before 
an actual bombardment occurred at that place. It is very evident 
that such gun crews can not do very efficient work. In only a few of 
the coast towns did target practice take place, and then only to a 
very limited extent. The reason was, as I was told, that ammunition 
was scarce, as the service ammunition had to be reserved for the 
enemy. That may be true, but this should have been thought of in 
time of peace, and this most important preparation for war should not 
have been deferred to the last minute or omitted altogether. 

8. The Spanish navy has never recovered since the beginning of 
the century, when it was completely annihilated. To illustrate, I will 
quote Nelson’s words after a visit to Cadiz in 1793: ‘‘The Dons may 
know how to build beautiful ships, but they do not know how to pro- 
cure men. At Cadiz they have in commission four battle ships of the 
first rank, very beautiful ships, but miserably manned. I am quite 
certain if the crews of oursix boats, who are picked men, had boarded 
one of these ships, they could have taken it.” Mahan, in his work 
on The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1783 to 1812, Chapter 
II, has cited a number of other proofs to show the lack of seamanship 
on the part of the Spanish. The above-mentioned words of Nelson’s 
are still true. A few handsome ships like the Almirante Oquendo, 
Vizcaya, and Infanta Maria Teresa have been incorporated into the 


11 


Spanish navy, but next to nothing has been done for the training of 
the personnel. Maneuvers of several fleets together were unknown, 
and the individual training of officers and men was limited to what is 
absolutely necessary. Especially as relates to target practice much 
has been left undone. The same thing applies to the torpedo-boat 
destroyers which the Spanish have secured during the last few years. 
The vessels were very beautiful, but no thought was taken of the 
manner in which they should be handled by their commanders, nor 
the training in tactics and torpedo launching. As to the condition 
of the ships generally, I will state, among other things, that the 
boilers of three cruisers of the same class, the Reina Mercedes, 
Alfonso XII, and Reina Cristina, were in such bad condition as to 
completely disable the vessels, so that they could be utilized only for 
harbor defense. There are several other points which also show care- 
lessness in the training of the personnel as well as equipment of the 
ships, and to which I will again refer in the course of this work. 


Ill BOMBARDMENT OF SAN JUAN DE PUERTO RICO. 


9. It was on May 9, 1898, that I had an opportunity for the first 
time of visiting the scene of war; that was at San Juan de Puerto 
Rico. The first thing that caught my eye was a proclamation by 
the Governor-General Macias. As this proclamation shows the 
enthusiasm and patriotism of which the Spaniard is capable to such 
a high degree, I give below a translation of the same: 


SAN JUAN, April 23, 1898. 
INHABITANTS OF PUERTO RICO: 


The day of trial, the hour of great decisions and great deeds of heroism has 
arrived. The Republic of the United States, trusting in her powerful resources and 
relying on the impunity with which she has so far heen able to foster the insurrec- 
tion of the Cubans, has resolved in her Congress upon armed intervention in the 
island of Cuba. The Republic has opened hostilities and has trampled under foot 
the rights of Spain and the moral sentiment of the whole civilized world. This isa 
declaration of war, and in the same manner that the hostile squadrons have com- 
menced their actions against the island of Cuba they will also direct them against 
Puerto Rico; but here they will surely be shattered against the loyalty and valor of 
the inhabitants, who would a thousand times rather die than surrender to the 
usurpers. 

Do not think that the mother country has abandoned us. With enthusiasm she is 
following our movements and will come to our rescue. Thesquadrons are ready for 
the fight. All the troops have been armed, and the same waters over which Colum- 
bus sailed with his famous ships will witness our victories. Providence will not 
permit that in these countries which were discovered by the Spanish nation the 
echo of our language should ever cease to be heard, nor that our flag should disap- 
pear from before the eye. 

Inhabitants of Puerto Rico, the time for heroic deeds has come. Fight and stand 
firm in the consciousness of your right and of justice. On to the war! 

Long live Puerto Rico, always Spanish! Long live Spain! 

MACIAS. 


It seems to me that more beautiful and more eloquent words could 
hardly be found to speak to the hearts of the people. And unless 


12 


the actions and deeds of the leaders fall far short of their words, the 
American invasion may be prepared to meet with strong resistance. 

10. The city of San Juan is located on an island, and presents from 
the sea a very pretty picture with her ancient castle of Morro on one 
side and San Cristobal Castle on the other. The forts are powerful 
masonry structures. Between them rise many stately buildings, 
mostly barracks, hospitals, etc. The Spanish flag is waving from all 
the buildings, and lends a picturesque charm to the whole scene in the 
wonderfully bright light, with chains of mountains as a background. 

Besides the old forts there are a number of new fortifications, east 
of Cristobal Castle as well as in the entrance of the harbor itself. The 
latter, which is difficult to pass even in time of peace, is closed by 
mines. After passing through the harbor entrance one enters a large 
basin close behind the city, adapted to receive a large number of 
ships. :There is also a second bay with sufficiently deep water. With 
the necessary funds the harbor might be greatly improved by dredg- 
ing, especially by the removal of at least a part of the shoals at Punta 
Larga. There are quite a number of piers offering good facilities for 
loading and unloading ships. 

11. In consequence of the breaking out of the war with the United 
States commerce was, of course, at a standstill. Yet as the harbor 
had not been declared blockaded there were a few German and Eng- 
lish steamers that were unloading their cargoes. A Spanish steamer 
also had been brought in from St. Thomas by the auxiliary cruiser 
Alfonso XIII. The only vessel that behaved in a suspicious manner, 
having apparently passed around the whole island several times and 
repeatedly appeared in front of San Juan, was a large ocean steamer 
with three smokepipes. The general opinion was that it was a United 
States auxiliary cruiser. The Spanish gunboats tried several times to 
go close up to this vessel but did not succeed, owing to her superior — 
speed. Nothing else in the city reminded one of war. Every one 
was pursuing his accustomed occupations as far as this was possible 
under the circumstances. Almost every evening after the close of 
business at 5 o’clock the volunteer companies marched through the 
streets to the place where they were drilled. There was not much 
done in that line, however, at least nothing of great importance, such 
as target practice, instruction in topography, or field service. Usually 
the troops were required to take their positions in the line of defense, 
and soon after they would march off again. On the whole, the vol- 
unteers made a good appearance and seemed to devote themselves 
with great zeal to their tasks. The large number of young men among 
the volunteers was striking. On one oceasion the Governor-General 
made a general inspection of the whole fortification, and at that time 
exercises took place with several batteries. But the exercises were 
carried out in a careless manner and without system. Target prac- 
tice with guns, which would have been necessary above all in order 
to place the fortification in condition for war and to drill the person- 


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nel, was held neither in peace nor after the breaking out of the war. 
In the evening the whole population would usually repair to the 
plaza; several times during the week there was music there. The 
theater also remained open and enjoyed pretty good audiences. 

12. This peaceful situation was suddenly changed when, on May 12, 
1898, a part of the fleet commanded by Admiral Sampson appeared at 
5 o'clock in the morning in front of San Juan, and without any further 
notification opened the bombardment. The Spanish complained bit- 
terly of this surprise, which did not give them a chance to remove the 
sick and the women and children to places of safety, and did not give 
foreign representatives and warships time to leave the city or the 
harbor. ‘‘There are no international agreements, it is true, as to 
previous notice of a bombardment,” says the Puerto Rico Gazette, “but 
in practice the custom prevails among all civilized nations to give 
notice of the bombardment of a city or fortification. For no Christian 
soldier, no civilized nation, will want to take the terrible responsibility 
of butchering defenseless women and children. The soldier fights 
against those who carry weapons, but not against the weak and the 
sick.” The Spanish are not entirely wrong in this. A real surprise 
could have been of advantage to Admiral Sampson only in case it had 
been his intention to force the harbor. If it was simply a question of 
reconnoissance, he might have granted a delay of two or three hours 
without in any manner prejudicing the result of the bombardment. 
As it was, the inhabitants were rudely awakened from their sleep. 
The troops and volunteers at once hurried to their posts; but old men, 
women, and children sought their safety in the fields and roads outside 
of the city. <A veritable emigration of fleeing people was moving 
along the road to Cangrejos, but all were quiet and orderly. Mean- . 
while the American projectiles were steadily falling upon the city and 
its vicinity; some passed over the city and fell into the bay. 

13. The American squadron was composed of nine larger ships and 
two torpedo-boat destroyers. Fire was opened immediately after 5 
o'clock and continued until about 8.30. Four of the American ships 
were about two cable lengths (370 meters) north of the island of 
Cabras (see accompanying chart), and at equal distances from each 
other they were describing circles. In order to safely avoid the shal- 
low places near the island, which they passed at a short distance, a 
boat had been anchored in the center of the circle. They came to 
within 1,500 meters of the Morro, and as each ship passed the cas- 
tle she fired a broadside. Five of the American ships were fighting 
farther north with Cristobal Castle and the eastern batteries of Morro 
Castle. These ships often changed their positions. ‘Two more ships 
could be discerned northeast of Santiago. Several of the American 
ships succeeded in passing so close to the fortifications that the near- 
est batteries could not fire upon them. The distance was probably 
800 or 900 meters. The Spanish infantry took advantage of the 
opportunity to join in the battle with musket fire. This musket fire, 


14 


in connection with the fire of a battery at a greater distance, caused 
the American ships to withdraw. It is said that the Americans fired 
in all from 800 to 1,000 shots from their heavy and medium caliber 
guns. 

14. The Spanish fortification artillery is said to have behaved well; 
but the batteries were unable to answer the lively fire of the American 
ships in the same manner. This was due to the fact, aside from the 
defective service of the guns, that many of them could not reach the 
American ships at all. On the Spanish side about 400 projectiles 
were fired in all. It is stated that the Spanish shots hit in several 
instances; but they can have done no great damage on board of the 
American ships, which has been confirmed by United States official 
statements. The guns in the fortifications are all of medium caliber, 
and their piercing power is not such that a single hit could be 
expected to cause serious injury to a modern ship. The losses on 
the American side were one dead and seven wounded. The number 
of American projectiles fired is out of proportion to the material 
damage caused by them. A large number of shells are said not to 
have exploded. Of course the fortification works were injured to some 
extent, but not one of the guns was put out of action. A few of the 
buildings visible at a great distance, like the barracks, the jail, the 
Hotel Inglaterra, and a few private residences, suffered from the 
bombardment. A large number of projectiles fell into the harbor. 
Some of them even reached the little town of Catafio, on the other side 
of the harbor. The French cruiser Amiral Rigault de Genouilly, 
which was lying in the harbor at the time, as also three small Spanish 
gunboats, receivea a shot in the rigging and smokepipe. The 
_ Spanish casualties were 20 dead (among them several civilians) and 
20 wounded. 

15. If we inquire into the advantages which Admiral Sampson 
expected from a bombardment of San Juan, we are probably not mis- 
taken in the assumption that it was merely a question of reconnois- 
sance. The batteries were to be brought out; Admiral Sampson 
wanted to ascertain their strength and efficiency and be guided 
thereby in determining the forces it would require for a serious bom- 
bardment of San Juan and the taking of the city by sea. It does 
not appear to have been the object of the American ships to system- 
atically bombard the city and silence the batteries. Probably the 
forts served as a general target,:and the number of shots that went 
beyond speak in favor of the assumption that it was also intended to 
reach the Spanish war ships which were supposed to be in the harbor. 
There will be other opportunities to treat of bombardments by Amer- 
ican ships. I will therefore refrain from further remarks at this time, 
and only state it as my opinion that a reconnoissance of the place— 
and there can be no question of anything else, since the American 
fleet withdrew— could have been made with a much smaller expendi- 
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THE NORRIS PETERS CO, PHOTO-LITHO., WASHINGTON, O C, 


15 
IV. EVENTS AT AND NEAR SANTIAGO DE CUBA. 


I will not attempt to give a connected account of all the happen- 
ings at and near Santiago and to set forth the reasons which inev- 
itably led to the surrender of that place, but will confine myself to 
the relation of some circumstances which are not generally known, 
and which have come under my own observation. 

1. There is a great deal of uncertainty as to the reasons why the 
garrisons of Guantanamo, Baracoa, etc., were included in the capitu- 
_lation of Santiago. The following note of the Spanish chief of the 
general staff will serve to explain this matter. He says, among 
other things: 

The garrison of Guantanamo, consisting of 7,000 men, had been on half rations 
since June 15 and since July 1 they had received no rations at all, and had been 
living on green corn and horse meat. The garrisons of Baracoa, Sagua de Tanamo, 
as well as of the smaller places of Palma Soriano, San Luis, Dos Caminos, Moron, 
Cristo, and Sbngo would have been cut off and unable to retreat, and would there- 
fore have been left to the mercy of the enemy, for the nearest place on which they 
could have fallen back was at least a seven days’ march distant. That is the reason 
why these garrisons were included in the capitulation, and that of Guantanamo was 
included on account of the absolute lack of provisions. Hence about 10,000 men 
capitulated without having been at the front at all, simply owing to the peculiar 
circumstances. 

2. In order to give a clear idea of the land fortifications of San- 
tiago, which were considerably exaggerated in the first reports of the 
battles near the city, I annex a sketch of the same. 

There was a line of ordinary trenches @bout 9 kilometers long 
from Dos Caminos del Cobre to Punta Blanea. I also noticed two 
batteries, but they were in such unfavorable positions that they could 
not take part in the battles of July 1 and 3. There were also wire 
fences and other obstructions in some places, as well as blockhouses, 
ete. The following data will show how few were the guns and of 
how inferior quality the material which the Spanish had at their dis- 
posal for the defense of the city. There were available— 

Six 16-centimeter muzzle-loading guns, two of which became dis- 
abled after the first few shots, two more on July 12. It was known 
beforehand that these guns would not be able to fire more than a few 
rounds, owing to their defective mounts. 

Five 12-centimeter muzzle-loading guns mounted on old carriages. 
On July 12 four of these were disabled, and the fifth was good for 
only two or three more rounds, although the charge had been reduced 
by one-half. 

Twelve 8-centimeter muzzle-loaders, six of which were unservice- 
able. 

Two 9-centimeter Krupp guns, one of which was dismounted and 
consequently disabled on July 2. 

Two 7.5-centimeter Krupp guns. 


16 


Besides these, the fleet had furnished two 9-centimeter Hontoria 
steel guns with a few rounds, which were not fired, and two 7.5-centi- 
meter Maxim guns, which could not be mounted, because the breech 
mechanism had remained on board of the ships. 

Therefore, aside from the muzzle-loaders, which were of very doubt- 
ful value, the Spanish had only two 7.5-centimeter and two 9-centi- 
meter Krupp guns. Whether the former were given a chance to be 
fired at all is doubtful; probably the two 9-centimeter guns were the 
only ones that took part in the battles of July 1 and 3. It is evident 
that with such defective artillery for the defense on land there was 
no chance in a fight with the American siege artillery, which by July 
10, according to statements of American officers, consisted of 34 guns 
that had been installed. 

3. As to the strength of the Spanish troops in the line of attack, we 
have the following data: 

On July 1 there were in the trenches 500 sailors from the fleet; 450 
men of four companies of the Provincial Battalion of Puerto Rico, No. 
1; 850 of the Talavera Battalion, No. 4; 440 of the San Fernando 
Battalion, No. 11; 350 of three mobilized companies; 350 volunteers. 
In all—Sailors, 500; regulars, 1,740; irregulars, 350; volunteers, 350; 
total, 2,940. 

These were the fighting forces. Besides, there were in the city some 
cavalry of the Civil Guard and some soldiers who had been assigned 
to other duties. Of these troops, two companies, one of the Provin- 
cial Battalion of Puerto Rico and one of the Talavera Battalion, in all 
not over 250 men, were defending the fortified position of San Juan. 
At the Socapa there were 400 men, 450 at the Morro, and 120 at Punta 
Gorda battery. Finally, for the defense of the line from Las Cruces 
to Aguadores, about 4 kilometers, there were six companies of the 
Cuba regiment of infantry and two companies of irregulars, in all 
about 550 men. 

4. The battles of July 1 and 3 at El Caney and San Juan are the 
only ones of importance in the campaign against Santiago. The 
above figures show that those two positions had very inadequate 
forces for their defense. It is incomprehensible why the Spanish 
commander in chief, after the American troops had arrived and their 
plan of attack was known, did not at least have the troops from 
Morro Castle and the Socapa, where they were of no use whatever, 
cooperate in the defense of the threatened positions in the main line. 
To hold El Caney and San Juan as against the vastly superior Ameri- 
can forces was an impossibility, although the positions were particu- 
larly well chosen and the ground very difficult for the assailants. 
With the same daring with which the American troops made the last 
assault on these positions, the Spanish defended them firmly and with 
coolness, firing one volley after another. On the spot they were to 


17 


defend, officers and men fell in great numbers, with that courage 
which has ever distinguished the Spanish soldiers. When the Ameri- 
cans finally succeeded in the assault, they found the trenches of San 
Juan filled with dead, and they buried the brave Spanish soldiers 
where they had fallen by simply filling up the trenches with earth. 
The total losses of the Spanish during the defense of El Caney and 
the attack on the city were: 

Killed—Brig. Gen. Vara del Rey, 3 staff officers, 12 officers, and 68 
men. Missing—Col. Jose Baquero, 4 officers, and 116 men. Prison- 
ers—2 officers. Wounded—Lieutenant-General Linares, 6 staff offi- 
cers, 30 officers, and 339 men. 

On July 4 Colonel Escario succeeded in reaching Santiago with 
3,000 men. But these troops were exhausted from the march, and 
the city had no provisions for them. It was therefore no wonder that 
the power of resistance of the garrison was not strengthened by their 
arrival, and that the Spanish, in view of the bombardment which they 
could not answer, had no recourse left but to capitulate honorably. 

5. An unlucky star was hovering over Santiago. No one had 
expected an attack on this city, and the events there are another 
proof that in war it is the unexpected and surprising operations, if 
well planned and somewhat favored by luck, that usually promise 
success. The Spanish troops were surely not wanting in bravery and 
good behavior. The cause of the defeat must therefore be sought 
elsewhere, and in my opinion it can be explained as follows: 

(a) No thought had been taken of supplying the large cities with 
provisions. If not sooner, at least immediately after the breaking 
out of the war, the commander in chief ought to have assisted these 
places in the most energetic manner in laying in supplies, and where 
no blockade had been declared it could have been done. 

(b) It was the plan of the Spanish commander to defend the whole 
- coast, even the smaller harbors. This necessitated a scattering of the 
troops. If it was not deemed expedient to concentrate all the troops 
at Havana, the one truly fortified place, which maneuver would 
have completely changed the character of the war in Cuba, a concen- 
tration of the troops should have been effected at least within the 
eastern province as well as the western province. Why was it that 
Guantanamo was garrisoned by about 7,000 men, Santiago de Cuba 
by 5,000, and Manzanillo by 5,000, and that at a time when Cervera’s 
fleet had already entered Santiago Harbor? On May 28 at the latest, 
when the fleet had been closed in and there could no longer be any 
doubt as to the American plans, the troops should have been concen- 
trated at Santiago, bringing with them all available provisions. The 
Americans might have taken Guantanamo and Manzanillo. That 
would have been of little importance from a technical point of view. 
The American troops would have met with energetic resistance upon 


12483 2 





18 


landing and in their attack upon Santiago, and it is questionable 
whether they would have been able to break such resistance with 
17,000 men. 

(c) The Spanish troops had no field artillery, and their siege artillery 
was utterly unserviceable. It is due to this lack of artillery that the 
Americans were enabled to line up their forces without opposition 
from the Spanish; that they showed themselves superior to the Spanish, 
not in number only, in the fights against the fortified positions at El 
Caney and San Juan; and finally, that they were able to place their 
siege artillery in position without being harassed by the Spanish. 

6. It now remains to speak of the manner in which the navy and 
army of both belligerent parties cooperated in joint operations, and 
finally, to examine minutely into the bombardments of the batteries 
of Morro Castle, the Socapa, and Punta Gorda. The destruction of 
Cervera’s fleet will be treated in a separate chapter. Of course, in 
expeditions of this nature it is always the navy that furnishes the 
basis. If the control of the sea has been gained, but can not be pre- 
served, the transport and landing of troops are dangerous enterprises, 
which a wise commander will always avoid. Success is also dependent 
on a strong and well-equipped transport and war fleet. This should 
be borne in mind by all nations that are engaged in colonial polities 
and are in possession of colonies, in order to secure new markets for 
the surplus production of men and merchandise. Of course the army, 
as the organ which is to execute the work, should be equal to the 
requirements made of itina foreign country. But there is still another 
factor which plays an important part in such expeditions, and which 
should not be underestimated, and that is the cooperation of the navy 
and army. This factor has been lacking, not only on the American 
but also on the Spanish side. On the American side there was at 
least some agreement on important tactical questions and the navy 
placed itself willingly at the service of the army. But on the Spanish 
side the conditions were so peculiar that a cooperation of navy and 
army can hardly be spoken of, except in so far as marine troops took 
part in the battles at Santiago. Was Admiral Cervera under orders of 
General Linares or General Toral, or under Captain-General Blanco, 
or directly under the ministry of marine at Madrid? The first does 
not appear to have been the case, but it seems that Admiral Cervera 
received orders both from General Blanco and from the ministry of 
marine. Another example: The general de marina at San Juan de 
Puerto Rico was in command of the flotilla at that place; he was not 
under orders of Governor-General Macias, however, but under those 
of Admiral Manterola, at Havana. I believe this question, which 
has hitherto been given little attention, had an essential share in seal- 
ing Admiral Cervera’s fate. The cooperation of the navy and army 
is of the greatest importance, and at the great maneuvers in time of 
peace it should receive the same attention that other problems do. 


19 


7. The American fleet has in every respect performed its tasks in 
front of Santiago. The transport fleet was convoyed to the places 
chosen by war ships, and the landings were effected under the same 
protection. A systematic blockade had been established, and in this 
connection the main object, namely, the destruction of Cervera’s fleet, 
was never lost sight of. Thanks to the intelligent dispositions of the 
commander in chief of the fleet and the skill of the American officers 
and crews, this object was attained with complete success. Inci- 
dentally the batteries of the Morro, Socapa, and Punta Gorda were 
bombarded by the American fleet, and these bombardments offer so 
much that is of interest and so many points of discussion for naval 
officers that I shall have to speak of them somewhat more at length. 
How much has been said of these bombardments! How many times 
have the batteries of the Morro and Socapa been placed out of action, 
the guns dismounted, the fortifications leveled to the ground! Bat- 
teries which did not even exist, as, for instance, Morro Castle p1oper 
and Estrella Battery, were said to have returned the galling fire, the 
latter completely destroyed, the former nothing but a heap of ruins! 
Such were the newspaper reports, of the inaccuracy of which I had an 
opportunity of convincing myself personally on the scene of events. 
Unfortunately, I am not in a position to state which of the American 
ships did the firing, nor how many projectiles were discharged in the 
different bombardments, nor the kind of projectiles and the results 
as to hits. But on the other hand I can give from personal observa- 
tion accurate statements as to the condition of the Spanish batteries 
after the surrender of Santiago, and aS my own observations have 
been supplemented by reliable information from others who were also 
on the scene, I am enabled to furnish sufficient material to permit an 
estimate of the actual conditions. 

8. On the different days when the bombardments took place the 
following guns were available in the different batteries of the Morro, 
Socapa, and Punta Gorda: 


























Bombardment. Date. Morro. Socapa. Punta Gorda. 
IN le .Qeboseecoeee May 18| One 16 cm. muzzle-| Two 8 cm. muzzle-| Two 15 cm. Hontoria 
loader mounted on loaders. howitzers, muzzle- 
a wooden carriage; loaders. 
could fire only 38 
shots. 
INOnoM mech e ces. ce. May 31 | Same and four 16cm. | One 16 cm. Hontoria Do. 
muzzle-loaders naval gun not yet 
mounted on car- ready for service. 
riages. 
(NOcGemeeee a sss. --. DUNC wor ese Ove aces ceniteace ac One 16cm. Hontoria. .. Do. 
IN ON SEE aa Spin'n <- = OMIT ee G3) ara ast OU RApe sas Sebo aee Same and one 16 cm.| Same and one 16 cm. 
Hontoria naval gun. Hontoria naval gun. 
INO Deere re rs ceess June 14 |....- 1 RE es Sener baer GO) oes Cee SRE Do. 
PS ee Ene VuUNe 1G We. . c DD ceansaakeeucecs ee a. CO a Marecesaeeeeey Same and one 16 cm. 
Hontoria naval gun. 
IN OR) cee winae. cers >: PUNO LS Ie ..2 OG ewan aaa teen Same and two 21 cm. Do. 
muzzle-loading how- 
itzers. 
EN One sais eee oon 2 -- July 2] Same and two 21 cm.| Same and one 21 cm. Do. 


muzzle-loading how- 
itzers. 


muzzle-loading how- 
itzer. 





20 


Hence, on July 2 there were in all— 

In the Morro battery: Five rifled 16-centimeter muzzle-loading 
bronze guns, only one of which was dismounted, and two 21-centi- 
meter muzzle-loading howitzers which were fired on that day only. . 

At the Socapa battery: Two 16-centimeter Hontoria naval guns 
from the Reina Mercedes. Only one of these was dismounted. Fur- 
ther, three 21-centimeter muzzle-loading howitzers. East of this bat- 
. tery, on the extreme edge of the shore, there were for the defense of 
the first row of mines, one 5.7-centimeter Nordenfeldt rapid-firing gun, 
four 3.7-centimeter Hotchkiss revolving guns, and one 1.1-centimeter 
Nordenfeldt machine gun, all taken from the Reina Mercedes. 

At Punta Gorda: Two 9-centimeter bronze Krupp guns, two 15- 
centimeter howitzers, and two 16-centimeter Hontoria naval guns 
from the Reina Mercedes. 

9. About three weeks after the surrender of Santiago, I visited 
these batteries and made the following observations: 


MORRO. 


(a) Morro Castle proper, an old fort, consisting of heavy masonry 
standing close to the water’s edge east of the harbor entrance, was 
not armed at all. It was used as barracks for the Spanish garrison. 
The outside walls had suffered considerably from the bombardments, 
the upper story had been completely destroyed, and in different 
places pieces had been shot away. The inner walls showed large and 
small shot-holes made by shells of different calibers, the largest of 30 
centimeters. 

(b) From the houses between the castle and the light-house, about 
200 meters distant, nothing had been removed. Some of them had 
been completely destroyed, others more or less damaged. The houses 
situated alittle farther back and lower down had suffered no inju- 
ries. The light-house, built of iron plates about 2.5 centimeters 
thick, had been pierced at the front by several small-caliber shells, 
the largest being of 15 centimeters. The rear wall had been blown 
out entirely. 

(c) About 100 meters east of the light-house is the new battery, sit- 
uated about 63 meters above the level of the sea. The following is a 
ground plan of this battery: 


1eaabrnap 





The guns are standing on concrete foundations built into the ground 
and fire over a wall erected for protection in front of them, consisting 


21 


of wooden boxes filled with cement. This protection is’ further 
strengthened by sandbags placed in front of it. Between each two 
guns wooden barrels filled with cement have been placed on top of 
the wall. The spaces between them are partly filled with cement or 
sand. The cross section between two foundations is about as follows: 


falas OE FS 
WY WWW: 


a, Cement boxes; b, barrels filled with cement; c, sandbags. 


The distance between each two guns is about 6 meters. 

(dq) Parallel with the front of the battery, at a distance of about 
10 meters, a trench 1.5 meters deep and 60 centimeters wide has been 
dug. A smaller trench leads in zigzag line from each gun to this 
trench. For the two 2l-centimeter howitzers, which were located 
farthest east and separated by a larger space from the 16-centimeter 
muzzle-loaders, there was a hole about 1.5 meters deep and 4 meters 
square, intended as a shelter. These shelters are said to have been 
frequently used by the Spanish. 

(e) The five 16-centimeter muzzle-loaders are bronze guns dating 
from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. One of these bore 
the dates 1668, 1718, 1769. About the middle of the present century 
these guns were adapted for centering by means of studs. The two 
21-centimeter howitzers farthest east were rifled iron muzzle-loaders. 

(f) All of these seven guns were mounted on iron sliding carriages 
with front pivots, turning on rails built into the concrete. As recoil 
checks, small iron plates were used which, at the rear of the top car- 
riage, were pressed firmly against the compressor bars by means of 
an ordinary pivot screw. For indirect elevation of the guns there 
was an ordinary graduated disk with a hand. There was no sight 
scale on the graduated are of the carriage. All the guns were 
adapted to be trained directly. When the Americans took possession 
of the battery they- did not find any tangent scales, but the American 
chief of the battery stated that they had been there. 

(g) Near some of the guns cartridges were lying about. A few 
feet west of the right-wing gun and a little to the rear was an 
uncovered pile of projectiles for the 16-centimeter guns. _ They were 
iron projectiles, with centering studs. The point, which was spheri- 
eal in shape, contained a perforation for the fuse which had been 
stopped up with cotton waste. The fuses themselves could not be 
found. Near this pile of projectiles stood several cartridge boxes. 
Judging from the cartridge-bag material lying about and the powder 
seattered around it may be assumed that the cartridges were being 
made right there. 


22 


(h) In the battery itself only minor injuries could be noted. The 
right-wing gun had been upset by a shell, but none of the other guns 
nor the cement protection had received any injuries. A few pro- 
jectiles had struck into the ground in front of the sand bags and 
destroyed a few of them. Back of the battery was lying an Ameri- 
ean 20-centimeter shell, which had not been exploded. ‘The base 
fuse had been removed. 


SOCAPA. 


(i) The new battery erected here is located, like that at the Morro, 
on the highest point of the ridge, about 400 meters west of the 
entrance. 

(k) The five guns installed here are in a straight line—the three 
°1-centimeter howitzers in the left wing and the two 16-centimeter 
Hontoria naval guns in the right wing. The composition of the 
battery is about the same as that at the Morro, except that there are 
no barrels on top of the cement boxes at the 16-centimeter guns, 
probably so as not to restrict the arc of fire of these guns and because 
they are protected by a 3-centimeter shield. Immediately back of 
the guns is a trench of little depth connecting the gun positions with 
each other. The 16-centimeter guns are separated from the howitzers 
by a broad traverse. 

(1) The 21-centimeter howitzers are like those at the Morro. The 
two 16-centimeter Hontoria guns were taken from the Reina Mer- 
cedes. They are long guns of modern construction on central pivot 
mounts, but not rapid-fire guns. The pivot sockets are built into 
the concrete foundation. These guns could probably not be fired 
oftener than once in two minutes. 

(m) About 20 meters back of the guns was a frame house with 
sheet-iron roof, built partly into the ground, and protected toward the 
sea by a small embankment of earth. This was an ammunition 
magazine for the battery. It still contained a number of 16-centi- 
meter projectiles with the necessary cartridges and powder boxes. 
The place was little suitable for an ammunition magazine, and it is a 
wonder that it was not hit. 

(n) Evidently the Americans fired more sharply at this battery 
than at the Morro battery, probably because it contained the only 
modern guns whose effects were to be feared. . 

One of the howitzers had received a hit of small caliber in the left 
side of the top carriage, but without placing the gun out of action. 
The shield of one of the 16-centimeter guns had been pierced from 
below by a 15-centimeter projectile, and the carriage had also been 
injured, so that the gun became unserviceable. No other damages 
are noticeable in the guns, but at different places shots had passed 
immediately in front of the guns and hit the gun protections and 
sandbags. 


23 


PUNTA GORDA BATTERY. 


(0) This battery was not fired upon by the Americans, although it 
took part in the firing on several occasions. 


10. According to the above, the final result of the numerous bom- 
bardments was but one gun placed out of action in the Morro and one 
in the Socapa battery. The loss in human life was a few killed and 
wounded. Punta Gorda battery, the only important position in a 
question of forcing the harbor entrance, remained uninjured. As I 
have already said, I am unable to state the total number of project- 
iles which the American ships fired in’ order to attain this modest 
result. In any event, the number is out of proportion to the result, 
and has proved once more a fact well established by the history of 
naval wars, namely, that coast fortifications are extremely difficult to 
place out of action, even with an expenditure of large quantities of 
ammunition. The American method of firing may perhaps be suscep- 
tible of improvement—that is not for me to say. But‘the American 
naval officers may take comfort in the thought that other seafaring 
nations would not have done any better in their place—perhaps not 
so well; for no navy, with the exception of the French, has made it a 
point in time of peace to make the bombardment of coast fortifica- 
tions, fortified cities, ete., the subject of thorough, practical study. 

11. As for the fire of the Spanish batteries, I have read of but one 
case where a Spanish projectile hit an American ship. It was:in a 
fight with the Socapa battery that the battleship Texas received a hit, 
probably from one of the 16-centimeter guns taken from the Reina 
Mercedes. The projectile struck the port side about 20 feet abaft the 
bow and exploded, after passing through a stanchion between decks 
killing one man and wounding six. The American officer who took 
charge of the battery at Morro Castle also told me the following amus- 
ing incident: There was a bombardment of the Morro battery at night, 
and one of the American ships was throwing her search light on the 
battery. The Spanish answered the fire part of the time. The ship 
with the search light was not hit, but the battleship Jowa, lying quite 
a distance away in the dark, was unexpectedly struck by an acci- 
dental hit from one of the Spanish howitzers. The projectile passed 
through the deck, entered the officers’ mess-room, exploded there, and 
caused some minor damages to the rooms; but none of the crew were 
hit. But what more could be expected of the kind of guns the Span- 
ish had at their disposal? It must surely have given the American 
officers who took charge of the battery a slight shock when they saw 
the dates 1668, 1718, ete., on the guns which they had been fight- 
ing. Part of the mediwval howitzers still had charges in them when 
the American officer took possession of the Morro battery. He there- 
fore decided to fire them, which gave him an opportunity of estab- 
lishing the fact that even with the greatest elevation the range was 


24 


only 800 yards! It is possible that the cartridges had suffered from 
humidity; but, on the other hand, it is quite as probable that this 
was really their greatest range. One thousand meters was not a bad 
performance for guns of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
No wonder that the Spanish could not reach the hostile ships with 
these guns! This will also explain why the Spanish garrisons, seeing 
the uselessness of their efforts, often stopped firing during the bom- 
bardments and withdrew to the trenches. It was on these occasions — 
that the newspaper reports stated that the batteries had been silenced, 
when, as a matter of fact, they were uninjured and in condition to 
resume their ‘‘ unbloody work” at any time. 

12. But now another question. Did the American fleet really allow 
itself to be deceived by these batteries? In the beginning, perhaps. 
And why not? Ido not hesitate to acknowledge that I had the same 
experience, together with several other officers. When we inquired 
into the nature of the batteries, we had no idea of the venerable age 
of those guns, but set them down as 12 and 16 centimeter guns. It is 
true that we did not go through a fight with the batteries, and that 
is the essential factor for estimating their efficiency. From observa- 
tions made at the Spanish batteries I judge, as already stated, that 
the Soecapa battery was the main objective of the Americans. They 
seem to have known that the only serviceable guns, namely, the 16- 
centimeter Hontoria guns from the Reina Mercedes, had been set up 
there; but Morro battery, too, was fired upon quite a number of times. 
Would the Americans have done this if they had known what miser- 
able guns their enemies had? Hardly. So there can be no doubt that 
in the beginning at least the Americans were deceived as to the 
strength of the foe, whom they overestimated, as is usually the case 
in war. Moreover, there was no occasion for the American com- 
mander of the fleet, even if the Spanish batteries had been recognized 
as efficient and dangerous, to attack them under prevailing cireum- 
stanees. If the harbor entrance was to be forced, neither the Morro 
nor the Socapa battery need have been considered, because they could 
not sweep the narrow entrance with their guns. The Punta Gorda 
battery was the only one that controlled the entrance, and owing to 
the great distance andthe difficulty of observing the fire, it was almost 
impossible to place this battery out of action from the sea. Then, why 
the bombardments of the batteries and the immense expenditure of 
ammunition, especially since the American commander in chief did 
not intend to force the entrance, but on the contrary was desirous of 
obstructing it, as is plainly shown by Hobson’s attempt? A simple 
blockade, without any further attack on the fortifications, would 
have had exactly the same result. I can not possibly believe that 
the American commander in chief had nothing more in view than to 
harass the enemy by the numerous bombardments and reassure the 
home press. My idea is that Admiral Sampson, as a practical and 


“a 


25 


experienced gunner, had a very definite object in view in these bom- 
bardments. I have no proofs to offer in support of this assumption, 
but I have an idea that there is something in it. After the batteries 
had been brought out all the subsequent bombardments were nothing 
more or less than target practice. The admiral wanted to accustom 
his officers and men to sharp firing. The whole crews were made to 
practice at regular intervals—the commanders in the manner of 
handling their ships, the officers in conducting and superintending 
the firing, the gun captains in training and aiming, the gun and ammu- 
nition crews in serving the guns and passing the ammunition, and all 
these under conditions of actual war, in fights with coast batteries. 
When the decisive day arrived—the battle on the high sea, ship 
against ship—the American fleet was well prepared and able to 
achieve its task in a brilliant manner and in the shortest possible 
time. 

13. Whether I am right or wrong in this assumption, whether it 
was a question of actual bombardments or of target practice, the 
final result remains the same. Even at target practice each one fires 
as well as he can. Therefore we are still confronted with the fact 
that the coast fortifications, in spite of vastly superior naval artillery 
and the expenditure of immense quantities of ammunition, were not 
placed out of action. What lessons are we to derive from this? 

Aside from the forcing of harbor entrances, where the assailant 
must eventually expose himself for a short time to the hostile fire, 
cases may arise in war where it becomes necessary prior to such fore- 
ing, or for other reasons, to destroy certain forts. The history of war 
teaches us that this is one of the most difficult problems. It should 
therefore be made a subject of study in time of peace, the same 
as any other problem. Of the necessity of studying tactics and 
strategy and their practical application, everyone is convinced, from 
the commander in chief to the youngest lieutenant. Immense sums 
are being expended for coal alone in order to have the ships of the 
fleet pass through all manner of evolutions in tactics and strategic 
maneuvers. Money should also be devoted to target practice under 
exactly the same conditions as in actual war. For what is it that 
decides a naval battle? The tacties of the commander in chief of the 
fleet and the commanders of the different ships are certainly of some 
influence on the battle, but nothing more. The decision will always 
be dependent on the good training of officers and men for the fight 
and the good firing of gun captains and officers. That is what the 
naval battle of Santiago has once more plainly demonstrated. 


V. THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA AND CIENFUEGOS. 


1. Immediately after the rejection of the Union’s ultimatum by 
Spain, and the breaking off of diplomatic relations between the two 
nations, Havana was blockaded, and later Cienfuegos. 


26 


On our way to Havana, about the middle of May, we met in the 
Yucatan Channel the first American war ships. They were a cruiser 
of the Raleigh class and a torpedo cruiser. The former, painted dark 
gray and stripped for service, having only a signal yard at the fore- 
topmast, being in all other respects cleared for action, made a good 
appearance. A large number of the crew were standing on the upper 
deck and near the guns, curiously eying the foreigner who had entered 
the line of blockade. After the exchange of a few signals as to name, 
place of departure, and destination, we resumed our course for 
Uavana. The next morning (May 17), through the veil of mist cov- 
ering the shore, we had a first glimpse of the mountain at Mariel, which, 
by its peculiar shape, affords the sailor an excellent point of bearing. 
A heavy fog was still enveloping Havana, and was not dispersed 
until the sun rose higher in the cloudless blue sky. The first object 
that met our eyes was the old castle of the Morro, with the red and 
yellow Spanish flag waving proudly in the wind. We eould dis- 
tinguish the high light-house to the left of the entrance, and adjoining 
it a huge mass of stone walls and fortifications. Havana from the 
sea forms a singularly beautiful picture; but this was a time of war, 
and our eyes, after gazing admiringly on the magnificent panorama, 
turned, as though instinctively guided by the military spirit, to the 
long rows of fortifications visible close to the shore at the Vedado, 
indistinctly at first, then more and more sharply. There was much 
to be seen. During the short moments while we were passing by, we 
had to observe carefully in order to gain at least an approximate idea 
of the value and strength of the forts. The whole line of fortifica- 
tions at the Vedado appeared to have been recently constructed. At 
Santa Clara and La Reina workmen could be seen strengthening and 
changing the original batteries. To the left of the harbor entrance, 
also, we could see two or three newly erected batteries extending as 
far as Cochima (Cojimar ?). 

The American blockading vessels remained at a considerable dis- 
tance and were apparently composed of only a few gunboats of the 
Annapolis class and auxiliary cruisers (small steamers or yachts armed 
with a few rapid-fire guns). We were slowly approaching the harbor 
entrance, and with the assistance of a pilot entered the harbor, 
passing through the mine obstruction and the channel, which was 
literally lined with guns, though mostly of old designs. Great num- 
bers of people, mostly soldiers and workmen, were crowding both 
sides of the entrance. Silently they were staring at our ship, and 
the same dismal silence also prevailed in the harbor itself. The 
beautiful wharves for loading and unloading steamers were empty. 
Only a number of workmen out of employment were sitting or lying 
around. Afew boats weremoving aboutintheharbor. All the others, 
as well as the larger sailing vessels which in time of peace are engaged 
in coasting trade, were at anchor in the inner harbor. ‘The coal 


27 


depots at the other side of the harbor contained immense supplies, 
but at the quays and coaling piers, which are the busiest places in 
normal times, there was not a single vessel to be seen. Finally, 
when we entered the harbor proper, we saw a few Spanish warships— 
the cruiser Alfonso XII, torpedo gunboats Marques de la Hnsenada, 
Nueva Espafia, Conde de Venadito, and a number of smaller gun- 
boats. These ships, also painted gray, stripped for service and 
cleared for action, made at a first glance a very good appearance, 
especially the large cruiser; but a second glance through glasses 
sufficed to convince us that the large cruiser, Alfonso XJIJ, had no 
large guns on board, which caused us to infer that on the inside also 
everything was not as it should be (and, indeed, it appeared subse- 
quently that the boilers were unserviceable). Close to the Alfonso 
XII thewreck of the Maine could be seen above the water, furnishing 
the key, so to speak, to the strange changes which Havana had under- 
gone in such a short time, the warlike preparations of the garrison 
on the forts outside, the stillness of the harbor, the inactivity of the 
population, and the appearance of the Spanish warships cleared for 
action. 

2. A walk through the streets of the city revealed the usual every- 
day life. Of course the traffic was not as great as in time of peace. 
The wealthier families—Cubans and Spaniards as well as foreign- 
ers—had left Havana in large numbers. Many beautiful houses, the 
former residences of these families, were now standing empty. Beg- 
gars were lying about in front of the church doors and in the main 
Streets, among them women with half-starved little children, but not 
in very large numbers. Many a coin was dropped into their out- 
stretched hands by the passers-by; but there was nothing to indicate 
at that time that the blockade had entailed serious results for the 
poorer population. Many stores in the principal streets were open, 
but in the majority of cases the clerks were taking it easy, either in 
the store or in front of it. The restaurants and cafes, on the con- 
trary, were enjoying good patronage. The prices, of course, were 
higher than usual, but not extravagant; and for good pay, good din- 
ners could be had in these restaurants. Meat was, on an average, 
1.50 marks (37 cents) a pound. Eggs were particularly expensive. 
The general opinion was that there were sufficient provisions in the 
city to sustain the blockade for some length of time; but what was to 
become of the poorer class of the population in that event was a 
problem. At the restaurants the large number of uniforms was strik- 
ing. ‘They were worn by the volunteers, who were represented at the 
capital in particularly large numbers. A special guard of honor of 
volunteers had been ordered for Captain-General Blanco, and they 
had taken charge of the guard service at the palace. As for the mil- 
itary qualities of these hakf soldiers, they were probably not of a high 
character, for proper training and drilling were lacking here as well as 


28 


in Puerto Rico. From the city I went to the seashore and took a look 
at the fortifications, especially Santa Clara and La Reina, and I 
could not help admiring the energy and zeal of the Spanish. Every- 
where the greatest activity prevailed. From early until late work 
was going on at the fortifications. The old forts were being strength- 
ened by earthworks and heavy guns mounted at Santa Clara. In 
some of the forts volunteers could be seen practicing at the guns until 
late at night; other divisions of volunteers had gathered for instruc- 
tion; feverish activity everywhere, from the private to the officer and 
-Captain-General. The latter frequently visited the forts and inspected 
personally the progress of the work. But in view of all this energy 
one may well ask, Was there not too much to be made up that had 
been neglected in time of peace? It is not possible to make soldiers, 
especially accurate and cool-headed marksmen, in a few weeks or 
months. That can only be done by constant practical training under 
able officers in time of peace. 

3. On May 14 the Spanish gunboats Conde de Venadito and Nueva ~ 
Espana had made an attack on the American blockading vessels, and 
as this is the only instance of initiative on the part of the Spanish 
ships at Havana, I will give an account of it. The Conde de Venadito 
is one of the older cruisers, of 1,200 tons displacement, launched in 
1888, having a speed of 12 knots, armed with four 12-centimeter guns 
and afew light rapid-fire guns. The Nueva L’spanais a torpedo gunboat 
of 600 tons, armed with two 12-centimeter guns and a few light rapid- 
fire guns, reputed to have a speed of 18 knots, but in reality she 
would probably not make more than 14 knots. The 12-centimeter 
Hontoria guns were installed behind shields. According to the state- 
ment of a Spanish officer, these could be fired not oftener than once in 
five minutes. No target practice had taken place. The Nueva 
Espana had fired the first shot at an American war ship. Her torpedo 
armament consists of four Schwartzkopff torpedoes of the older type, 
with small explosive charge (about 25 kilograms), and two torpedo 
tubes. No regular exercises in torpedo launching had taken place. 
Both vessels have a great deal of woodwork. On the forward conning 
bridge is a saloon with heavy wood wainscoting, tables, chairs, ete., 
none of which had been removed for the fight. Both ships went out 
to sea at 5 o’clock p. m., followed at some distance by two small tugs. 
The blockading line was quite a distance from the shore, and it was 
about an hour before the engagement commenced. Five American 
vessels, probably only gunboats and auxiliary cruisers, were soon 
surrounding the Spanish ships, so that the latter could use their guns on 
both sides. The vessels approached to within 8 kilometers. A suc- 
cessful hit from the Spanish is said to have caused the American 
ships to retreat, but owiny to the darkness the Spanish ships did not 
dare follow them, and returned to Havana at 8.30 p. m. without havy- 
ing been hit once. This was not very much of a success, and does 


29 


not appear to have raised the spirit of the Spanish ; for, even after the 
harbor flotilla had been reenforced by the cruiser Infanta Isabel, it 
never again attempted an attack on the American ships, either at 
night or in daytime. That does not speak very highly for the initia- 
tive and spirit of enterprise on the part of the Spanish naval officers, 
especially as the blockading fleet consisted only of gunboats and 
inferior auxiliary cruisers, which later were reenforced by the large 
cruiser San Francisco. Even the latter might have been successfully 
attacked at night by the Spanish torpedo boats under able command 
and with intelligent handling of the torpedo weapon. 

4. In order to cut off the supply of provisions from the sea the 
cities of Matanzas, Cardenas, and Cienfuegos, which are connected 
with the capital by railway, had been blockaded since the beginning 
of the war. Several attempts of the United States to land troops at 
these places were unsuccessful, owing to the inadequate means with 
which they were undertaken. The Americans therefore confined 
themselves to a few insignificant bombardments, and finally to the 
blockade alone. When arrived at Cienfuegos, on June 11, I did not 
meet a single American vessel keeping up the blockade, either in 
Yucatan Channel or in front of Cienfuegos. I have subsequently 
been told that the American ships would often leave the harbor with- 
out any guard and then suddenly reappear at the end of a few days. 
I infer from this that the Americans did not handle the blockade 
Service very strictly at Cienfuegos. The result was that several 
steamers were successful in running the blockade. If the Spanish 
Government had used some energy in securing blockade runners at 
the beginning of the war, or had encouraged them by premiums, 
Havana, as well as the other provinces of the island, could have been 
abundantly supplied with provisions. How little such enterprises 
were supported by the Spanish Government is shown by the fact that 
at Cienfuegos, for instance, two large steamers were lying idle during 
the whole period of the war, while with a little more energy they 
might have been of the greatest service. Besides Cienfuegos, the 
waters near the Isle of Pines—the town of Batabano among 
others—were very favorably situated for blockade runners. From 
suitable anchoring places in deep water, which are abundant in that 
vicinity, the cargoes could have been taken ashore by smaller vessels. 
Of course, all such matters require preparation and decisive action— 
conditions which did not exist among the Spanish. As a matter of 
fact, at different times in the course of the war supplies did reach 
‘Cuba just in that manner, and that was the reason why the United 
States saw themselves compelled to extend the blockade from Cape 
Antonio to Cape Cruz, the whole territory here under discussion. 

5. When we arrived at the entrance to Cienfuegos we noticed to the 
right the ruins of a light-house, which the Americans had fired upon 
in an unsuccessful attempt at landing. To the left of the harbor 


30 


» 


entrance, which was now plainly visible, was a large castle in the 
usual Spanish style of architecture, standing on an elevation, and 
below it the town, which, with its white houses hidden among trees, 
reached down to the water’s edge. The houses were mostly one-story 
high, with porches running all around. Some boats and small steam- 
ers were lying at the landing piers. After hoisting the necessary sig- 
nals and waiting patiently we saw two Spanish gunboats approaching. 
We could plainly see that they had been cleared for action and were 
extremely suspicious, for they advanced, but very slowly. Finally, 
they seemed to come to the conclusion that the white ship with awn- 
ings, lying there quietly, without any warlike preparations, could 
have only a peaceful mission. A boat was lowered, the pilot came on 
board, and we ran in. The entrance is similar to that at Santiago de 
Cuba, and quite narrow. There is a bend to the north which makes 
it difficult for large ships to enter the harbor, because the current 
coming from several directions is usually very strong at this place, so 
that a ship turning slowly might easily run aground on the eastern 
point. Here also the indefatigable activity of the Spanish troops 
could be noticed. They were working energetically on new batteries, 
which were armed with field guns. There were mines in the entrance. 
Works of defense, trenches, ete., had been built in the direction of 
the castle. The number of regular troops was conspicuous; there 
appear to have been no volunteers at that place. As we passed, the 
soldiers stopped in their work to take a look at the ship. At one of 
the landing piers, at the narrowest place of the entrance, a crowd of 
people and regular soldiers had gathered. A band on the porch of 
one of the houses was playing ‘‘The Watch on the Rhine,” a courtesy 
extended to the German ship by the Spanish commander. We 
steamed into the large bay and after passing several small islands 
and shallow places we saw before us the city of Cienfuegos. The 
channel is narrow even here; the large bay has many shallow places, 
and only a narrow passage leads to the city, at which our ship cast 
anchor some distance from the shore. Nevertheless, the harbor of 
Cienfuegos is one of the best of the whole island of Cuba, and with the 
expenditure of the necessary funds a very fine place could be made 
of it. Outside of Santiago, whose commerce, owing to the inaccessi- 
bility of the country back of it, will probably never be developed to 
any great extent, Cienfuegos is the only good harbor on the southern 
coast, and has therefore probably a great future. It is also to be 
noted that the largest sugar factories of Cuba, which are mostly oper- 
ated by American capital, are in the vicinity of Cienfuegos. 

6. ‘The small Spanish gunboats lying in the harbor were doing guard 
service at the entrance, relieving each, other every day. Besides these 
the torpedo-boat cruiser Galicia was in the harbor. An unlucky star 
seems to have been over this vessel. At first if was stated that she 
was to be docked in order to make repairs. Afterwards she was again 


31 


pronounced seaworthy; but the fact is that she never left the harbor 
during the whole period of the war. There was no lack of provisions 
noticeable in the city. The Spanish Government had bought up the 
provisions and set selling prices on them. For instance, a pound of 
beef was only 80 pfennigs (20 cents)—certainly a low price consider- 
ing that the blockade had already lasted two months. On June 13 
gun fire was heard in the direction of the entrance. The Spanish 
gunboats went out and had a slight engagement with an American 
auxiliary cruiser, probably the Yankee. The gunboat Vasco Nunez 
de Balboa was shot through the bow above the water line, and sev- 
eral of the crew were wounded. In other respects the engagement 
was of no importance. The following day we left Cienfuegos, spoke — 
the American cruiser Yankee, which was on blockade service, and 
after stopping a few days at the Isle of Pines we shaped our course 
for Havana. 

7. In the morning of June 22 we came within sight of the table- 
land. We kept close to the shore in order to inspect the harbor of 
Mariel and to see how far the American blockading line extended. It 
was not long before the blockading ships, among them the gunboat 
Wilmington, which was lying close to Mariel, came in sight. There 
was the usual exchange of signals! A heavy thunderstorm was 
threatening. Morro Castle, which had been visible in indistinct out- 
lines, disappeared behind a dark cloud. The storm came up rapidly. 
The flashes of lightning followed each other in quick succession, the 
thunder roared, and the rain was coming down in torrents with a 
force only possible in the Tropics. The blockading ships had van- 
ished from sight. We could hardly see a ship’s length in front of us, 
and the torrents of rain continued to fall, merging the lines of the sky 
and the sea. As we had made out Morro Castle before the storm 
commenced, I had the ship steer for it very slowly. Soon it com- 
menced to clear up in the direction of the land, and while the storm 
continued to rage on the sea and the whole line of blockade was 
still enveloped in rain, we entered the harbor with the assistance 
of the pilot. Involuntarily the thought occurred to me, what an 
opportunity that would have been for a blockade runner; but 
the matter is not as simple as it looks. It is true that at this 
season of the year a heavy thunderstorm, usually about noon or in 
the afternoon, may be counted upon almost. daily. Still the 
chances of being thus favored are too slim to make it advisable 
for a ship to attempt to run the blockade in daytime. The only real 
opportunity is at night. The American blockading fleet consisted of 
the gunboat Wilmington, two gunboats of the Annapolis class, one 
or two monitors and about four auxiliary cruisers, the latter partly 
small vessels. The ships were distributed over a line about 30 miles. 
long, surrounding the harbor in an are at a distance of about 120 to 
140 kilometers. In my opinion it would not have been difficult for a 


32 


fast ship (15 or 16 knots would have been sufficient, since the Amer- 
ican blockading vessels, with the exception of a few small cruisers, 
did not exceed 12 knots) to run the blockade at night. The require- 
ments were that the night should be as dark as possible, the lights 
on board darkened, and the course shaped straight for the entrance 
through the middle of the blockading line. As the beacon light was 
kept burning all the time, there was no difficulty about steering for 
the entrance. The blockade runner would have had to depend en- 
tirely on her speed and maintain her course without regard to hostile 
projectiles. The firing of guns, including rapid-fire guns, with night 
sights is so difficult that hits can hardly be counted on unless the dis- 
tance is very small. To approach the line of blockade by hugging 
the shore I consider hazardous. The vessel could not have remained 
entirely hidden, owing to the close formation of the line. There would 
have been danger, as soon as the alarm signal was given, for the block- 
ade runner to be cut off from Havana by the blockading fleet and 
forced upon the shore. 

8. Since our last visit to Havana, about a month ago, there was 
hardly any change noticeable in the aspect of the town and the con- 
ditions prevailing there. The harbor was empty and deserted. Two 
steamers, however, could be seen, of rather enterprising appearance, 
one of them even with two small rapid-fire guns on board. The Span- 
ish war ships were still at anchor at the same place. There were no 
foreign war ships. Work on the improvement of the fortifications 
was still going on with the same restless activity. The volunteers 
continued their drills. Provisions were expensive, but the prices were 
held down by the Government, so as to prevent excesses on the part 
of the dealers. The poor were being taken care of as far as possible 
by the distribution of food in free kitchens and by entertainments for 
their benefit. The theaters were kept open. On certain days there 
was music in the public places. The Governor-General did all he 
could to keep up the spirit of the inhabitants. The rate of sickness 
and death was said to be hardly higher than usual. The climate at 
this time of the year is especially unfavorable, because the beneficial 
effects of the rainy season are not yet felt. Inside of the fortified 
region the Government had laid down so-called zonas de cultivo, which - 
were intended for the raising of vegetables, ete., and were expected 
to prove of great benefit. One of the chief articles of food consisted 
of pineapples, which in time of peace are exported in incredible num- 
bers, and which could now be bought in quantities for a fabulously 
low price. : 

9. In the forenoon of June 24, I noticed some preparations on board 
the Spanish steamers Montevideo and San Domingo, from which I 
inferred that they were about to put to sea. The time was well chosen. 
The moon set about 10 o’clock, and at midnight both steamers, with 


33 


all lights darkened, passed through the entrance. They were suc- 
cessful in eluding the American ships. I afterwards met the Monte- 
video again at Vera Cruz, with a full cargo, ready to leave the harbor 
at any moment; but as far as I could ascertain, the steamer, after 
putting to sea, preferred to return and unload her cargo again. The 
San Domingo, upon her return to Cuba, was captured by American 
blockading ships and run ashore near the Isle of Pines. 

10. We remained at Havana until June 29. We then proceeded to 
Kingston and from there to Santiago de Cuba and Cienfuegos, casting 
anchor at the latter place on the evening of J uly 8. The blockade 
was now quite strict, as we had an opportunity to find out upon 
approaching Santa Cruz. At Trinidad we met the American gunboat 
Helena, and at Cienfuegos the cruiser Detroit, lying close to the har- 
bor. Nevertheless, the auxiliary cruiser Reina Maria Cristina, a large, 
fast steamer, armed with fourteen 5-centimeter rapid-fire and several 
revolving guns, had succeeded in entering the harbor of Cienfuegos. 
Her cargo consisted of dried codfish and ham. Part of the steamer’s 
guns and ammunition were used to reenforce the fortifications. The 
city itself had not again been harassed by the American ships. Com- 
munication with Havana by rail was kept up, though there were fre- 
quent delays in the arrival of trains, owing to the lack of fuel. There 
did not appear to be any great scarcity of provisions. A proclama- 
tion by Captain-General Blanco, published in the Gaceta de la Habana, 
apprised the city of the catastrophe of Santiago, which was so disas- 
trous to the Spanish. 

The Spanish at Cienfuegos gained an idea that the ships had gone 
down with all their crews. It was not learned at that time that the 
ships had been run ashore and that the Americans had taken many 
prisoners. The heavy blow was borne with comparative equanimity. 
It was the general opinion that the fate of Santiago was also sealed 
and that then peace negotiations would be opened. 

11. On July 10 the crew of the steamer Alfonso XII arrived at 
Cienfuegos and was transferred to the auxiliary cruiser Reina Maria 
Cristina. The Alfonso XIT had attempted to run the blockade at 
Havana, keeping close to the shore, but had been compelled by the 
American blockading ships to run ashore at Mariel. The majority 
of the crew was rescued. The cargo was destroyed by the Americans, 
who fired upon the steamer and set her on fire. In connection with 
this attempt to run the blockade we seek in vain for an explanation 
as to why the cruisers, torpedo gunboats, and other vessels in Havana 
Harbor did not assist the blockade runner. The time of her arrival 
could have been announced by cable. It then became the duty of 
the Spanish warships to go out in accordance with a prearranged plan 
and try to divert the blockading ships. Such a maneuver would not 
only have raised the moral courage of the garrison, condemned to 


12483-——3 


34 


demoralizing inactivity, but would in all probability also have been 
attended with success. 

12. We left Cienfuegos on July 12, and after visiting Vera Cruz, 
again returned to Havana on August 1. The blockading fleet 
appeared to have drawn closer together, so that there was one ship to 
every 2 miles. The flag ship San Francisco was also seen this time. 
Few changes were noticeable in the city itself. There was not as yet 
an actual famine, but the poorer classes were evidently much worse 
off than they had been on our former visit, for the number of beggars 
in the streets had increased. Crowds of poor people would come 
alongside the ships in boats to try to get something to eat. It was a 
sad sight tolook upon those half-starved women and emaciated little 
children, barely covered with miserable rags, holding out their hands 
imploringly and asking for alms. Everything floating around in the 
water was examined by these miserable people. Nothing escaped 
their eyes. Parings of fruit and other refuse were caught up and 
sucked out. The suffering was terrible, and we were powerless before 
it. All could not be helped, but at least a few. This scene was 
repeated every noon and evening. The crews gave willingly what 
could be spared, and more than that. Ashore, as already stated, the 
poor people were being taken care of as far as possible by free kitch- 
ens. Since the middle of July about 30,000 rations had been distrib- 
uted in these kitchens. The health conditions were remarkably good 
this year. Yellow fever had not yet made its appearance, but there 
was typhoid fever and dysentery. The sentiment of the population, 
as well as of the troops, seemed to incline toward peace. A general 
feeling of listlessness had settled upon them since the capitulation of 
Santiago. “If the Americans would only attack Havana,” the people 
would say, “‘they would soon find out what the garrison of the capital 
is made of. They would get their heads broken quick enough. But 
Uncle Sam is only beating about the bush. He is not going to swal- 
low the hot morsel and burn his tongue and stomach.” No wonder 
that the Spanish troops, condemned to inactivity, poorly fed, cut off 
from the whole world, and without any prospect of relief, were anxious 
for the end to come. And so peace was being talked of everywhere, 
and there was a persistent rumor that the French ambassador at 
Washington had been empowered to conduct peace negotiations. 

13. After a cruise around Cuba, Haiti, and Puerto Rico, upon which 
I had started at the beginning of August, I returned to Havana for 
the fourth time on September 3. How different everything looked! 
The clouds of smoke of the blockading ships were no longer seen on 
the horizon. That circle of brave vessels, greedy for prey, ready 
every moment to pounce upon anything that came within their reach, 
had vanished. Our first glance was for the flag on Morro Castle. 
The red and yellow colors were still waving there, but there seemed 
to be an air of sadness and listlessness about them, as though they 


35 


were anticipating their fate of having to make way for another flag 
without having been conquered. The harbor entrance was animated. 
Many sailing vessels were going in and out. In the harbor itself 
German, English, and Norwegian steamers were busily engaged in 
loading and unloading. Alongside the custom-houses there were a 
number of American and Mexican sailing vessels that had brought 
food and wine. All the storerooms were filled with provisions of 
every kind. The city had awakened to new life, business houses 
were once more open, merchants were again at their work, the streets 
were full of people; yet there was an air of depression over the whole 
city. The one thought, what was to become of them now, seemed to 
have cast a spell over everything. The insurgents were lying close 
to the city, and many of the inhabitants of Havana went out to visit 
with friends or to satisfy their curiosity. Will the United States 
sueceed in dispelling the specters it has conjured up? Will Cuba 
Libre triumph, or will the island be annexed to the Union? These 
are the questions which are now ever present. 

14. As peace is now at hand, there is no reason why a discussion of 
the fortifications of Havana, which were erected or improved by the 
Spanish with so much skill, should be kept secret any longer. I will 
therefore try to give an approximate idea of the same: 

(a) The harbor entrance had been made inaccessible by several 
rows of mines. Along the entrance many guns had been set up which 
were fired through embrasures from behind thick masonry walls. All 
these guns were muzzle-loaders of old types. Farther inland there 
was a torpedo battery—two ordinary launching tubes, which had been 
temporarily installed on a float without any protection. 

(b) The object of the shore fortifications was partly to defend the 
entrance and partly to prevent landings. During the first few days 
after the breaking out of the war the Spanish had feared a bombard- 
ment of Havana and a landing of American troops at the Vedado, 
and this fear was well founded, as there was only one fortification 
on the Vedado, and that not entirely completed. The Americans 
allowed that opportunity for attacking Havana by surprise to go by 
without taking advantage of it, because they were themselves by no 
means prepared forthe war and had neither troops nor transports in 
readiness. By dint of unremitting activity the Spanish were able 
in the course of the war to place the following works in good condi- 
tion, part of them having been newly erected: 


EAST OF THE ENTRANCE. 


Battery No. 1 (permanent): Four 15-centimeter Ordonez guns; on 
the wings, two 5.7-centimeter Nordenfeldt rapid-fire guns. 

Battery No. 2 (permanent): Two 30.5-centimeter Krupp guns; four 
21-centimeter Ordofiez howitzers; two 5.7-centimeter Nordenfeldt 
rapid-fire guns. ; 


36 


Velasco battery (temporary): Three 28-centimeter Krupp guns; 
three 12-centimeter Hontoria naval guns; one 5.7-centimeter Norden- 
feldt rapid-fire gun. 

Between the latter two batteries there were three small temporary 
batteries, the first of which was armed with two 9-centimeter field 
guns and the second and third with three 12-centimeter and 15- 
centimeter guns, respectively. | 


WEST OF THE ENTRANCE. 


La Punta (permanent): Two 15-centimeter Ordofiez guns. 

La Reina (permanent, but considerably strengthened and newly 
armed): Three 16-centimeter Hontoria naval guns (from the cruiser 
Alfonso XII); two 25-centimeter muzzle loaders; seven 21-centimeter 
muzzle-loading howitzers. 

Santa Clara (permanent, but considerably strengthened and newly 
armed): Two 30.5-centimeter Ordofiez guns; three 28-centimeter 
Krupp guns; four 21-centimeter howitzers. On the flank, two 5.7- 
centimeter Nordenfeldt rapid-fire guns and three 15-centimeter guns. 

Battery No. 3 (permanent): Four 21-centimeter Ordofiez howitzers; 
two 15-centimeter Ordofiez guns; two 24-centimeter Ordofiez guns. 

Battery No. 4 (temporary): Three 16-centimeter Hontoria naval 
guns (from cruiser Alfonso XJJ); four 15-centimeter Ordofiez guns; 
two 5.7-centimeter Nordenfeldt rapid-fire guns. 

Besides these, temporary stands had been erected on the west wing 
for field guns. 

(c) The shore fortifications had their bases of support in some of 
the larger forts, like El Principe and Atares forts, forming the inner 
belt around the city. An outer belt had also been established at a 
distance of about 10 kilometers from the city. The fortifications on 
the outer belt consisted of a large number of infantry sites protected 
by artificial obstructions, stakes, wire fences, ete. For each two or 
three of these sites there were more extensive works with gun stands. 
Thus, all the important points had been connected by one long line of 
fortifications. The defense of the coast east of battery No. 1 near 
Cochima (Cojimar?). was suprisingly weak. Batteries Nos. 1 and 2 
are trained toward the sea; only one 4.7-centimeter rapid-fire gun” 
covers the flank. The fortifications on this part of the coast consist of 
only one gun site with two field guns. It would seem as though a 
landing with a sufficient force of troops, assisted by the fleet, might 
have had a chance of success. Fortunately for the city the fortifica- 
tions were not put to a severe test. Aside from a few shots at the 
beginning of the blockade, about twenty shots were fired at the 
American cruiser San Francisco toward the end of the war, namely, 
on August 12. The ship did not answer the fire. A Spanish pro- 
jectile hit the stern of the American cruiser as she was steaming 
away, but without causing serious damage or loss of human life. 


37 


15. In order to show in a comprehensive form the steamers which 
during the war ran the blockade of Cuba, I give in the following table 
the names of the steamers and the different harbors they entered, 
together with their respective cargoes : 


Harbor. 





ee 





Cargo. 








Santiago de Cuba a. 
Caibariena 


Manzanillo 
Sagua laGrandea.. 


Matanzas 


Cayo Francesa .... 


Batabano 


La Isabella (sea- 
port of Sagua la 
Grande). a 


San Cayetano...... 

















i 
i 


Name of ship. Date. 
Steamer Montserrat ........ Apr. 26 
Steamer Adula.......- 566... June 17 

Steamer Reina Maria Cris- | June 22 
| tina. 
Steamer Polaria .........-- May 7 
Steamer Alava............-: July 4 
Steamer Franklin........... ae doe 
SLOAINOER-A NItdcorse teense bJune ls 
_ Steamer Fritjot Nansen ....| July 3 
Steamer Montserrat ........ July 29 
| Steamer Franklin .......--- July 31 
Coast steamer Arturo....... bJune 13 
Coast steamer Sara......... bJune 24 
Bark Tres Hermanos....-.-.- bJ une 20 
AC Ooe MOvoserecserccecivescince acl, Cll Vale 
Coast steamer Victoria ..... July 13 
Steamer Villaverde ......... bJ une 23 
TIC U IIA. het on we x cee a July 26 
mLeamer Salli... os a.-scecess May 20 
Steamer Franklin........-..- June 11 
Steamer Chateau Lafitte....| June 17 
Steamer Regulus .-.-......... July 19 
Steamer Pralrono........--- bAug.8 











War material. 

50 barrels flour, 50 barrels corn, 50 sacks 
rice, 10 tubs butter, 15 barrels pork, 15 
barrels beef, 10 barrels hard tack, 6 
sacks beans, 5 sacks pease. 

1,000 boxes bacon, 50 barrels bacon sides, 
600 barrels codfish, 200 sacks beans. 

300 sacks barley, 14,000 sacks rice. 

2,500 sacks flour, 6 barrels codfish. 

2,495 sacks flour, 3,056 sacks corn, 200 
sacks spices, 333 sacks potatoes. 

Small quantities flour, rice, and meat. 

Small quantities potatoes, onions, meat, 
and rice. 

8,000 sacks rice, 805 sacks beans, 600 sacks 
pease, 500 sacks flour, 1,399 boxes bacon, 
213 boxes codfish, a large quantity of - 
smoked meat, 15 barrels drugs. 

3,495 sacks flour, 1,350 sacks corn, 500 
sacks rice, 165 sacks beans. 

800 sacks corn, 150 sacks flour, 20 sacks 
pease, 100 sacks beans, 80 cans lard. 

35 boxes flour, 20 half boxes and 2,490 
sacks corn. 

Beans, flour, and corn. 

156 tubs bacon, 200 sacks rice, 160 sacks 
corn, 129 barrels flour, 60 boxes meat, 
65 boxes condensed milk. 

237 sacks corn, 20 sacks pease, 100 sacks 
flour, 200 sacks beaus, 5 sacks lentils, 
12 boxes salt meat, 120 cans, 2 barrels, 
and 4 tubs lard. 

4,785 sacks flour, pease, coffee, beans, 
corn, and rice. 

6 barrels lard, 438 sacks rice, 22 sacks 
beans, 200 sacks flour. 

125 sacks pease, 95 sacks rice, 185 barrels 
wine, 650 sacks salt, 50 boxes oil, 5 
boxes cheese, garlic, hard-tack, and 


pepper. 

2,266 boxes flour, 284 sacks rice, 2,593 
sacks beans, 96 sacks spices, 50 sacks 
pease, 697 sacks corn, 72 sacks coffee. 

50 barrels codfish, 6 barrels soup, 3,885 
barrels fiour, 9,295 sacks fiour, 5,000 
sacks rice. 

6,573 barrels flour, 1,000 sacks wheat, 
4,000 sacks corn, 450 boxes canned 
meat, 1,000 barrels pork, 500 barrels 
hard-tack, 30 boxes groceries, 1 box 
quinine. 

400 sacks flour, 100 sacks rice, 100 sacks 
beans, 200 sacks corn, 272 tubs lard, 20 
baskets garlic, 10 baskets onions. 


The above demonstrates once more how difficult it is to maintain 
a blockade even under the most favorable circumstances, as in this 
case, where the Spanish navy did not make a single attempt to shake 


off the blockading ships. 


I am unable to say what part of the pro- 


visions mentioned in the foregoing table went to Havana; probably 





a These ports were never declared to be blockaded. 
b These ports were not declared to have been blockaded until after these dates. 


Only four of the above-mentioned ports were included in the President’s proclamation declaring 
certain ports to be blockaded, viz, Cienfuegos and Matanzas on and after April 22, 1898, and Manzan- 
illo and Batabano on and after June 27, 1898. 


Out of the 22 instances given in the table of vessel 


were but 9 of these which ran the blockade. 


s entering Cuban ports during the war, there 


O.N.1. 


38 


all those that were landed at Batabano, but I have information from 
reliable sources that on August 12 the military administration of 
Havana had provisions on hand for three months longer, outside of 
what the blockade runners had brought into the country and what 
was hidden away in the houses of the city. One can therefore 
understand the indignation of Captain General Blanco when he heard 
that the peace protocol had been signed. But of what use would 
have been a further resistance on the part of the Spanish garrison? 
The United States Government only needed to make the blockade > 
more rigid. That would necessarily have sealed the fate of Havana 
sooner or later. <A fortress in the ocean, cut off from its mother 
country, can be rescued only with the assistance of the navy. 
The enemy who has control of the sea need only wait patiently until 
the ripe fruit drops into his lap. 

The lessons to be derived from the foregoing are evident and need . 
no further explanation. May our colonies be spared the fate of 
Havana. 


2) 





j 


OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, 
War Notes No. Iv. ; 
INFORMATION FROM ABROAD. 


SIKETCHES — 


SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 


COMMANDWH S23 (0 00... 


(CONCLUDED.) 


TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN, 





OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE 


aR Oe Orns 


| WASHINGTON: | 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 
1899, 


util hia 


she Oke 





OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 
WaR Notss No. IV. 
INFORMATION FROM ABROAD. 





SKETCHES 


FROM THE 


SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 


COMMANDER. J 


(CONCLUDED.) 


- ae 


TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN, 





OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 


WASHINGTON: 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 
1899, 


AT LE Mee RSE SNe OE ASS eB epee EI aay) ws ayes, 2 € 


re ee its ee ae ac CL, SW PS a de en oe a a 
2 ‘ ‘ 


i 


- 





INTRODUCTORY. 


Sketches from the naval battle of Santiago and occupation of Puerto 
Rico, by Commander Jacobsen, of the German protected cruiser Geier, 
given in this number of the War Notes, are a continuation of Sketches 
from the Spanish-American War, by the same officer, given in War 


Notes No. III. 
RICHARDSON CLOVER, 


Commander, U. S. N., Chief Intelligence Officer. 
NAVY DEPARTMENT, March 27, 1899. 


Approved: 
A. 8. CROWNINSHIELD, Rear-Admiral, U. 8. N., 
Chief of Bureau of Navigation. 
3 





SKETCHES FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 


By Commander J....... 


[Translated from the Marine-Rundschau, January and February, 1899—Concluded.] 
VI. THE NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTIAGO. 


1. I have no official sources at my disposal from which to give an 
account of the battle. The reports of Admiral Sampson and the com- 
manders of the American ships, as well as the reports on the condition 
of the Spanish vessels after the battle and on the positions and move- 
ments of all ships during the battle were published in the New York 
Herald. From the Spanish side nothing has been published except a 
short report of Admiral Cervera to Captain-General Blanco and an 
article entitled “Admiral Cervera’s fleet” published in the Revista 
General de Marina. Under these circumstances it is inevitable that 
errors and omissions will occur in the account of the battle; but, on the 
whole, it will probably give an approximately correct idea. 


Paragraphs 2-13, inclusive, have not been translated as they were 
from United States publications containing: 

(1) Descriptions of the United States and Spanish vessels engaged 
in the battle. 

(2) Chart showing the positions of the ships during the battle at dif- 
ferent times between 9.30 a. m. and 1.15 p. m. from the records of the 
United States Naval Board appointed to plot such positions. 

(3) Description of the engagement compiled from official reports of 
the commanders of the United States vessels. 

(4) Condition of Spanish vessels after the battle, as shown by the 
United States board appointed to examine them. 


14. With Admiral Sampson’s permission the officers of the Geter 
inspected the Spanish ships on August 12, more than a month after 
the battle, at which time the following observations were made: 

(a) The ships, after coming out of the harbor entrance on a westerly 
course, turned to starboard and ran ashore in small coves, where they 
probably saw the best chance for their crews to reach the shore through 
the surf. 

(b) The reason for beaching the ships can probably be found in the 
fact that the fires which broke out on board after the first American 

5 


6 


‘ * 

hits could not be controlled by the crews, who had lost their heads 
under the hail of hostile projectiles. All three of the ships present 
pictures of the most frightful ruin, chiefly due to the explosions and 
the conflagrations, which did not reach their full intensity until after 
the ships had been run ashore. All the woodwork and combustible 
material had been burned. The following will give an idea of the 
intense heat that must have prevailed: 

The iron deck beams and other horizontal iron parts were very much 
warped; the bearings of the connecting rods had been melted; theiron 
inasts had been partly melted where they pass through the upper deck; 
the brass frames of the ports between decks had been partly melted, 
and the ports themselves were found on deck converted into large 
lumps of glass; parts of the rapid-fire mounts had been melted, the lead 
in the small caliber and machine-gun projectiles had melted and run 
out, and the casings had been reduced to ashes. 

(c) Besides the conflagrations and subsequent explosions, the ships 
sustained such severe leaks when running ashore that it will be impos- 
sible to float them again, with the exception of the Maria Teresa, which 
is now being attempted to be hauled off.! 

All the masts of the ships had fallen aft and had been hurled to the 
deck with their tops. Only the mainmast of the Maria Teresa was 
left standing, which is an evidence that she ran ashore at less speed, 
which is further shown by the fact that she sustained less leaks than 
the other ships. The mainmast of the Oquendo had fallen to star- 
board and broken in two upon striking the railing and one part gone 
overboard. 

(d) Nothing definite could be ascertained as to the boats that had 
been on board. There was nothing left but the wrecks of two iron 
steam launches hanging in the warped and partly broken davits on 
board of each of the ships. 

(¢) The engines were probably intact in all of the ships at the time 
they ran ashore, for they were apparently running at great speed—at 
least the Oquendo and the Vizcaya. 

The machinery installation on board the ships was about as follows: 

a. The two main engines and six main boilers are located in five 
water-tight compartments below the protective deck. Above them, 
between decks, and protected by lateral coal bunkers, are two large 
auxiliary boilers of at least 12 tons capacity, and many auxiliary 
engines, conspicuous among which is a large and powerful centrifugal 
bilge pump with a discharge pipe of about 300 mm. diameter. The 
protective deck, extending from the stem to the after torpedo room, is 
slightly vaulted forward of the boiler rooms, and pierced above the : 
boiler and engine rooms for the passage of smokestack casings and 
engine skylight, but is protected at this place by a strong glacis, rising 





Beth the meantime the Maria Teresa has been floated by American wreckers, but 
she sank on her way to Norfolk.—Ep. ‘‘ RUNDscHAU.” 





rf 


at an angle of about 30 degrees from the inner bunker walls. The 
openings in the engine skylight and smokestack casings were protected 
by iron gratings. Tlie protection by lateral coal bunkers extended 
through boiler and engine rooms, reaching to the battery deck, a 
height of 3.5 meters. Alongside the engine rooms in each of the 
bunkers to port and starboard forward and starboard aft was a room 
for engine supplies, while to port aft was a well-equipped workshop, 
extending nearly to the ship’s side. In the workshop was a small 
l-cylinder steam engine for driving transmission gear, actuating a 
turning lathe, a boring engine, a grindstone, and very strong shears, 
also five vises. The supply rooms appear to have been well equipped, 
but everything seems to have been stored in wooden closets and on 
wooden shelves, for all the tools were found scattered on the floor in 
wild confusion. 

f. There was a surprising number of rough castings, especially of 
stuffing boxes. Spare parts for the main engines were found suspended 
in the engine skylight; covers, pistons, and slide-valve faces for low- 
pressure cylinders on the bulkheads. To the smokestack casings were 
secured three connecting rods, eccentric rods, etc. 

vy. Nothing could be noticed of any provisions having been made for ' 
the protection of the machinery installations except the iron gratings. 
In the Almirante Oquendo coal sacks were found near .the auxiliary 
boiler, but their object could not be determined, the boiler room being 
flooded. The steam pipes above the protective deck do not appear to 
have been disconnected before the battle. Valves leading to auxiliary 
engines, which were not used during the fight (such as ash-hoisting 
machinery, pumps for auxiliary boilers, etc.), were found open. The 
centrifugal bilge pump above mentioned also appeared to have been in 
gear. The bulkhead doors above the protective deck were all open. 
They could not have been opened subsequently, since all the bulkheads 
had been warped by the heat, but the bolts were intact. 

(f) At the time of our inspection nothing could be ascertained 
regarding the injuries in the engine rooms, because they were all under 
water almost up to the protective deck. It was learned from an Ameri- 
can engineer engaged in the wrecking operations of the Infanta Maria 
Teresa that no dead bodies had been found in the engine and boiler 
rooms, and hence it is probable that there have been no material inju- 
ries to the boilers and steam pipes. All the bunker bulkheads and con- 
necting doors are said to have been open and all the fires of the boilers 
lighted. 

(g) The damages above the protective deck had been caused chiefly 
by the conflagrations, but also by hits from the enemy’s secondary bat- 
tery. The inadequacy of the lateral protection of the engine rooms 
was Striking. The supply rooms and workshops had been hit a num- 
ber of times. Shots which entered the coal did not go through. Only 
one hit was noticed in the auxiliary piping above the protective deck of 


8 


the Infanta Maria Teresa. The shot had gone clear through the pipe 
without ripping it open, from which it may be InIOUrD Es that there was 
no steam in it at the time. 

(h) On the gun and upper decks the smokestack casings had been 
perforated in several places, also the smokestacks themselves. Appar- 
ently no measures had been taken for closing up these shot holes. The 
electric wiring had been struck in many places. Shot holes were also 
noticeable in the speaking tubes. It was not possible, owing to the 
complete destruction by fire, to make any further investigation of the 
means of communication and command. 

(i) The three ships inspected had all their guns on board. The 
only ones that could not be found were the two 7-centimeter rapid-fire 
boat guns, but pivots had been provided on both sides of the stern, 
where these two guns were apparently intended to be installed for use 
against torpedo boat attacks at night. 

(kK) From the slight losses which the American ships claim to have 
sustained, it may be judged that the training of the Spanish gun crews 
must have been very inadequate. This is not surprising, in view of 
the statement of one of the Spanish naval officers to the effect that no 
- target practice is held in Spain in time of peace. Other circumstances 
also give evidence of very inefficient handling of the guns. The turrets 
and their guns, with the exception of the forward turret of the Almi- 
rante Oquendo, were found entirely intact. The loading apparatus for 
the 28-centimeter guns (Whitworth, Manchester, 1895) was of the 
hydraulic order, and the loading time was about two minutes. The 
14-centimeter rapid-fire guns also were probably not used to their best 
advantage, owing to want of experience. # There was evidently no lack 
of ammunition, for near some of the guns a number of cartridges were 
found, and some of the guns were still loaded, but had not been fired. 
To what circumstance it is due that the breechblocks of two of the 
guns were found lying in the rear of the guns with their pivot bolts 
torn off, and the projectiles jammed near the muzzle of the tubes 
could not be explained. Perhaps this may also be attributed to ineffi- 
cient handling of the projectiles. 

(l) Only the port side of the ships was fired upon. The starboard 
side shows but a few holes, where shots have passed out. Where the 
course of projectiles could be traced it was usually ranging from port ~ 
aft to starboard forward. The destructive effect of the American pro- 
jectiles is mainly due to the conflagrations caused by them. Aside 
from a shot through one of the turret roofs, no hits were observed in 
any of the armored turrets. Neither have any projectiles pierced the 
side armor, which shows no injuries. Only indentations are noticeable 
in places where projectiles have struck the armor. Projectiles of 15 
centimeters and larger calibers that had hit the ship had in many 
instances gone out through the other side, making holes about 1 meter 
square, but without bursting. As the same observation has been made 
in the bombardments of Santiago and San Juan, it may be assumed 


9 


that it is due to the uncertain functioning of the base fuse. Itis not 
probable that the Americans used armor-piercing shell, as fragments 
of projectiles of different sizes found in the vicinity show that explosive 
shell and not nonexplosive shell were used. Projectiles which had hit 
smokestacks and masts had gone clear through, making only small, 
round or oblong shot holes. Hits of small-caliber projectiles (5.7-centi- 
meter) could be noticed in large numbers, and this was corroborated by 
the statement of an American officer to the effect that they were used 
in great quantities. 

(m) The question whether the Spanish had any intention of making 
use of the torpedo weapon may probably be answered in the negative. 
The torpedo armaments of the ships, although including a large num- 
ber of tubes, were so defective that there could hardly be any chance 
of success aS against the powerful American ships. The armaments 
consisted of two bow, four broadside, and two stern tubes, all above 
water and of antiquated design, with large cartridges, band-brakes, 
etc., all located above the armored deck and entirely unprotected. In 
a very primitive manner the tubes had been partly protected by grate 
bars lashed with chains. 

(n) The projectiles were 35-centimeter Schwartzkopff torpedoes with 
large depth-regulating apparatus. 

No war-heads were to be found, with a single exception. According 
to the statement of an American petty officer, the war-heads had been 
left at Santiago, where they were to be used in connection with the 
mine obstructions. It is true that this does not agree with the fact 
that a torpedo head exploded on board the Almirante Oquendo. It is 
possible, however, that the ships retained one or two war-heads to be 
used in case of necessity as against rams, since the broadside tubes 
were adapted to be turned in any direction, or perhaps it was the com- 
mander’s wish to take a war-head along. 

(0) The following points support the assumption that it was not the 
intention to make use of the torpedo weapon: 

a. Not one of the tubes still in existence was loaded, and all the 
tubes were closed. In the tubes destroyed by shots or otherwise no 
remnants of torpedoes were found. 

fp. The remaining torpedoes, almost without exception, were lying in 
their places along the ship’s side. No torpedoes were found lying back 
of the tubes, with the exception of the bow tubes of the Almirante 
Oquendo. 

y. There was no pressure in any of the flasks. This is shown by 
the fact that the flasks were entirely uninjured, although the heat had 
partly melted the tailpieces of the torpedoes. 

6. In several of the torpedoes lying on top, the protecting cap for 
the depth-regulating apparatus had not been taken off, while it is 
necessary to remove it in order to put on the war heads. 

é In a few of the torpedoes the sinking valves had been put in place, 


10 


but in most of them they were still found soldered, with connecting 
links raised. 

¢. The tubes for filling the launching cartridges were not connected, 
and only on the Almirante Oquendo was the powder charge in readiness. 


A. INFANTA MARIA TERESA. 


(p) This was the flagship, and the first one to be beached, about 6 
miles from the entrance of Santiago. The ship’s bow was lying only a 
little higher than usual above the water line, the stern a little lower; 
otherwise upright. She evidently ran ashore at slow speed, for aside 
from the fact that there were only small leakages in the bottom, no 
boiler explosion took place, nor was the mainmast thrown down. In 
other respects also her injuries are much less than those of the other 
ships. The ammunition rooms appear to have been previously flooded, 
and therefore did not explode. 

(q) This ship shows very few hits from the hostile guns, especially 
few of small caliber as compared with the others. While all the wood- 
work has been burned, the same as on the other ships, little damage 
has been sustained by the ship’s hull. The ship has therefore been 
floated by the Americans.! All leaks had been stopped up, the ship 
pumped out, and then hauled off by steam tugs about 6 feet toward 
the sea. In this operation she sprang another leak aft and was again 
filled with water. On the day of our inspection this leak was being 
stopped up and the water pumped out by means of four steam pumps. 
Heavy articles, such as anchors, chains, etc., had been transferred to 
one of the wrecking steamers. While the ship was dry the two forward 
boilers had been set to work, and with them the auxiliary piping and 
several bilge pumps. One of the workmen stated that the engines had 
been found intact. The engine rooms could not be visited, because 
they were under water up to the tops of the cylinders. It could only 
_be ascertained that the engine skylight had not been damaged. 

(r) Three hits of large caliber—probably 20-centimeter—were 
observed: 

a. A shell had entered the after torpedo room close above the 
water line, had passed through a heavy stanchion and a lateral bulk- 
head, and out through the starboard side, where it had torn a hole 
about 1 meter square. There were no indications to show that the 
projectile had burst. The shot hole on the starboard side was slightly 
forward of and about 1 meter higher than that on the port side. 

f. Another projectile had passed through the whole length of the 
compartment above this torpedo room and out through the starboard 
side, likewise without exploding. 

y. A heavy shell must have exploded at the upper conning bridge, 
for the top of the conning tower, without having been perforated, 
showed large oblong scars, caused by heavy explosive fragments. 


1 She sank again on her way to the United States.—Ed. ‘‘ RUNDSCHAU.” 


11 


(s) A 15-centimeter shell had struck the port bow and loosened the 
reenforcement ring of the hawse hole. No injuries from explosive 
fragments were noticed here. 

Another 15-centimeter shell had perforated the 3-centimeter shield 
of a 14-centimeter rapid-fire gun on the port side. Fragments had 
destroyed the shaft of the elevating gear and both hand wheels. 
Others had perforated the forward smokestack casing. This hit 
appears to have annihilated the whole crew of this gun, near which 
six charred bodies were found. 

Another 15-centimeter shell had damaged the after smokestack, after 
passing through the empty part of a coal bunker, which was still filled 
with coal to within 1 meter of the ceiling. 

(t) Very few small-caliber hits were noticed, only 6 in ints ship’s sides, 
2 in the forward, and 5 in the after tears though one of the lat- 
ter may perhaps have been caused by a 15-centimeter projectile. Near 
the stern three indentations were noticeable in the side armor, proba- 
bly caused by 5.7-centimeter projectiles which, striking at a very small 
angle, had glanced off. 

(w) Further observations made are as follows: 

All the breechblocks of the rapid-fire guns and parts of the mechan- 
anism of the revolving guns had been thrown overboard by the Span- 
iards. Whether the turret guns had also been rendered unserviceable 
could not be ascertained. In any event, they had not been injured by 
hostile projectiles nor by the conflagrations. The gun sights were also 
missing. Inside the armored turrets no damages of any kind were 
noticeable. Even the paint had hardly sutfered from the heat. In 
the after-turret gun a projectile had been rammed home, but appar- 
ently the cartridge had not been entered. The couning tower was not 
injured, only burned on the inside. 

(v) The torpedo-launching tubes and torpedoes had been less dam- 
aged by shots and fire than in the other ships. The complete remnants 
of twenty-four torpedoes were found, with the exception of the war 
heads. Only a few practice heads were found. 


B. ALMIRANTE OQUENDO. 


(w) This ship sustained very severe leaks when running aground. 
She lies over to port, with the bow about 1 meter light and the stern 
14 meters deep. The ship appeared to have her back broken in the 
region of the foremast. The rapid-fire ammunition room just forward 
of the after turret had exploded. Amidships everything above this 
room had been hurled down. The protective deck was heaved up and 
wrenched from the sides. The deck beams throughout were badly 
warped, and both sides of the ship showed large holes, through which 
the water was washing in. ‘The second explosion had taken place in 
the forward rapid-fire ammunition room. The effects were about the 
same as aft. On one side they were still further increased by the 


12 


explosion of a torpedo war head in the forward b:toadside torpedo room. 
Here the aperture in the ship’s side had reached the dimensions of two 
meters in width and about 5 meters in length, its lower edge being 
formed by the armor. 

(w) The Almirante Oquendo had suffered more than either of the other 
ships from hostile projectiles. 

aA 15 to 20 centimeter shell had torn a piece about 20 centimeters 
wide and 50 centimeters long from the upper edge of the gun port in 
the top of the forward 28-centimeter turret and burst inside. A num- 
ber of small holes, caused by shell fragments, covering a space of about 
1 meter square, were noticeable in the top of the turret. There were 
no other traces of shell fragments. The bore was empty, the breech- 
block closed, and a shell was found in the rear of the gun in position 
for loading. Back of the gun and to the left of it two charred bodies 
were found, and to the right a mass of human remains that had appar- 
ently formed two more bodies. A head was found lying on the plat- 
form under the gun. Where the turret commander had been standing 
another charred body was found lying on its back, with the gun sights 
under it. The gun itself appeared to have sustained no injuries. 

f. Ashell, probably of 20-centimeter caliber, had passed through the 
ship’s side in the engine workshop, where it had demolished the trans. 
mission shaft, the boring engine, and the turning lathe; then through 
the engine skylight and exploded on the other side of the latter, in the 
engine supply room. 

y. A heavy projectile had passed through the smokestack and out 
through the starboard side without having bursted in the ship. 

6. About 25 meters from the stern a heavy shell had struck the 
%ween-decks and passed through it. On the starboard side inboard, 
several small holes were visible, apparently from fragments of this 
shell. 

é. A shell, probably of 15-centimeter caliber, had hit the shield of 
the fourth 14-centimeter rapid-fire gun. The irregular holes noticeable 
in the forward smokestacks are probably attributable to fragments of 
this shell. The wheels of the revolving and elevating gear of this gun 
had also been damaged. 

c¢, A 15-centimeter shell had passed through the port coal bunker 
and out through the starboard bunker. 

yn. A 14-centimeter rapid-fire gun on the starboard side had been hit 
on the left side by a 5.7-centimeter shell ranging forward. The pro- 
jectile with solid point had passed entirely through the forward hoop 
and penetrated the bore to the depth of 2 centimeters. There were no 
splinters from the gun, but the displaced metal had been forced out at 
the edges, which is a proof of its great tenacity. The point of the pro- 
jectile had been broken off and was lying near the gun. The hole is 
about 15 centimeters long and at the widest place 5 centimeters wide. 

S. In the whole port side about forty small-czliber hits were counted, 


EE —— 


13 


most of them amidships. The smokestacks had also been hit several — 
times by small projectiles. 

i. Other observations made on board the Almirante Oquendo are as 
follows: 

The armor had not been injured by any hits. In two of the rapid- 
fire guns the sights were found set for ranges of 13 and 14 kilometers, 
and in the 5.7-centimeter after-port gun at 10 kilometers. The sights 
of all the guns, witb the exception of the revolving guns, had traveling 
eyepieces. None of the sights were found set for short ranges. Some 
of the 14-centimeter rapid-fire breechblocks were missing, while some 
of the guns were found completely loaded. 

(y) The torpedo tube in which a torpedo had exploded had been torn 
into small fragments, the largest of which were a guiding bar and a 
hinged door. The torpedoes secured to the ship’s side had also been 
destroyed, with the exception of the flasks, which had been hurled 
several meters from their positions. The bulkhead ’tween-decks near 
the place of the explosion showed traces of the same. Pieces about 4 
centimeters square had passed entirely through it, while still smaller 
pieces had penetrated it to the depth of several millimeters. The 
conning tower had remained intact. 

In the forward torpedo room torpedoes were found near each of the 
tubes, but without war heads on them. The port tube had the depth- 
regulating apparatus in readiness, The outer cap of one of the tubes 
was stillopen. The tubes had been bent by the grounding of the ship. 
They were not loaded. 


CO. VIZCAYA. 


(2) The Vizcaya, like the Almirante Oquendo, is so seriously damaged 
that there is no prospect of hauling her off. This ship also ran ashore 
at great speed, and the keel was apparently broken in two, for with 
each sea ‘the stern would rise and fall with loud creaking and groaning. 
The vessel was lying almost upright with only a small list to port. 
All the rooms below the protective deck, and the after rooms above it, 
were flooded. | 

Near the forward turret an explosion had taken place in the lower 
part of the ship, probably in one of the ammunition rooms. The wood 
part of the upper deck had been burned, and the iron plating torn 
open, and through the gap could be seen a chaos of broken anchor 
gear, capstans, chains, cement, rubbish, torpedo tubes, ete. The hull 
is about equally damaged on both sides. 

a. The protective deck had been ripped open and the plating folded 
back on the starboard side, between the forward smokestack and the 
ship’s side, probably as the result of a boiler explosion. The pivot 
sockets of the 14-centimeter rapid-fire guns had been torn away and 
the guns bent back to such an extent that the bores were pointing 
upward almost vertically. 


14 


f. Hot coal gas and smoke issuing from an open bunker hole showed 
that the coal was still burning. 

y. The Vizcaya has suffered little from hostile fire. A 15 to 20 centi- 
meter shell had struck the forward broadside topedo room, dismounted 
the port tube, and had apparently killed a number of men. Several 
charred bodies were found scattered over the whole room. 

A 20-centimeter shell, ranging forward, had passed through the 
ship’s side, through a locker amidships near the second 14-centimeter 
rapid-fire gun, and through a lateral bulkhead abaft of the forward 
turret; then, striking the turret, had glanced off without causing any 
impression, anal exploded on the starboard side. 

A heavy shell had entered the gun deck forward of the after funver 
and passed out through the starboard side without bursting in the 
ship. 

Besides these three large-caliber hits, about twelve smaller ones 
could be noticed in the broadside, most of them of 4.7 and 5.7 centi- 
meter caliber; also five hits in the forward and one in the after 
smokestack. . 

Other observations were made as follows: 

The conning tower had‘ not been damaged by projectiles, but com- 
pletely burnt out on the inside. The conning bridge was totally 
demolished. Two charred bodies were found still lying in the tower, 
also several bodies or parts of bodies in different places on the iron 
gun deck. Many rapid-fire cartridges, either whole or in part, were 
found scattered about; also a quantity of exploded small-arm 
ammunition. 

The breechblocks of two 14-centimeter rapid-fire guns were found 
near the guns. In one of these guns the projectile had been jammed 
near the muzzle. The whole cartridge was found in one of the bores. 
The breech was open. 

6. The torpedoes had not been made ready for use and the tubes 
were not loaded. 

15. If we compare the observations made by the officers of the Geter 
as to the number of hits with the results of the examination made 
immediately after the battle, we obtain the following figures: 


Hits from— Maria Teresa.| Oquendo. Vizcaya. Colon. 
TOLONISPLOFOCLLIGN = os toalcce da te eettat es Coe neceee 1 5 2 le aoe 
JesteCIM= Projectile’... [2c hee --ee wien ea -eeee es Bae Livi 5 II 6 4 
BUCS LOIOCUUC 2 «25. co oeaaecne oniteneeeine met 3 Serv 4 TIE |e se sesen se 
a } na 
33 SPF OJGCHIO £2555). 7 58h 66 od ee om nite eels EL Perec yrs 


Recondary Dadtery .;--Locveune?ceseuecbenecmels 20 XV 42. XU. | 1 eV 


In the above table the Arabic figures designate the results of the 
United States Board, while the Roman figures represent the observa- 
tions made at the time of our inspection in August last. It will be 


15 


noticed that there is not much discrepancy in the figures. Of course, 
observations made so long after the action can not lay claim to abso- 
lute accuracy, especially as our sojourn on board was necessarily short. 
The traces of many hits have been partly obliterated by the powerful 
action of the surf, especially in the superstructures, of which hardly 
anything is left standing. It may therefore be inferred that the figures 
of the United States Board are more nearly correct than ours; but even 
they probably fall short of the actual results. 

16. The Brooklyn was hit about twenty times by shells and several 
times by fragments and machine gun projectiles. The cruiser sustained 
no serious injuries of any kind. The Jowais said to have been hit 
twice in the bow, just above the water-line, by 15-centimeter shells and 
seven times by small-caliber projectiles. The Texas and Indiana were 
hit twice by light projectiles without sustaining serious injuries. 

17. In order to be able to realize the complete defeat of the Spanish 
fleet it is necessary to call clearly to mind its situation in Santiago 
Harbor. Cervera had entered the harboron May 19. As early as May 
27 five hostile cruisers with several gunboats and auxiliary cruisers 
were observed in front of the harbor, and there was no longer any 
doubt that the whole American battle fleet was blockading the harbor. 
Then followed the bombardments of Morro Castle and the Socapa, sev- 
eral shells falling into the bay, and the Spanish ships retreated closer 
to the city. On June 3 the Merrimac was sunk, but the entrance 
remained unobstructed. On June 22 occurred the landing of the 
American troops, who on July 1 attacked the fortifications of the city. 
Five hundred men of the landing corps of the Spanish ships took part 
in the defense and are said to have fought very valiantly. 

18. The Government authorities at Havana were very anxious to 
have the fleet leave the harbor, in order to remove the main object of 
the attack upon Santiago; for the ships had been the cause of the 
blockade and of the attack on the unprepared city. Hence it was 
imperative that the ships should leave. It is probable that ever since 
the middle of June this had been suggested to Admiral Cervera by the 
authorities at Havana; but the Admiral appears to have declared that 
it was impossible to make an attempt to run the blockade at night. 
Whether direct orders were finally given to leave the harbor under all 
circumstances I have not been able to ascertain. 

19, Admiral Cervera was in a very difficult position. He was expected 
to act in some manner. He did not dare make the attempt at night, 
and so he decided to go out with his fleet in broad daylight. The 
whole crew fell a victim to this fatal decision. Instructions for the 
order of the sortie and the taking of the western course had been pre- 
viously issued by the chief of the fleet. According to the Revista Gen- 
eral de Marina, Vol. XI, No. 3, August, 1898, the Admiral was entirely 
convinced of the impossibility of defeating the enemy or of. reaching 
another Cuban harbor, even if he should succeed in steaming right 


16 


through the hostile fleet. It is to this feeling of helplessness and impo- 
tence as against the American naval forces more than to anything else 
that I attribute the defeat. The Spanish ships had spent a month and 
a half in the harbor without even attempting to attack the blockading 
fleet when a favorable opportunity presented itself, or even of harass- 
ing it. The two torpedo-boat destroyers were not used for the purpose 
for which they were intended. This inactivity and lack of initiative 
must have had a very demoralizing effect on the officers and men. If 
we add to this the certain knowledge that the opposing forces were 
much stronger, it will be readily understood that the idea of general 
flight after coming out of the harbor entrance was the only acceptable 
one, especially in view of the possibility of beaching the ships, thereby 
rendering them unserviceable, and eventually rescuing the crews. From 
the very moment that this feeling of impotence took possession of the 
Spanish and led to the above reflections their fate, psychologically 
speaking, was sealed. We do not mean to disparage their valor and 
tenacity in the midst of the hostile fire; but, on the other hand, it is 
quite natural that the Admiral, seeing that everything was happening 
as he had foreseen, was the one who set the example of running his 
ship ashore. All the other commanders followed this example. 

2, On the American side the situation was just the reverse. Ad- 
miral Sampson’s fleet was fully conscious of its power. The blockade 
was being conducted in accordance with carefully prepared plans, as 
were also the arrangements in case of the enemy’s attempt to escape. 
Frequent engagements with the Spanish forts had given commanders 
and crews that calm and assurance in the handling of their weapons 
which guarantees success. The long blockade service, exhausting and 
monotonous, hardly interrupted by any action on the part of the Span- 
ish, had strung the nerves to the highest pitch, and everybody was 
anxious for the end to come. Suddenly the enemy attempts to escape. 
All the passions that had been smoldering under the ashes break forth. 
The welcome opportunity for settling accounts with the enemy had 
come at last, and with a wild rush the American ships fell upon their 
victims. At the beginning the American fire, owing to the excitement 
of the personnel and the great distances, was probably not very effect- 
ive; but when the Spanish admiral turned to westward and the other 
anne followed him the moral superiority of the Americans reasserted 
itself. The commanders, calm and cool-headed, had their ships follow 
the same course, and the Americans, having every advantage on their 
side, recommenced the fire on the fleeing ships, which soon resulted in 
their total annihilation. 

91. I have already spoken of the lack of training of the Spanish 
crews, the neglect of gun and torpedo target practice, the inadequate 
education of the commanders of the ships and torpedo-boat destroyers. 
It is mainly due to these deficiencies that the defeat was hastened and 
that the American ships sustained so few losses. Furthermore, there 
can be no excuse for having allowed the cruiser Cristobal Colon to 


17 


icave Spain without her heavy armament. It has also been stated that 
the rapid-fire guns of this cruiser were unserviceable, so that she was 
really completely defenseless. The training of the engine personnel 
also was totally unreliable, which is not surprising in view of the fact 
that the Spanish ships, as a rule, are not sent out on extensive cruises. 
The bottoms of the Spanish ships had not been cleaned for a long time, 
and as they had been lying in Santiago Harbor for a month and a half 
they were considerably fouled. Thus the cruisers Maria Teresa, 
Oquendo, and Vizcaya, which in all official books are credited with 18.5 
knots speed, went into the battle with a speed of from 10 to 12 knots 
at most, and the Cristobal Colon, which is the latest ship and was to 
run 20 knots, hardly attained a speed of 13.5. Under these circum- 
Stances, in every way unfavorable for the Spanish, whose crews were 
insufficiently trained and physically and morally enervated by long 
inactivity, whose ships were inferior in number, speed, and fighting 
efficiency, it is no wonder that the victory of the Americans was easy 
and paid for with insignificant sacrifices. 

2%. There was only one chance for the success of the sortie. It should 
have been made at night in scattered formation. After a personal 
investigation of the locality, it is my opinion that it is entirely practi- 
cable for a fleet to leave Santiago Harbor at night. The wreck of the 
Merrimac did not constitute an obstruction. It is true that Admiral 
Sampson’s report on the night blockade states that the light-ships 
were lying from 1 to 2 miles from Morro Castle, according to the state 
of the atmosphere, and that they lighted up the channel for half a mile 
inside. Hven the best search light, however, does not reach farther than 
1 mile. Therefore the illumination could not have been very eftect- 
ive. Moreover, the shore batteries, by opening fire upon the light-ships, 
could have compelled them to change their positions; but, strange to 
Say, this was never done. The dark nights at the time of the new moon 
about the middle of June would have been best suited for the enter- 
prise. Besides the four vessels of the fleet, two large Spanish merchant 
vessels lying in Santiago Harbor might have been taken out in order to 
deceive the enemy. The six vessels, with lights darkened, should have 
followed each other out of the harbor entrance, in predetermined order, 
as fast as possible. They should then have steered different courses, 
previously determined, with orders not to fight except when compelled 
to do so by the immediate vicinity of a hostile ship or when there was 
no possibility of escaping the enemy in the darkness. A rendezvous 
should have been fixed for the next day, where the ships that succeeded 
in escaping were to assemble. 

23. If the fleet did not dare attempt a night sortie and was neverthe- 
less compelled to leave the harbor in obedience to orders, then the 
ships should have been headed straight at the enemy. All weapons, 
including the torpedo and the ram, should have been used. <A bold 
attack in close formation was the only chance of success against the 

17176——2 


18 


superior hostile fighting forces, who would hardly have found time to 
form their lines. | 

24. I shall not attempt to discuss at length all the lessons which may 
be derived from the battle, because this would lead too far. I will only 
enumerate them, and confine myself to dwelling a little more fully on 
those which are of the greatest importance for practical service. 

(a) Abolition of all woodwork. 

(b) No unprotected torpedo tubes. 

(c) Protection for all gun crews against shell fire. 

(d) Protection of the fire-extinguishing apparatus against shell fire. 

(ec) Smokeless powder; greatest possible simplicity in the service of 
the guns and greatest possible rapidity of fire. 

(f) Good speed of the ships under norma! conditions. 

(g) Thorough training of the crews in all branches of the service. 

25. The last two are the most important. A ship may show: very 
brilliant results at the trial trip and be credited with the greatest 
speed in the different books on the navies of all nations; but for the 
officer who is to command the ship in battle this is not a criterion 
from which to judge of her efficiency. Frequent trial trips under full 
steam, making it possible to discover and cure defects of the machin- 
ery in-time of peace, and familiarizing the personnel with the function- 
ing of the vessel in all its details, can alone give the commander an 
idea of what he may expect of his ship in battle. Extensive cruises at 


war speed should also be made, in order that the personnel may get an - 


idea of how much more will be required in time of war. This is espe- 
cially important in the tropics, where the great heat materially affects the 
physical endurance and efficiency of the boiler and engine personnel. 

26. The most perfect training of the crews in all branches of the 
service, especially by all kinds of torpede and gun practice, as nearly 
as possible under war conditions, is the foundation of success. As I 
said in Part IV of this work, nothing should be left undone to attain 
the greatest perfection possible in time of peace. No expense should 
be spared to enable those who bear the responsibility of the battle— 
the chiefs of fleets and squadrons, as well as all commanders—thor- 
oughly to test the actual degree of efficiency of their crews by prac- 
tical exercises, resembling as nearly as possible the operations of 
actual warfare. 

27. Such exercises will also demonstrate whether the weapons, from 
a technical standpoint, are equal to all the exigencies of war. I learned, 
for instance, that the following defects were found to exist in the Amer- 
ican artillery matériel: 

(a) Brooklyn.—In the 5.7-centimeter rapid-fire guns cartridges were 
jammed in several instances. In the 20-centimeter guns the plugs 
stuck several times. Some of the 12.7-centimeter rapid-fire guns 
became unserviceable toward the end of the battle because the elevat- 
ing gear did not function properly, and all these guns had to be sup- 
plied with new mounts after the battle. 


















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(b) Texas.—The two 30.5-centimeter guns had been fired several times 
across the deck, considerably damaging the latter. A suggestion made 
in time of peace that the guns be tested in that respect had not been 
followed out. 

(c) Lowa.—On this ship, also, the deck had been damaged by the 
firing of the heavy guns. The training gear of the 20-centimeter guns 
had not been able to sustain the firing at great elevation. 

The most careful examination of the artillery matériel in time of 
peace is absolutely necessary. Even when the strictest requirements 
are made and fulfilled in testing the guns, it is no guarantee that the 
matériel will not in the course of time show defects on board ship. In 
order that such defects may not remain hidden, to become apparent 
only when the guns are used in actual war, at least part of the target 
practice should be held with full service charges. 


VIl. THE OCCUPATION OF PUERTO RICO. 


1. In my first visit to San Juan de Puerto Rico (see Part III of the 
Sketches), I found there, to my great astonishment, a comparatively 
large German colony. I learned that in all the principal towns on the 
island, such as Ponce, Mayaguez, Aguadilla, and Arecibo, Germans 
are likewise settled, and in the possession of large business houses, 
enjoy the esteem of the Spaniards as well as of the Puerto Ricans. 
Under these circumstances it appeared necessary to send thither a war 
ship for the protection of the Germans when the Government of the 
United States commenced action against Puerto Rico. I have success- 
ively visited the harbors of Mayaguez, Ponce, and San Juan. The first 
two were already occupied by the Americans, while the third city was 
still in the hands of the Spaniards. On the 13th of August it became 
known that peace negotiations had commenced, and hostilities ceased. 

No great battles were fought in this campaign; only a few minor 
skirmishes took place. But the American troops were marched up in 
Such a simple and skillful manner that the operations are not without 
interest. Moreover, our readers will be glad to learn some particulars 
about this beautiful island, in which these many years German mer- 
chants, mostly from Hamburg and Bremen, have exerted their best 
energy in steady, unremitting toil, and which now, as the price of vic- 
tory, falls into the lap of the United States. 

2, The accompanying map of the island is the latest and best pub- 
lished. It shows the different departments, so that a description is not 
necessary. All the turnpikes and roads which are to be considered in 
connection with the advance of the American troops, as well as the 
railroad skirting the coast, are also indicated on the map. The moun- 
tain range which extends nearly parallel to the southern coast from 
Adjuntas to Cayey is, on an average, not over 1,000 meters high, and 
from both towns is continued in several spurs to the eastward and 
westward. This range constitutes a weather barrier, as the fresh 
northeast trades cool the northern part of the island and provide 


20 


abundant rains, while in the southern part of the island the mountains 
prevent this moderation, and the heat often becomes unbearable. 
Numerous streams water the fertile soil, which in former years pro- 
duced mainly sugar, but now also coffee, tobacco, and bananas, and 
furnish large areas of magnificent pastures. The number of inhabitants 
in round numbers is 800,000. The area of Puerto Rico is about one- 
tenth that of Cuba, which has hardly 1,500,000 inhabitants. The 
whole island of Puerto Rico is inhabited. There are no extensive uneul- 
tivated stretches, as in Cuba. Still, much remains to be done to obtain. 
better yields than heretofore from the rich and fertile soil. In the first 
place, the agricultural methods should be improved, better communica- 
tion established with the coast, and, finally, the mineral treasures of 
the island exploited. In this latter direction hardly anything has been 
done. As far as the social conditions of the island are concerned, it 
has been spared the serious disorders that have been raging in Cuba 
during the last few decades. The Spanish, by means of military posts 
distributed all over the island, and especially the Guardia Civil, an 
excellent police system, have succeeded in maintaining order and 
safety throughout the country. There have been minor disturbances, 
it is true; but at no time has there been an actual rebellion against the 
Spanish Government, such as was spoken of at the beginning of the 
Spanish-American war. Nevertheless, there has gradually developed 
among the Puerto Ricans an intense hatred toward the selfish Spanish 
administration, and with open arms they received the Americans who 
came as liberators from the Spanish yoke. 

3. The general opinion, reinforced by the United States press, was 
that the troops would land east of San Juan, probably at Tajardo. 
General Miles was the only one who was informed as to the landing 
place selected, and he left Guantanamo on July 21, with the auxiliary 
cruiser Yale and seven transports with about 3,500 men. The battle- 
ship Massachusetts, the cruiser Columbia, and six small gunboats and 
auxiliary cruisers, among them the Diwxie, Annapolis, and Gloucester, 
accompanied the transport fleet. Upon reaching Mona Passage the 
fleet headed for the southern coast of Puerto Rico, and on July 25, the 
troops were landed at Guanica without encountering serious resistance. 
The very next day, after a short fight with the Spanish, Yauco, which 
controls the railway to Ponce, was occupied. 

On July 27, the Dixie, Annapolis, and several other vessels appeared 
in front of Ponce and demanded the surrender of the city. The United 
States general granted time until the next morning, and told the com- 
mander of the city that unless the surrender had taken place by that 
time he should at once proceed to bombard the city, and land his men. 
Captain-General Macias, at San Juan, had given the commander strict 
orders to defend the city to the utmost, but the combined efforts of the 
foreign consuls prevailed upon Colonel San Martin to agree to the sur- 
render of the city on condition that the Spanish troops would not be 
pursued for forty-eight hours. This agreement, however, of which the 


21 


United States commander had already been notified, was declared null 
and void by Captain-General Macias, who at the same time dischvaiged 
Colonel San Martin from office, and it was only due to the energetic 
efforts of the German and British consuls that the captain-general 
became convinced of the necessity of surrendering, and finally con- 
sented to the evacuation of the city. Thus the Americans took-posses- 
sion of Ponce at 6 a.m. on July 28, without loss of life or injury to 
property, and on July 29, they landed a large division of troops, con- 
sisting of from 5,000 to 6,000 men, with artillery and wagons. On 
August 1, two vessels occupied Arroyo, where about 3,006 men were 
landed. 

4, Thus the Americans in a short space of time had gained posses- 
sion of the three principal harbors on the southern coast of Puerto Rico 
without firing a single shot. They owe this first of all to the friendly 
disposition of the population and the lack of energy of the Spanish 
officers, who did not dare offer any resistance. General Miles’s sub- 
sequent plan of campaign is self-evident. The troops landed at Arroyo 
were to advance upon Guayama, thence to Cayey, which lies on the 
main road to San Juan. The fighting forces at Ponce were also to 
advance upon Cayey by way of Juana Diaz, Coamo, and Aibonito. The 
troops at Guanica were to advance by way of Yauco, San German, and 
Hormigueros, and occupy first Mayaguez, then Aguadilla and Arecibo. 
A glance at the map will show that this plan would compel the Spanish 
forces, in order not to be cut off, to retreat to San Juan. When all the 
United States forces had been concentrated at San Juan, they were to 
surround the city, supported by the blockading fleet, and it was here 
that the decisive blow was to fall. 

5. General Miles’s plan of campaign was carried out as intended. 
On August 8 General Schwan advanced from Yauco upon San German. 
At Hormigueros they were opposed by the Spanish, who with 1,000 
men occupied an excellent position; but as soon as the American artil- 
lery was lined up and the American lines advanced the Spanish evacu- 
ated the heights and retreated. On August 11 General Schwan took 
possession of the town of Mayaguez, which had been evacuated by the 
Spanish, and met with a hearty reception from the inhabitants. The 
American troops pursued the Spanish and succeeded in surprising them 
on August 12 at Las Marias. The Spanish troops were resting, with- 
out any special measures of precaution, on the bank of the Guasio 
River, when the Americans were discerned on the heights. As the 
river was very high from recent heavy rains, the Spanish had difficulty 
in crossing it. The American commander demanded their surrender; 
but it seems that the Spanish had opened fire, thereby compelling the 
Americans to answer with their artillery. This caused great confusion 
in the Spanish lines. Two companies only succeeded in crossing the 
river, the others had to surrender. The Spanish had 40 killed and 
wounded. Among the many prisoners who were taken to Mayaguez 
were several colonels and captains. 


22 


On August 4 the main body of the troops advanced on tle excellent 
road from Juana Diaz, a small town about 25 kilometers from Ponce. 
On August 9 they took Coamo, which the Spanish were holding with a 
force of about 1,000 men. The fight lasted five hours, and ended in 
the evacuation by the Spanish, as the Americans had succeeded in 
going around the enemy’s flank.. The Spanish had 15 killed, among 
them the commander in chief and and several officers. About 150 
were taken prisoners. The Americans had 7 wounded. The Spanish 
retreated to Aibonito, where they intrenched themselves in a fortified 
position. They were not effectively attacked here, because hostilities 
were suspended about that time. 

The third division of the American troops had advanced from Arroyo 
and taken Guayama on August 5. On August 8, while advancing 
toward Cayey, the Americans had a slight engagement with the enemy 
intrenched in a fortified position, ending in the retreat of the latter. 
But the American troops had to return to Guayama, because they did 
not consider themselves strong enough to accomplish the task set them-— 
viz, to advance as far as Cayey. When, on August 12, the Americans 
started a second time, they found the Spanish in the same fortified 
position. No fight took place, because the news arrived that peace 
negotiations had been entered into. 

6. According to the census of January 1, 1898, the Spanish had the 
following troops in the different departments: 


ARMY. 


Generals. Com- Officers.| Men. Total. 





manders. 

SAMO UA Ste cecckc cca keds cctcnctete nce eedecateeeee 2 39 136 2, 217 2, 394 

FATOCIDO i sac aa oo cle ioc dbiniin o Suis ae bwsine oe a seeas see cleo eee 1 15 253 
PAWUACIUAS AE iicls cores test etosthiaelsauidead cute a sea alceeeerineele 2 13 313 328 
DAV ROUND T Le teres steak wdconee ger es a se'ee ta et em alee ems - oe 3 51 1,101 1, 155 
ONCO me cacels cantemne a sieletaa et omndaniem ae oe ast se bce arsee ssa 5 51 Toll 1, 373 
ARAVAIA vee vem mis shen cone ie case cuiens ieee sane sls| ene emeiwe 4 44 997 1, 045 

INTIMACAO se s vee oe wens occ ee cce pee wee wet cee ap lee oeeee 1 16 320 
WARTUCS one oo nk ateames pee oblate aman ae ceemeie le ape Settee 1 4 96 101 
Totals evi dee, eee Ree fe 56 330 | 6, 614 7, 002 

NAVY 
a | Bernie ar 
: m- mechanics, arine 
Admirals. manders. Officers. and fire- | infantry. Total. 
men. 

AIL E ec lels site ani a'w aise siciate tee mata 1 9 20 287 22 339 
IATOCLUO seme e wise cas 5 a5 e'cla aeicstaccieeuloave dab enane lamereenaes 1 3°) 2chae eee 4 
SAAT hope Windle p vs vise os ARE eee ewe weck inca ab haan o age nas 1 2 late h a eee 3 
DIAVOR MOU Ry er occa e a we - cca Daten ersenalsnnceeceee se d feddavecces 4 | oa etae oaeere 5 
ION COe eters ons tc an bee ene eee meet eee epee acters 5. 5 eee 6 
SPOR YOM ee toca gs oes cc ecbcstuelenriviea as aemean cet teenie 1 2 | ceeeawmeae 3 
INTUIN BOBO le eteeie re aes ie wuya oon sae eee en meets meee n les eee ee 2 4 booth eee 6 
IN IOQUOM een aavige anos cescccecnaus tubes soaae stare ttleesinaaee ss 1 Ue ASH ccc 2 











23 


The volunteers have not been included, because, with very few excep. 
tions, they laid down their arms as soon as the Americans landed in 
Puerto Rico. 

7. In Puerto Rico, as well asin Cuba, no plans had been made for con- 
centrating the troops at the beginning of the war. The fighting forces 
were so small that landings of the enemy at any point on the coast 
could not be impeded. The troops, by remaining in their different 
departments, might find themselves under the necessity of having to 
fight far superior hostile forces, and finally to retreat within sight of 
the enemy in order not to be cut off. The best plan would have been 
to concentrate all the troops in a fortified position near Cayey, keeping 
up retrograde communication with San Juan. If the enemy had landed 
east or west of San Juan, it would have been easy, in view of the good 
road, to effect a change of front or for the whole force to retreat to 
San Juan, which was the most important point of the Spanish. If 
that city had been defended by 7,000 men, it could have resisted the 
enemy for a long time. It is true, Toe that without the prospect 
of assistance from the Navy, the final surrender of the city, as the 
result either of the harbor being forced by the enemy or of starvation, 
would have been only a question of time. 

8. At the time of our arrival at Mayaguez hostilities had just been 
suspended. General Schwan had taken charge of the administration of 
the department. ‘The inhabitants were entirely satisfied with the new 
order of things, but many families were mourning the fatal defeat of the 
Spanish troops at Las Marias. The prisoners taken by the Americans 
had been quartered in the barracks and were being strictly guarded. 
We had to abandon our attempt to inspect the scene of the battle 
because the road, owing to recent rains, was in very bad condition and 
obstructed by the numerous baggage carts of the American troops. 
But in order to gain at least an idea of the immediate surroundings of 
Mayaguez, I drove to Hormigueros, where the first engagement had 
taken place between American and Spanish troops. <A well-kept road 
follows the coast over almost level ground, passing through several 
small hamlets. Soon the scenery changes. Cane fields resplendent in 
their fresh verdure are seen in every direction, and beautiful hills 
closely covered with banana palms and coffee trees appear before our 
eyes and gradually rise higher and higher. 

In the distance the river may be seen, crossed by a number of iron 
bridges, over which the railroad passes that runs along the river. The 
road rises very gradually, and after we had passed over the top of the 
range of hills we saw at our feet the pretty town of Hormigueros. At 
its highest point stands the church from which one must gain a mag- 
nificent view over the whole region. We went there, and after mount- 
ing the stone steps into the belfry, we saw before our eyes a panorama 
of indescribable loveliness. Indeed, a better point could hardly be 
found from which to gain an idea of the exquisite beauty of Puerto 


24 


Rico. Far as the eye can see stretch the picturesque ranges of hills 
clad in the loveliest green; at their feet a few scattered cottages and 
small hamlets, and glistening streams winding their way through 


them. But we could not allow our eyes to be completely captivated by Mi 


the natural charms of the country. We had also to satisfy our military 
curiosity. One thing became evident at a glance, namely, that the 
church was the best tactical point of the whole region, as all the dif- 
ferent positions could be observed from there. The Spanish commander 
in chief appears to have realized this circumstance; for, as the kindly 
priest of the church told us, it had been his intention to occupy the 
church and line up his artillery on the adjoining hill; but the priest 
had succeeded in dissuading the commander from this plan, which 
would surely have entailed the destruction of the church and town. 
Probably no serious resistance had been planned by the Spanish, and 
they were therefore only occupying the range of hills between which a 
defile leads to the town of Mayaguez, to which the troops retreated as 
soon as the Americans commenced to advance after the first few vol- 
leys. In the little town of Hormigueros peace and quiet were reigning. 
The Americans had already appointed a mayor. A few families from 
Mayaguez had come hither to await further developments. On my 
return to Mayaguez I had an opportunity of inspecting a company of 
United States volunteers. They were nearly all tall, robust men, most 
of them with healthy complexions and of good military bearing. All 
the volunteers were equipped with Krag—Jérgensen rifles. 

9. On August 16 we left the harbor of Mayaguez and steamed to 
Ponce, where we arrived in the evening of the same day. The harbor 
was crowded with American war ships, auxiliary cruisers, and trans- 
ports; but as a result of the peace negotiations, many of the war ships 
had received orders to return to Guantanamo or to proceed to the 
United States, so that the harbor was considerably cleared during the 
next few days. General Gilmore, in the absence of General Miles, who 
was then at Coamo, had established the headquarters of his staff at the 
custom-house. The United States garrison was encamped near the 
harbor on both sides of the main road leading to Ponce. The camp 
consisted of ordinary tents, with camp beds raised a few feet above the 
ground. As it always rained several hours during the day and usually 
all night long, one may easily imagine the condition of this camp. 
Men were constantly at work digging new drains for the water. At 
times the guards and patrols surrounding the camp had to wade in the 
mud up to their knees. It is a wonder that there was not more sick- 
ness in the camp, for the American general told me there were only a 
few cases of malarial fever. But exposure to the burning rays of the 
Sun, to constant rains, and the exhalations of the soil is extremely 
dangerous in this climate, as the residents know only too well, and can 
not fail but have its injurious effects sooner or later. As a matter of 
fact, many cases of fever have subsequently developed among the 


29 


American troops. I can not understand why the military authorities 
had not exercised greater care. Would it not have been better to send 
the troops to Coamo, which is located on much higher ground, leaving 
only a small garrison at Ponce? Such a garrison would have been 
quite sufficient for the protection of the latter town, and might have 
been quartered in public buildings, such as the church, the theater, ete. 
The United States transport steamers are said to have had on board 
all the material necessary for the construction of a small shipyard. If 
it is true that they carried their preparation to that extent, then better 
provisions should also have been made for taking care of human lives. 
If it was not deemed advisable to quarter the men in the towns, then 
corrugated-tin barracks should have been taken along, which can be 
taken apart and speedily erected on piles driven into the ground. 
Ordinary tents were certainly inadequate. 

10. On one of the following days we made an excursion to the vicinity 
of Coamo, about 30 kilometers from Ponce. The beautiful wide road 
extending all the way to San Juan is a true work of art, and makes it 
possible to advance rapidly. The whole distance from Ponce to San 
Juan, about 135 kilometers, can be made in vehicles, by changing the 
horses twice, in fourteen to sixteen hours. The rise is very gradual. 
On both sides are small huts of natives with corrugated tin roofs, or 
covered simply with palm leaves and built on piles about | meter high. 
Soon we came out upon the open country, where wooded hills and val- 
leys alternated with coffee plantations and banana and sugar-cane 
fields. The profuse tropical vegetation, especially the slender palms 
with their magnificent crowns, is a constant delight to the eye. After 
the rain, which had been falling all through the preceding night, the 
foliage was particularly green and fresh and the shady road nearly free 
from dust. In several places the road is crossed by the river, which 
can usually be forded. Where it is too rapid bridges have been built. 
Upon reaching Juano Diaz the landscape becomes even more beautiful. 
The heights afford a splendid view of the whole region from the coast 
to the high mountain range. At Coamo we left the main road and soon 
reached a beautiful valley made famous by the “ Banos de Coamo.” 
There is a large hotel for the accommodation of visitors. The bathing 
establishment also is very conveniently arranged. <A natural spring 
furnishes sulphur baths. The only thing that reminded us of war dur- 
ing our trip were a few squads of American cavalry and long trains of 
wagons, each drawn by six mules, which were taking the necessary 
supplies to the troops encamped at Aibonito. From what we could 
learn, it seems that the American authorities were preserving excellent 
order and safety at Ponce and vicinity, but the Puerto Rican inhabit- 
ants showed their hatred for the Spanish so openly that in spite of the 
strict measures taken by the Americans there is danger of demonstra- 
tions by the inhabitants in that direction. 

1iL. On August 23 we made a second visit to San Juan. The mines 


26 


in the entrance had been removed and the channel was marked by 
buoys in the usual manner. Besides the Spanish gunboats Isabel IJ, 
General Conche, Oreola, and Ponce de Leon, and the torpedo-boat de- 
stroyer Terror, there were neither war nor merchant vessels in the har- 
bor. The city itself presented the same aspect as before the blockade. 
It was not until the latter part of August that steamers arrived and 
commerce and traffic were reestablished. I took advantage of our 
presence there to learn further particulars about the engagement 
between the torpedo-boat destroyer Terror and the United States 
auxiliary cruiser St. Paul. The commander of the Terror gave me the 
following account of the battle: i 


At 9 a.m. on June 22 the lookout at the fort signaled a suspicious vessel. The 
commander gave orders for the Isabel II to go out to reconnoiter and for the Terror 
to be ready for action. By 11.30 the vessel had come closer and the Isabel IJ went 
out. Upon sighting her, the hostile cruiser immediately hoisted her flag and waited. 
The Isabel IJ opened fire on the foe. The destroyer then received orders to go out 
and assist the Isabel. The Terror, which had been left by her fleet at Martinique, 
had not been able to recover her guns and ammunition, which during the voyage 
had been transferred to the Maria Teresa in order to make room for coal. The Terror 
therefore had no other weapons than her torpedoes and two 57-millimeter guns with 
little ammunition. The Isabel fought the St. Paul at a distance of from 10,000 to 
12,000 meters. As the utmost range of our guns was only 4,000 meters, we could not 
assist the Isabel by going closer to her. I therefore gave orders to head the Terror 
east, so as not to interfere with the Jsabel firing north’on the enemy. When we were 
sufficiently clear of her and had the open sea before us, I headed straight for the 
St. Paul at a speed of from 20 to 21 knots. 

The enemy, who hitherto had been firing on the Isabel, now directed upon us the 
well-aimed rapid fire of both her batteries, the lower one of which appeared to have 
eight, the upper one ten to twelve guns. At 4,000 meters we opened fire with our 
guns, in order to keep up the spirit of the crew during the long interval between 
the beginning of the hail of projectiles and the launching of the torpedo. Our fire 
was very accurate. At the first shot we saw the shell explode on the stern. Sev- 
eral other shots also hit their target, and our men were wild with joy. We had 
approached to within 1,200 meters and were about to launch the torpedo when the 
Terror commenced to veer to starboard. I had the helm shifted to port, but the 
ship kept on turning. ThenI ordered the port engine stopped, and still the ship 
continued to turn to starboard. I then learned that a shell had exploded on deck 
and destroyed the leads to the steering gear and telegraph, so that the vessel fol- 
lowed the movements of the screw and was unmanageable. The hand-steering 
gear was at once put in operation; but as we passed the enemy at such close range, 
several projectiles hit us, one of them passing through the port side into the engine 
room, where it burst. The engine room became flooded and the engine appeared to 
have been disabled. We just managed to steam into the harbor. 


From an inspection of the Terror it appeared that the fatal shell, 
ranging obliquely downward, had passed through the ship’s side, ‘hist 
off a steam gauge, killed on men, and struck the lower edge of the 
main steam pipe, tearing off its covering. This had deflected the shell, 
and it had passed out through the starboard side. It was through the 
hole made by the projectile in passing out that the engine room had 
been flooded up to the lower edge of the steam cylinder; but the 
engines continued to run, so that the Terror, though with gradually 


27 


slackened speed, was able to reach the harbor under her own steam. 
The shortest distance between the Terror and the St. Paul had been 
800 meters. The gunboat [sabel II, I was told by her commander, had 
not gone closer than within 6,000 meters of the enemy. 

12. We then visited. the fortification works and made the following 
observations, which may be considered as a supplement to the descrip- 
tion of the bombardments contained in Part III of these Sketches: 

(a) Morro Castle-—On the highest terrace are three 15-centimeter 
Ordofiez guns of 30 calibers length and two 24-centimeter breech-load- 
ing howitzers of modern type; direction of fire northwest to west. On 
the next lower terrace are two 15-centimeter Ordonez guns. These are 
all the guns that had been mounted. No guns were dismounted during 
the bombardments. The walls of the fort are over 6 meters thick and 
extremely solid. They show many hits of heavy, medium, and light 
artillery. The heavy projectiles had entered the walls to the depth of 
2 meters and torn large pieces out of the masonry work. The smaller 
projectiles had done very little damage, which had already been repaired. 
One shell had struck the corner of the wall on the lower terrace and 
killed two of the men serving the guns and wounded several others by 
shell fragments and débris. 

(b) Cristobal Castle-—Two 15-centimeter Ordoftez guns of 30 calibers 
length, trained north, fired about eighty rounds during the bombard- 
ment. A little to the rear are three 24-centimeter breech-loading how- 
itzers of modern type. At one of these an enfilading shot passing 
over Morro Castle had struck the breech and killed one man. As a 
result of this accidental hit, and to protect the men serving the farther 
guns against shell fire and débris, earth traverses had been thrown up 
between the guns after the battle. A little further back and to the 
east three 15-centimeter guns, with an arc of fire north by way of east 
to southwest, and hence also adapted to fire on the land, were mounted 
on central-pivot carriages, These took part in the fight with about 
thirty rounds. Finally, at the Princesa Battery, adjoining Cristobal 
Castle on the east, there are four more 15-centimeter guns and two 
24-centimeter howitzers. Cristobal Castle and the Princesa Battery 
sustained only a few hits, slightly damaging the outer walls. 

(c) The howitzer and gun batteries of the harbor entrance show no 
serious injuries. Morro Castle appears to have been the main object 
of the American fire. The fact that many shells did not explode has 
been much commented upon. 

(d) Besides the fortifications mentioned above, the Spanish had 
erected a new battery at Escambron, with three 24-centimeter how- 
itzers of modern type in central-pivot mounts, for indirect fire. For 
land defense a series of earthworks had been erected near San Antonio 
and armed with mortars and bronze guns. 

13. As we left Morro Castle Spanish soldiers were engaged in tak- 
ing down the shield with the Spanish coat of arms over the main 


28 


entrance. As the remains of the ever-glorious Columbus had been 
removed from the cathedral at Havana, where they had a beautiful 
and well-cared-for resting place, so it was also desired to carry to 
Spain this escutcheon which for centuries had been the witness of the 
victories and greatness of the Spanish nation. When both of these— 
the remains of the man to whom the whole world owes so much and 
the emblem of Spanish power—reach Spain there will be profound sad- 
ness throughout the whole country over the final loss of its colonies. 
The history of this short struggle is another example of the instability 
of power and fame in the ever-changing destinies of the nations of 
the earth! 
-) 


OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 
War Notes No. V. . 


INFORMATION FROM ABROAD 


Bike 


EFFECT OF THE GUN FIRE 


OF THE 


UNITED STATES VESSELS 


IN THE 


BATTLE OF MANILA BAY 


(MAY 1, 1898). 


By Lrevr. JOHN M. ELLICOTT, U. 8. N., 
Intelligence Oficer, U. S. S. Baltimore. 





WASHINGTON: 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFIOR, 
1899, 





— 


OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 
Wak NOTES No. V. 


INFORMATION FROM ABROAD. 


HFFECT OF THE GUN FIRE 


OF THE 


PvP D STATES VESSELS 


IN THE 


BATTLE OF MANILA BAY 


(MAY 1, 1898). 


By Lirut. JOHN M. ELLICOTT, U. 8. N., 
Intelligence Oficer, U. 8S. 8. Baltimore. 





OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, 


WASHINGTON: 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 
1899, 





EFFECT OF GUN FIRE, BATTLE OF MANILA BAY, 


May 1, 1898. 


U.S. 8. BALTIMORE, 
Tloilo, P. I., January 1, 1899. 

Srr: I have the honor to submit the following report on the effects 
of the gun fire of the United States fleet upon the Spanish war vessels 
in the battle of May 1, 1898, and respectfully request that it be for- 
warded to the Office of Naval Intelligence. The report is based upon 
a personal examination of all the vessels, personal conversations with 
officers who served on them in the action, and extracts from Admiral 
Montojo’s official report. 


REINA CRISTINA. 


This vessel was flagship of Admiral Montojo during the greater part 
of the first engagement. She received a large concentration of gun 
fire and was placed hors de combat by conflagrations fore and aft, the 
destruction of her personnel, the destruction of her steering gear, and 
the bursting of a shell in her super-heater. She was then sunk by the 
Spaniards and abandoned in shoal water under the north wall of 
Cavite heading eastward, where she burned, with bulwarks awash. 
During the conflagration there were frequent heavy explosions. The 
injuries visible above water afterwards were as follows: 

One large shell across bulwarks at break of forecastle, cutting away 
starboard lower boom. 


One large shell swept bridge, apparently from starboard to port, and 
destroyed starboard search light. This may have been theshell described 
by Admiral Montojo as destroying the steam steerer. 

In the forward smokestack the following shells: One 8-inch low, one 
8-inch high, one 6-pounder low, one 6-pounder high; and in forward 
escape pipe one 5-inch and one 6-pounder midway. 

In ventilator forward of after smokestack, one 6-pounder waist high 
and one 6-pounder midway. ; 

The after smokestack fell 60 degrees to port, probably caused by the 
large shell mentioned by Admiral Montojo as exploding in the super- 
heater. This stack was struck, apparently while still upright, by one 
8-inch shell low, two 6-pounders near the top, and one 5-inch midway. 

Underneath topgallant forecastle one 8-inch shell entered near the 


deck and close under break of forecastle, going from port to starboard 
5 


6 


and forward at an angle of 45 degrees, and burst under the forecastle, 
a large fragment passing out on starboard side. 

Two 5-inch shell also penetrated under the forecastle on port side 
well forward, 6 feet above deck, and burst. 

One 5-inch entered on starboard side in same locality and passed out 
on port side without exploding. 

The mizzenmast, although much burned, showed evidences of having 
been pierced six times, and the fore and main masts once, by shells of 
various calibers. 

The starboard after launch’s davit was shot away, as if by a large 
shell. 

An 8-inch shell pierced the shield of the port forward 16-centimeter 
gun, above and to left of the breech, and exploded, slipping the elevat- 
ing are band just its width to the rear and wrecking the elevating 
wheel, rod, and pinion on left side of gun. <A fragment of this shell 
wrecked the elevating gear on the right side of the opposite gun. The 
portion of the shield penetrated sloped at an angle of about 30 degrees 
with the axis of the shell. The bursting of the shell about 2 feet in 
rear of its point of impact was coordinated by a huge hole torn upward 
in a sheet-iron bulwark rail arched over the sponson embrasure. 

Admiral Montojo reports additional injuries as follows: 

A shell burst on the forecastle, disabling all the crews of the four rapid-fire guns 
and driving splinters from the foremast which wounded the helmsman, who was 
steering on the bridge. 

A shell burst on the orlop deck, setting fire to the lockers of the crew, who fortu- 
nately succeeded in putting out the fire. 

The enemy * * * covered us with a hail of rapid-fire projectiles. 

About half past 7 a shell completely destroyed the steam steerer. 

Another shell exploded aft, putting nine men out of action. 

* * * Another carried away the mizzen truck and gaff, bringing down the 
ensign and my flag, which were immediately replaced. 

Another shell burst in the wardroom * * * and destroyed the wounded who 
were there under treatment. 

Another burst in the after ammunition room, filled the compartments with smoke, 
and prevented the coupling of the handwheel. It being impossible to keep down 
the fire, this ammunition room had to be flooded when the cartridges were begin- 
ning to explode. 

Amidships * * * a large shell had penetrated the super-heater, putting out of 
action a gunner’s mate and twelve men who were serving the guns. 

Another disabled the starboard bow gun. 

* * * The fire forward was renewed by a shell which penetrated the side and 
burst on the orlop. 

When many men had already been saved * * * ashell killed her heroic cap- 
tain * * * who was directing the rescue of the crew. 


Summing up, it is in evidence or officially recorded that the Cristina 
was struck by five 8-inch, five 5-inch, and thirteen other large shell, and 
by seven 6-pounder and nine other projectiles, or thirty-nine projectiles 
in all. These are not all, as Admiral Montojo reports having been coy- 
ered by a hail of rapid-fire projectiles, and in conversation has estimated 
that the Cristina was hit about seventy times. 


7 


CASTILLA. 


This vessel had developed such weakness in steaming to Subig Bay 
some days before the battle that she was not under way on the Ist of 
May, but in the beginning of the engagement was moored head and 
stern in the line of battle, her port broadside bearing. A string of 
iron lighters loaded with sand was moored in prolongation of Sangley 
Point to protect her water line. During the engagement her bower 
chain was cut by a shell and from the impact of another shell she 
swung around till her starboard broadside was presented. Being a 
wooden vessel she was readily and repeatedly set on fire. About 10 
o’clock, while the United States squadron was drawn off, her flag came 
down, either by design or accident, and she burst into flames fore and 
aft. She then sank until her main deck was awash, and her bulwarks 
aud upperworks were completely consumed by flames. Her forward 
smokestack fell 60 degrees toward the starboard quarter, probably 
weakened, like the Cristina’s, by the explosion of a large shell. Next 
to the Cristina she received the greatest injury from gun fire. Injuries 
visible to inspection are as follows: 

One 5-inch shell dismounted 37-millimeter gun on port forward 
bridge over sponson. : 

One 6-inch cut fore and aft beam over port forward gun sponson. 

Seven small shell passed through forward smokestack. 

Five small shell passed through forward drum room. 

A large shell tore a 4-foot hole in the port side below the main deck 
and just abaft the port midship gun. 

There 1s a similar injury on the starboard side, nearly opposite. 

One 5-inch shell through the after smokestack. 

Three 5-inch shell, close together, entered port side under main deck, 
abaft after smokestack. 

One 6-pounder in after smokestack. 

One 6-pounder in after escape pipe. 

Two 5-inch entered port side between mainmast and after sponson. 

One 5-inch passed through shield of 37-millimeter gun on port after 
bridge, over sponsor, dismounting gun. 

One 6-pounder cut forward part of upper edge of port after gun- 
sponson embrasure. 

One 1-pounder cut forward vertical edge of same. 

One 5-inch raked outside of starboard after sponson. 

One 6-inch entered starboard side, under main deck, under midship 
gun. 

There are two jagged holes, 4 feet and 1 foot in diameter, on starboard 
side under main deck, abreast after smokestack. 

One 5-inch on starboard side under main deck, just abaft forward 
sponson. 

One 5-inch through after side of forward starboard sponson, 


8 


One 5-inch through port after sponson, forward side, near deck. 

T'wo sears of small shells on port after 16-centimeter gun shield. 

Several small holes in after smokestack as if from fragments of a 
bursting shell. 

Total, two 6-inch, twelve 5-inch, and four other large shell; three 
6-pounders and sixteen other small shell; thirty-seven shell in all. 
Survivors tell of three 8-inch shell which burst on the orlop deck for- 
ward, amidships, and aft, causing fires which could not be controlled. 
This raises the known hits to forty. 

Admiral Montojo states: 

The Castilla * * * had all her guns put out of action except one on the poop. 
*“ * * Riddled by shot and in flames from the enemy’s shells, she was sunk and 
abandoned by her crew. ; 

Survivors state that they were rescued by boats from shore which 
came off in obedience to a prearranged signal. 


DON ANTONIO DE ULLOA. 


This vessel was not in repair on May 1, parts of her machinery being 
on shore. She was moored head and stern on the left of the Spanish 
line, in Canacao Bay, just behind Sangley Point, her starboard broad- 
side bearing, the port guns having been removed to be emplaced on 
Shore. The low sandy point was expected to form some protection to 
her hull. She was only manned by men enough to fight her starboard 
battery, about half of her normal complement. She received but little 
gun fire in the first engagement, but was riddled and sunk by the lead- 
ing American ships in the second, and was abandoned with colors 
flying. She listed heavily to starboard just before settling, but righted 
on the bottom and lay with her poop awash, superstructure and fore- 
castle above water. She had sent down yards and topmasts and these 
Spars were on shore, except the fore yard, which had been-untrussed 
but not sent down. The slings of this yard were cut during action 
and the yard fell across the forecastle on the sheet bits, breaking the 
beam at the break of the forecastle. The other injuries visible above 
water are as follows: 

One 6-pounder entered under forecastle from forward, passed through 
the midship waist ventilator and burst in front of pilot house, near 
deck. 

One 8-inch raking shell entered at break of topgallant forecastle 
just under the deck and burst. 

One 8-inch burst just under the superstructure deck, port side, on 
line with after end of pilot house, a long half fragment passing out 
through the skin of the ship. 

One 5-inch came over starboard rail a little farther aft and passed 
out through port bulwarks. 

Six 6-pounders came over same way between superstructure and 
_ poop, and passed out through hammock nettings on port side. 


9 


One 8-inch passed clean through both sides, starboard to port, just 
under after break of superstructure deck and near mainmast. 

One 6-inch came in starboard rail abaft mainmast and passed out 
through port hammock netting. 

Seven large shells, probably 5-inch, ripped across superstructure 
deck, coming from direction of eioned bow. 

One 8-inch across forecastle from starboard to port dismounted star- 
board 6-pounder gun, cutting away the mount. 

One 6-inch shell passed through the shield of this gun. 

Three 6-pounders from starboard to port passed through mount of 
port 6-pounder gun. 

One small raking shell gouged skin of ship just forward of port 
sponson. 

One large shell ripped poop in front of mizzenmast. 

One large shell cut starboard binnacle stand. 

Three large shells ripped poop deck, coming from direction of star. 
board bow. 

Two large shells burst under poop, one near break and one aft, fore- 
ing up the ‘deck. 

The left side of after 4.7-inch gun shield and the sponson rail were 
cut through by a 6-inch shell. 

Total hits observable: Four 8-inch, three 6-inch, one 5-inch, and four- 
teen other large shells; ten 6- mernden and one other small shell; 
thirty-three projectiles in all. 

Admiral Montojo states: 


The Ulloa * * * was sunk by the holes made along her water line by the 
enemy’s projectiles. 


DON JUAN DE AUSTRIA. 


This vessel was sunk by the Spaniards behind Cavite Arsenal, in 
Bacoor Bay, about two cables off shore abreast the west arsenal gate, 
after retiring from battle at the end of the first engagement. She 
was anchored by the port anchor and sank heading east, her top- 
gallant forecastle above water and poop awash. After being aban- 
doned, and while sinking, she was set on fire by a party from the 
Petrel sent for that purpose, and burned from the after engine-room 
bulkhead to the stern. Her starboard guns remained trained on the 
bow, and port ones on the beam. 

Twelve empty 6-pounder cartridge shells lay at starboard forecastle 
gun and nine at the port one. A full box of 1-pounder ammunition 
remained on starboard side of superstructure near the pilot house. 

The injuries to this vessel were as follows: 

Two 6-pounders, or smaller, scarred foremast. 

One 6-pounder and one 5-inch entered port side under topgallant 
forecastle and burst without causing fire. 

One 6-inch or 8-inch passed through superstructure deck under the 


10 


bridge on port side and burst in the captain’s galley, causing no fire, 
there being no woodwork in its neighborhood. 

Another similar shell coming from same direction (one and one-half 
points abaft the beam) struck the superstructure deck near the corner 
of the pilot house, glanced up and demolished the steering wheel and 
gear and engine telegraphs. 

Two 6-pounders passed through the pilot house, one from port to 
starboard low, and one from starboard to port halfway up. 

One 5-inch cut through the mizzenmast about halfway up. 

One 5-inch entered under port hawse pipe and burst, damaging 
port torpedo tube. 

One 6-pounder entered at waterway under superstructure on main 
deck, port side. 

One 5-inch entered port hammock netting abreast the mainmast. 

One 6-pounder struck the rail abaft the port after 47-inch gun. 

No further injuries were found after the vessel was raised. Summing 
up, she was hit by the following shells: Two 6-inch or 8-inch, four 5- 
inch, five 6-pounders, and to other small shells; thirteen projectiles in all. 

The Austria has two bow torpedo tubes. When raised a 14.2-inch 
Schwartzkopff torpedo was in the upper starboard outboard rack 
abreast the tube, and another lay on the deck in rear of the starboard 
tube without a head. 

The Austria assisted in rescuing the men from the Castilla before retir- 
ing behind the arsenal. 


ISLA DE LUZON. 


This vessel and the Isla de Cuba maneuvered together on the Spanish 
right flank, more retired than the other vessels, circling together at 
considerable speed. The Luzon retired behind the arsenal at the end 
of the first engagement, anchoring near the Austria, and was sunk by 
her owncrew. Her stern settled upon a submerged wreck, keeping the 
cabin above water and the topgallant forecastle awash. After sinking 
her head lay northeast, she being about a cable’s length southwest of 
the Austria. She was set on fire and burned by the same party which 
burned the Austria, the damage by fire being almost identical. 

One 4.7-inch common shell, nose fuzed, remained in a rack between 
the after guns. 

The injuries by gun fire were as follows: 

One large shell crossed her rail in wake of the two forward guns, 
disabling both guns. 

One shell cut the chain topping lift of the fore gaff, letting the peak 
fall across the bridge. 

The Luzon assisted the Cuba in rescuing men from the Reina Cristina 
before retiring behind the arsenal. 

Admiral Montojo states that— 


The Luzon had three guns dismounted and some small injuries to her hull, 


13 


There seem, therefore, to have been three hits in all. No additionai 
injuries could be discovered when this vessel was raised. 


ISLA DE CUBA. 


Admiral Montojo transferred his flag to this vessel when the Cristine 
was abandoned. After rescuing a part of the latter’s crew she stood 
in behind the arsenal and was anchored by the starboard anchor a 
cable’s length southwest of the Luzon, heading southeast. She was 
sunk by the Spaniards and burned by the Petrel’s party in the same 
manner as the Austria and Luzon. Her main-battery guns remained 
trained on the bow. This vessel used armor-piercing shells from her 
after 4.7-inch guns, and these being the only guns of that caliber firing 
armor-piercing shells in the engagement, it must have been one of these 
which struck the Baltimore. 

The injuries to the Cuba were as follows: 

One 6-pounder through the pilot house, starboard to port. 

One shell cut away both forward vangs abreast the pilot-house rail. 

One 6-pounder passed through under the topgallant forecastle with- 
out exploding. 

One 6-pounder glanced from left side of starboard after 4.7-inch gun 
shield. 

One 6-pounder struck conning tower shoulder high, but did not 
penetrate. 

Total hits, four 6-pounders and one unknown caliber; five in all. 

The Ouba showed no additional injuries when raised. 


MARQUES DEL DUERO. 


The Duero was in action in the left wing of the Spanish line and 
under steam. She assisted in rescuing the survivors of the Cristina 
and retired like the others behind the arsenal, where she was anchored 
close to the shore, about 800 yards west of the Cuba, heading east, and 
was there scuttled and abandoned. A party from the Petrel burned 
her. She was entirely gutted by fire and lies with bulwarks awash. 
She shows the following injuries from gun fire: ; 

One 8-inch shell entered close under topgallant forecastle deck, 
starboard side, and probably exploded. 

One 6-inch very close to the latter, probably exploded; there being 
no evidences of egress by either of these shells. 

One 6-pounder passed through midship-gun sponson, starboard side, 
forward of gun shield. 

One 6-pounder passed through after bulwarks, starboard side, down 
through deck and out port side near break of poop. 

Admiral Montojo reports: 


The Duero had one engine crippled, as well as her 12-centimeter bow gun and one 
of her sponsons. 


Thus there seem to have been five hits in all. 


12 


VELASCO. 


This vessel was undergoing extensive repairs and lay at moorings 
near the east water front of Cavite arsenal. Her main deck in wake 
of the boilers had been removed to take out the latter, which were on 
shore. A new superstructure deck had been laid, but was unfinished. 
She had no steering gear in place. She took no part in the action. 
All her guns had been removed to be mounted in shore batteries. She 
was sunk by the Spaniards after the first engagement and then burned 
by a party from the Petrel. She lies on an even keel, heading westward, 
with bulwarks awash, and was not seriously injured by fire. There are 
evidences of the explosion of a quantity of small-arm ammunition on 
her deck aft, probably when she was burned. She was struck by one 
stray shell, which crossed her stern from port to starboard, carrying 
away the taffrail and kedge-anchor fluke on starboard quarter. 


GENERAL LEZO. 


Admiral Montojo states that this vessel was under repair and not in 
action. After the second engagement she was found anchored in 
Bacoor Bay by the port anchor about 2 cables south of the Luzon, 
heading south and settling. She was burned by a party from the 
Petrel, her after magazine exploding with great violence, as well as 
some ammunition on deck. Her midship guns were missing and, 
although she had a bow torpedo tube, there were no evidences of tor- 
pedoes on board. Theelevating gear of her 9-centimeter bow gun had 
been damaged by a projectile. She lies with main deck about 2 feet 


under water. 
ARGOS. 


The Argos was a hydrographic survey vessel lightly armed and not in 
the fight. She remained anchored behind the arsenal about 800 yards 
west of the Velasco, and was scuttled by the Spaniards and burned by 
a party from the Petrel. She settled till her bulwarks were awash, 
heading east. One large shell struck her starboard bulwarks at break 
of forecastle, passing outward. 


Summary of hits in evidence or officially reported. 


Num- 





Name of vessel. ber of Remarks. 
hits. 
PUI MCTIBWIUR ovenencnendurons os ester amtace Momence reacts 39 | Probably not more than half. 
CRSGLLA a ete as secon. veces ce tebomees pecan eeeatar neon smene 40 Do. 
ones ntonio de Ulioa i.) toe ee ee, ae 33 Do. 
Wonk UAnidorA UStiia . i.e eee nonce cen tee ee eee 13 | Complete record. 
islane Oubarecces> ce: ate come eee eubsieasd mee ctehices 5 Do. 
DALE MIO MBO sons. 2 .wnino een ten enema Cemones be bod fer coe 3 Do. 
Marques ceL-Duero .. <2. 22s crake ee eee ey eo Pee 5 | Probably more. 
ORBBEO Megiete ncn ats cness oc ateamneRatere was estes Oba Tees 1} Probably all. 
(FOnorAl OZ veo er Loos 48. Sokm. eee Cer eredcec caren. 1 Do. 
APSOSM see ensaest oiuas cb cedes scunbnane crate ther de Se eee 1 Do. 
TDDB MEW eS + nsx’ va oad sea Sea See cacan a eeeeee 141 











13 


Of these, thirteen were § inch, six 6-inch, and twenty-two others 5-inch 
or larger; thirty-one were 6-pounders and twenty-nine others smaller 
calibers. 

The Spanish ships had removed all light spars, slung gaffs, and 
snaked rigging, but they went into action without unshipping awning 
stanchions, ridge ropes, or canopy frames, and they carried many of 
their boats. They were all painted gray except the Castilla. She was 
still white except her gun sponsons, which were gray, and her smoke- 
stacks yellow. 

The killed and wounded, as nearly as I have been able to ascertain 
by painstaking inquiry, were as follows: 




















Vessel. Killed. | Wounded.| Total. 

Rar CN IIIT Doe ooo aoe oe coe Bec tote salem celine ec ccs sec eaccusceceseuns 130 90 220 
eT NS, one sea ee Sieg aS pe RE i 8 oS ee ee ee en 23 80 103 
Shavte y=, UCT a Spe le ie aR I a SE Sis on i ae a eee eer eT a 2 2 
Pe amrePIGMZOlN se. s+ os 524 oo ss - = ete ae me clemeriemrewiceece (os ee sans se ccnsmeie ieee weiss 6 6 
Doe a. dro, Ta AERO eee een = See Soc boo Oe ep OSCR Ee ae eee tesa Aone rere ee 22 
Ia TRT RESET TAN LL OL U LO eae fe cei ere ee oe ee Ribose anise Selon ticec nic nlcee ns 8 10 18 
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TIME hs tint Se SaSBoe hE dooa meio: MADE SS Ae Bsa eee eae ke 167 214 381 











Ofiicers killed and ineluded in the above: Reina Christina, captain 
and six others; Castilla, one; Don Antonio de Ulloa, captain and two 
others. 

The total casualties agree with Admiral Montojo’s official report. 

The following points in connection with my examination seem to be 
brought out or emphasized: 

1. The sides of iron and steel built cruisers do not arrest projectiles 
enough to explode them. 

2. The incendiary effect of bursting 8-inch shells is great, and far 
greater than would seem proportionate to that of lower calibers. 

3. At ranges over 2,500 yards the gun shields of cruisers are in no’ 
sense a protection, but insure the annihilation of the gun’s crew and 
the disabling of the gun if struck by a large projectile. 

4, War ships of the present day will generally be placed hors de 
combat by conflagration and the destruction of their personnel before 
they are sunk by gun fire. 

Very respectfully, JOHN M. ELLICOTT, 
Lieutenant, United States Navy, Intelligence Officer. 


To the COMMANDING OFFICER, U.S. 8S. BALTIMORE. 


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OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 
WaR Notss No. VI. 


INFORMATION FROM ABROAD. 


THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 


BLOCKADES AND COAST DEFENSE. 


BY 


SEVERO GOMEZ NUNEZ, 
CAPTAIN OF ARTILLERY. 


TRANSLATED FROM THE SPANISH. 





OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 


WASHINGTON : 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 
1899. 





OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 
WaR Nortss No. VI. 


INFORMATION FROM ABROAD. 


THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 


BLOCKADES AND COAST DEFENSE. 


BN 


SEVERO GOMEZ NUNEZ, 
CAPTAIN OF ARTILLERY. 


sae TRANSLATED FROM THE SPANISH. 








OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 


—_—= o> ¢ a __— 


WASHINGTON : 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 
1899. 





INTRODUCTORY. 


Since the issue of the interesting diary by Lieut. Miillér y Tejeiro, 
of the Spanish navy, there has been nothing written in Spain on the 
war worthy of reproduction until lately a work by Severo Gémez 
Niiiez, a captain of artillery, who served in the city of Habana during 
the war. The aversion of the Spaniards to writing on the war and 
their reticence thereon is characterized by the writer as a “deathlike 
Silence.” In his final conclusions he states: 

It is surprising how much has been written in foreign countries on the Spanish- 
American war during these few months. We have before us dozens of American, 
English, French, Italian, and German books, reviews, and periodicals, in which 
writers relate, to their hearts’ content, the phases of our defeat. And in the face of 
this wonderful activity, which often interprets erroneously the causes of the appall- 
ing decline of Spain, we, on the other hand, preserve deathlike silence. This is 
not as it should be. In the United States, for instance, there is not a single officer 
of high rank who took an active part in the war but has furnished, in books or 
reviews, an exposition of the facts, substantiated by documents, and the Govern- 
ment, in its turn, has followed the same plan and published reports of the Army 
and Navy. Among us, as stated, deathlike silence reigns, and thus it is that foreign 
critics lack all knowledge of our claims to vindication which, though slight, may 
nevertheless throw light on many things, for by the side of much that is bad and 
for which we are being justly censured, there is also some good which is being 
ignored, while it should be truthfully and conscientiously set forth, so that we may 
not be judged without being heard and considered more inefficient and incapable 
than we really are. 


The correspondence of Admiral Cervera, which was published by the 
Office of Naval Intelligence at the close of the recent war with Spain, 
and was obtainable only in part, is given in full in this work. 

This translation of Captain Niiiez’s book is complete except where 
indicated in the first chapter. The paragraphs there omitted are the 
personal opinions of Captain Nijfiez regarding the actions of our people. 
His feelings under the circumstances are pardonable, but his ideas have 
no historical value. 

The concluding chapter of a previous work on the Spanish-American 
war by Captain Ninez, entitled Ships, Guns, and Small Arms, is given 
in Appendix A. 

Appendix B is the decree of the council assembled in the trial of 
General José Toral Velasquez, commander in chief of the Spanish 

3 


4 


forces, and other officers engaged in the defense and surrender of San- 
tiago de Cuba, translated from El Mundo Naval Ilustrade of Septem- 


ber 15 and October 1, 1899. 
RICHARDSON CLOVER, 


Commander, U. S. N., Chief Intelligence Officer. 
Navy DEPARTMENT, October 5, 1899. 


Approved: 
A. 8. CROWNINSHIELD, 
Chief of Bureau of Navigation, 


TABLE OF CONTENTS. 


I cn evn wc enlace nee holes asin nes enn nce cecn ee ewan e ene eee 
CHAPTER I.—THE UNITED STATES PLAN OF CAMPAIGN: 

Political blindness—What Spain could do—What the United States could 

fm—Nayal strategy 222-022. 22--..4.---- ears eas Sa om 
CHAPTER II.—BLOCKADES AND PRIVATEERING: 

Laws regulating them—Letters of marque and reprisal—Brutality of 

blockades—Blockading on a large scale..........---------------------: 
CHAPTER IIJ.—OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SQUADRON: 

Before the arrival of Cervera’s squadron—What the Naval Annual says— 

Initial orders of the Navy Department at Washington..-....----..----- 
CHAPTER 1V.—OPERATIONS OF OUR SQUADRON: 

Opinions of Admiral Cervera—Replies thereto—Appalling deficiency of 

our naval power—Sortie of the squadron .......----.------------------ 
CHAPTER V.—THE BEGINNING OF THE END: 

Increase of the United States fleet—Operations on the Cuban coast— 
Bombardment of different ports—Operations against Puerto Rico— 
Destruction of our cables—Our squadron at Santiago......-.---------- 

CHAPTER VI.—BLOCKADE OF HARBORS: 

The Oquendo and Vizcaya—Blockade of the coast—Aspect of the blockade 
of Habana—Conditions of the blockade of Santiago—Sinking of the 
Merrimac—A few strange facts ........-.---+ 0-2-2 ee ene woe ee eee eee 

CHAPTER VII.—Coast DEFENSE: 

Stationary defenses—Mobile defenses—Shore batteries—Sea forts—Float- 
ing batteries—Torpedoes—Torpedo boats—Monitors—Battleships and 
fone oa als Sia see ain a wp Sale wines owns <n be Hm siete 

CHAPTER VIII.—Wuat A MILITARY PORT SHOULD BE: 

Choice of location—Commercial cities—Military ports—Geographical sit- 

mstion—Santiago de Cuba... 2.2... 250 oe eens ce enon soem en cee nee ween eee 
CHAPTER IX.—CONCLUSIONS: ; 

The political aspect—The naval aspect—The military aspect—The needs 

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THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 


BLOCKADES AND COAST DEFENSE. 


By SEVERO GOMEZ NUNEZ, Captain of Artillery. 
[Translated from the Spanish. | 


INTRODUCTION. 


1 frankly acknowledge that I bad considerable misgivings when I 
gave the first book of this work to the public. 

I was afraid that a storm would be raised against it, and although I 
always try to use moderation in my criticism, I had at times to fight 
with so many obstacles in conforming to that line of conduct that I 
was tempted to tear up what I had written. 

But the conviction triumphed within me that anyone who knows 
anything relative to the defeats we have suffered is under moral obliga- 
tions to speak out, and that by doing so he renders a valuable service, 
because nothing is gained by suffering in silence; on the contrary, by 
clearly setting forth the facts we make the benefits inherent in truth 
accessible to all, and at the same time, by conveying an accurate 
knowledge of the errors which have brought us to our present pitiful 
condition, we give a better understanding of the responsibilities which, 
in the distribution of the same, fall to each entity, and of the dangers 
which the future has in reserve for us—dangers of death, of absolute 
dissolution, of complete annihilation—which will fall down upon us 
with crushing force, unless we place our whole trust and energy at the , 
service of one single idea, the defense, preservation, and development of 
what there is left to us of our country. 

Fully convinced of the necessity of promulgating these theories, L 
put in print the second volume of The Spanish-American War, inspired 
by the same motives as set forth in the preface to that work, although 
at present I possess more freedom of action, since I do not labor under 
the disadvantages which I experienced before. The causeof this change 
is the good will and approval with which the public has received the 
first part of this work, entitled Ships, Guns, and Small Arms, and the 
kindness with which the press has commented upon it. From these 
circumstances I gather the conviction that the great mass of the people 
is not indifferent to the causes of the present terrible decline of Spain, 
and that therefore it will not be labor lost to examine into the disaster 
for the purpose of deriving lessons therefrom and obtaining the means 
for obviating still more radical misfortunes. 

As the subject of the present volume, I propose to analyze the prinei- 
pal system of warfare (if I may be permitted to use that term) which the 

< 


8 


United States employed against our colonies—the blockade—in order 
to explain the fatal circumstances which rendered efficacious a course 
of action hitherto looked upon as a secondary means of little conse- 
quence in naval conflicts, and will then enter upon an analysis of coast 
defense and show, always with reference to the results of the Spanish- 
American war, how necessary it is for our country to prepare for the 
defensive, applying the maxim of less theory and more practice, less 
studies and more action. 

And when I set down these words, with which I closed the first book 
of this work, it must not be supposed that I deem studies and theory 
superfluous; on the contrary, the less studies are required in the execu- 
tion of anything, the more studies are necessary in the preparation 
therefor. Technical knowledge is becoming each day more indispen- 
Sable, and we may be sure that as its foundation grows more solid the 
mind will be more and more freed from fantastical schemes, followed 
by irresolute action, with serious detriment to the service. What I 
mean is this, that to defend our coasts it is not sufficient to widen the 
field by studies a posteriori, when the essential thing, a knowledge of 
the harbors, is an already much abused matter, on the subject of which 
innumerable plans have been drawn and lucid essays written; we 
should also understand that our tendency should be to begin with the 
acquisition of the most modern and perfect material with which to 
equip our works of defense, because the factors of defense and, to a 
certain extent, their location are subordinate to their equipment. 
There was a time when it was possible to pursue the opposite course; 
that is to say, to construct fortifications with numerous emplacements 
for guns, which were to be had in large numbers; but nowadays, when 
guns are very expensive and of complicated construction, it is indis- 
_pensable to have the guus first and adapt to them the works of defense, 
and that is precisely what requires a great deal of previous study on 
the part of those who are called upon to decide as to the acquisition of 
our future war material, because, as was said by a general of our army, 
well known for his scientific learning: 

They should be inspired with the most complete knowledge of the technical prin- 
ciples which underlie modern inventions, and it.is only with such knowledge and 
the application of the results achieved in other countries, together with further 
experiments in our own, that the problems which present themselves, one after 
another, can be speedily solved and the country prepared for the future. 

To these ideas we might add the advisability of giving an impulse, 
on a large scale, to our military industries—gun, shell, cartridge, and 
powder factories—but as the men who are at, present in charge of our 
military matters appear to have realized this, we do not deem it neces- 
sary to insist upon it. 

But it should be remembered that nothing we have said is opposed 
to the rapid development of our defenses, with less studies and more 
action. 

SEVERO GOMEZ NUNEZ, 

MADRID, Jurg 2, 1899. 


CHAPTER I. 
THE UNITED STATES PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. 


POLITICAL BLINDNESS—WHAT SPAIN COULD DO—WHAT THE UNITED 
STATES COULD DO—NAVAL STRATEGY. 


Anyone who had not seen the war coming must have been blind. 
* * * * & * * 


To us the war seemed inevitable and imminent. Nevertheless the 
news which reached Cuba from the Peninsula revealed great confidence 
that the conflict would be settled peaceably. The mistake was patent 
and the harm it worked was infinite. This hope should never have 
been harbored in Spain, and yet there were people who believed in it, 
and their belief seemed warranted by the absolute calm that reigned, 
for neither in Spain nor in Cuba were any of those rapid and energetic 
measures taken which the war demanded in the way of provisioning 
the country, concentrating the troops, and developing the naval power. 

The plan of campaign of the United States commenced to be clearly 
outlined. The astonishing voracity of the press in that country gave 
free play to its anxiety and devoted itself to sketching the outlines of 
the naval and military operations likely to be undertaken against us. 
The Yankee strategists attached the greatest importance to our navy, 
which appeared to be quite strong judging from the published lists of 
our warships and the attributes with which they were credited, among 
others the speed and efficiency claimed for our destroyers, which really 
succeeded in producing a certain panic among the United States sailors. 
We feel sure that the exaggerated reports about the expedition of 
which they formed part were not without influence on the subsequent 
maneuvers of the United States squadron. 

in the United States the war was considered so imminent that more 
than two months before it broke out, namely, on February 13, the New 
York Herald gave to the press a complete plan of operations, which 
was considered of semiofficial character.! 

Much of this plan was so rational that there could be no doubt as to 
its having been traced by an expert hand, and it might very well have 
been taken as a basis for the future policy of our country. But perhaps 
our Government had better information. We had not, and, moreover, 
there was so much consistency between what the plan said, what log- 
ical reasoning advised, and what the Americans did that we will take 
it for the basis of our argument. 





' We considered it of sufficient importance to undertake the task of translating 
and publishing it in the Diario del Ejército at Habana. It appears to have been 


inspired by the strategic board. 
9 


10 





It might be objected that there could be little foundation for a plan 
of war which was imparted beforehand to the enemy. Anticipating 
this objection, we will say that anyone who has lived in the United 
States and is acquainted with its mode of being knows that there is 
nothing hidden in that country. This special idiosyncrasy is carried to 
such a degree that even the most secret plans are published. As an 
example, we might cite the filibustering expeditions, which were 
always announced beforehand and afterwards confirmed by facts. | 

In the plan of war referred to, the following questions were dis-— 
cussed : 

In case war should be declared between Spain and the United States, 
what would be the plans of campaign of the two nations? 

Would Spain be the first to take the offensive? 

Would the initial action be taken by the United States? 

Would the struggle be easy if carried abroad, on land or on the sea, 
or in both places, and to what extent? 

, These different subjects are discussed in ‘the following manner: 


In strategy there are three things which demand special consideration : 

(1) The base of operations. 

(2) The objective. 

(3) The line of operations. 

The base of operations is the position from which the forces are able to advance 
and to which they can withdraw. 

The objective comprises four different phases: Attack upon the enemy’s commerce ; 
bombardments of hostile ports; blockade of hostile coasts; invasion of hostile 
territory. 

The line of operations moins the place where the fighting occurs—that is to 
say, the scene of war generally. 


THE SPANISH BASE OF OPERATIONS. 


The principal base of operations for Spain would be the island of Cuba, and for 
the United States, Key West. Cuba is the largest island of the West Indies and the 
most important Spanish colony. It is situated at the entrance of the Gulf of Mexico, 
130 miles south of the State of Florida and 75 miles distant from Key West, from 
which it is separated by the Florida Channel. To the east, the island is separated 
from Haiti by the Windward Passage, which is over 50 miles wide; 90 miles to the 
south, in the Caribbean Sea, lies the island of Jamaica; to the west, Yucatan Chan- 
nel, 130 miles wide, separates it from the nearest part of Central America. 

The extent of its coasts, leaving minor sinuosities out of the question, is 2,000 
miles. The littoral is very dangerous and full of rocks and reefs, and of sand banks 
extending several miles into the sea. Owing to these sand banks there are only few 
places where it is possible to land. There are not to exceed fourteen bays of suffi- 
cient depth to allow warships of average draught to enter. 

Hence there are along the coasts arms of the sea which are protected by keys aon 
sand banks and can only be entered through straits and sinuous channels, at the 
extremities of which the bays open, or which terminate toward the outside, between 
sand banks, in the shape of bays. | 

This configuration must be taken into consideration from a strategic standpoint 
and from the point of view of the advantages and disadvantages which these coasts — 
present. From what has been stated it will be seen that it weuld not be a difficult 
operation to close the ports of Cuba against a foe and leave them open as places of 
safety and refuge for the friend. 





EE 


WHAT SPAIN COULD DO. 


For the defense of the eastern part of Cuba Spain could keep the Windward 
Passage under surveillance, using it as a lookout upon the Caribbean Sea. On that 
side the island terminates in Cape Maysi. The Windward Passage at the place 
where it separates this cape from Haiti is about 45 miles wide. Practically the 
whole navigation between the eastern coasts of the United States and the lower part 
of Central America goes through this passage. Cape Maysi is a point of low land, 
uninhabitable, without any port; the nearest anchorage is the harbor of Baracoa, 25 
miles distant, on the northern coast of the island. 

The base of operations of a squadron designed to blockade the Windward Passage 
might be either Baracoa on the northern coast or Guanténamo on the southern 
coast. The harbors of both are sufficiently deep for warships of large draught. 


THE DEFENSIVE SQUADRON. 


Two squadrons would be necessary, one to operate on the north from Baracoa, the 
other on the south from Guantdénamo, and in order to insure cooperation between 
the two fleets a line would be required from sea to sea across the country. When 
this line is established and the patrol of the Windward Passage and the Caribbean 
Sea provided for, the action would have to be extended to the northern channels 
toward the central part of Cuba, farther remote from the passage referred to. For 
that purpose another harbor would be required to serve as a depot not far from 
Baracoa—Nipe, for instance, 75 miles distant from the former. 

The harbor of Nipe is very safe and its water deep. This bay is 9 miles long and 
from 3 to 7 miles wide. The distance of 75 miles from Baracoa could be made by 
the squadron in five hours if necessary, or one division might be kept at Nipe and 
the other in the Windward Passage, one of which could be cruising while the other 
remained at its station. 


BAHAMA CHANNEL. 


From Nipe the Bahama Channel can be effectively blockaded by the Spanish 
fleet. The limits of the cruising line from Nipe might be 150 miles, from the island 
of Lobos to Crooked Island, 600 miles from Puerto Rico. 

A powerful hostile squadron might make an attack from the northeast, in which 
case the Bahama Channel and Windward Passage would play an important part, 
because it is there that the principal battles would take place. 

The ships necessary to close these passages and operate in the south in case hostile 
forces should present themselves from that direction would be 3 armored cruisers, 
4 cruisers of large tonnage, 8 smaller ones (including gunboats and seagoing torpedo 
boats), and a few torpedo boats as adjuncts of the armored cruisers. 

The fleet required to control the sea oh the northern and eastern coast of Cuba 
might consist in al] of 3 armored cruisers, situated 150 miles apart, 4 large protected 
cruisers at intermediate stations relative to the former, and 8 smaller cruisers or 
gunboats between each of the large cruisers and the line of harbors which serve as 
bases. 

Such a fleet, in the positions indicated, could be concentrated in twelve hours at 
any point where the enemy might appear with sufficient forces and with the inten- 
tion of breaking through the line, and would moreower guard a good part of the 
Windward and Mona passages, so as to prevent hostile attacks from the south. 

As we have stated, the squadron of the south might be stationed at Guantanamo; 
but this harbor might prove inadequate for the needs of the large squadron of the 
north, especially in connection with the southern squadron. 

If that should be the case, the harbor of Santiago de Cuba would constitute a 
better base for the fleet, as it has better resources. It is situated 5 miles from the 
coast, and can be reached only through a narrow channel which is intricate and 
tortuous and in several places only 200 feet wide. 


12 


THE KEY TO THE ISLAND. 


On the northwest Cuba is bounded by Florida Channel, 130 miles wide, and Yuca- 
tan Channel, 100 miles wide. For operations in Florida Channel, the base might be 
a line 45 miles long connecting Habana with Matanzas. These two cities play the 
most important part from the standpoint of strategy and commerce. 


Habana, the capital of Cuba, is the key to the island; but its defenses, like those 
of all other Cuban harbors, are old and vulnerable and equipped with guns that are 
not adapted for attacks upon modern armored ships. 

Habana is practically undefended,! and yet, by adequate defenses for its harbor 
and coasts, it might have been made an impregnable base of operations, and at the 
same time a base for refitting and a safe depot for men as well as supplies of every 
kind for the ships, and the center of the necessary reserves. 

Matanzas, the other extreme point of the western base, is a much smaller city 
than Habana, its population reaching only 70,009 at most. The channel is 4 miles 
long and 1 mile wide, and is defended by three antiquated batteries. 

The coast between Habana and Matanzas is open and can be safely navigated at 
a distance of 3 miles. Within this base the ships can cruise without danger by day 
and night. If the adversaries should attempt to effect a landing here, they might 
find it impossible, provided there were some mobile defenses and some means for 
harassing the enemy on the sea. This action could be further extended by con- 
trolling the 80 miles of the Florida Channel in the manner indicated below, and the 
result would be the destruction of the hostile commerce in that direction. A first- 
class battle ship could be stationed midway of the channel, 40 miles from Habana, 
and one armored cruiser between this battle ship and Key West, and another between 
the battle ship and Habana. On both sides of the line formed by these three large — 
ships would be placed large protected cruisers, and in the intervals between them 
dispatch boats. 


YUCATAN CHANNEL. 


In this arm of the sea might be stationed three cruisers, assisted by three or four 
gunboats, to watch for and pursue merchant vessels. At Cape San Antonio there 
are no harbors, but good anchorages are quite near where the gunboats could have 
their stations. In case they should find it necessary to go into port, there is Bata- 
ban6é, between cays, but well marked by buoys, and with 12 feet of water. Gun- 
boats would be quite safe here, because no large ships can enter from withort. 


ATTACK UPON COMMERCE. 


Having indicated the bases of operations which Spain might occupy in order to 
render both the defensive and offensive effective, and having examined into this sec- 
ond and most important conception of strategy, we will branch out on some other 
considerations. 

The principal objective of attack will be the enemy’s maritime commerce. The 
disposition of the Spanish fleet as above set forth will facilitate the pursuit of 
United States vessels navigating in the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico. 


THE COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES. 


All merchant vessels bound for Central America passing through the straits 
between the West Indian islands would be at the mercy of a couple of cruisers of the 
Alabama type. 

If Spain wanted to operate against the commerce of the United States, she would 
have to watch, besides the Caribbean Sea, the outer part of the Gulf Stream, begin- 
ning at Cape Hatteras, in the vicinity of which the merchant vessels bound for the 
south usually leave the Gulf to avoid the current. 





'In treating of the defenses of Habana we shall see how erroneous this opinion 
was. 


13 


Another important point where the commerce with North America might be inter- 
cepted is about 1,000 to 1,200 miles east of New York, in a circle not exceeding 300 
miles in diameter. At this place pass all the merchant vessels from Europe bound 
for the eastern ports of the United States. 


THE SPANISH COMMERCE ENDANGERED. 


We should remember that in warfare upon commerce the party attacking may 
suffer as much damage as the party attacked. Suppose Spain should intend the 
destruction of the United States commerce. In that case she might lose her own 
maritime commerce, for the simple reason that she would be compelled to devote 
the ships which are necessary for the protection of her commercial routes to the pur- 
suit and destruction of hostile merchant vessels in the courses which they in their 
turn have to follow. 

The Spanish merchant marine consists of 960 vessels, 402 of which are steamers of 
over 1,000 tons; 37 of these have a tonnage of over 3,000 and 37 are of tonnage between 
2,000 and 3,000. Thirty-two of all the merchant vessels have a speed of 12 knots, 
and only 2 of them attain 16 knots an hour. These latter vessels are therefore 
subventioned by the Government, and in case of war they must be placed at the 
disposal of Spain. The greater part of her commerce would be placed outside of 
her flag. 


BOMBARDMENTS AND BLOCKADES, 


Among the main objectives is the possibility of Spain bombarding, blockading, or 
invading the United States coasts. 

Bombardments appear attractive, but would not be of much avail, if practicable 
at all. The large cities of the United States cannot be reached by the guns of a hos- 
tile fleet without great danger to the fleetitself. A superior and powerful navy 
might take the risk, but for an inferior navy like the Spanish it would mean meeting 
disaster half way. 


LANDING OF FORCES. 


The landing of Spanish forces in the United States is a hypothesis which must be 
rejected. If Spain had a squadron of the first order she might invest Key West, 
although even then it would require a bombardment in good earnest to reduce the 
forts defending the entrance. But this would not be of any advantage, as our forces 
would be at a distance from the “‘ Key,” beyond the range of the guns of the fleet. 
The naval station might be destroyed and some coal captured, but to reduce the 
place would require a large amount of ammunition, which would be difficult to 
replace, and it would not be worth spending it for that purpose. 

From these few remarks it may be concluded that Spain’s only objective would be 
the destruction of our commerce, especially to the West Indies, where our traffic is 
extensive and our prestige great. These losses would injure us, but they would not 
profit Spain either and would have no influence on the duration of the war. The 
depredations of the Alabama were of no influence on the conclusion of hostilities 
between the North and South. 


THE LINE OF OPERATIONS. 


The third point of importance in naval strategy is the line of operations, which 
in this case is clearly indicated. It would consist in protecting Cuba by means of 
an offensive fleet, acting as a defensive fleet, as far remote from the coasts as pos- 
sible; that is to say, this fleet would always have to maintain contact with the 
bases of operations and be in condition at any time to search for and annihilate any 
hostile forces that might attempt to enter its waters by forcing a passage. If the 
passage were forced it would probably be impossible to eject the enemy. If the 
Spanish fleet should be victorious, it would then be in condition to attempt block- 
ades and bombardments. 


14 


On the other hand the Spanish fleet might be defeated, its line broken, its forces 
demoralized, and then Habana and Matanzas, Yucatan Channel, and the Wind- 
ward Passage would fall into our hands, and Cuba would cease to be a Spanish 
colony. 


WHAT THE UNITED STATES COULD DO. 


The plan of campaign sets forth that the principles of strategy 
require.from the outset the number of ships that will be necessary for 
the defensive as well as the offensive; it indicates the theories to which 
they would have to conform and states that the scene of war would be 
ihe same for them as for us, but with the advantage in their favor that 
the United States forces would be a thousand: times better situated 
than the Spanish. It then proceeds to treat of the invasion of Spain. 

It states that the invasion of Spain would probably not enter into 
the plan of campaign, but that no doubt attacks might be made by 
war ships upon the fortified harbors of Spain, in which case the fire of 
cruisers of the most modern type would rage in the bays of Biscay and 
of the Atlantic. , 

To invade the Peninsula would require many transports to take the 
troops across the ocean. The long line of communication would have 
to be protected and the army of Cuba might constitute another obstacle 
requiring an army to fight it. Nevertheless the invasion would follow | 
if the first attack were crowned with ‘success. This first attack, of 
course, would be made upon Cuba. : 


ATTACK UPON HABANA. 


Cuba can be reached easily. The lines of communication are shert and can be 
protected without difficulty, and, moreover, in the very heart of the hostile country 
we should find thousands of allies. It is a question to be carefully considered 
whether it will be necessary to make an invasion of the island. Contributions of 
arms, food, and military supplies sent to the interior by our war ships would weaken 
the Spanish forces and encourage the Cuban insurgents, so that the military forces 
required by the United States would be less than an army corps. There is a saying 
that Napoleon ended in Spain. Well, Spain might end in the Pearl of the Antilles. 


CHARACTER OF THE WAR. x 


a 


Thus the war would from the beginning be of a naval character and the fight 
would be concluded in a short time. We need not speak of the confidence of our 
people in this fact; nevertheless we do not want to indulge in exaggerations which. 
would cause disappointment if the conflict should not be short, because there are 
many things which can not be foreseen, and the Americans should not be put in the 
same class with the unfortunate French people, who in 1870 shouted: ‘‘On to Ber- 
lin!” and whose predictions of one month of campaign were ridiculed by every 
nation. 

It is true that the forces we have at our disposal are superior to those of Spain in 
every class except that of torpedo boats; it is also certain that the auxiliary fleet 
under our flag is much larger and can be mobilized more readily, and that, leaving 
valor entirely out of the question, the discipline and training of our Navy are of a 
very high order, because superior intelligence and noble traditions animate our 
service, and it is equally certain that our facilities for refitting are superior and that 
we have better resources for meeting thé expenses incident to a war. Itis further 


15 


true that our house is better guarded, that we can supply our forces more easily with 
coal, provisions, and war supplies, and that we have yards for construction and 
repairs conveniently at hand. 


COALING AND REPAIRING. 


In the matter of coaling facilities we have an enormous advantage, because the 
Spanish ships have to rely to a great extent on imports from without. They would 
have to get coal from friendly nations, who, through the obligations of international 
laws, would have to become neutrals. 

The coal depots in Spain would soon become exhausted and the resupply might 
prove difficult, if it is not entirely prevented by our cruisers on the sea. There 
would also be great difficulties in the matter of making repairs which, while often 
necessary in time of peace, become numerous in time of war. 

The task of our Navy would be the reduction of Habana, the blockade of Cuba 
and Puerto Rico, the equipment of the Cuban insurgents, the destruction of Spanish 
commerce, and the defense of our bases of supplies and other ports. This is work 
of tremendous magnitude and will require great energy. Naval battles must be 
fought before Habana will fall into our hands, and to this object we shall be able to 
devote all the ships of our Navy that are not required for the protection of our 
coasts. 


The catastrophe of the Maine occurred on the 15th day of February, 
1898, at half past 9 o’clock at night, and this plan of war against Spain, 
as set forth above, was published two days prior to that date, on Feb- 
ruary 13, in the Herald. This is one more circumstance in support of 
the fact that that catastrophe was simply a pretext skilfully utilized. by 
the Americans for launching themselves into the fight, and that the 
latter had long been decided upon and was one of the secret aspirations 
of the United States. : 

But this plan of campaign, as well as many other manifestations of 
hostility against us, might well have been thoroughly considered by 
those who were at the head of our affairs, in order to adopt the more 
rational of the two following propositions: 

If we had a squadron that could measure itself with the United States 
fleet on e({ual terms—then on to war! 

If we did not have such a squadron, nor any resources, nor any sup- 
port, and if we had no plan and were not able to formulate one—then 
we should by all means acknowledge this to ourselves and avoid tlie 
war. | 

Was it so very difficult to decide which of these two courses would 
be best? 

The facts which we give further on show that the problem was clear 
and simple. There could be no doubt as to the fact that we had no 
squadron to speak of. If with the knowledge and: in spite of all this 
the war was nevertheless necessary for absolutely imperious reasons 
which are beyond my ken, then we had to enter into it with all possible 
energy, without beating about the bush, and set on foot all offensive 
means that we could possibly raise. 

Nothing but the most vigorous and heroic initiative could keep our 
national honor intact. 


CHAPTER II. 


BLOGKADES AND PRIVATEERING. 


LAWS REGULATING THEM—LETTERS OF MARQUE AND REPRISAL— 
BRUTALITY OF BLOCKADES—BLOCKADING ON A LARGE SCALE, 


Pasquale Fiore defines blockades as operations of war which consist 
in surrounding a hostile coast in order to intercept all communication 
by sea, maintaining an are around such coast with a number of ships 
that are really and effectively in condition to prevent by force any ship 
which might attempt to cross the blockading line from doing so, with- 
out exposing themselves to be sunk by the guns of the station vessels." 





\The principal rules which at present govern blockades may be summed up as 
follows: 


(1) Objects of a blockade.—A belligerent may blockade, in whole or in part, the 
coasts, ports, and roadsteads of the hostile country, as far as may be necessary to 
attain the object of the war; but the war must actually exist, and in case of civil 
war, one of the parties must be seeking to recover the right of sovereignty in the 
territory which it occupies together with the other party. 

(2) Different kinds of blockades.—A blockade may be simple or by notification. It is 
considered as by notification when formal notice of the same has been given to other 
nations by the nation establishing it. Other blockades are termed simple. In the 
former case, the captured parties must establish discontinuity of the blockade in 
order to become exempt from the penalties imposed upon those who break it. In 
the latter case, it devolves upon the captors to establish the existence of the block- 
ade at the time of the capture. 

(3) Authority of the commander in’chief of the forces.—When the commander in 
chief of a squadron establishes the blockade of a port, the blockade is not to be 
considered void for lack of special authority, unless the respective government has 
disauthorized such commander in chief. Some doubt the right of a commander in 
chief to order a blockade without instructions when he is near the seat of his Gov- 
ernment, where it would be easy to receive such instructions; but the moe generally 
accepted opinion is to the contrary. 

(4) Necessity of notification—A private neutral vessel bound for a blockaded port 
is not liable to capture unless it has been expressly notified of the blockade, and 
such notice entered on the ship’s log, by a vessel of the squadron maintaining the 
blockade. The intention alone of entering a blockaded port, when this fact is not 
connected with others, is not sufficient to decree the condemnation of a neutral ves- 
sel. Notification of the blockade given to the government of a neutral nation is 
considered sufficient for the citizens of that nation. 

(5) Effectiveness of blockades.—In order to be binding, the blockade must be main- 
tained with a number of ships sufficient really to prevent access to the enemy’s 
coasts. . As a general rule, temporary absence of the ships maintaining the blockade 
is permitted. The blockade ceases when the ships maintaining it withdraw for any 
reason, giving rise to the conclusion that the enterprise has been abandoned, at least 
temporarily. 

(6) Breach of a blockade.—If the blockade is absolute, it is considered broken by 
any positive act committed by a vessel for the purpose of entering or leaving the 
blockaded port, except in case of injury or distress. 

(7) Penalties.—The penalty threatening those who break the blockade of a port is 
confiscation of both vessel and cargo. 


Lis 


According to him, therefore, the blockade is the occupation of waters 
within the jurisdiction of the enemy, which naturally carries with it an 
exercise of sovereignty which is estimated differently by different 
writers on international law; for while Hiibner, Ortolén, and Haute- 
feuille admit that the belligerent party acquires that sovereignty when 
it occupies waters within the jurisdiction of its enemy, others are of 
opinion that such right is not incontrovertible, because the blockaded 
coast is almost always in the power of the enemy, who exercises his 
sovereignty as far as the range of the guns of his ports extends, and 
that therefore the right of blockade is really practiced on the high seas 
where the blockading vessels are stationed, and those seas are not sub- 
ject to any State. Hence the generally accepted opinion is that the 
blockade is founded solely on an exigency of war, to which neutrals 
must submit, although it prejudices them. Gessner, following the 
opinion of Grotius, also considers blockades a necessity of war which 
should be confined to cases in which they are absolutely indispensable; 
and Dudley Field (Outlines of an International Code, art. 891) says that 
belligerents can only blockade military ports, and only as far as may 
be necessary to take possession of contraband of war, meaning by ‘ mil- 
itary port” a fortified harbor or one occupied by more troops than are 
required for the maintenance of internal order. He bases this opinion 
on the principle that the hardships of a blockade will be effective only 
in ports belonging to an island or which unite exceptional conditions.' 

There can be no doubt that the island of Cuba united these conditions, 
and hence it is that in the United States’ plan of campaign, which we 
have described in the preceding chapter, the blockade played quite an 
important part, in as far as it relates to the operations of the Ameri- 
cans, as also to the operations of defense against any which the Spanish 
might undertake, for they realized that, owing to our lack of naval 
power, the island of Cuba, separated from Spain by a long distance 
and without direct means for supporting its army and people as a result 
of its agricultural conditions, could be easily cut off and reduced by 
starvation, without much effort or bloodshed.” This was in pursuance 
of the theory of humanity under which the Yankees had for a long 
time been taking shelter to hide their intentions. 

But the Americans never imagined that they might be able to establish 
a blockade of the entire coast of Cuba, because they were far from 
realizing that our squadron was as deficient as it actually was. At first, 
therefore, they only announced the blockade of the northern coast com- 
prised between Bahia Honda, Habana, Matanzas, and Cardenas, and 
only when they had positively ascertained that not all the destroyers 
were coming over, and that the only ships which we could make imme- 


1In the work cited by Captain Nifiez, David Dudley Field presented a draft out- 
lining a proposed code, not one having any authoritative sanction.—O. N. IL. 

2The greater part of the articles of first necessity, such as flour, rice, bacon, dried 
beef, butter, etc., were imported into Cuba. 


6884. 2 











18 


diately available were those of Cervera’s division, was the blockade. 
extended to the southern coast, first from Cienfuegos to Santiago de 
Cuba, and subsequently to the entire island after our squadron had 
been closed in at Santiago Harbor. After that the blockade at times 
assumed the character of a veritable farce (juerga). With glasses we 
could see from the batteries of Habana, among the blockading ships 
and exercising functions of vigilance and even chasing coasting vessels 
and carrying orders back and forth, private tugs of the United States 
Press and pleasure yachts, on board of some of which we could distinguish 
lady excursionists and almost feel the excitement of champagne. 

And in the face of all this, we did not even use the one method of 
warfare which the enemy feared, privateering, while in the United 
States, though not under the name of privateers, yet under that of 
auxiliary vessels, there were in the blockading fleet numerous craft whose 
functions, as a matter of fact, were identical with those of privateers. 

There was, there must have been something, some secret reason which 
the people suspected at the time and which was, perhaps, the obstacle 
to our issuing letters of marque and reprisal which, by their moral 
force alone, would have compelled the enemy to divide his squadron, 
and in that case, who knows whether our defeat, if we had to suffer it, 
would not have been less disgraceful? 

This something—could we not find out what it was? Could we not 
ascertain to whom we are indebted for it? 

For if there were no obstacles, no embargoes, it was a grave respon- 
sibility not bravely to resolve upon privateering. 

The convention which abolished privateering for some States, and 
was sanctioned by others, namely, by Spain, the United States, and 
Mexico, who were not signatories to it, and only accepted articles 
2, 3, and 4, says: 

APPENDIX TO PROTOCOL No. XXII. 
DECLARATION. 


The plenipotentiaries who signed the treaty of Paris of March 30, 1856, assembled 
in conference, ; 

Considering that, 

Whereas the waritime law in time of war has for a long time been the subject of 
unpleasant controversies; and 

Whereas the uncertainty of the law and duties relative to this matter gives rise, 
among neutrals and belligerents, to differences of opinion which may lead to serious 
difficulties and even conflicts; and 

Whereas it would therefore be of advantage to establish a uniform doctrine on a 
point of such great importance; and 

Whereas the plenipotentiaries assembled at the Congress of Paris could not better 
voice the intentions of their respective Governments than by trying to introduce 
into the international relations fixed principles on this point: 

Now therefore the said plenipotentiaries, being thereunto duly authorized, have 
agreed to unite upon the means for attaining this object and have consequently 
resolved upon the following solemn declaration: 

1. Privateering is and remains abolished. 

2. The neutral flag covers enemy’s goods, with the exception of contraband of war, 


Ea 


3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to cap- 
ture under the enemy’s flag. 

4, Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective; that is to say, maintained by a 
force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy. 

The Governments of the undersigned plenipotentiaries bind themselves to submit 
this declaration to the States who were not called upon to take part in the Congress 
of Paris, and to invite them to accede to tho same. 

Convinced that the above maxims can not help but be received with gratitude 
by the entire world, the undersigned plenipotentiaries trust that the efforts of their 
respective Governments in the direction indicated will meet with the most complete 
success. 

This declaration is not and shall not be binding except as to the powers who have 
acceded to it or who will accede to it. 

Done at Paris this 16th day of April, 1856. 


For Austria: BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN, HUBNER. 
For France: A. WALEWSKI, BOURQUENEY. 
For Great Britain: CLARENDON, COWLEY. 

For Prussia: MANTEUFFEL, HATZFELDT. 

For Russia: ORLOFF, BRUNNOW. 

For Sardinia: C. CAVoUR, DE VILLAMARINA. 
For Turkey: AALI, MEHEMMED DJEMIL. 


It is therefore incontrovertible that Spain, with good international 
law on her side, could have decreed and practiced privateering and 
derived from this means of commercial warfare, which the Yankees 
dreaded, every advantage consistent with the laws regulating it.! 

It would have been the more natural for Spain to adopt this means 
of warfare, as she had to do with a nation that had not acceded to the 
abolition of privateering, and which, for that reason, was also at liberty 
to practice it if it cared to. If the war had been between Spain and 
one of the powers which had declared themselves in favor of the aboli- 
tion of privateering, it would have been quite a different.thing. 





'Privateering is completely regulated by law, and therefore offers no danger of 
crime nor abuse. 

The conditions imposed by conventional law as well as usage, and which will 
always be observed by civilized nations to make privateering legitimate, are a 
follows: ‘ 

1. The taking out of a letter of marque and reprisal. 

2. The giving of security. 

3. The opinion of a competent court as to the captures made by privateers. 

A letter of marque and reprisal, which is to be issued by the commander in chief 
of the squadron, is a legal document conferring upon a private individual a com- 
mission in due form to take an active part in the operations of war and antagonize 
the enemy in the waters specified in such letter. 

Under the Spanish law a person who wishes to equip a vessel for privateering 
must make application to the chief of the naval forces of his province for permis- 
sion to do so, setting forth in his petition the kind of vessel he intends to equip, its 
displacement, the weapons and ammunition it is to carry, and the number of per- 
sons who are to form the crew, as also the securities which he offers; when these 
legal formalities have been complied with, the document referred to is issued to the 
captain of the vessel. 

In the absence of such special authorization by the sovereign or the head of the 
State any act of aggression committed by a private individual, except in case of 
natural and legitimate defense, is considered piracy. 

Letters of marque can be issued only to merchant vessels of the power whose 


20 


The negative attitude toward the suppression of privateering, says 
Urtolan, assumed by a nation like the United States or like Spain, 
which possesses within itself all the necessary factors for making it 
now, as in the past, a naval power of the first order, deprives the prin- 
ciple of the declaration of Paris of that character of universality which 
is necessary to make it an absolute and uniform rule of international 
naval law founded on treaties. The principle of legitimate defense 
inherent in sovereignty implies necessarily, for a nation engaged in 
warfare, the right to call to arms all its citizens, and organize on land 
and on the sea a national militia; this being one of the rights which 
writers call primitive and absolute. The powers which agreed to limit 
or abandon the principle of privateering pursued chiefly the object of 
avoiding the repetition of the abuses that were attributed to it. But 
such excesses are not inherent in that mode of warfare. The abuses 
sometimes committed by privateers should be attributed, first of all, 
to the uncertainty of the rights and duties between neutrals and bel- 
ligerents, to which uncertainty the second and third articles of the 
Paris declaration put an end as far as possible by laying down a unt- 
form doctrine as to certain important points, which had already been 
observed by all nations, with the exception of Great Britain. 

From whatever point of view we may look at this question, the 
mistake remains apparent: There is no possible excuse to justify our 
not having taken advantage of this means of warfare. 

And on the other hand, what did we gain by not practicing priva- 
teering? Was it not acovert method of privateering which the United 
States practiced? In this connection we reproduce below what the 
Diario del Ejército of Habana said during the blockade (June 10): 


What is the United States method of warfare if not privateering? It is evident 





colors they carry and over which the sovereign exercises his jurisdiction, as the law 
of every country, asa rule, prohibits its merchant vessels from soliciting or accept- 
ing letters of marque from foreign powers. Some treaties stipulate that the bellig- 
erent power may treat as pirate any neutral vessel in possession of a letter of 
marque and reprisal from the enemy of the former. 

Letters of marque are usually issued for a limited term therein specified, and 
when that term expires they become void; that is to say, from that moment on the 
vessel ceases to be a privateer and becomes once more a merchant vessel. Hence, if 
such vessel, after the expiration of the term for which the sovereign had granted 
the commission, continues to practice privateering, its actions assume the character 
of illegality, and any captures it might make are likewise illegal and the prize - 
courts must annul them, restore the captured vessels to liberty, make the captor 
pay the costs and damages, and impose upon him such penalty as the laws of the 
country provide for punishing such irregularity. 

‘ Letters of marque also become void as to their effects on the day when the treaty 
of peace is signed, and vessels captured after such date must be returned to their 
legitimate owners, except in case of an express stipulation modifying this general 
principle; but in the former case the owners of the captured vessels are not entitled 
to indemnity, the privateer having acted in good faith. 

The property captured, whether by a warship or a privateer, and whether belong- 
ing to the enemy or to neutrals, is not conceded as a prize to the captor, unless a 
special court instituted for that purpose declares the capture valid and legitimate. 


21 


that they are practicing it, because not only do they utilize, in their. so-called 
blockade, the ships of the squadron proper as privateers to chase and capture our 
mercantile vessels, but they have also equipped numerous merchant vessels for war 
and are devoting them to that operation. 

The merchant vessels which the United States has equipped for war are cruising 
in our waters, capturing our vessels, and taking them to its ports, there to be 
confiscated and the proceeds distributed, which is no more nor less than what priva- 
teers do. Why can we not do the same thing? 

If it is a question of name under which the true purpose is covered up, let us 
resort to the same method. Whether they are called auxiliaries to the squadron or 
whether they are called privateers, the service rendered by these merchant vessels, 
equipped for war, is the same—they capture hostile vessels which they meet and 
paralyze commerce. It is arrant madness that Spain, from incomprehensible scru- 
ples, is not doing what the United States has been doing ever since the beginning of 
the naval campaign. 

Here in Cuba we have valuable factors which we could use in such enterprises. 
There are numerous coast vessels which could be made to do service as auxiliaries to 
the fleet, if we do not wish to give them the more explicit name of privateers. 


Besides, the blockade of the island of Cuba never was effective, and 
this must at times have been apparent and would have furnished facili- 
ties for taking in provisions. 

The majority of writers on international law agree as to the fact that 
the blockade ceases the moment the ships forming the are of vigilance 
and force disappear for any reason whatever from the waters of which 
they have taken possession. 

There are some authors, like Hautefeuille, Negrin, Riquelme, Ortolan, 
Halleck, and Fauchille, who lay down the radical principle that, if the 
blockading ships are compelled to leave the blockaded port, either on 
account of stress of the weather, or injuries, or to rest their crews, or 
from lack of provisions, the blockade becomes ineffective, and in order 
to reestablish it new notification is required. 

Others, like Bello, Perels, Bluntschli, Le Moine, Wheaton, Heffter, 
and Scott, do not admit that the blockade ceases when the blockading 
ships absent themselves because of fortuitous circumstances, and it is 
their opinion that the blockade is not to be considered interrupted on 
that account. This is the theory generally professed by English, and 
hence by American, writers as opposed to the other theory advocated 
by French authors, with better right and reason. 

Our rear-admiral Manuel J. Mozo, in a recent and very excellent 
treatise on the Rights of People, which is used as text-book in the gen- 
eral school of the Armada, declares himself in favor of the French 
doctrine, because, he says, if the blockade consists in the conquest of 
th: enemy’s maritime territory, really and effectively maintained by the 
naval forces of the blockading party, it is clear and obvious that when 
such conquest ceases and the occupation is suspended the blockade 
also ceases and is suspended, and it is not necessary to enter upon an 
investigation as to the causes thereof, for, whether they are voluntary 
or involuntary, fortuitous or predetermined, the result remains the 
same. In either event they put an end to the dominion and jurisdiction 
which the blockading party had assumed and in virtue of which it pro- 


22 


hibited access to the waters over which it had control and which ipso 
facto return to the jurisdiction and dominion of their original sovereign; 
and as the latter had permitted the entrance and sojourn of vessels of 
friendly nations in these waters, such vessels are at liberty to take 
advantage of the permission without being considered blockade break- 
ers, for since there is no actual blockade it could hardly be broken. 

Leaving aside these controversies of law, we must fix our attention on 
the point on which all authors agree, namely, that when the blockading 
squadron raises the blockade in order to engage in another operation of 
war, and especially when compelled to raise it in order to meet an 
attack of the hostile squadron, the blockade ceases, and in order to 
reestablish it the same formalities must be gone through as though it 
were a new blockade. | 

Now, then, the United States squadron was repeatedly compelled to 
abandon the blockade of Habana and several other ports of the island 
in order to look after other objectives which were not due to fortuitous 
causes, but, on the contrary, to the necessity of giving attention to the 
danger represented by our squadron. The fact may be pointed out 
that for three days the United States ships were absent from the waters 
of Habana, owing to the rumored approach of Cervera’s squadron, dur- 
ing which time they left at the blockading station only a few inefficient 
vessels, some of them sailing craft, which could not really be considered 
as blockading ships, because they lacked the necessary attributes and 
power to prevent by force the ingress and egress of the harbor. The 
blockade of Habana must have ceased several times if the law had 
been properly laid before the nations of the civilized world. 

The newspaper above referred to said under date of May 5: 

The blockade of Habana, Cienfuegos, Matanzas, and Cardenas is not effective, 
and the proof is that it was broken by several steamers, among them the Cosme 
Herrera, Avilés, Monserrat, and a number of sailing vessels which have entered or 
left said ports. 

In the second place, the naval forces of the United States for three days, from 
Sunday, May 1, to Wednesday, May 3, had to abandon almost entirely their block- 
ading mission pecance they were needed elsewhere; which goes to show that they 
were insufficient to render the blockade of such aie as Habana real, effective, 
and absolute, and this very day, while the Indiana, Iowa, Montgomery, New York, and 
Marblehead, that is to say, all the powerful hostile ships, are cut of sight, anyone 
could run the blockade, for only the Wilmington and a few merchant vessels in the 
service of the squadron are left in front of Habana to blockade the harbor. 

Having gone somewhat extensively into these questions, we will not 
close this chapter without setting forth our ideas as to the brutality 
and inhumanity of blockades when practiced as they were practiced in 
Cuba. 

For reasons of universal morality the different nations have turned 
their attention to making wars more humane, by dictating general 
measures and agreeing to abstain from methods contrary to civilization 
and which work hardship to the innocent, the noncombatants, women, 
children, invalids—in a word, all those whose destruction lea to 
nothing and whom it is barbarous to injure. » act aan r 


23 


To this end treaties and conventions have been drawn up which 
regulate the use of the instruments of war and put restrictions on 
destructive tendencies. An absolute and extensive blockade, under 
the circumstances under which Cuba had to sustain it, is not a means 
of war, but of oppression and death, which is contrary to every law of 
God and man, even though it is considered the most gentle method to 
reduce the enemy. 

Perhaps it is because it has never before been attempted on a large 
scale and in an absolute manner that it has escaped the perspicacity of 
the “humanizers” of wars to place restrictions on the system of reduc- 
ing to starvation not only the combatants, but an entire population— 
old men, women, children, and invalids, who, as a general rule, should 
not be subjected to the privations incident on battles—in these times 
when so much philanthropy and so much universal love is being 
preached. 

The blockade as practiced in Cuba caused a thousand times more 
victims and more horrors than bursting shells, the burning of cities, 
the massacre of battles, and all the cruelties of weapons. The blockade 
makes living expensive, extinguishes the means of livelihood, gradually 
decimates the population, destroys family life, annihilates human beings 
without distinction—or rather, with one distinction, for it strikes par- 
ticularly the feeble, the children, the women, and the sick. 

Let the observations I have made on the subject of the practice of 
naval blockades, the most important of modern times, be taken into 
consideration when the “humanizers” of war meet again, and let them 
not only take thought of regulating the use of bursting shell and the 
protection of real property, but also give a prominent part in their 
deliberations to the humanization of the blockade as far as it affects 
those who should not be made to suffer the rigors of war in a brutal 
manner; for it is brutal to reduce to starvation and death human 
beings who have no share in the conflict and are in no manner respon- 
sible for it. 

In our opinion, absolute blockades should be limited to fortified 
cities and harbors, and as far as towns are concerned there should be 
restrictions on the introduction of men, arms, ammunition, and war 
supplies; but it is not humane to extend these restrictions to food, 
medicines, and clothing for the noncombatant inhabitants. 

In the Spanish-American war the whole enormity of the effects of the 
blockade become apparent in the frightful mortality. After two 
months of blockade in Cuba there could be seen in the cities and in 
the country thousands of human beings looking like ghosts, and men, 
women, and children dying of hunger in the public roads. A sad con- 
trast to the condition cf that war, fought on the pretext of humanity! 

We will now leave this subject to speak of the advantage and influ- 
ence which the mistakes and incompetence of the men at the head of 
our affairs and the scantiness and deficiency of our war resources had 
on the United States plans of campaign. 


CHAPTER Il. 
OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SQUADRON. 


BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF CERVERA’S SQUADRON—WHAT THE NAVAL 
ANNUAL SAYS—INITIAL ORDERS OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT AT 
WASHINGTON. ‘ 


The first signal of “Hostile squadron in sight” was made by the 
Semaphore at Morro Castle on Friday, April 22, at 5 o’clock p. m., while, 
Strange to say, it was not until Monday, the 25th, that President 
McKinley signed the joint resolution declaring that war between the 
United States and Spain had commenced on the 21st. 

From the telemetric observatory of Morro Castle we witnessed the 
first appearance of the enemy and closely followed the movements of 
the hostile ships, the vague outlines of which could be seen on the 
horizon.'. The gunners stood in readiness to fire and all were waiting 
for the moment when fire would be opened; but to everybody’s sur- 
prise the United States ships kept beyond range, at a distance of about 
20,000 meters from the batteries, and in that position they remained the 
nextday. It was evident that they were refusing battle and that their 
plan of campaign was founded on the blockade. 

It was well known that one of the enemy’s most ardent desires was 
to take Habana as early as possible. Why was the enterprise delayed ? 
Why were the tactics changed ? 

In order to explain this we must begin by giving some interesting 
data. 

The Naval Annual—a very important book which has been published 
for fifteen years by T. A. Brassey—furnishes us certain antecedents, to 
which we shall refer. 

The nominal forces of the two belligerent fleets were believed to be 
approximately equal.’ 





'A few moments later three steamers came out of the harbor, among them one 
United States vessel, the Saratoga, displaying her flag. As soon as she had rounded 
the Morro she sped away at full speed. We shall never be able to comprehend why 
that vessel did not remain in our power. 

?This error, which had so much to do with the declaration of war, and for which 
we had to pay so dear, should never have prevailed in Spain, for there was one man 
at least who, thinking of the future and foreseeing the conflict which was hanging 
over us, devoted many hours to the study of the United States Navy and published 
extensive technical data concerning the ships of that nation. It was Adolfo Marti- 
nez Jurado y Ruiz, a captain of artillery, subsequently assigned to the navy-yard at 
Nabana, who carried out this work with unflagging perseverance and on his own 
initiative, following step by step the United States publications and making every 
possible effort to obtain information. A year before the breaking out of the war he 
published an album of the United States fleet, a perfect piece of work, which contains 
all the ships, their plans of construction, the material of which they are built, their 
armor, armament, speed, engine installation—in a word, everything necessary to 
form a correct idea of the modern ships of that navy. This work was known at 
Madrid. Pity it is that it was not made to serve better purposes than to be used in 
the telemetric observatories of the Habana batteries to supplement observation in 
case of the opening of fire, which unfortunately never occurred on a large scale! 

24 


25 


In order to give an idea of what is taken into account by naval 
experts—and Lord Brassey has the universal reputation of being one 
of them—in estimating the military efficiency of war ships, we will here 
copy the comparison made by the Naval Annual: 





Battleships ....c0cceeece cess ce cece ence nent ema e cence tne nsnncnce tease snceanesancns 
Armored cruisers 
Armored coast-defense vessels 


Armored ram 


Cruisers, protected 
Cruisers, unprotected 





Class of ships. 








a ee ee 
eee er a ee 
eee ews cee eee sete eh ceseee ee swan aeentee es eeeseseeesese re eseeeesesese “ 








United : 
States. Spain. 
5 1 
2 7 
9 eae ed 
13) Soa 
7a) 5 
8 10 








The following tables show the classification which Col. Sir George 
Clarke gives in the Naval Annual of the real fighting ships, which is 
evidence of the slight value attached to small vessels and shows how 
the naval forces are estimated among powerful nations: 





Class. 


Battleships 


Armored cruisers 


Battleship 


Armored cruisers 


Nore.—The Vitoria and Numancia are excluded as being little more than harbor defense ships. 


| Cisneros 





UNITED STATES. 





Name. 


Tons. 


Speed. 


Date of 
launch. 


Armaments. 





Indiana 
Oregon 
Massachusetts 


er es 


Texas (second class) -..----- 


INGWENC OB Kec estaneane sie uns 


Brooklyn.....---------+---- 





8, 200 


9, 215 


SPAIN. 


a 


Carlos V 


Cristébal Colén 


Vizcaya 
Oquendo 
Infanta Maria Teresa 





Princesa de Asturias 


9, 900 


9, 235 


6, 840 


7, 000 | 
7,000 | 


7, 000 


7, 000 


7,000 








17 


16 





16 4 


20 


20 
20 
20 





20 | 
20 | 


| 


4 30-cm. 

8 20-cm. 

1896 6 10-cm. 
20 57-mm. 
6 387-mm. 

4 33-cm. 

8 20-cm. 

1893 |< 415-cm. 
20 57-mm. 
6 37-1nm. 

30-cm. 

15-cm. 
1892 |) 19 57-mm. 
6 37-mm. 

6 20-cm. 

12 10-cm. 
1891 8 57-mm. 
4 37-mm. 

8 20-cm. 

12 12-cm. 

1895 13 57-mm. 
4 37-mm. 


32-cm. 

28-cm. 

16-cm. 

12-cm. 

42-mm. Nf., R. F. 
57-mm: Hk: EY. 


1887 
1897 


1895 


1895 


1891 
1891 
1890 





8 57-mm., R. F. 

8 37-mm. H., rev. 
2 24-cm. 

1896 |)10 14-cm. 

1896 |) 857-mm.,R.F. 


8 37-mm. H., rev. 








~ 


26 


This comparison shows the superiority of the United States in battle 
ships and protected cruisers, while Spain had apparently more armored 
cruisers; but when the time arrived for using them it was found that 
out of the seven only four could be made immediately available, nor 
could the only battle ship be made available for immediate service. 
Consequently, far from being equal to the Americans in effective naval 
forces, we proved to be very much inferior in number and quality of 
fighting ships. On the other hand, we had more personnel, for while 
the United States Navy counted only 12,000 men and no reserves, we 
had 23,000 men besides the reserves, including officers. 

The hostile squadron which made its appearance off Habana was the 
so-called North Atlantic Squadron, which had for months been in proc- 
ess of organization at Hampton Roads, carrying out practices along 
the coasts of Florida, and after the blowing up of the Maine it was 
stationed at Key West, a few hours’ distance from the Cuban shore.! 

We have already spoken of the composition of this squadron in the 
first part of this work (Ships, Guns, and Small Arms, p. 34 et seq.). It 
was under the command of Mr. Sampson, at that time captain, who was 
very anxious to attack Habana, although he is said to have expressed 
the opinion that the battle of Habana would have to be fought at the 
expense of some of his ships, and in view of the equality which was 
supposed to exist between the United States naval forces and those of 
Spain and the recent loss of the Maine, that would have been a serious 
calamity. 

The squadron was admirably officered. But the United States Gov- 
ernment decided, very wisely, to try the crews first and give them addi- 
tional training, and not send them at once into a battle which could not 
help but be fierce, without initiating them by means of less difficult 
operations in which the victory would be sure and complete, and where 
the gunuers would acquire greater facility in firing. This was the more 
important as the Maine catastrophe, in which 266 sailors lost their lives, 
had given rise to certain fantastic legends that Cuba and its ports were 
full of mines and torpedoes which could sow death and destruction 
everywhere and at all times. 

The principle prevailed which underlay the plan of campaign 
described in the first chapter, namely, that before proceeding directly 
against Cuba it would be necessary to fight naval battles to see whose 
was the preponderance on the sea. This will also explain why the 
Americans kept their ships so close together and why Sampson’s squad- 
ron always remained near the Flying Squadron, which was under 
Schley’s orders, so that the two fleets, in case of necessity, might be 
able to cooperate in a battle against the Spanish fleet with overwhelm- 
ing superiority. As we go on we shall see that the plan was carried 
out in full. 








1 This was an excellent base of operations. It was stated that during the blockade 
of Habana even beefsteak and fried potatoes were daily sent to the crews of the 
fleet from Key West. 


27 


For this reason it would have been of great advantage if those who 
had charge of conducting the war on the Spanish side had made efforts 
to divide the United States squadron, which could surely have been 
accomplished by permitting privateering or resorting to the system 
adopted by the United States, namely, disguising privateers in the 
Shape of auxiliary vessels, for while some of these auxiliary vessels 
were commanded by regular naval officers, like the St. Paul, which had 
been given to Captain Sigsbee, of the Maine, the majority of them were 
commanded by officers of a special corps of reserves formed of active 
and retired sailors of the merchant marine. What was there to pre- 
vent us from giving the same character to our merchant vessels and 
following the example of our enemies, who thus equipped for war not 
less than 128 vessels? If it is true, as maintained by some, that priva- 
teering is no longer any use in our time, why were our enemies so anx- 
ious that we should not resort to it? And why did we reserve the right 
to practice it? 

A few score auxiliary vessels would have constituted a menace to 
commerce, which the Americans worship, and would have compelled 
their squadrons to subdivide and operate without that close correla- 
tion which gave them so much strength. A threat of operations against 
the undefended ports of Florida or against the United States fleet at 
the Philippines—anything in the nature of naval strategy or plan of 
campaign—should have been resorted to, so as to make at least an 
attempt to scatter Sampson’s and Schley’s squadrons. 

Nothing of all this was thought of; or if it was the people did nov 
hear of it. If there was any fixed and concerted plan of campaign, if 
every resource of intelligence was exhausted in formulating it, it has 
not come to the knowledge of the general public, and thus, while the 
American people are already in possession of official reports rendering 
an account of everything that has happened, of the expenses incurred, 
the injuries suffered, we know nothing at all except what we see before 
our eyes in the evidence of our terrible débacle. We must envy the 
system of other nations, for obviously we have among us none who are 
capable of imitating it. 

The opinion which Sir George Clarke formed of the naval capacity 
of Spain is pitiful, and it has gone abroad and become the opinion of 
the world on the strength of his authority. 

“In Spain,” says the Naval Annual, “some efforts of preparation 
were made, but want of money, of resources, and of administrative 
capacity proved fatal. At the beginning of 1898 there was not a single 
completely effective war ship, and in home waters there was no organ- 
ized squadron. ‘The isolated force in the Far East, composed mainly 
of obsolete craft, of which the flagship was scarcely the equal of our 
Active, was not, in the modern sense, a real fighting body. The effi- 
ciency of a navy, involving the fulfillment of exceedingly complex con- 
ditions, is a delicate test of sound government and of national vigor. 


28 
Spain throughout her history, in spite of great natural advantages, has 
never proved able to create and maintain a really efficient fleet.” 

We think these statements are a little exaggerated. There was atime 
when Spain was all-powerful on the sea. Everyone knows the causes of 
ourdecline. As far as the present time isconcerned, Brassey’s opinion is 
correct and is confirmed by the sad facts of a terribly disastrous con- 
flict. But we will not yet despair; we still think that days of rejoicing 
and glory may return if we can become convinced that morality and 
order and good government are the basis of the civil and military pros- 
perity of nations. 

The Americans had a pretty accurate idea of our deficiencies, thanks 
to information received from intelligent spies operating in Spain. 

Among a number of documents recently published by the United 
States is one, bearing no signature, which is unique of its kind and may 
be of interest as being suggestive. It can be found in the original on 
page 27 of the second volume of the Report of the Secretary of the 
Navy, 1898, and is as follows: 


APRIL 16, 1898. 

Sir: Yesterday the Spanish Government began to take extraordinary precautions 
to prevent the getting out of news relating to the movements of ships or anything 
pertaining to war preparations. It is quite probable, therefore, that definite infor- 
mation in regard to these subjects will be difficult if not impossible to get. My 
latest information, which I have telegraphed, is to the effect that the torpedo squad- 
ron, consisting of three destroyers, three torpedo boats, and the Ciudad de Cadiz, 
Colon, and Teresa are at the Cape de Verdes awaiting instructions. Itissaid that the 
Colon and Teresa left Cadiz not properly provisioned. Provisions and coal have been 
sent to them. I have no reason to believe that they have not a full supply of 
ammunition. The Oquendo and Viscaya, from Puerto Rico, should arrive at Cape de 
Verdes to-day. Although I have no definite information, I believe the Pelayo 
arrived at Cadiz yesterday, coming from Cartagena. It was intended that she 
should go, after a few days’ necessary delay in Cartagena, and it is reported that 
she was sighted in the Straits of Gibraltar day before yesterday. ‘The Proserpina, 
Osado, Destructor, Barcelo, Retamosa, Habana, Halcon, torpedo boats and destroyers, 
and the Vitoria are now practically ready in Cadiz, awaiting the arrival of the 
Carlos V and the Pelayo. The Alfonso XIII is also about ready in Cartagena. 

The installation for moving the guns by electricity in the Carlos V is not com- 
pleted, andI am unable to get at any estimate of the date when she will be entirely 
ready for service. I know on good authority, however, that in an emergency she 
could be used at once, working some of her machinery by hand. Work is being 
pushed, also, as rapidly as possible on the Cisneros, but she can hardly be ready for 
several weeks. The trans-Atlantic steamers Mexico, Panama, Santo Domingo, San 
Augustin, and Villaverde, now in Cuban waters, are being armed as auxiliary cruisers. 
To this number should be added the Columbia and Normannia, recently purchased 
in Germany, and the Giralda, now being converted in Barcelona. This makes 21 
auxiliary cruisers concerning which I have quite definite information. The two 
steamers bought in Germany were strengthened there and are in condition to receive 
their artillery and crew when they arrive at Cadiz, which is expected to-day. I call 
your special attention to the newspaper slip which I inclose, entitled, ‘‘Fe en la 
Armada.” It was published in the Heraldo of April 6, the leading and most influen- 
tial paper of Madrid. The Imparcial of the following morning called attention to 
it and spoke in very severe terms of the impropriety of a former secretary of the 


: 29 


navy speaking so unreservedly of such important matters at this critical time. The 
following is a translation: 

‘‘We had an opportunity to-day to talk for a long time with General Berdnger, 
the last minister of marine under the Conservative cabinet. 

“To the questions which we directed to him concerning the conflict pending 
with the United States he was kind enough to inform us that he confided absolutely 
in the triumph of our naval forces. 

“The attack on our island ports is not to be feared, he said, by taking advantage 
of the darkness of night. — 

‘The reason of this is that Habana, as well as Cienfuegos, Nuevitas, and Santiago 
are defended by electrical and automobile torpedoes, which can work at a great 
distance. 

“Senor Canovas del Castillo, who did not neglect these things, arranged for, in 
agreement with me, the shipping to Cuba of 190 torpedoes, which are surely located 
in these ports at present. 

“The transportation and installation of these war machines was in the charge of 
the distinguished torpedoist, Senor Chacén. 

““T have already said that we shall conquer on the sea, and I am going to give you 
my reasons. 

“‘The first of these is the remarkable discipline that prevails on our war ships, and 
the second, as soon as fire is opened the crews of the American ships will commence 
to desert, since we all know that among them are people of all nationalities. 

‘Ship against ship, therefore, a failure is not to be feared. 

“‘T believe that the squadron detained at the Cape de Verdes, and particularly the 
destroyers, should have and could have continued the voyage to Cuba, since they 
have nothing to fear from the American fleet. 

‘In this class of ships we are on a much higher level than the United States.” 

The Company Bandera Espanola have been ordered to suspend the voyages of 
their ships to Habana, and I presume the Government intends to take these ships 
into service. Also the Compafiia Trasatlantica has ordered its ships not to touch at 
Corunna hereafter, presumably for the same reason. 

It is said quite openly here that the intention of the Government is to make some 
kind of an effort on our coasts. I am inclined to believe that they have this plan in 
view; but I have been unable to verify the reports or to get at any of the details. 

Just at this moment, here at Madrid, everything is very quiet. Considerable tur- 
bulence is reported from the provinces. How great this may be we are unable to 
judge, as the Government is keeping a sharp watch on the telegrams and does not 
permit news to be disseminated. A few days ago there was some excitement and 
danger of a mob here in Madrid, after the announcement of the proclamation of the 
armistice in Cuba. That crisis is now apparently passed. Everybody here expects 
war, and the lower classes ardently desire it. The Government and the more intel- 
ligent classes dread it, but will accept it if it is forced upon them. The press has 
fed the people with all sorts of nonsense about the superior bravery of the Spanish 
sailor, the superior discipline on board the Spanish ships, and the greater fighting 
power of the navy. 

The people believe that this superiority of the Spanish navy over that of the 
United States is overwhelming and that they must defeat us. This opinion is shared 
also by many intelligent persons—in fact, I believe, by all Spaniards. They say 
they have nothing to lose; they could not be worse off with the war than without it, 
as they are about to lose Cubaanyhow; but they can do incalculable damage to our 
commerce, and seriously injure, if not destroy, our Navy, and although they would 
probably be beaten in the end, they will have taught us a salutary lesson for the 
future. One of the most intelligent, best-informed Spaniards I have met here, a 
man who had traveled much and claims to have a great admiration for the United 
States, and who knows much about our history and resources, a senator of the King- 
dom, told me yesterday that the thing that he dreaded most was the long period 


30 


that the hostilities would last. He was sure that the struggle might last three 
years; that he could very well understand and appreciate the feelings and ambitions 
of a young and powerful nation like the United States for conquest; that he could 
understand that we were desirous of taking the islands of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and 
the Canaries, and even of coming to Madrid itself; but what he could not under- 
stand was that, while protesting a desire for peace, a decided disinclination to the 
annexation of any territory, the people of the United States had done everything in 
their power to foment the rebellion in Cuba and to make it impossible for Spain to 
overcome it by the force of arms. 

I give you this as a matter of interest solely, but it ene the attitude of the 
intelligent, educated, and traveled Spaniard. 


This is certainly remarkable information. 

The Secretary of the United States Navy, on April 6, addressed to 
Sampson, commander in chief of the North Atlantic Squadron, the 
following instructions: 


WASHINGTON, April 6, 1898. 

Srr: In the event of hostilities with Spain the Department wishes you to do all 
in your power to capture or destroy the Spanish war vessels in West Indian waters, 
including the small gunboats which are stationed along the coast of Cuba. 

2. The Department does not wish the vessels of your squadron to be exposed to 
the fire of the batteries at Habana, Santiago de Cuba, or other strongly fortified 
ports in Cuba, unless the more formidable Spanish vessels should take refuge within 
those harbors. Even in this case the Department would suggest that a rigid 
blockade and employment of our torpedo boats might accomplish the desired 
object, viz, the destruction of the enemy’s vessels without subjecting unnecessarily 
our own men-of-war to the fire of the land batteries. 

There are two reasons for this: 

First. There may be no United States troops to occupy any captured stronghold, 
or to protect the landing, until after the yellow-fever season is over, about the first 
of October. 

Second. The lack of docking facilities makes it particularly desirable that our 
vessels should not be crippled before the capture or destruction of Spain’s most for- 
midable vessels. 

3. The Department further desires that, in case of war, you will maintain a 
strict blockade of Cuba, particularly at the ports of Habana, Matanzas, and, if pos- 
sible, of Santiago de Cuba, Manzanillo, and Cienfuegos. Such a blockade may 
cause the Spaniards to yield before the rainy season arrives. 

4, All prizes should be sent to Key West or other available United States ports 
for adjudication. 

5. Should it be decided to furnish the insurgents with arms and ammunition, the 
Department suggests that Nuevitas and Puerto Padre would be the most suitable 
places to land them and establish communications with the Cuban forces. 

6. Should the Department learn that the Spanish fleet had gone to Puerto Rico, it 
is possible that the flying squadron may be sent thither, in which case some of your 
vessels may be needed to reenforce that squadron. 

7. The Department hopes to be able to cut the cable off Santiago de Cuba, even if 
it has to employ a special cable vessel for this purpose, and it has also under consid- 
eration the practicability of cutting the cable near Habana and connecting the end 
to one of the vessels of your command, so that you can always be in communica- 
tion with the Department. This plan has not yet been decided upon. Please con- 
sider it. 

8. The Department need not impress upon you the necessity for stringent sanitary 
regulations. It leaves this matter, as well as the details in regard to conducting 


31 


operations, to the commander in chief, in whose judgment it has the greatest confi- 
dence. : 
Wishing you every success, very respectfully, 
JOHN D. LONG. 


Admiral Sampson answered these confidential instructions on April 
9, from Key West, expressing himself in favor of a direct attack upon 
Habana, and setting forth the manner in which the batteries could be 
easily destroyed, Captains Evans, Taylor, and Chadwick concurring in 
his opinion, We will treat of this matter more fully when speaking of 
Habana in the volume which is to follow the present one. 

The next instructions of the Secretary of the Navy were as follows: 


WASHINGTON, April 21, 1598. 

Sir: The Department’s instructions of April 6 are modified as follows: 

You will immediately institute a blockade of the north coast of Cuba, from Car- 
denas to Bahia Honda; also, if in your opinion your force warrants, the port of Cien- 
fuegos, on the south side of the island. It is considered doubtfulif the present force 
at your command would warrant a more extensive blockade. 

If it should become necessary for the army to embark for Cuba, the navy will be 
required to furnish the necessary convoy for its transports. For this reason it does 
not seem desirable that you should undertake at present to blockade any more of the 
island than has been indicated. It is believed that the blockade will cut off Habana 
almost entirely from receiving supplies from the outside. 

The Navy Department is considering the question of occupying the port of Matan- 
zas by a military force large enough to hold it and to open communications with the 
insurgents, and this may be done at an early date if part of the army is ready to 
embark. If this operation is decided upon, you are directed to cooperate with the 
army and assist with such vessels as are necessary to cover and protect such a 
movement. 

If you obtain any information of the movements of Spanish ships of war in any 
part of the West Indies you will, if practicable, inform the Department. 

In conducting the other operations you will be governed by the instructions con- 
tained in the Department’s letter of April 6. 

The Department does not wish the defenses of Habana to be bombarded or 
attacked by your squadron. 

Very respectfully, 
JOHN D. LONG. 


Nothing could be more precise, simple, clear, and of sounder judg- 
ment than these instructions. 

We may gather from them that the Government at Washington had 
definitely decided to avoid the operation of attacking Habana, because 
the information that was being received and the weakness of Spain 
which was becoming more and more apparent, rendered it probable 
that better and easier results could be attained by a simple blockade. 
Yet in all these admirable initial orders there may be noticed a certain 
fear of the Spanish squadron and a desire to keep the ships intact for 
the encounter with them and to accumulate naval forces with the same 
object in view, and that is the reason why so much circumspection was 
required of Sampson; for the loss of any of his ships at Habana— 
which was by no means an improbable result if they entered upon an 


; 


32 


engagement with the batteries, and which would have produced bad 
effects in the United States, where there was a strong faction opposed 
to the war, the partisans of which were decreasing as reports of easy 
victories arrived, but which is still in existence—would destroy the 
pretended naval equality of which some prominent Spaniards were 
boasting, either from ignorance or because they were misinformed. 

In whatever light we may look at this matter, it is obvious that it 
would have meant a great deal to us if we could have divided the 
United States squadron by means of privateering, having recourse, as 
a last resort, to an attempt or threat of some daring operation. 

It would likewise have been of good effect if we had compelled the 
enemy to engage in a battle against Habana. A victory there would 
have cost them much time and blood. Such a battle could probably 
have been provoked on several occasions when one of the best Yankee 
battle ships, through her own heedlessness, came within range of 
the windward batteries. If the first shots had been exchanged at 
that time, who knows how the battle would have ended, for it is not to 
be supposed that a battle ship would be undignified enough to take to 
flight before a battery. The officers in charge of the artillery at the 
forts could hardly control themselves in the presence of certain superior 
orders. This is a matter of which we shall speak more at length when, 
in the course of this work, we take up the organization of the fortifica- 
tions of Habana; for we orn to point out that the artillery of a forti- 
fied place, when ta the presence of the enemy, should be accorded more 
liberty of action, as a whole, as also in each battery or group of bat- 
teries, than was the case at Habana. 

We have already expressed our admiration for the foresight and 
Strategic judgment shown in the orders of the United States Navy 
Department, and as we pursue this purely technical analysis we will 
show that on our side, on the contrary, everything was confusion, 
incompetence, and terrible discord. 


CHAPTER IV. 
OPERATIONS OF OUR SQUADRON. 


OPINIONS OF ADMIRAL CERVERA—REPLIES THERETO—APPALLING 
DEFICIENCY OF OUR NAVAL POWER—SORTIE OF THE SQUADRON. 


The comparison of both navies, based upon the studies made in pre- 
vision of a war with the United States, suggested to the admiral the 
following considerations on February 25, 1898: ! 


If we compare the Navy of the United States with our own, counting only modern 
vessels capable of active service, we find that the United States have the battleships 
Iowa, Indiana, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Texas ; the armored cruisers Brooklyn and 
New York; the protected cruisers Atlanta, Minneapolis, Baltimore, Charleston, Chicago, 
Cincinnati, Columbia, Newark, San Francisco, Olympia, Philadelphia, and Raleigh, and 
the rapid unprotected cruisers Detroit, Marblehead, and Montgomery. Against this 
we have, following the same classification, the battleships Pelayo, Infanta Marta 
Teresa, Vizcaya, and Oquendo, armored cruiser Coldén, and protected cruisers Carlos V, 
Alfonso XIII, and Lepanto; no fast unprotected cruisers; and all this, supposing the 
Pelayo, Carlos V, and Lepanto to be ready in time, and giving the desired value to the 
Alfonso XIII. I do not mention the other vessels, on account of their small military 
value, surely inferior to that of the nine gunboats, from 1,000 to 1,600 tons each, 6 
monitors still in service, the ram Katahdin, the Vesuvius, and the torpedo boats and 
destroyers, which I do not count. I believe that in the present form the comparison 
is accurate enough. 

Comparing the displacements, we find that in battleships the United States have 
41,589 tons against our 30,917 tons; in armored cruisers they have 17,471 tons against 
our 6,840; in protected cruisers, 51,098 against 18,887, and in fast unprotected cruisers 
they have 6,287 and we none. The total of vessels good for all kinds of operations 
comprise 116,445 tons against 56,644 tons, or something less than one-half. 

In speed our battleships are superior to theirs, but not to their armored cruisers. 
In other vessels their speed is superior to ours. 

Comparing the artillery, and admitting that it is possible to fire every ten minutes 
the number of shots stated in the respective reports, and that only one-half of the 
pieces of less than 20 cm. are fired, and supposing that the efficiency of each shot of 
the calibers, 32, 30, 28, 25, 20, 16, 15, 14, 12, 10, 17.5, 5.7, 4.7, and 3.7 be represented by 
the figures 328, 270, 220, 156, 80, 41, 33, 27, 17, 10, 4,2, and 1, which are the hundredths 
of the cubes of the numbers representing their calibers expressed in centimeters 

(caliber in cm.)? 
(S00 
represented by 43,822, and that of ours by 29,449; that of the American armored 
cruisers by 13,550, and that of ours (Colén) by 6,573; that of the American protected 
cruisers by 62,725, and that of ours by 14,600; that of the American unprotected 
cruisers by 12,300. Therefore, according to these figures, the offénsive power of the: 
artillery of the United States vessels will be represented by 132,397, and that of ours 
by 50,622, or a little less than two-fifths of the enemy’s. 





), we find that the artillery power of the American battleships is 


1The data and letters which follow were published in La Epoca, and have been 
circulating for some time in numerous facsimile copies, which have not been denied. 
33 
6884——-3 


34 


To arrive at this appalling conclusion I have already said that it has been neces- 
sary- to count the Pelayo and Carlos V, which probably will not be ready in time; 
the Lepanto, which surely will not be ready, and the Alfonso XIII, whose eres ren- 
ders her of a very doubtful utility. 


IMPOSSIBILITY OF AN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN. 


Now, to carry out any serious operations in a maritime war, the first thing neces- 
sary is to secure control of the sea, which can only be done by defeating the enemy’s 
fleet, or rendering them powerless by blockading them in their military ports. Can 
we do this with the United States? It is evident to me that we can not. And even 
if God should grant us a great victory, against what may be reasonably expected, 
where and how would we repair the damages sustained? Undoubtedly, the port 
would be Habana, but with what resources? I am not aware of the resources 
existing there, but judging by this department, where everything is scarce, it is to 
be assumed that the same condition exists everywhere, and that the immediate 
consequences of the first great naval battle would be the enforced inaction of the 
greater part of our fleet for the rest of the campaign, whatever might be tho result 
of that great combat. In the meantime the enemy would repair its damages inside 
of its fine rivers, and aided by its powerful industries and enormous resources: 
This lack of industries and stores on our part renders it impossible to carry on an 
offensive campaign. 

* * *% * * * * 

If the control of the sea remains in the hands of our adversaries, they will imme- 
diately make themselves masters of any unfortified port which they may want in 
the island of Cuba, counting, as they do, on the insurgents, and will use them as a 
base for their operations against us. The transportation of troops to Cuba would 
be most difficult and the successs very doubtful, and the insurrection, without the 
check of our army, which would gradually give way, and with the aid of the 
Americans, would rapidly increase and become more formidable. 

These reflections are very sad; but I believe it to be my unavoidable duty to set 
aside all personal considerations and loyally to represent to my country the 
resources which I believe to exist, so that, without illusions, it may weigh the con- 
siderations for and against, and then, through the Government of His Majesty, which 
is the country’s legitimate organ, it may pronounce its decision. I am sure that this 
decision will find in all of us energetic, loyal, and decided executors. Our motto is 
“the fulfillment of duty.” 


[To the admiral.! “ 
MADRID, March 4, 1898. 


I notified you that, when I should have recovered somewhat from the painful 
impression caused by the reading of your personal letter, I should answer it, and I 
now do so, and will first take up the comparative study of the United States naval 
forces and ours, which, taken absolutely as you have done, omitting some of our ves- 
sels at Habana, which are available for a conflict with the United States, show a 
difference of tonnage, but not so excessive as would appear from your lines. In my 
opinion, the matter should be studied from the standpoint of the present distribution 
of the United States forces, remembering that it will be to their interest to maintain 
the ships now in the Pacific for the protection of San Francisco and the arsenal of 
San Diego, as also their costly trans-Pacific liners plying between the former city 
and Australia and China, and also to protect the Hawaiian Islands, about to be 
annexed to the United States, for which reason naval forces are being maintained 
there. With your good judgment you will understand that the long and difficult 
voyage which these forces, among them the Oregon, would have to make in order to 
join the Atlantic forces, leaving the Pacific region unprotected, could not be effected 








‘The matter inclosed in brackets, on this and subsequent pages, does not appear 
in O. N. I. publication, ‘‘ Views of Admiral Cervera.” The brackets have been inserted 
Dy OsN- I 


35 


without the knowledge of others, and so far all such knowledge is absolutely lack- 
ing. I must therefore refer you to the inclosed statement; while it shows deficien- 
cies, which the Government is endeavoring to remendy at any cost by the acquisi- 
tion of new elements, if only in the matter of speed, they do not exist to such an 
extent as stated in the comparison with the United States Atlantic Squadron. There 
isno doubt that, in order to concentrate our nucleus of forces, we shall require some 
time, the whole month of April, in my estimation. 

Since I have been in charge of this department, His Majesty’s Government has 
known the situation of the great nucleus of our naval forces, which are being 
remodeled or repaired abroad, and in conformity with such knowledge the Govern- 
ment has endeavored, and is endeavoring by every possible means, with a view also 
to the general interests of the country, to pursue in its relations with the United 
States a policy of perfect friendship, although at times points have come up which 
were not easy of solution. But with your good judgment you will understand, and 
I want therefore to remove some misapprehensions regarding the island of Cuba; 
our flag is still flying there, and the Government, to meet the sentiments of the peo- 
ple, even at the cost of many sacrifices, desires that this Spanish colony should not 
be separated from our territory, and is trying by every possible means, political, 
international, and military, to solve satisfactorily the Cuban problem. That is 
the prevailing opinion of the country, and it contorms its actions thereto. As already 
stated, the Government is acquainted with our situation, and for that reason is 
endeavoring to collect all possible resources at Habana Harbor, fortifying it so that 
it may serve as a base for our naval forces, equipping it with a dock, already in 
operation, where our ships will be able to repair slight damages. 

It is my opinion that it will not be possible, either on our side or the enemy’s, to 
repair those injuries which may be caused by the action of a battle in the short 
period of time in which international military campaigns are enacted, compared 
with the material interests they affect. The other harbors of the island, such as 
Cienfuegos, Santiago de Cuba, etc., are prepared to be closed by means of torpedoes. 
In your estimate you do not count for anything the effect of homogeneous troops, 
well trained and disciplined, as against the United States crews of hirelings (mer- 
cenaria), and you might find historical facts, evoking sad memories for us, to con- 
firm what I say. I will close, never doubting for one moment that you and all of us 
will fulfill the sacred duty which our country imposes upon us, and in giving you 
my Opinions in answer to yours there is nothing that I desire more than peace. 

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO. ] 


The above letter was accompanied by the following comparative 
statement of the tonnage of the principal ships: 


[NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON. 


Possible formation. 














Tons. Tons. 

RNS a onjay ania 6 oo a0 win otal «acide 8,200 || ViZCayae ccaccnesencesncassecsnecsesescs 7, 000 
vibeinn. - 53335 ere ero ges LOR AS SEH OB Olay 0% oajcaeccqccmace caelccee ss nics 2s 5.-~ 9, 900 
PReNBaCRUHEtS . 2s... 5-2-2 5 cee. HORS She COL LOS Vine 4. <1 a cee onees seme ae rete ae 9, 250 
TEENS TS) coors :chO He IES eee er Seep as F Geoloaly Mari at LOLOsa pe oceans eee ae sates sas 7, 000 
soe eS a le are Seed UGUODUO: . ance. cance sme cee ogee eso ~ 7, 000 
MTEeS oeetakif nt ct = lies et. cub 3! L405 Cristébal Col6n- aio: ese Be ee. tiie 6, 800 
MNO EN ee ois cclsiocs ese eoewere sue cass 2eU00n) Alonso; X LL]... mepepenibi Fae baunenes 4+ 4, 826 
SS tat Ol 36 5 ri ies eee ie PeOUOt eM Hinsenada sssceheoseeer tec oe ouse cs. 1, 064 
NE Ss cia k 5 vin nis » ons bbe ons se Gade oF loan Alfonso &Dbsisie dein wWawe eee 5 12s 3, 900 
RRR eae wed one cen pea decane amacssas TG Il AVG EIR sae seein ae Saco sds ness SaSereer 1, 189 
ROME Tet Uses cosine deddee BS Gourieieing Mercedes’! ts staces> cess s-ssc-- 3, 900 
Pirstgee, dispatch boat ...c.¢cceccen=|-nancbsnne Infante Laabel: 4-3i- nee dts be sess» - = 1, 189 

BPOUEE GORMNAGO 5.226. - 605 ae ac aee 66, 537 Votal- COnnarG. samme cec esse oe 6s 162, 818 
5 torpedo boats ; average speed, 21 knots. 3 destroyers and 3 torpedo boats; aver- 

age speed, 25 knots. 








163,018. 


36 


Letter from the admiral. 


CARTAGENA, March 7, 1898. 


[Yesterday I received your personal letter of the 4th, to which I am about to reply, 
but you must first permit me to give you a general idea of our situation as I see it. 
That it is the intention of the United States to engage us in war appears beyond all 
doubt, and it therefore becomes more important each day to examine into the advan- 
tages and disadvantages which such a war may have for us. Inspired by these ideas, 
I deemed it my duty as a patriot to reply to the official communication through 
which I was advised of the distribution of the American vessels and the condition of 
certain points on the United States coasts, and I did so in my personal letter of Feb- 
ruary 25 last. To-day, feeling at liberty to express my ideas more freely in a con- 
fidential letter, I will reply to your communication. ] 

An examination of our forces, based upon what I already knew and upon recent 
information and observation, not only confirms what I said, but shows it to be still 
worse. I have visited the Vitoria, on which I counted, and from my visit I have 
drawn the conviction that we can not count on her for the present conflict. Neither 
does my information permit me to count on the Pelayo, Carlos V,or Numancia. And 
yet, as this opinion is not based upon personal observation, I include them in the 
inclosed statement [solely because you have included them in yours]. Whatever 
may be the direction given to the conflict, either war, negotiations direct or through 
a third party, an arbitrator or otherwise, the longer the decision is delayed the 
worse it will be for us. Ifit is war, the longer it takes to come the more exhausted 
we willbe. If it is negotiation of any kind, the longer it is postponed the greater 
will be the demands, each time more irritating, which will be presented by the 
United States, and to which we will have to yield in order to gain time in the vain 
hope of improving our military position. And as our position can not be improved, 
let us see what we can expect from a war under such conditions. 

It would be foolish to deny that what we may reasonably expect is defeat, which 
may be glorious, but all the same defeat, which would cause us to lose the island 
in the worst possible manner. But even supposing an improbability—that is, that 
we should obtain a victory—that would not change the final result of the campaign. 
The enemy would not declare himself defeated, and it would be foolish for us to pre- 
tend to overcome the United States in wealth and production. The latter would 
recover easily, while we would die of exhaustion, although victorious, and the 
ultimate result would be always a disaster. Only in case we could count on some 
powerful ally could we aspire to obtain a satisfactory result. But, besides having to 
discount the high price to be paid for such an alliance, even then we would only be 
postponing the present conflict for a few years, when it would become graver than 
it is to-day, as is the present insurrection in comparison with the last. 

Even admitting the possibility of retaining Cuba, this island would cost us enor- 
mous sacrifices by the necessity of being constantly armed to the teeth. And here 
the problem already pointed out by somebody arises: Is the island worth the ruin 
of Spain? (Silvela, in Burgos.) I do not speak on the subject of privateering, 
because it seems to me that no man acquainted with history can attach any value 
to privateering enterprises, which nowadays are almost impossible on account of the 
character of modern vessels.! [Although I do not attach much importance to cer- 
tain details, which can have but little influence on the general events, I shall never- 
theless speak of some upon which you touch, in ordér to set forth my point of view 
in answering your letter. ] 

The accompanying statement [which appears to me to be more correct than the 
one inclosed with your letter] shows that our forces in the Atlantic are approxi- 
mately one-half of those of the United States, both as regards tonnage and artillery © 
power. 








a 


‘We do not agree with this opinion. In the course of this book we show that 
privateering might have brought us many advantages. 


37 


I have never thought of the forces which the United States has in the Pacific and 
Asia in connection with the development of events in the West Indies; but I have 
always considered these forces a great danger for the Philippines, which have not 
even a shadow of a resistance to oppose to them. And as regards the American 
coasts of the Pacific, the United States has no anxiety about them. I think you are 
mistaken in believing that during the month of April our situation will change. As 
I have said above, I am sure that neither the Carlos V, the Pelayo, the Vitoria, nor 
the Numancia will be ready, and nobody knows how we will be as regards 14-centi- 
meter ammunition. It seems sure that by the end of April the 25.4-centimeter guns 
of the Colén willnotbe mounted. Evenif I were mistaken, then our available forces 
in the West Indies would be 49 per cent of that of the Americans in tonnage and 
47 per cent in artillery. Our only superiority would be in torpedo boats and 
destroyers provided all of them arrive there in good order. 

I do not know exactly what are the sentiments of the people concerning Cuba, but 
I am inclined to believe that the immense majority of Spaniards wish for peace above 
all things. But those who so think are the ones who suffer and weep inside of their 
own houses, and do not talk so loud as the minority, who profit by the continuation 
of this state of affairs. However, this is a subject which it is not for me to analyze. 

Our want of means is such that some days ago three men went overboard while 
manning the rail for saluting, through the breaking of an old awning line. A new 
line had been asked for fifty days ago, but it has not yet been replaced. [More tban 
one official letter has been written on this interesting subject.] In times past, forty- 
three days after the Herndn Cortés was laid down the vessel was at sea. It is now 
fifty-one days since I requested the changing of certain tubes in the boilers of asteam 
launch of the Teresa, and I do not yet know when it will be finished. This will prob- 
ably be the proportion between us and the United States in the repair of damages, in 
spite of our having the Habana dock, which is the principal thing, but not all. As 
for the crews, I do not know them, but I may say that the crews that defeated our 
predecessors at Trafalgar had been recruited in the same way.- [I beg that you will 
- not consider this an argument against yours, for that would be accusing me of great 
presumption in speaking of what I do not know. It is simply a thought that occurs 
to me. | 

These are my loyal opinions, and for the sake of the nation I express them to [you 
with the request that you will transmit them to] the Government. If you should 
deem it advisable for me to express them personally, I am ready to do so at the first 
intimation. After I have done this, thus relieving my conscience of a heavy weight, 
I am quite ready to fulfill the comparatively easy duty of conducting our forces 
wherever I may be ordered, being sure that all of them will do their duty. 

PASCUAL CERVERA. 


With the foregoing letter the admiral inclosed the following statement: 
Comparison with the United States fleet. 
SPAIN. 


Protected vessels actually there, or unprotected, but with a speed of over 15 knots: | 


Displace- 











Wieets Armament. 

Tons. 
TOE nie va did y a cae ke saves sad kr bednes bo Woscecdde Cd owe dncth e's uqueusas 7, 000 6, 130 
eres cic tine rece re wine Mae cre nae aes tae sag dina tian doieraie a coamma cl 7, 000 6, 130 
ITAL POBSONACD. soc cccnccscnses daace kota bastassibsscssckweetehervee 1, 064 1, 100 
[15,064] [13, 360] 


[23 per cent. || [23 per cent. ] 





38 


A 


Comparison with the United States fleec-—Continued. 


UNITED STATES. 
Same kind of vessels: 
































eyecare Armament. 
Tons. 
PNG WiOMIOTIC Sercaus cist ote lne BRT hee bit efoss Slalele a. haa Rita te cian ota wields le ole Clete alatane aieeererate 8, 200 6, 400 
Ate b eit ee ee ee ere a rae oA eneite en oe mee eae ee oe 10, 288 9, 304 
AAW LESWSHES Fe] Wh FS Ley a= eae i Peed far A Ce gh Ee erg et Sei tr A hea Aa a Rime i Se 10, 288 9, 304 
"PGRN 22 ate Ca tie SAE Ea poeta Se plete sen eet tee Gee eer abmiateitals Sele ee ciceite © Bette 6, 315 4, 550 
EAPOOMK IY om o's no-sense 5 Shu bie 04 ste Seas ne eae Sie Wie Ce eee rin ns nena oe 9, 271 7, 880 
BOWS se eke ER Ses See ESSER Seo. ete ate eee a a aeim etnies ete rra siete) fareterstatere atten 11, 410 8, 360 
Montoomery <a) ise eHed- opie cae bees se ae pees eed ben aa ee to == Saas 2, 089 4,100 
Wi Cee (:leys¥:11 eee ape ae eps eee arene wae mine o SAG a ease Sah coc boone Setocaene 2, 089 4, 100 
DOtrOlt. cc 2s vacews cocaics feed Seb ee te Cee tae atts Ue ee Sere aan feaiate Riaiole efeteeiets 2, 089 4, 100 
MOTPOTS foc cee eee le acs id ae Wine a asieia + piace eels eet ae woe cee eee eee 3, 600 2, 896 
65, 639 60, 994 
To these may be positively added: 
SPAIN. 

Displace- 

“ment. Armament. 
Tons. 

LntantasMaria Teresa: i c2.cce-esco5s pecs deedec te tee ae eae oes ae esse eee 7, 000 6, 130 
GristoDALCol6i oo eet ace ev ece ce ccc be eee Sem ners Aes ere rete aie eater nate tate rented 6, 840 a8, 490 
Alfonso XT b fia sels Sa Poet eee aes Be eee eee eet ee eters 4, 826 4, 340 





18, 666 18, 960 





a Without the 25-cm. guns, the value of which is represenged by 1,248. 


UNITED STATES. 





Displace- 





ment Armament. 

Tons. | : 
Minneapolis. Fee ce a. cc teraa tee aback tld stale On Won ate ae ldte de eters pietctatettans eEntate 7,375 4,790 
Wolimpiaws oo Fe Soe eee re ee hie siete Bioiele le eta ae Ge eter eee aaa eerie 7,315 4, 790 
14, 750 9, 580 





Doubtful additions. 











SPAIN. 

Displace- 

nient Armament. 
Tons. 
PROLAVO ete c cc anc ec erlccs aces ce mene cannes cei s wales aioe a cetera eee eee etaia ste eeete 9,917 6, 987 
WATIOS Vee cas cents cee ance ate eee re eee nie cree me ee ee ae Sark atete srotavnte a eta eters 9, 250 5, 620 
19, 167 12, 607 
UNITED STATES. 

Displace- 
nent Armament. 
PAGG LATTE etcs kote w ake cyan c om hx dase Sele Gale et aicle ea tle/aie caine wape eran aa ae ela nies iarreee 3, 000 4, 270 
CATT OS TOM aire cancion sine 2 oom Ses DU ate ato ate oles oe oS re cae ee norte eee nee 3, 730 4,570 
CGMICA DOF eos Sc Sotelo 0,0: dude creeinigs eicicw oe ein fae nieces wee emer ciee emate einer ereetnete 4, 500 4, 470 
Ne Warkeetostornoe tease. bee lh ree a ee Cn eee Be Sarmoriseauce: 4, 098 6, 740 
PUBS DBAS boas sens = 0a docdetpasadehubacte cece tebe eee nares saenea aera ee tenes 4, 394 7, 640 
OL p HIM sereee ts See oie bs Swe owls Cee eRe Se on nt eee a eer ee rete 1, 485 700 
NO) DORN AN a AS oa ace eee SEAS 5 9 JeSnE ey GOmtac mone Ser cS Stora co srecaesnias 1, 703 3, 320 





SS 


22, 840 31, 710 





oo 


Doubtful additions—Continued. 


In the South Atlantic they have: 








Displace- 
Taare Armament. 





Tons. 
RTT eT RNA EL tle eee ee tenes epee aya Sarg Suis owls eld ce'= wc wise aia sek sce ceutes aes 3, 200 4,795 











All the other vessels have very little military value, with the exception of the 
torpedo boats and destroyers, not mentioned in this statement, including the Katahdin 
and Vesuvius. 


From the admiral. 
Capiz, April 6, 1898. 

[In last night’s mail I received your letter of the 4th, having previously received 
your telegram concerning the same matter. It is precisely] on account of the 
general anxiety prevailing [that] it is very important to think of what is to be done, 
so that, if the case arises, we may act rapidly and with some chance of efficiency, 
and not be groping about in the dark, or, like Don Quixote, go out to fight wind- 
mills and come back with broken heads. 

If our naval forces were superior to those of the United States, the question would 
be an easy one; all we would have to do would be to bar their way. But as our 
forces, on the contrary, are very inferior to theirs, it would be the greatest of follies 
to attempt to bar their way, which could only be done by giving them a decisive 
naval battle. That would simply mean a sure defeat, which would leave us at the 
mercy of the enemy, who could easily take a good position in the Canaries, and by 
establishing there a base of operations, crush our commerce and safely bombard our 
maritime cities. It is therefore absolutely necessary to decide what we are going 
to do, and, without disclosing our proposed movements, be in a position to act when 
the time comes. 

This was the substance of my telegram, and my ideas have not changed since then. 
If we are caught without a plan of war, there will be vacillations and doubts; and, 
after defeat, there may come humiliation and shame. 

[You will understand these frank and loyal statements of an old friend and com- 
rade, who desires nothing more than to help the Government and act with circum- 


spection. 
PASCUAL CERVERA. ] 


[ To the admiral. 

MADRID, April 7, 1898. 
We are in the midst of a serious international crisis. While I have not yet lost 
all hope of a peaceable solution, it being the wish of the Government to avoid war 
at any cost, we have now reached the utmost limits of concessions by using the 
influence of foreign powers; but the President of the United States is surrounded 
by the waves which he himself has raised and which he is now trying to appease. 
It devolves upon you as the admiral of the squadron, and owing to the prestige 
which you are enjoying in the navy—or God himself has singled you out for that 
purpose—to carry out the plans which will be formulated and intrusted to your 
- intelligence and valor. I believe I have done all that you asked me to do, as far as 
it was in my power; if I have not done more it is because I have not had the neces- 
sary means at my disposal. In this, as in everything else, my conscience is entirely 
clear. In the instructions which you will receive a general idea is outlined which 
you will work out with your captains. I will close, begging that you will express 
my regards to the personnel under your orders and confirming the confidence which 

‘H. M. and the Government place in your high ability. 
SEGISMUNDO BERMBJO. ] 


A() 


From the admiral. 
Capiz, April 8, 1898. 

[I have received all your telegrams. The ships are ready and I expect to go out 
this evening. I have just sent the paymaster to San Fernando for the money, as the 
Captain-General advises me that it has been received there. At Cape Verde I shall 
await the instructions which you are to send me. The reproduction of the cipher 
telegram differs in one word; it says that the instructions se ampliardn (will be 
amplified), while the first telegram received said se empleardn (will be used); that 
is the reason why T indicated my idea of protecting the Canaries, and now, as pre- 
viously stated, I shall wait.] I regret very much to have to sail without having 
agreed upon some plan, even in general lines, for which purpose I repeatedly 
requested permission to go to Madrid. From the bulk of the telegrams received I 
think I see that the Government persists in the idea of sending the flotilla to Cuba. 
That seems to me a very risky adventure, which may cost us very dear, for the loss 
of our flotilla and the defeat of our squadron in the Caribbean Sea may entail a 
great danger for the Canaries, and perhaps the bombardment of our coast cities. I 
do not mention the fate of the island of Cuba, because I have anticipated it long 
ago. I believe a naval defeat would only precipitate its ultimate loss, while if left 
to defend itself: with its present means, perhaps it would give the Americans some 
annoyance. We must not deceive ourselves concerning the strength of our fleet. If 
you will look over our correspondence of the last two months you will see, not that 
I have been a prophet, but that I have fallen short of the true mark. Let us not 
have any illusions as to what we can do [which will be in proportion to the means 


available]. 
PASCUAL CERVERA. 





From the admiral. 


St. VINCENT (CAPE VERDE), April 19, 1898. 

[The San Francisco, and with it your instructions and letter, arrived yesterday. 
If the Oquendo and Vizcaya have really sailed for here, they have now been out ten 
days and must arrive to-day. or to-morrow, for that is all the time they would require 
to make the voyage of 2,400 miles from Puerto Rico. But I am thinking that per- 
haps the date stated, the 9th, is that of the cablegram issuing the order, and not the 
date of sailing, in which case they will arrive later. ] 

The boilers of the Ariete are practically unserviceable, so that this vessel, instead 
of being an element of power, is the nightmare of the fleet. She could only be used 
for local defense. The boiler of the Azor is eleven years old and is of the locomotive 
type. As for the destroyers Furor and Terror, their bow plates give as soon as they 
are in a seaway, and some of their frames have been broken. [Villaamil has had 
this remedied as far as he has been able.] The Plutén had an accident of this kind 
when coming from England, and had her bows strengthened at Ferrol. 

I do not know whether the port of San Juan de Puerto Rico affords good protec- 
tion for the fleet. If it does not, and if the port of Mayaguez can not be effectively 
closed, the fleet would be in a most unfavorable position. However, before forming 
a judgment, I shall await the arrival of the Vizcaya, whose captain, Eulate, is 
thoroughly acquainted with Puerto Rico. I am constantly preoccupied about the 
Canaries. It will be necessary to close and fortify the port of Graciosa Island, as 
well as the island commanding the port of La Luz in Gran Canary. 

[From your instructions] it seems that the idea of sending the fleet to Cuba has 
been abandoned, I believe very wisely. 

Concerning Puerto Rico, I have often wondered whether it would be wise to accu- 
mulate there all our forces, and I do not think so. If Puerto Rieo is loyal, it will not 
be such an easy job for the Yankees; and if it is not loyal, it will inevitably follow 
the same fate as Cuba, at least as far as we are concerned. 

On the other hand, I am very much afraid for the Philippines, and, as I have said 
before, the Canaries; and above all, the possibility of a bombardment of our coast, 


4] 


which is not impossible, considering the audacity of the Yankees, and counting, as 
they do, with four or five vessels of higher speed than our own. For all these 
reasons, I am doubtful as to what it would be best for me todo; and I will not take 
any decision without your opinion and that of the council of captains, as indicated 
in your letter. 

Ileave this letter open until to-morrow, in case anything should happen. 

I was here interrupted by the information that the Vizcaya and Oquendo were in 
sight, and I have had the pleasure of seeing them come in and of greeting their 
captains. The crews are in the best of health and spirits, but the Vizcaya needs 
docking badly. During the trip from Puerto Rico she burned 200 tons more than 
the Oquendo, which means a diminution of her speed of from 3 to 5 knots according 
to my reckoning, and a diminution of her radius of action of from 25 to 30 per cent, : 
thus losing the advantage of speed [to which you called special attention in your 
instructions]. Both are now coaling, but it is a long job, for, unfortunately, we do 
not feel at home here. We are indeed unlucky! 

[Until to-morrow. The mail has come in and will shortly go out again; I will 


therefore close this. * * * 
PASCUAL CERVERA. ] 


From the admiral. 


[For lack of time I could not tell you yesterday about the council which met on 
board the Coldén, and only sent you a copy of the proceedings. ] 

The council lasted nearly four hours. The prevailing spirit was that of purest 
discipline, characterized by the high spirit which animates the whole fleet, and 
especially the distinguished commanders, who are an honor to Spain and the navy, 
and whom it is my good fortune to have for companions in these critical cireum- 
stances. The first and natural desire expressed by all was to go resolutely in quest 
of the enemy and surrender their lives on the altar of the mother country; but the , 
vision of the same mother country abandoned, insulted, and trod upon by the enemy, 
proud of our defeat—for nothing else could be expected by going to meet them on 
their own ground with our inferior forces—forced them to see that such sacrifice 
would not only be useless but harmful, since it would place Spain in the hands of 
an insolent and proud enemy, and God only knows what the consequences might be. 
I could see the struggle in their minds between these conflicting considerations. All 
of them loathe the idea of not going immediately in search of the enemy and finish- 
ing once and for all. But, as I said before, the vision of the country violated by the 
enemy rose above all other considerations, and inspired with that courage which 
consists in braving criticism and perhaps the sarcasm and accusations of the igno- 
rant masses, which know nothing about war in general and naval warfare in partic- 
ular, and which believe that the Alfonso XIII or the Cristina can be pitted against 
the Jowa or Massachusetts, they expressly and energetically declared that the inter- 
ests of the mother country demanded this sacrifice from us. 

One of the captains had certain scruples about expressing his opinion, saying that 
he would do what the Government of His Majesty should be pleased to order; but 
as all of us, absolutely all, shared these sentiments—it is hardly necessary to say— 
his scruples were soon overcome. [My reason for mentioning this is to give you an 
exact report of everything that happened.] Another of the captains, certainly not 
the most enthusiastic, but who may be said to have represented the average opinion 
prevailing in the council, has, by my order, written down his ideas, and I send you a 
copy of his statement, which reflects, better than I could express them, the opinions 
of all. This document represents exactly the sentiment which prevailed in the 
meeting. 

[Believing that I have fulfilled my duty in giving Your Excellency an accurate 
account of all that happened, I reiterate the assurance of the excellent spirit of all. 

PASCUAL CERVERA. ] 

APRIL 21, 1898. 


MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS. 


The second in command of the naval forces and the captains of the vessels, having 
met on board the cruiser Colén, by order of his excellency the commander in chief of 
the squadron, and under his presidency, the president submitted for discussion the 
following question: 

“‘Under the present circumstances of the mother country, is it expedient that this 
fleet should go at once to America, or should it stay to protect our coasts and the 
Canaries and provide from here for any contingency ?” 

Several opinions were exchanged concerning the probable consequences of our 
campaign in the West Indies; the great deficiencies of our fleet compared with that 
of the enemy were made manifest, as well as the very scanty resources which the 
islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico are at present able to offer for the purpose of estab- 
lishing bases of operations. In consideration of this, and the grave consequences 
for the nation of a defeat of our fleet in Cuba, thus permitting the enemy to proceed 
with impunity against the Peninsula and adjacent islands, it was unanimously agreed 
to call the attention of the Government to these matters by means of a telegram as 
follows: 

“‘Commander-General of the Squadron to the Minister of Marine: In agreement 
with the second in command and the commanders of the vessels, I suggest going to 
the Canaries. Ariete has boilers in bad condition; boiler of Azor is very old. Cana- 
ries would be protected from a rapid descent of the enemy and all the forces would 
be in a position, if necessary, to hasten to the defense of the mother country.” 

On board cruiser Colén, April 20, 1898. 

PASCUAL CERVERA. 
JOSE DE PAREDEs. 
JUAN B. LAZAGA. 
EmILio Dfaz Morev. 
Victor M. Concas. 
ANTONIO EULATE. 
JOAQUIN BUSTAMANTE. 
FERNANDO VILLAAMIL. 


OPINION OF CAPT. VICTOR M. CONCAS. 
[Commander of the battleship Infanta Maria Teresa.] 
- 


Concerning the subjects presented for diseussion by the admiral of the fleet at the 
council of war held on board the battleship Cristébal Colén my opinion is as follows: 

(1) The naval forces of the United States are so immensely superior to our own in 
number and class of vessels, armor, and armament, and in preparations made— 
besides the advantage given the enemy by the insurrection in Cuba, the possible 
one in Puerto Rico, and the latent insurrection in the Eust—that they have sufficient 
forces to attack us in the West Indies, in the Peninsula and adjacent islands, and in 
the Philippines. Since no attention has been paid to that archipelago, where it 
was perhaps most urgent to reduce our vulnerable points, which could ha¥e been 
done with a single battleship, any division of our limited forces at this time and 
any separation from European waters would involve a strategic mistake which 
would carry the war to the Peninsula, which would mean frightful disaster to our 
coasts, the payment of large ransoms, and perhaps the loss of some island. As soon 
as this fleet leaves for the West Indies it is evident that the American Flying 
Squadron will sail for Europe; and even if its purpose were only to make a raid or 
a demonstration against our coasts, the just alarm of all Spain would cause the 
enforced return of this fleet, although too late to prevent the enemy from reaping 
the fruits of an easy victory. 

The only three vessels of war remaining for the defense of the Peninsula, the 
Carlos V, the Pelayo, whose repairs are not yet finished, and the Alfonso AIL, of 
very little speed, are not sufficient for the defense of the Spanish coasts, and in no 


43 


manner for that of the Canaries. The yacht Giralda and the steamers Germania and 
Normania [of the acquisition of which official notice has been received] are not 
vessels of fighting qualities and add no strength to our navy. 

(2) The plan of defending the island of Puerto Rico, abandoning Cuba to its fate, 
is absolutely impracticable, because, if the American fleet purposely destroys a city 
of the last-named island, in spite of all the plans of the Government on the subject, 
and even though it would be the maddest thing in the world, the Government itself 
would be forced by public opinion to send this fleet against the Americans, under the 
conditions and at the point which the latter might choose. 

(3) Even deciding upon the defense of Puerto Rico, the trip across at this time, 
after the practical declaration of war, without a military port where the fleet might 
refit on its arrival, and without an auxiliary fleet to keep the enemy busy—whao, I 
suppose, will make St. Thomas its base of operations—is a strategic error, the more 
deplorable because there have been months and even years in which to accumulate 
the necessary forces in the West Indies. It seems probable, judging from the 
information acquired, that the supplies accumulated at St. Thomas are intended by 
the enemy to establish a base of operations in the vicinity of our unprotected Vieques 
(Crab Island). For all these reasons the responsibility of the trip must remain 
entirely with the Government. 

(4) Adding these three battleships and the Cristébal Colén, without her big guns, 
to the two remaining in the Peninsula and to the few old torpedo boats which we 
have left, itis possible to defend our coast from the Guadiana to Cape Creus, includ- 
ing the Balearic and the Canaries, thanks to the distance of the enemy from its base 
of operations. This defense, however, will have to be a very energetic one if the 
enemy brings his best ships to bear on us, [and it will not be possible to save the 
coasts of Galicia and of the north of Spain from suffering more or less if the enemy 
brings along a light division, nor even the protected coasts from an attack here and 
there, as our ships are too few in number to be divided]. 

(5) It is very regrettable that there are not enough vessels to cover all points at 
one time; but duty and patriotism compel us to present clearly the resources which 
the country gave us, and the needs which present circumstances bring on the coun- 
try in danger. 

(6) Lastly, I believe, with due respect, that the military situation should be laid 
before the minister of marine, while I reiterate our profoundest subordination to his 
orders, and our firm purpose most energetically to carry out the plans of operations 
he may communicate to these forces. But after pointing out the probable conse- 
quences, the responsibility must remain with the Government. 

St. Vincent, Cape Verde, April 20, 1898. 

VicToR M. Concas. 


From the admiral. 


St. VINCENT, CAPE VERDE, April 22, 1898. 

[My DEAR GENERAL AND FRIEND: I have not yet answered your letter of the 7th, 
which the San Francisco brought me, because, though I have written you since, I 
did not have it before me. | 

It is impossible for me to give you an idea of the surprise and consternation 
experienced by all on the receipt of the order to sail. Indeed, that surprise is well 
justified, for nothing can be expected of this expedition except the total destruction 
of the fleet or its hasty and demoralized return, while in Spain it might be the safe- 
guard of the nation. 

[It is a mistake to believe that the Canaries are safe, which is only the case with 
reference to Santa Cruz, Las Palmas, and one or two other places. But is Graciosa 
Island safe, for instance? If the Yankees should take possession of it and fortify the 
port they would have a base for any operations they might wish to undertake 
against Spain, and surely the battalions will not be able to eject them from there. 


Aq 


Such a thing will not be possible at present, with the squadron at the Canaries, but 
it will be inevitable when the squadron has been destroyed. | 

You talk about plans, and in spite of all my efforts to have some laid out, as would 
have been wise and prudent, my desires have been disappointed [to such an extent 
that, if the circumstances had been different, I should have applied to be placed on 
the retired list, and I shall ask for it, if God spares my life, just as soon as the dan- 
ger is over. 1 should even apply for it to-day, without caring a straw for being 
accused of cowardice, if it were not for the fact that my retirement would produce 
among the squadron the deplorable effect of a desertion of its admiral before the 
enemy]. How can it be said that I have been supplied with everything I asked for? 
The Colon does not yet have her big guns, and I asked for the poor ones if there 
were no others. The 14-centimeter ammunition, with the exception of about 300 
rounds, is bad. The defective guns of the Vizcaya and Oquendo have not been changed, 
The cartridge cases of the Colén can not be recharged. We have not a single Busta- 
mante torpedo. There is no plan or concert, which I so much desired and have sug- 
gested in vain. The repairs of the servomotors of my vessels have only been made in 
the Infanta Marta Teresa and the Vizcaya, after they had left Spain. In short, it isa 
disaster already, and it is to be feared that it will bea more frightful one before long. 
And perhaps everything could be changed yet! But I suppose it is too late now for 
anything that is not the ruin and desolation of our country. 

[I can understand that your conscience is clear, as you state in your letter, because 
you are a good man and your course is clear before you, but think of what I tell you 
and you will see that lam right. I assembled my captains, as you told me, and sent 
you by telegraph an extract of their opinions. I have since forwarded you a copy of 
the minutes of the meeting, and by this mail I send you an official letter comment- 
ing onit. I have nothing further to add. ] 

The Vizcaya can no longer steam, and she is only a boil in the body of the fleet. 

But I will trouble you no more. I consider it an accomplished fact and will try to 
find the best way out of this direful enterprise. 

PASCUAL CERVERA. 


St. VINCENT, CaPE VERDE, April 24, 1898. 

The telegram ordering us to start has just arrived, and I have given orders to trans- 
ship from the Cddiz to these vessels coal, supplies, crews, and the artillery of the 
destroyers, which was on board the Céddiz. 

Iintended to sail without finishing the provisioning of the ships, but since the 
Cddiz is to remain here, I have decided to ship as much coal as possible. I will try to 
sail to-morrow. . 

As the act has been consummated, I will not insist upon my opinion concerning it. 
May God grant that I be mistaken! You see I was right when I told you that by 
the end of April the Pelayo, Carlos V, Vitoria, and Numancia would not be finished ; 
that the Colén would not have her big guns unless we took the defective ones; that 
we should not have the 14-centimeter ammunition with which to fight, ete. 

With a clear conscience I go to the sacrifice, but I cannot understand the [unani- 
mous] decision of the general officers of the navy against my opinion. 

I have been informed of the sailing of a cargo of [5,700 tons of] coal for Puerto 
Rico, where it is expected to arrive on the 11th or 12th of May, but I am much afraid 
that it may fall into the hands of the enemy. 

It is a mistake to suppose that I can accept or avoid a naval battle at will. The 
Vizcaya, on account of her stay in Habana and not having had her bottom cleaned 
for nine months, is nothing more than a buoy, and I can not abandon her. 

[PASCUAL CERVERA, 


21TH, 
I am almost in despair at the slowness of the Cddiz ; she is well prepared for a 
voyage, but very poorly for loading and unloading. I think we can start to-morrow. ] 


45 


AT SEA, May 5, 1898. 

Dear JUAN: To complete our collection of documents, I think proper that you 
should have the inclosed copy of a telegram from Villaamil to Sagasta. I send you 
this letter by two destroyers which I am sending to Martinique in search of news. 
Allis well on board, and the spirit is excellent. We shall see what God has in store 
forus. The final result is not doubtful; butif we could only start with a good 
lucky stroke! God be with us! Good-bye. Regards to your folk, etc. 

PASCUAL. 
Telegram from Villaamil. 
APRIL 22, 1898. 
[PRAXEDES Sacasta, Madrid: 
[(To be deciphered by naval key.) ] 

In view of the importance to the country of the destination of this fleet, I deem 
it expedient that you should know, through a friend who does not fear censure, that, 
while as seamen we are all ready to die with honor in the fulfillment of our duty, I 
think it undoubted that the sacrifice of these naval forces will be as certain as it 
will be fruitless and useless for the termination of the war, if the representations 
repeatedly made by the admiral to the minister of marine are not taken into con- 


sideration. 
F, VILLAAMIL.! 


ADDENDUM TO CHAPTER IV. 


At the conclusion of the war the Office of Naval Intelligence pub- 
lished a pamphlet under the title of ‘‘“Views of Admiral Cervera 
Regarding the Spanish Navy in the*Late War,” being a translation of 
a series of letters published at Madrid in La Epoca of November 5, 
1898, in vindication of the Spanish Navy. The pamphlet referred to 
contains the following letters in addition to those given in Captain 
Niinez’s book. 


In January, 1898, Admiral Cervera wrote to one of his relatives: 
DEFICIENCIES OF THE NAVAL INDUSTRY. 


“About two years ago I wrote you a letter concerning our condition to go to war 
with the United States. I requested you to keep that letter in case some day it 
should be necessary to bring it to light in defense of my memory or myself when we 
had experienced the sad disappointment prepared for us by the stupidity of some, 
the cupidity of others, and the incapability of all, even of those with the best of 
intentions. 

‘““To-day we find ourselves again in one of those critical periods which seem to be 
the beginning of the end, and I write to you again to express my point of view and 
to explain my action in this matter, and I beg you to put this letter ith the other 
one, so that the two may be my military testament. 

“The relative military positions of Spain and the United States has grown worse 
for us, because we are extenuated, absolutely penniless, and they are very rich, and 
also because we have increased our naval power only with the Colén and the torpedo 
destroyers, and they have increased theirs much more. 

“What I have said of our industry is sadly confirmed in everything we look at. 
There is the Cataluia, begun more than eight years ago, and her hull is not yet com- 
pleted. And this when we are spurred on by danger, which does not wake patriot- 
ism in anybody, while jingoism finds numerous victims, perhaps myself to-morrow. 
And the condition of our industry is the same in all the arsenals. 





1 See the addendum which here follows.—O. N. I. 


46 


‘Let us consider, now, our private industries. The Maquinista Terrestre y Mari- 
tima supplies the engines of the Alfonso XIII; Cadiz the ilipinas. If the Carlos V is 
not a dead failure, she is not what she should be; everything has been sacrificed to 
speed, and she lacks power. And remember that the construction is purely Spanish. 
The company of La Grafia has not completed its ships, as I am told. Only the 
Vizcaya, Oquendo, and Maria Teresa are good ships of their class; but, though con- 
structed at Bilbao, it was by Englishmen. Thus, manifestly, even victory would 
be a sad thing for us. As for the administration and its intricacies, let us not speak 
of that; its slow procedure is killing us. The Vizcaya carries a 14-cm. breech plug 
which was declared useless two months ago, and I did not know it until last night. 
And that because an official inquiry was made. How many cases I might mention! 
But my purpose is not to accuse, but to explain why we may and must expect a dis- 
aster. But as it is necessary to go to the bitter end, and as it would be a crime to 
say that publicly to-day, I hold my tongue, and go forth resignedly to face the trials 
which God may be pleased to send me. I am sure that we will do our duty, for the 
spirit of the navy is excellent; but I pray God that the troubles may be arranged 
without coming to a conflict which, in any way, I believe would be disastrous to us.’ 


STATE OF THE FLEET, 


In the beginning of February Admiral Cervera wrote to a high official personage: 

“Although I am sure that I am telling you nothing new, I think it is not idle, in 
these critical times, to make a study of the condition of the fleet. We must dis- 
count the Alfonso XI/J, so many years under trials that it appears we shall not have 
the pleastire ever to count it among our vessels of war. The fleet is reduced to the 
three Bilbao cruisers, the Coldén, the Destructor, and the torpedo destroyers Furor and 
Terror. The three Bilbao battle ships are practically complete, but the 14-cm. 
artillery, the main power of these vagsels, is practically useless, on account of the 
bad system of its breech mechanism, and the bad quality of the cartridge cases, of 
which there are only those on board. 

“The Colon, which is undoubtedly the best ot all our ships from a military point 
of view, has not received her guns. The Destructor may serve as a scout, although 
its speed is not very high for this service in the fleet. The Furor and Terror are 
in a good condition, but I doubt if they can make effective use of their 75-mm. © 
pieces. As for the supplies necessary for a fleet, we frequently lack even the most 
necessary. In this arsenal (Cadiz) we have not been able to coal, and both at Bar- 
celona and Cadiz we could only obtain half of the biscuit we wanted, and that only 
because I had ordered 8,000 kilos to be made here. We have no charts of the Amer- 
ican seas, although I suppose that they have been ordered; but at the present time 
we could not move. Apart from this deficient state of the material, I have the pleas- 
ure to state that the sprit of the personnel is excellent, and that the country will 
find it all that it may choose to demand. It is a pity that a lack of better and more 
abundant material, greater supplies, and less hindrances are wanting to put this 
personnel in a condition to amply carry out its role.” 

* * * * * * * 

“‘T note,” said the Admiral in another letter, ‘‘what I am told concerning the 
heavy artillery of the Colén. It is to be very much regretted that there is always so 
much underhand work about everything, and that there should be so much of it now 
regarding the acceptance of the 254-mm. guns, because if we finally take them, it will 
seem that we are yielding to certain disagreeable impositions, and if things come to 
the worst, it seems to me we will have to accept, as the proverb says, ‘hard bread 
rather than none ;’ and if we have no other guns, and these ones can fire at least 25 or 30 
shots, we will have to take them anyhow, even though they are expensive and ineffi- 
cient. And we must not lose time, so that the vessel may be armed and supplied 
with ammunition as soon as possible.” 


AT 


Some time afterwards, when matters were getting worse and worse, the admiral 
was more explicit still. Shortly after the Dupuy de Lome incident he said: 

‘‘T do not know when the Pelayo and the Carlos V will be able to join the fleet, 
but I suspect that they will not arrive in time. Of the first one I know nothing at 
all, but I have received some news concerning the second one, and certainly not very 
satisfactory as regards the time it will take for it to be ready. It seems to me that 
there is a mistake in the calculation of the forces we may count upon in the sad 
event of a war with the United States. In the Cadiz division I believe the Numancia 
will be lacking. I do not think we can count on the Lepanto. Of the Carlos V and 
the Pelayo I have already spoken. The Coldn has not yet received her artillery, and 
if war comes she will be caught without her heavy guns. The eight principal ves- 
sels of the Ilavana station have no military value whatever, and, besides, are badly 
worn out; therefore they can be of very little use. In saying this I am not moved 
by a fault-finding spirit, but only by a desire to avoid illusions that may cost us 
very dear. 

“‘Taking things as they are, however sad it may be, it is seen that our naval force 
when compared with that of the United States is approximately in the proportion 
of 1to3. It therefore seems to me a dream, almost a feverish fancy, to think that 
with this force, extenuated by our long wars, we can establish the blockade of any 
port of the United States. A campaign against them will have to be, at least for 
the present, a defensive or a disastrous one, unless we have some alliances, in which 
case the tables may be turned. As for the offensive, all we could do would be to 
make some raids with our fast vessels in order to do them as much harm as possible. 
It is frightful to think of the results of a naval battle, even if it should be a suc- 
cessful one for us, for how and where would we repair our damages? I, however, 
will not refuse todo what may be judged necessary, but I think it convenient to 
analyze the situation such as it is, without cherishing illusions which may bring 
about terrible disappointments.” 


MORE DEFICIENCIES—THE COUNTRY MUST BE TOLD THE TRUTH. 


On February 26 the admiral wrote the following: 

‘“‘When I received yesterday the letter in which, among other things, you asked 
me if the Colén could go out for target practice, I answered that the vessel was 
ready, and at the same time I took measures so that the cartridge cases which might 
be used in’ that practice should be recharged, but it appears that there is no furnace 
in which they can be reannealed, or a machine to reform the cartridge cases. The 
extra charges which the vessel brought (72 per gun) are therefore useless. 

“‘T send to-day the official letter which I announced yesterday. Its conclusions 
are indeed afflicting, but can we afford to cherish illusions? Do we not owe to our 
country not only our life, if necessary, but the exposition of our beliefs? I am very 
uneasy about this. I ask myself if itis right for me to keep silent, and thereby 
make myself an accomplice in adventures which will surely cause the total ruin of 
Spain. And for what purpose? To defend an island which was ours, but belongs to 
us no more, because even if we should not lose it by right in the war we have lost 
it in fact, and with it all our wealth and an enormous number of young men, vic- 
tims of the climate and bullets, inthe defense of what is now no more than a roman- 
tic ideal. Furthermore, I believe that this opinion of mine should be known by the 
Queen and by the whole council of ministers.” 

That this thoughtful and patriotic advice was not favorably received by the Gov- 
ernment is shown by the following letter a few days afterwards: 

“Yesterday I received your letter of the 28th, and I regret very much the painful 
impressions caused by my remarks; but I am not surprised, because they are truly 
sad, and still, perhaps, they fall beneath the mark, judging from everything one 
sees. Just now we have another proof of this in the fact that the difficulty of 
obtaining cartridge cases for the Coldén arises from the want of means (money), and 


48 


this on the eve, perhaps, of a war against the richest nation in the world. I do not 
wish to dwell too much on this point, for no practical result could be obtained. 
But every detail points out either our lack of means or our defective organization, 
and, above all, our utter lack of preparation. 

“TI have deemed it my duty to express my opinions to the proper authorities 
clearly and without beating around the bush. Now let orders be given to me; I 
will carry them out with energy and decision. I am ready for the worst.” 


CERVERA WISHED TO EXPLAIN HIS OPINION TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. 


_ Admiral Cervera’s already expressed desire to personally inform the council of 
ministers was still more clearly expressed under date of March 16: 

“Yesterday I received your favor of the day before, by which I see that our opin- 
ions agree concerning the conflict which threatens our unfortunate country. As 
both of us are animated by the best desires, such agreement was sure to come. It 
also appears that the whole Government participates in this opinion, but I am afraid 
that there may be some minister who, while believing that we are not in favorable 
conditions, may have been dazzled by the names of the vessels appearing in the gen- 
eral statement and may not realize how crushing a disproportion really exists, 
especially if he is not thoroughly aware of our lack of everything that is necessary 
for a naval war, such as supplies, ammunition, coal, ete. We have nothing at all. 
If this fear of mine is well founded, I think it isof the greatest importance that the 
whole council of ministers, without exception, be fully and clearly informed of our 
terrible position, so that there may not remain the least doubt that the war will 
simply lead us to a terrible disaster, followed by a humiliating peace and the most 
frightful ruin; for which reason it is necessary not only to avoid the war but to find 
some solution which will render it impossible in the future. If this is not done, the 
more time is spent the worse will be the final result, whether it is peace or war. 

‘“‘From this reasoning, as clear as daylight to me, it appears that since we can not 
go to war without meeting with a certain and frightful disaster, and since we can 
not treat directly with the United States, whose bad faith is notorious, perhaps 
there is nothing left for us to do but to settle the dispute through arbitration or 
mediation, provided the enemy accepts. However, this order of consideration does 
not come within my sphere of duty, which, as the chief of the squadron, is limited 
to reporting the state of military affairs and then carrying out the orders of the 
Government. The latter, however, must be fully informed of the situation. Before 
dropping this subject I must insist that perhaps it would be well for me to verbally 
inform the members of the cabinet and to say that I am ready to start at the first 
intimation. 

“Concerning the available forces and what may be expected of them, I will be 
very glad if Ansaldo carries out his promise about the 254-mm. guns of the Coldn. 
The 14-cm. cartridge cases are absolutely necessary. This vessel has only 30, and 
it is to be supposed that the stores of the Oquendo and Vizcaya are not better sup- 
plied. For the present the firm is supplying only 100 per week, and suppos- 
ing that the first ones have already arrived or will arrive in Cadiz one of these 
days, at this rate we won’t have finished until October. Then they have to be 
charged; therefore they can never be ready in time for the present conflict. I 
thought I would have the first ones by January, and I will not have them until 
April. The engines of the Pelayo are ready and the vessel can sail, but how about 
the secondary battery and the armored redoubt? These will not be ready. If the 
old battery could be mounted! But I doubt it; the ports will not permit it. Ihave 
heard it said that the crew which brought the Pelayo was taken from the Vitoria, 
which is another proof of our excessive poverty. It will be very well if the 
Carlos V is soon ready, but I understand that the 10-cm. battery has not yet been 
mounted, and then the trials are to be made. 


49 


“T never had great confidence in the purchasing of vessels. Too much fuss is made 
over every detail by ignorant people. It was through this that we lost the Garibaldi, 
and now we have lost the Brazilian cruisers. In fact, we have only secured the 
Colon, an excellent ship, but which has not yet arrived, and the Valdés. And sup- 
posing that we had everything our own way, and that Providence should grant usa. 
victory, which is highly improbable, we would then find ourselves in the condition 
explained in my last and which it is not necessary to repeat. It only rests for me now 
to be informed of the destination of the fleet. I believe the Teresa ought to be in 
Cadiz, where the cartridge cases are to be recharged, and she could sail as soon as all 
her guns were mounted. 

“‘T will insist no more, but the voice of my conscience, animated by my love for 
my country, tells me that in saying this I am fulfilling my unavoidable duty.” 


CONDITION OF THE FLEET IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE WAR. 


In the month of April, shortly before the war, Cervera wrote: 

“‘My fears are realized. The conflict is coming fast upon us; and the Colon has 
not received her big guns; the Carlos V has not been delivered, and her 10-cm. artil- 
lery is not yet mounted; the Pelayo is not ready for want of finishing her redoubt, 
and, I believe, her secondary battery; the Vitoria has no artillery, and of the 
Numancia we had better not speak. 

‘‘But after all I am glad the end is coming. The country can stand this state of 
affairs no longer, and any arrangement will be a good one, however bad it looks, if 
it comes without our having to lament a great disaster, as may happen if we go to 
war with a few half-armed vessels, and with want of means and excess of incum- 
brances.” 


6884——4 


CHAPTER V. 
THE BEGINNING OF THE END. 


INCREASE OF THE UNITED STATES FLEET—OPERATIONS ON THE 
CUBAN COAST—BOMBARDMENT OF DIFFERENT PORTS—OPERA- 
TIONS AGAINST PUERTO RICO—DESTRUCTION OF OUR CABLES— 
OUR SQUADRON AT SANTIAGO. 


The Americans used every endeavor to increase their fleet, without 
having to stop at such considerations as kept us back. We should be 
glad to give here a list of the 128 vessels which they purchased and 
equipped for war under the name of auxiliaries of the fleet. We do 
not do so in order not to burden the reader with numerical data, and 
will confine ourselves to a short review of the strength of their Navy 
on August 15, 1898.! 





' A list of the vessels purchased, their value, and the names with which they were 
christened, may be found in the Report of the Secretary of the Navy, Vol. I, 1898. 

Through the United States Consul at Cadiz, C. L. Adams, says the New York 
Herald, the Navy Department at Washington received detailed information as to 
the Spanish merchant marine. Mr. Adams furnished a complete list of all vessels 
carrying the Spanish flag, specifying those which might be used as auxiliary 
cruisers in time of war, and those which would probably continue to be merchant 
steamers and might be captured by a United States fleet of light vessels sent to the 
coasts of Spain. 

The following is the information furnished by Consul Adams: 

Compania Trasatlantica (Barcelona and Cadiz): Thirty-two steamers, 20 of which 
have over 12 knots speed and some of which are ready to be fitted out as cruisers 
and armed transports. These vessels carry on traffic with Puerto Rico, Cuba, Mexico, 
New York, Liverpool, the Philippines, Rio de la Plata, and Africa. 

Pinillos Séenz y Ca. (Barcelona): Five steamers, 3 of which can be equipped as 
auxiliary cruisers. These ships go to Puerto Rico, Cuba, Mexico, and the United 
States. 

I’. Prat y Ca. (Barcelona): Five steamers of 2,000 tons each; same route as those 
of Pinillos Séenz y Ca. 

De Aarotegui (Bilbao): Seven freight steamers; same route as preceding ones. 

Compania de Navegacién La Flecha (Bilbao): Seven freight steamers; to Liver- 
pool and preceding lines. 

Hijo de J. Jover y Serra (Barcelona): One steamer of 2,000 tons. Route: Spain, 
Puerto Rico, and Cuba. 

J. Jover y Costa: One steamer of 2,000 tons. Route: Spain, Puerto Rico, and 
Cuba. 

Sociedad de Navegacién 6 Industria (Barcelona): Four steamers. Route: Spain 
and Canaries. 

Empresa de Navegacion 4 vapor La Bética (Seville): Twelve steamers. Between 
Spain, England, and Germany. Freight vessels. 

Compania Maritima (Barcelona): Eighteen freight steamers, Carry on traffic 


50 


ol: 


At that time the personnel of the Navy, which at the breaking out of 
the war numbered only 12,000 men, had risen to 24,123, and the fleet 
was composed as follows: 


Snr CLEA st ENCP PRE eE, ele ce a yn. nlm de binne nop dpann wees 4 
MERIT UCU Tee EN ene ee ee Sac sens open eae Dose eon ann aes 1 
ELSES co Cag (Sate Aa GG A Sell lal ag dae Ay kA ae A ea 2 
te EAR EAT Cote) GE oe ae CS Le eo 6 Se 6 
eet eel) oe BUC ul. Se ls AN os ood Sag stad ole Besa 1 
OD an ye gol Gk wit « os OS be ee ~ Sa es din oid 12 
En I ann laa e on tints ohn ne ae dw mide ee MA Sie vin ieee aan sin = 3 
eg yaa 2 caine ic nin abe oe ain Ua se ee we nas hcl ee cos wena tne 18 
SO bah Se a eee Se ee ae Lee Rese ae 1 
It er carr ee? Pot pee ee SPB aed ot ree dete Se BOL 11 
SCENT GING NOMLEOTS 252 os oes 5s Bs aie a Says gn oof ee Me ye nd 14 


Auxiliary Navy. 


a Sore: ig one cons et adi an a alg A a eM rai i. 11 
TR i fh gel bay le 8  ed  e 28 
SMMIILOMECROOGIS ...1 (URGED ee hha ween eae ve ees MS Boel oa LS, 15 
ERNE hf STS Sa tos im eal 8 oa bw otee s aril begs 2. «bed. gees 4 
EEC a ERR Es ee = Ale CS ce eae oa ee 27 
RN a i ae er ane rrr co 
EE RMICER OSEGIN Ge tot con awe psoas es eees enn acedesases no gentaee tape Re 19 


To these must be added a number of stipulations and contracts for 
supplying the squadrons at Cuba and the Philippines with coal and 
fresh provisions; also hospital ships, tank and distilling ships, repair 
ships, steamers of great speed to carry orders back and forth, ete. 

The difficult and arduous task of blockading was therefore performed 
by our enemies with comparative ease, the vessels being frequently 











with the coasts of England and Spain. (This and the preceding line belong to 
McAndreu & Co., London. ) 

P. M. Tinore y Ca. (Barcelona): Four freight steamers; traffic between Spain and 
England. 

Compania Bilbaina de Navegacién (Bilbao): Six steamers for transportation of 
mineral between Bilbao and England. 

J. M. Martinez de las Rivas (Bilbao): Three steamers for transportation of min- 
eral between Bilbao and England. 

Hijos de Tomas Haynes (Cadiz): Eight freight steamers; between Spain and 
North Africa. 

Sociedad Islenio Maritima (La Palma and Mallorca): Five steamers; traffic between 
Barcelona and Balearic Islands. 

Sociedad Mahonesa de Vapores. Five steamers; Barcelona and Balearic Islands. 

Ibarra y Ca. (Seville): Twenty-one steamers; coast traffic. 

Claveria Lozo y Ca. (Gijon): Five steamers; coast traffic. 

Melitén Gonzalez y Ca. (Gijon): Five steamers; coast traffic. 

Espalia y Ca. (Seville): Five steamers; coast traffic. 

Compania Valenciana de Navegacién (Valencia): Five steamers; coast traffic. 

The conclusion which the Herald drew from this statement was that we should 
probably use many of these steamers as auxiliary cruisers, and the others it held out 
as a bait to the United States auxiliaries, reminding them that the prizes would be 
distributed as follows; One-half would go to the United States Treasury and the 
other half to the officers and crews. There can be no doubt as to this system being 
privateering, and it was practised as often as there was a chance. 


52 


relieved and in constant communication with the base of operations — 
established at Key West and Dry Tortugas. 

Now and then the bombardment of some port on our insular coasts 
was combined with the blockade. Among the most important, aside 
from the bombardment of Santiago, of which we will speak separately, 
may be mentioned the following: 

On April 25 the torpedo boat Cushing attempted to reconnoiter the 
bay of Cardenas; the Ligera, which went out to meet her, fired and 
hit her condenser, destroying it, as was subsequently loarnenn The 
torpedo boat withdrew. 

On April 27 Admiral Sampson received notice that works of defense 
were being erected at Matanzas and he decided to stop the work. To 
that end he entered the bay with his flagship, accompanied by the 
Puritan and Cincinnati. The works were bombarded without any 
effect on the new batteries of Morrillo, Punta Gorda, and Punta Saba- 
nilla, all of which were of sand and rose only a little above the level of 
the sea. The works answered boldly and the ships withdrew. The 
French and Austrian consuls protested against this bombardment, of 
which no previous notice had been given to the city.! On the 29th of 
April the Hagle engaged with our small gunboats, among them the 
Diego Velazquez, at Cienfuegos, with the intention of reconnoitering the 
entrance of the bay. Soon after the Marblehead fired upon the entrance, 
and the batteries of Pasacaballos and gunboats Satélite, Lince, and 
Gaviota answered. 

The same day the squadron was apparently trying to effect a landing 
at Mariel, which was not carried out, because as three towed launches 
full of men approached the beach of Herradura they were received by: 
the fire of the troops belonging to the Gerona battalion and had to 
reembark in great haste. It should be remembered that the Americans 
had chiefs of the Cuban insurrection and many insurgents on board 
their vessels as pilots, and they were the ones who went ahead in these 
operations. The troops which had occasion to repulse these attempts 
at landing stated that they heard the classic voices of the Cubans 
apostrophizing the Spanish as they were wont to do in their battles. 

On April 30 the steamer Argonauto was captured near Cienfuegos, 
and 1 colonel, 6 officers, 3 sergeants, and 5 privates were taken pris- 
oners. The vessel was looted in a barbarous manner.’ 

On May 6 a torpedo boat opened fire on the works of the battery of 
Punta Maya at Matanzas; Punta Sabanilla battery answered, and the 
torpedo boat withdrew without having caused any damage. On the 
Sth the small gunboats Ligera, Alerta, and Antonio Lépez, starting from 
Cardenas, met the hostile ships Winslow and Machias between Buba 





! We touch on these bombardments lightly so as to follow the thread of the oper- 
ations, intending to describe them more fully in the future. 

2A trustworthy person told us that as the passengers rushed to the boats hot 
water and steam were thrown upon them. 


53 


and Mangle keys. Fire was opened and they were forced to leave the 
bay. 

On May 11 the boats of the Marblehead and Nashville, under cover 
of the guns of said vessels, and the Winslow attacked the mouth of the 
bay of Cienfuegos, with a view to effecting a landing. They were 
received by the fire of the artillery and infantry, which compelled them 
to withdraw, with one dead and eleven wounded. The same day the 
Machias, Wilmington, and Winslow, accompanied by the coast-guard 
vessel Hudson, attempted an attack upon Cardenas, and were all 
repulsed by the fire of our Antonio Lopez.’ The Winslow was struck 
by many shells, disabling her engine and boiler, causing a conflagration 
on board, and killing Ensign Bagley and five sailors. Her commander 
was wounded. The vessel and crew were rescued through the inter- 
vention of the Hudson, which towed her out of range. Combined with 
this operation was the landing of a force at Cay Diana, in the bay of 
Cardenas, for the purpose of blowing up the mines located there. The 
enterprise could not be prevented, owing to superior hostile forces, and 
for the first time the Americans raised their flag in Cuba. 

On the 12th San Juan de Puerto Rico was bombarded by 11 vessels 
under Admiral Sampson’s cominand; they withdrew without having 
produced any effect, being repulsed by the fire of the batteries of the 
forts. On the 14th the gunboat Diego Veldzquez sustained an engage- 
ment with a hostile vessel at Cienfuegos. On the 15th an American 
vessel appeared in front of Caibarien, but retreated when fired upon 
by our launches. On the 20th a gunboat fired from a distance upon 
Varadero and Punta Camacho, between Cardenas and Matanzas, and 
on the same day two vessels entered the bay of Guanténamo, firing 
upon Playa del Este and the gunboat Sandoval. The fire was returned 
from Punta Caracoles and the mouth of Guanténamo River, and they 
retreated without having done any damage. Two batteries of anti- 
quated guns had been established here, one at Caimanera and the other 
at Cay Toro. On June 13 the Yankee had an engagement with a gun- 
boat of ours and the batteries at the entrance to Cienfuegos. On the 
15th of the same month the Texas, Marblehead, and Suwanee entered 
the outer bay of Guantanamo, where there were no defenses, properly 
speaking, and took possession of it. On the 22d the St. Paul had 
an engagement with our destroyer Terror, assisted by the gunboat 
Isabel 1, near San Juan de Puerto Rico. The fire of the rapid-fire guns 
of the St. Paul caused several deaths and serious damage on board the 
Terror, which was thereby prevented from firing her torpedoes. This 
fact is worthy of notice in connection with battles between torpedo 
boats and cruisers. 

On June 21 a vessel appeared before Mariel, exchanging heliographic 
signals with the shore. The old guns of the Fort San Elias battery 





1'The report of the Secretary of the Navy states that there were shore batteries 
here. This we have already denied in the first volume of this work. 


54 


opened fire, but it fell short. On the 29th the Hagle and the Yankton 
had an engagement with some of our troops at the mouth of the river 
- Hondo. On the 30th the Hist, Wompatuck, and Hornet, while making 
a reconnoissance between Cape Cruz and Manzanillo, had an engage- 
ment with our vessels anchored there, the field batteries erected ashore, 
and some infantry. The Hornet was struck several times and was 
completely disabled, the main steam pipe having been cut. She was 
towed out of action by the Wompatuck. On July 1 our gunboats at 
Manzanillo, the Delgado Parejo, Estrella, and Guantdénamo, under way, 
and the Cuba Espanola, Maria, and Guardian, at anchor, under cover 
of the field batteries of the place, sustained an engagement with the 
Scorpion, Osceola, Hornet, Wompatuck, and others, which retreated 
after three hours of firing, one of them having been injured. On July 
2 the anchoring place of Tunas was attacked by two hostile vessels, 
one of them a turret ship, followed by transports. They were repulsed 
by a battery of two 8-centimeter Krupp guns. They returned to the 
attack on the 3d, and were again repulsed by the same guns and two 
Plasencia guns. They had evidently intended a landing. 

On the 12th of the same month the Eagle gave chase to the Santo 
Domingo west of the Isle of Pines. On the 15th the Annapolis engaged 
the shore batteries near Baracoa. On the 18th the Wilmington, Helena, 
Scorpion, Hist, Hornet, Wompatuck, and Osceola again attacked the 
vessels and batteries at Manzanillo, destroying the gunboats we had 
at that anchoring place. The same day! the Annapolis, Wasp, Leyden, 
and Topeka took possession of the Bay of Nipe, destroying the gunboat 
Jorge Juan. 

On the 30th three vessels bombarded Punta Maya, at Matanzas. The 
improvised 21-centimeter battery to the west returned the fire and the 
vessels retreated. A 

On August 12 the Newark and Resolute carried the First Battalion 
of Marines to Manzanillo, where they were joined by the Suwanee, Hist, 
and Osceola. They then asked for the surrender of the place, which 
was refused, and the city sustained a bombardment. 

At daybreak of the 13th it became known that the peace protocol 
had been signed and the battle was suspended. 

The transports with the army corps intrusted with the campaign 
against Puerto Rico were convoyed from Santiago to the southern coast 
of that island by the Massachusetts (flagship), Columbia, Yale, Dixie, 
and Gloucester. The Columbia and the Yale also carried troops. This 
Squadron was under the command of Capt. F. J. Higginson. At 
Guanica the Annapolis and Wasp joined the fleet, and at Ponce the 
Cincinnati. The Puritan and Amphitrite, together with the New 
Orleans, were blockading San Juan. On June 18 Ponce fell into the 
hands of the enemy, represented by the Dixie, Annapolis, Gloucester, 
and Wasp, and their landing forces. On July 1 the Gloucester and 





' According to United States reports Nipe Bay was taken the 21st.—O. N. I. 


55 


Wasp took possession of Arroyo. On August 6 the Amphitrite landed 
forces at Cape San Juan. They took possession of the light-house, 
which they abandoned again upon an attack by our troops on August 8. 

These operations did not lead to serious battles, as may be judged 
from the small number of casualties sustained by the hostile squadron.! 
The main thing was to blockade, terrify, and make a show with lively 
bombardments of open and undefended places, without any decisive 
battles. The preconceived plan of cutting Cuba off from all assistance 
from without was entirely successful. As it became obvious that our 
Squadron, in which we had placed so much confidence, was nothing but 
an illusion, the Americans grew more and more audacious. 

In order to isolate us completely, they sought to cut the cables con- 
necting us with Europe. Spain, after four centuries of dominion in 
Cuba, did not have a single cable of her own connecting her with her 
wealthy and much-coveted colonies. Let the reader make his own 
comments on this fact, which is one more item on the list of criminal 
neglects. 

In Cuba we harbored the hope that, inasmuch as the cables are pro- 
tected by international law, the United States would not dare do 
anything against them. But such was not the case. The intention 
of destroying them was very obvious from the beginning, for, as pre- 
viously shown, the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Long, suggested it to 
Sampson in his preliminary instructions, before hostilities had broken 
out. Hence the Americans never thought of respecting this sacred 
property. On the contrary, they made every effort to destroy it, and 
succeeded in cutting us off from the rest of the world and from the 
mother country, so that toward the end of the campaign the only means 
of communication from Habana was the cable by way of Key West, 
of which the Americans had taken possession. According to some 
writers, who have given this matter special attention, it is not certain 
whether the island was cut off from other countries. But certain it is 
that Santiago preserved communication by means of the English cable 
until the last days of the blockade, because this cable was landed quite 





1The total number of casualties sustained by the United States Navy in these 
actions and at Manila is as follows: 














Killed. | Wounded.| Total. 
PERT ETIDES Socks, Jai fda eee tee ent eae a duGd en Se nub each se aacdames eal cena Soh 9 9 
IN OGOS so maces Senta eel cash cee oe mbes awh ss oe np sane me dean 1 11 12 
pen PC MIGHTULOMNDS «cacao Caceres sae cecinica See wacis seen secct.ete snare aces 5 3 8 
Sen ae WAT) so. ate sae clea so aeiteictoe claieies emule vio omovies) seen cohen 1 7 aS 
RIO TMA EAN AINO < seu os cele cebice a aa wecis decors clewieinic wcrc cau ctnas's aisclowts 6 16 22 
Battle of Santiago de Cuba: 
Tie 28... SEBS RBRL CSAS ORE CRSSE G8 6. GAconcD SOGB OCHS DHGEE Sore OS Gee oOSS 1 9 10 
I 7 ie Ore eee oe oan er dose see thee 1 10 11 
Seer, ) ULY 12 25S co cn oe dodle bawlanicecceenneesshabvedescdsescadss|oceemde- 1 1 
rm HnamEauCrOolt, A WO Usb = ceils staan Vin cine msi eins © sled's.aje'w\nic esos wine amin WIEN so oasis 1 
DO nILrILe, AU2USt U =o 5 15s eeeents sedersc aa snes seen cc ceeessoue Bee at) Rw A 
perros, An rust 11 cias sb dees meds vee einige swas ch ss space c ene pamela mean’ =f 1 1 
LOGAN! <ic:<1< ~ RARE ots a nae we eta Scores a etatenehs eae ayarersiiel sale. Sela odie awe te mene 17 67 84 








56 


a distance inside the bay and could not be cut. And it is also cer- 
tain that the Americans did whatever they pleased about the cables, 
without any protest from the civilized world against this spoliation. 
Although some claims have been formulated, it was more from the 
standpoint of commercial enterprise than from that of international 
law, and the object was to claim damages rather than punish and exact 
amends for the abuse. It would almost seem as though the powers of 
Europe were afraid of what is called the Colossus of the North. 

On April 25, Long issued instructions to Sampson, contrary to former 
suggestions, not to touch the cables, and when the latter complained 
of this order, the Secretary replied that there was some idea of declar- 
ing them neutral. The cable from Habana to Key West was at once 
taken possession of by the Americans, and we shall see that the so-called 
neutrality was nothing but a feint to better conceal the real intentions 
and to prepare the final blow in Europe. | 

This was the general policy of the Americans: Stoical calm in order 
to prepare the ground; decided action when they knew that their plans 
had been perfected and that no one could bar their way.! 

We will now mention the principal operations carried out by the 
Americans to destroy the cables. 

The order to cut the cables south of Cuba was issued April 30. On 
May 11 the Hagle dragged unsuccessfully for a cable laid between Cien- 
fuegos and Batabano in shallow and clear water. On the same day, 
Captain McCalla reported that the cable between Cienfuegos and Man- 
zanilla had been successfully cut by boats used close to the shore. Both 





1 One of the many proofs of the solidarity which existed between the United States 
and England against Spain is the following telegram: 

‘‘London, July 13.—The first meeting of the Anglo-American League took place 
at Safford House to-day. The Duke of Sutherland presided. There were present 
the Earl of Grey, the Earl of Jersey, Baron Farrer, Baron Brassey, Baron Tennyson, 
Baron Monkswell, Sir John Lubbock, Rear-Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, the Archbishop of York, Cardinal Baughan, the Duke of 
Westminster, Henry M. Stanley, and many others. The Duke of Fife sent a letter 
stating that he regretted very much not to be present at the first meeting, but that 
it was utterly impossible. 

“The Duke of Sutherland stated in the opening speech that the society had noth- 
ing to do with politics, its only and exclusive object being to give expression to the 
affection and cordiality existing between the people of Great Britain and that of the 
United States, and he believed that this effort would be appreciated and find an echo 
in the United States. 

“‘Upon the motion of Lord Brassey it was resolved that— 

‘“‘Whereas the people of the British Empire and that of the United States are 
closely allied by the bonds of blood; and whereas they have inherited the same 
literature and laws and preserved the same principles in their Governments; and 
whereas they recognize the same ideas of liberty and humanity, and are closely 
allied in many parts of the world by questions of interest; now, therefore, this 
society is of opinion that every possible effort should be made, in the interest of 
civilization and peace, to insure the most cordial and constant cooperation on the 
part of both nations.” 

An executive council to represent the association was then appointed. 


: D7 


of these cables were landed in Spanish territory and laid in Spanish 
waters, so that no question was raised on account of their destruction. 
The cutting of the latter cable could only be effected about 180 meters 
from the shore, because the boats employed in the work were covered 
with such a galling fire that they were compelled to retreat after cutting 
two of the three cables they had found there. 

The St. Louis and Wompatuck,the latter especially fitted for this class 
of operations, attempted to cut the cable from Santiago to Jamaica 
during the night of May 16, but had to abandon the enterprise when 
the Wompatuck was discovered by one of our patrol boats. 

On May 18 the attempt was renewed and the cable was successfully 
grappled in 500 fathoms of water, hardly amile from the Morro. When 
these vessels were fired upon from the Morro they could do nothing 
but steam out, with the picked-up cable. Captain Goodrich of the St. 
Lowis, was under the impression that there were two cables here and 
was in hopes that the second one had been damaged; if this was not 
the case, the enterprise was a failure. 

On May 19 the same vessels attempted to cut the French cable at 
Guantanamo. A gunboat succeeded in preventing them and compelled 
the United States ships to retreat when they had already grappled the 
cable. The other end of it was landed near Mole St. Nicolas, west of 
Santo Domingo. Captain Goodrich went thither, and on the morning 
of May 20 he cut the cable in deep water, being careful not to pass 
inside the 3-mile limit from Santo Domingo. 

An attempt was then made to cut the cable from Puerto Rico to Ponce; 
but the nature of the bottom and the deep water prevented its success. 
Captain Goodrich was of opinion that specially fitted vessels with ade- 
quate apparatus were required for this service of cable-cutting. He 
said in this connection: 

I venture to remind you that cable grappling is a very slow and tedious operation, 
often necessitating repeated drives over the same ground. The good fortune which 
has attended our efforts so far is quite exceptional in grappling practice. 

In the Kast, Commodore Dewey, who was master of the Bay of Manila 
after the destruction of the Spanish squadron, made application to the 
representatives of the Hastern Extension Telegraph Company at Manila 
for permission to send telegrams the same as under normal conditions. 
The Captain-General refused permission, whereupon Dewey cut the 
cable and took the end of it on board his ship. Before he could make 
use of it, considerable time elapsed owing to the lack of instruments 
and operatois. But soon after he had succeeded in establishing com- 
munication with his Government, the Spanish Government exercised 
its right by reason of its contract with the Eastern Extension Telegraph 
Company and sealed the end of the cable at Hongkong, thereby isolating 
Dewey and Manila. | 

From the above it will be seen that shore batteries and boats, in spite 
of their weakness, in many instances prevented the cutting of the 


58 


cables, and also that cable-cutting is a difficult operation in deep water, 
even when there is no enemy to contend with. 
In this connection Admiral Colomb says: 


As to international law, it is understood to be clear that a neutral cable within 
the enemy’s territorial waters takes the chances of war, as does all neutral property 
in the enemy’s territory. But the somewhat curious and clearly misunderstood 
point is, that out of territorial waters a neutral’s cable is protected by international 
law as being neutral property, and can not be cut there except in defiance of the 
rights of neutrals. 

If l rightly understand matters, Captain Goodrich transgressed international law 
by cutting the French cable outside the 3-mile limit off Mole St. Nicolas. He 
respected the neutrality of Haiti, which did not count for much, but he destroyed, 
or attempted to destroy, French property on the high seas. Apparently the French 
cable from Cuba to Haiti was in three conditions. It was open to destruction by 
the belligerent within 3 miles of the Cuban shore, without raising any claims of 
neutrals. From the Cuban 3-mile limit to the Haitian 3-mile limit the cable was as - 
much French property as any French mail steamer in the same waters, and the bellig- 
erent had just as much right to cut the cable as he had to capture the French mail 
steamer. Within the Haitian 3-mile limit the cable was doubly protected. It was 
French property in Haitian territory, so that French rights and Haitian rights 
would have been equally defied had the cable been touched in those waters. ! 

Practically, then, it seems that, quite apart from any difficulty arising from grap- 
pling cables in deep water, an intending belligerent proposing to astonish us by 
way of dramatic surprise would have to cut all our cables within three miles of our 
own shores or else leave it alone. The lesson appears to be that it is not impossible 
that, if we were at war, attempts might be made to damage us in that way, and it 
seems a legitimate conclusion to assume that the ends of our cables ought to be 
covered and protected by a few of the longest-ranged guns properly mounted in a 
battery. Where possible, as illustrated by the usefulness of the Spanish gunboat at 
Guantanamo, naval force should le localized with the same defensive object. On 
the whole, the lesson does not seem unsatisfactory. 

The case of the Manila cable is evidently special, and it is understood to be so. 
We may have noticed by the announcement in the papers the other day that the 
Eastern Extension Company had brought a claim against the American Government, 
which the American Government had in the first stage disallowed. It is evident 
that the claim made is likely to raise the whole question of the neutrality of cables, 
but, the matter being sub judice, I might prejudice it by offering any opinions. All 
I will say is that we should watch the case as closely as we can. 


Relative to this matter we will say that, as is well known, the theory 
of the strongest predominates. Everything is permissible to the pow- 
erful. While we refrained from privateering, the Americans not only 
carried on something very similar, but also cut our cables, without any 
consideration or respect, and no one has interfered nor will interfere. 
Perhaps the nations of Europe may have to pay dear for this Selfish 
conduct. 

We now come to the fate of our squadron. 

From Admiral Cervera’s letters there is no doubt that the four 
cruisers and the three destroyers—Terror, Plutén, and Furor—left 





‘There is at present great uncertainty as to what constitutes territorial waters; 
some hold that it extends to 3 miles; others claim 5. The range of guns which was 
formerly the standard has changed so much nowadays that it would perhaps be 
proper that an international agreement should settle this point definitely. 


a 


Cape Verde in a precarious condition, and it will also be understood 
that the return of the other three torpedo vessels, together with the 
Ciudad de Cadiz, to the Canaries, must have injured us much in the 
eyes of the world and must have had a demoralizing effect in our own 
country. 

On this point we read in the Naval Annual: 

It must be assumed that the Spanish Government, in the peculiar circumstances, 
felt bound to make an apparent effort to succor Cuba in the face of the strong opin- 
ion of Admiral Cervera and his officers that disaster was inevitable. The movement 
across the Atlantic must be regarded as political rather than naval. 

We add no comment of our own. We only wish to state facts and 
give the opinions of others, in order that: each one may, with absolute 
independence, form his own dispassionate judgment. 

Admiral Cervera, with the Colon and the Marta Teresa, had left Cadiz 

‘on April 8, and on the 15th he reached Cape Verde (Porto Grande), 
where the Oquendo and Vizcaya joined them. They remained at anchor, 
transhipping coal from the Cddiz and making repairs, until the 29th, 
when the squadron started for Cuba with the admiral’s flag hoisted on 

the Maria Teresa. | i 

There were great difficulties to contend with. Several times it became 
necessary for the Teresa to tow the Plutén, the Oquendo the Terror, and 
the Colon the Furor; damages had to be repaired, the greatest pre: 
cautions used, and practices carried out. On the 12th the squadron 
came in sight of Martinique, where it stopped from 5.15 to6.15 a.m. One 
of the destroyers went into port. The vessels with extreme caution 
then shaped their course for Curacao, where they arrived on the morn- 
ing of the 14th. The Teresa and Vizcaya went in, while the Oquendo, 
the Colén, and the destroyers remained outside. 

At midnight the Terror was towed inside. On the 16th the Plutén, 
with the Teresa and Vizcaya, entered the bay, and the engine of the 
latter wasrepaired. The squadron took as much coal as it was possible 
to obtain and started on the 18th for Santiago de Cuba, where it arrived 
on the morning of May 19. There it took some coal, under very unfa- 
vorable conditions, from the depots of the Juragua Mining Company 
and the San Luis Railway.! 

The Americans, who had accurate information as to the starting of 
the squadron from Cape Verde and its probable course for the West 
Indies, had maintained their squadrons, one near Habana (Sampson’s) 
and the other at Hampton Roads (Schley’s). On the supposition that 
Cervera would go to Puerto Rico, it was decided that Sampson’s fleet 
should take position in the Windward Passage. To that end it started 
on May 4 with the battle ships Jowa, Indiana, and New York, the moni- 
tors Amphitrite and Terror, a few auxiliaries, and one collier. The 
monitors proved an impediment because they had to be towed long 








1The operations of the squadron while in this harbor, that is to say, to July 3 
when it went out, are closely connected with the land battles, and we shall therefore 
speak of them when we come to that part of our account. 


60 


distances and resupplied with coal several times. On the 7th Sampson 
arrived at Cape Haitien, where he was advised from Washington that 
no news had been received of the Spanish squadron. Nor did the two 
vessels which had been detached to cruise east of Martinique and 
Guadeloupe, the Harvard and St. Louis, succeed in sighting our squad- 
ron. On the evening of the 9th Sampson held a council with his cap- 
tains and decided to shape his course for San Juan de Puerto Rico to 
see whether the squadron was there. But at 11 o’clock he received a 
telegram from Washington advising him of the rumors of the press to 
the effect that the Spanish squadron had been sighted off Martinique, 
and indicating the expediency of his return for fear of an attack upon 
Key West and the breaking of the blockade at Habana.! 

But Sampson continued on his course to San Juan, and at daylight 
of the 12th the bombardment commenced. The admiral says that he 
could have taken the place, but when he found that our squadron was 
not there and that he would have to leave his ships there until the 
army of occupation arrived, he decided to return to Habana. Our 
opinion does not coincide with his. To bombard a fortified place is 
easy; to take it is quite a different matter. Itis reasonable to suppose 
that Sampson was very desirous to take San Juan and make himself 
popular, but he had not counted on the resistance he encountered, and 
that is what caused him to desist. It is said that the following night, 
while en route for Habana, he learned that Cervera had been sighted 
at Martinique, and afterwards he received official notice of his arrival 
at Curacao on the morning of the 14th. The Harvard was chased by 
the Terror, which had remained behind, probably on account of injuries, 
which compelled her to go to Fort-de-France, which the Harvard had 
left owing to international laws, which provide that there shall be an 
interval of twenty-four hours between the going out of two belligerents. 
In the meantime the battleship Oregon was shaping her course for the 
Bermudas to join Sampson’s squadron, after her long voyage from the 
Pacific coast. 

On May 13 Sampson received orders to proceed to Key West, and 
Schley was also instructed to go there from Hampton Roads. The lat- 
ter arrived on the 18th, and Sampson with his flagship New York the 
same day, the remainder of the squadron following him closely. 

Obedient to orders from the Department at Washington, several fast 
cruisers were guarding the passages between Haiti and Puerto Rico. ~ 
The St. Lows had been at Santiago on the 18th and bombarded the 
Morro and Punta Gorda at short range. She was struck by a shell in 
the bow. It is a pity that the Socapa battery had not been completed 
at that time, as it could have seriously injured the ship, which, in con- 
junction with the Wompatuck, was attempting to cut the cable. From 








'This part of Sampson’s conduct does not seem clear. If he had information as 
to the whereabouts of our squadron, why did he undertake the bombardment of San 
Juan? What we have read concerning this matter seems cleverly devised, but is not 
convincing. 


61 


there she proceeded to Guantanamo without having sighted the Spanish 
squadron, which, as stated, entered Santiago Harbor on the 19th. 

On the 25th the St. Paul captured a vessel, the Restormel, carrying 
2,400 tons of coal for our squadron. ‘This vessel had been at San Juan de 
Puerto Rico, had gone thence to Curacao, and arrived there two days 
after Cervera had departed. Her captain informed the Americans that 
there were at San Juan two other vessels loaded with coal. It was also 
learned that there were only 2,300 tons of coal at Santiago. 

Schley, with the Flying Squadron and the Jowa, while off Cienfuegos, 
received instructions to go to Santiago, where he arrived on the 26th, 
finding the Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Yale already there. By that time 
it was positively known that Cervera’s fleet was at-Santiago, and Samp- 
son received orders to proceed there at once. He arrived off Santiago 
on June 1l.!' The Oregon had in the meantime joined his squadron. 

On the subject of so important an operation as the entering of Cer- 
vera’s squadron into this harbor, the English Vice-Admiral P. H. 
Colomb, a well-known authority on naval matters, to whom reference 
has already been made and will again be made in the course of this 
work, says in a recent article entitled The Misfortunes of Cervera: 


Instead of crossing the Atlantic at 10 knots, Cervera was only able to cross at 7 
knots, and then his coal was exhausted by the time he got to Martinique. Because 
of this, and because of the breakdown of one, if not two,‘of the destroyers, his 
presence at Martinique was known all over the world a few hours after he arrived 
there. Then further delay in the search for coal came about by the visit to Curagao, 
and again the presence of the squadron and its hapless condition was everywhere 
known. It could only cross to Cuba at the rate of some 5 knots, and when it finally 
arrived at Santiago, on May 19—four days later than should have sufficed to finish 
the stroke at Key West—the fate of the squadron was as absolutely sealed as if it 
had run there and then into the heart of the combined American fleets. 

It was, of course, instantly blockaded. Probably, had there been ample supplies 
of coal, and ample appliances for coaling at Santiago, it would not have been able to 
get away for a stroke in the time allowed. As it was, there were neither of these 
things in the Spanish port, and it was but a question of time when Cervera’s squad- 
ron would fall with the surrender of Santiago to a land attack, or be driven out by 
the land force as rabbits are driven out of their holes by a ferret. 

It followed that nothing could be done by the Americans until the Spanish squad- 
ron was put out of existence, and all the existing force of America was thrown upon 
a point that became of consequence when Cervera appeared there. 

Still obeying orders that had no reason in them, Cervera made an attempt to 
escape on July 3, Had the squadron been everything in reality that it appeared on 
paper, the attempt was probably hopeless; but it may be said that had tactics 
apparently more dangerous, but really more hopeful, been adopted, it is not impossi- 
ble that a better show might have been made. As it was, with foul bottoms, the 
wrong guns, and not the whole of them, and short ammunition, the fate of the 
unfortunate ships was only made more certain by a run alongshore, which enabled 
the Americans to employ all the fire possible against their enemies without any hesi- 
tation caused by the danger of hitting their friends. 

It might have been worse for Cervera, but perhaps it would have been better for 
Spain, had Cervera taken the position that was his due as the leading Spanish 





1 While the Americans boast of having known the situation of our squadron for a 
long time, it is certain that none of their actions bear this out. 





62 


admiral, and absolutely refused to take a part in annihilating the naval power of 
his country. 


The plan of operations, which, according to Admiral Colomb, Cervera 
was expected to carry out, was as follows: 


The moment it put to sea it was bound to have on the American Navy all the par- 
alyzing effect of Lord Torrington’s “fleet in being,” ! and, indeed, it had precisely 
this effect when the time came. The news that the squadron had ijeft St. Vincent 
forced the Americans to abandon the blockade of Cuba practically, brought down 
to Cuban waters the division of the United States fleet, that, somewhat owing to 
popular and very ignorant clamor, had been detained in the north, and it drove 
Sampson’s division away to the eastward, and to a position which would hardly 
have contributed to the success of Cervera’s operations had success been possible. 

The program I had sketched as a likely one for Cervera to follow—when I sup- 
posed that he had with him, in fact, what paper accounts gave him credit for—was 
the following: I assumed that the four cruisers would take the three destroyers in 
tow and steer straight for the passage between Martinique and St. Lucia, timing 
itself so as to pass through in darkness on the ninth or tenth day, so as not to be 
seen from either shore; then to pass well to the southward of Jamaica, to round the 
west end of Cuba, well out of sight, and to strike a blow at the shipping, transports, 
etc., in Key West, on the fifteenth day, soon after daylight. It was a pretty program, 
a daring one no doubt, but I think quite feasible had all been as it appeared to be. ’ 





'A fleet inferior to the hostile forces and which refuses battle, constituting a con- 
stant menace for the enemy. 


CHAPTER VI. 
BLOCKADE OF HARBORS. 


THE OQUENDO AND VIZCAYA—BLOCKADE OF THE COAST—ASPECT 
OF THE BLOCKADE OF HABANA—CONDITIONS OF THE BLOCKADE 
OF SANTIAGO—SINKING OF THE MERRIMAC—A FEW STRANGE 
FACTS. 


From all that has been stated in this book we must come to the con- 
clusion that the United States really feared our squadron and the forti- 
fied places on our colonial coasts. The Americans had no conception 
of the small number of our available vessels, and thought that those 
we did have were models of their kind. This fact—though we do not 
imagine that in the long run the struggle would have been decided in 
our favor, as it would soon have become apparent that it was moral 
rather than material—might at least have been taken advantage of in 
good season, and in that event, perhaps, we should not have lost the 
whole of our colonial empire; perhaps only the island of Cuba would 
have been taken from us, while we should have retained Puerto Rico and 
the Philippines. 

Among the most important means to that end, from a strategic 
standpoint, would have been a basis of naval power in Cuba, adapted 
to keep alive among the enemy that uncertainty and dread which was 
apparent in all their actions. 

This would have been possible if we had retained at Habana the 
eruisers Vizcaya and Almirante Oquendo, which, though doomed to be 
sacrificed in any event, would without any doubt have done a great 
deal more good here in cooperation with the shore batteries. 

The Vizcaya had been sent to New York by reason of the dark and 
unwarranted rumors to which the Maine catastrophe had given rise. 
She was subjected to much annoyance while in New York harbor, but 
there is no doubt that her presence there made considerable impression 
on the minds of the Yankees. On the 1st of March she entered Habana 
harbor. 

Shortly after, on the 5th, the Oquendo arrived there. 

There can be no doubt that some significance, some plan, underlay 
the arrival of these two battle ships at Habana, where they found an 
adequate base for brilliant action, and sufficient resources for maneu- 
vering, fighting, taking refuge, and keeping a whole hostile squadron 
in check. 

In the chain of errors, the final link of which—for the present !—is 
the terrible defeat we suffered, not the least, perhaps, is the order for 
these two ships to return to Cape Verde to join the destroyers and 
torpedo boats already there and those which Cervera afterwards took 
there from Cadiz. It seems to us, though we are not of the profession, 
that after the long voyage of the Vizcaya and Oquendo, as the result 

63 


64 


of which the former had a foul bottom and had lost her speed, the most 
natural thing would have been to put them in perfect condition and 
keep them at the scene of the prospective war. In cooperation with the 
small but by no means inefficient vessels which we had at Habana 
and other ports of the island, and auxiliary vessels in the shape of 
merchant steamers, they might have constituted a flying squadron which 
would have given the enemy something to do and something to fear. 

The reader will agree with us that if we had had such a naval force 
at Habana the Americans, who had, moreover, to reckon with Cervera’s 
squadron, which could have gone out a little later if it chose, reenforced 
by the Pelayo and one or two other ships, would have been compelled 
to divide their fleet considerably, especially if we had considered the 
possibility of using some privateer cruisers—under the name of auxil- 
iaries, if preferred—against their commerce. 

Are these conjectures well founded, or are we mistaken? 

We are inclined to believe the aaittets But in case of doubt it must 
be admitted that, even if the results of the Oquendo and Vizcaya 
remaining in said harbor had not been as favorable as we presume, it 
is at least reasonable to suppose that if those two ships had been kept 
at Habana Cervera’s squadron would not have gone to Santiago, and 
the latter city, in the eastern extremity of the island, would not have 
become the enemy’s objective. For there can be no doubt at this time 
that it did not enter into the United States’ plans to make the capital 
of the eastern province the scene of war. The attack of that city 
became necessary and easy by reason of the Spanish squadron having 
taken refuge there. 

Finally, it will be readily understood that it is not expedient to wear 
out ships by long voyages on the eve of war. The Vizcaya reached 
Cape Verde in unserviceable condition, nothing more than a buoy, as 
Admiral Cervera says graphically in one of his letters. 

We are firmly convinced that leaving those two ships at Habana 
would have given the enemy much to think of and much to fear, and 
would have made it necessary for them to draw their naval forces 
farther west. In that event the blockade of Habana and other ports 
and coasts of the island would at once have assumed an entirely 
different aspect, and the whole nature of the campaign would have 
been changed. 

It was therefore with feelings of profound sadness that we saw the 
Oquendo and Vizcaya, obeying superior orders, steam out of the harbor 
at 5 o’clock in the evening of April 1. The ships stopped at Puerto Rico, 
which island they left on the 9th, shaping their course for St. Vincent, 
Cape Verde, and leaving the West Indies at the mercy of the blockade 
which was announced a few days later. 

A blockade when continued for some length of time is a tedious 
operation for warships, because it compels them to remain constantly 
on the high sea, always on the lookout, in almost unendurable monotony, 
which is very exasperating and fatiguing. The United States squad- 


65 


ron hardly felt these onerous effects. There being no enemy to be 
feared in the immediate vicinity, and bases of operations and large 
dockyards and depots being near, the ships could move at their ease, 
and were frequently relieved to replenish the ammunition expended and 
resupply themselves with provisions and fresh water. 

Hence the blockade of the coast was nothing more than simply quiet 
cruising. 

The blockades of the harbors were of a more difficult nature, espe- 
cially at Havana and Santiago, and as these are naval operations of 
unfrequent occurrence, we deem it expedient to describe them somewhat 
more at length. 

In order to give an idea of the blockade of the former place we avail 
ourselves of the observations which were made day and night for nearly 
four months by the Central Telemetric Station at the Pirotecnia Militar, 
which was connected by telephone with the telemetric apparatus of the 
batteries and with the different chiefs of the forts, artillery, and bat- 
teries, all of which organizations we will describe at length when we 
speak of Habana in the book which is to follow the present one. 

From the charts which represent the observations_of the station 
referred to we have selected a few of different dates, in order that the 
reader may form an accurate idea of the blockade of a harbor and of 
the manner in which the United States vessels effected the blockade of 
Habana. 

° Situation of hostile ships in the order from windward to leeward. 


[Artillery. Teélemetric observatory of the ‘‘Pirotecnia.”” April 22, 1898, 6 p. m.] 
































Distance 
No. Class. Name. | Masts. Sabi Armament. Preiss 
tory. 
Meters 
iL | (ES SE ee aa | a 2 De heetaystarettstain are aaa ae acta a eer 22, 000 
OE a ee ee Montgomery.. 2 2 | 10 12.5-cm. R. F ....... 23, 500 
GioleIN Mert ores Scr er elotas 
PESTER fess eae eee 3 
: 2 IBRCHING Scans == 
i a ei na ee ers |e ce ae L lic Soe eee es Pas Sas e 20, 500 
ih) (CNEGT) 44a a arr Marblehead... 2 2b LOM Abeer iw aes cee 23, 000 
Ooi sere. He 38k 
ASHP IE EA esate eee 
PiMBChIMO pees coats ont 5 
oe 1 ES TOWaceee we oss 1 Zr ke GOU-CMe eects cas sone ass 20, 500 
Se20-CMiye see tees cee. 
OAT CTTY, Dy eae, sepa 
Z20Df-MM essere ce eee 6. 
} DRAIN Ns Con ar CeeeaOeeS 
HIN OAR. Pe  o'c'sc< o'a's So aura locus ee elie ee led v2 soc Aki Ace arr 19, 500 
7 | USS Oe eee ee eimdigna ss <>... 1 7 NER GRAS Naar Geet 22, 000 
SIO Cimeeneet. week se eee 
2 WIGS Se, ee 
PAU Vite 10 en ee 
Gio vos se ee oe. s, cc 
LS gts a Ress AS ES oP (le 3 fs det ns tac saya a 20, 000 
Dale .ots.s.2 0): asc pqg ae Oa aaaeeee ote New York.... 2 Or iG 20°C ae eee ae 22, 500 
LoplOzemiplvs He ees. ey 
SAIN Cope sae eee 
COS FIAT esa ee 
41i1aCBINO nee ess. oo oe 
SBME sia a we cic cic en deen els onde cna vue sss 2 1G aoc ccae, oe en 23, 500 
18 lene FR. foals is ania sk lama coe awn Cees 2 ls eee TES (5. 2 oe 22, 000 
4 EUSTASIO DE AMILIVIA, Captain. 


66 


APRIL 22, 6 P.M. 


Aedes jonay \terbleheod 
\ 


Montgomery 


New York 
: Yacht 


Merchant / 










Cucter, “Critser 





2429/1049 &/ aps - 
PACIY bd 2p SauoUeF | 


| 


SCALE: 1 MM. = 400 M. AND 1 CM.= 4,000 M. 


The United States squadron appears at 5.30 p. m., following a north- 
easterly course. When within 22,000 meters of this observatory theships 
stop and separate into three groups, which take positions to leeward, 
north, and windward. The squadron is composed of battleships Lowa 
and Indiana, armored cruiser New York, two unprotected cruisers, appar- 
ently the Marblehead and Montgomery, and one three-masted cruiser 
the type of which can not be made out. The remaining vessels, 11 in 
number, are small merchant vessels. The alarm signal is given from 
the forts at 6.20. Two steamers have left the harbor, shaping their 
course northward, one of them English, the other United States; alsoa 
schooner of the latter nationality. At 9.25 p.m. Battery No. 5 signals 
that several ships, believed to be quite near, are discerned in that direc- 
tion. At 10 a second alarm signal is given. About 2 o’clock the light 
of the Morro light-house is extinguished. Al] through the night red 
and green lights, obviously signals of the hostile fleet, are noticed at a 
ereat distance. | 


67 


APRIL 28, 6.30 P. M. 






4 





» PIROTECS 
PRINCIPE 


4 
q 
4 






oeves 





In the morning only the Jowa and one merchant vessel, indicated on 
the chart, were in sight. A war ship was sighted to windward at 8 
and disappeared shortly after. At 5, a ship was seen passing to wind- 
ward at such a distance that she could not be recognized. At 530 a 
small yacht and the Triton appeared, steering toward the Lowa. 


68 


May 5,2 P.M. 





" , Pirorec4 
PRINCIPE 





Sasepuaus/y 2 


At 6 there are in sight the Wilmington, an antiquated cruiser, and 
three gunboats. At9 the dispatch boat Dolphin appeared and stopped, 
forming a group with three vessels to windward; they exchange flag — 
signals and boats pass to and fro. At 10 the Dolphin shapes her 
course to windward and disappears. ‘At 12 another cruiser, of anti- 
quated type, appears to the northward... At 1 a gunboat appears to 
windward. At3asmall Spanish schooner is sighted, steering for the 
harbor. At 3.30 she is captured by a gunboat, which takes her in 
tow, and they disappear to windward. At 5.30 the French steamer 
Lafayette appears to windward. The hostile ships steer toward her. 
At sunset the group formed by the latter and the Lafayette is still in 
sight. Nothing of interest was observed during the night. 


Fn 


69 


May 14, 4.30 P.M. 







w Gunboat 


Crufser 


~~ Pinorec4 
PRINCIPE 
12 

oo) 





sosepuauy % 


At8 three gunboats. At 8.30 two cruisers and one gunboat to wind- 
ward. At 8.40 a steam launch appears. At 11 two gunboats disap- 
pear to windward, reappearing at 11.15. The Mexican schooner Arturo 
leaves the harbor. At 1 a merchant vessel, whose nationality could 
not be made out, appears to the northward. A cruiser starts in pur-_ 
suit and fires a shot; the merchant vessel stops, then proceeds on her 
course. At 3 two gunboats appear to windward; at 4.20 one of them 
- disappears. The Conde de Venadito and Nueva Hspana come out of 
the harbor, steering first to windward, then changing their course to 
leeward, then again returning to the former direction. A_ hostile 
cruiser, two gunboats, one of them small and with a single mast, and 
the tug Triton concentrate to the north. The Spanish vessels steer 
towardthem. A hostile gunboat advances, followed bythe cruiser. The 
Oonde de Venadito turns about and steers to windward; the Nueva Hspana 
continues on her course toward the United States gunboat. At 4,000 
meters the hostile gunboat referred to opens fire, which is returned by 
our vessels. The Nueva Hspana also turns to windward. The United 
States vessels stop at 17,000 meters, then retreat to a distance of over 
20,000 meters. Our vessels again turn to windward, passing in front 
of the enemy, and the Conde de Venadito fires another shot. They con- 
tinue on their course to windward and are joined by the Aguila and 
Flecha. At night our vessels enter the harbor. The effect of the shots 
could not be ascertained, owing to the distance. 


70 


May 21,1 P. M. 


J Puritan 


J Miantonomoh 















y; on Cushing Mimin gton N 
Cruiser Gi Ahost unboat X 
ies Gunboat / 


) Gupboar 


PRINCIPE 


4 
¥F. 
4 






3 
& 
iY) 
3 
@ 


At daybreak there are seen on the horizon the monitor Miantonomoh, 
two old cruisers, dispatch boat Dolphin, first-class gunboat Wilming- 
ton, and seven smaller gunboats; total, 12 vessels. The battle ship - 
Towa, which was in sight last night, has disappeared. At 6 a gun- 
boat disappears and the monitor Puritan appears to northward. There 
remain 11 vessels. At 7 two gunboats appear to northward. Thir- 
teen vessels. The nearest is the Wilmington, about 8,500 meters 

distant. At 9 a gunboat appears to northward. J ourteen vessels. 
At 10.40 the first-class battle ship Jndiana and armored cruiser New 
York appear to northward. Sixteen vessels in sight. At 12.30 three 
more vessels appear, making a total of 19, shown on the chart. From 
7 to 8 the telegraph lights of the United States vessels are observed to 
be in operation. The searchlight of the Velasco battery has been in 
operation all night. Nothing further of interest during the night. 


71 


JUNE 10, 9.30 A.M. 


] Gunboat 










wm, Gunboat 


PA 
Gunboat ~, Gunboat 





At daybreak six gunboats, among them the Wilmington and one 
cruiser. At 7.40 a gunboat with one mast and one smokestack appears 
to windward. To leeward another gunboat is sighted. At 8.30 the 
Spanish vessels Conde de Venadito, Nueva Espana, Yanez Pinzon, and 
Flecha come out of the harbor and steam to windward, keeping about 
1,000 meters from the shore. When within 3,800 meters of Battery 
No. 1 they turn to leeward. The hostile gunboat sighted to windward 
steers to leeward, firing a shot. The cruiser and another gunboat also 
fire, but no shells are seen. ‘They proceed to windward and approach 
four gunboats. At 10,000 meters from our vessels they open fire, which 
is at first quite accurate. Our vessels increase the distance between 
them and continue to cruise to leeward, close inshore, as far as Almen- 
dares River. In the meantime the enemy has turned to leeward, but 
at a distance of over 15,000 meters. At 1.35 our vessels enter the 
harbor. 


T2 


JUNE 13,12 M. 










«Cruiser 


Monitor Puritan 
type 
Gunboat 








% 
“J 
84 


sosepuauiy % 


At daybreak nine gunboats, among them the Wilmington, two cruisers, 
one of them the Montgomery, and the monitor Terror. At 7.40 a gun- 
boat appears to windward. At 10.30 the gunboat Maple, displaying a 
white flag, steers towards the city and stops 6,300 meters from the 
shore. At 11.15 the gunboat Flecha goes out to speak with the United 
States vessel, returning to the harbor a few minutes later. The Maple 
Shapes her course northward. At 12 a gunboat disappears to the 
northward. At 3 another gunboat disappears to the northward. At 
3.21 -a gunboat is sighted far to windward, approaching another gun- 
boat, 2,000 meters from the shore. At 3.50 the cruiser Montgomery 
advances to within 8,300 meters of the leeward shore. The Santa 
Clara Battery fires three shots at her, and Battery No. 4 two. Owing 
to the high wind the shells were deflected to the left. At the flash . 
of the first shot the cruiser started at full speed. -At 5 a gunboat 
approaches the windward shore to within less than 8,000 meters. Bat- 
tery No.2 fired a shot at her and the gunboat withdrew. - At 8.30 p. m. 
a hostile ship throws her searchlight towards the city on the leeward 
shore for five minutes. A group of two vessels could be distinguished. 
All through the night light signals were seen, which were watched by 
our searchlights. 


13 


JULY 6,6 P.M. 


Monitor Terror 


@ PIROTECS 
PRINCIPE 
“oy 

Wy, 
<q 





At daybreak the horizon can not be distinguished, owing to dense 
fog. At7.20 the fog disappears and the following ships are seen: Three 
cruisers—the Montgomery, Vicksburg, and one of antiquated type—five 
gunboats, among them the Machias, Maple, and one of antiquated type, 
and the monitor Terror. Total,9 vessels. At 7.25 a cruiser appears to 
northward. Total, 10 vessels. At 8.30 the gunboat Anita appears to 
leeward. Total,11 vessels. During the day the trans-Atlantic steamer 
Alfonso XII was seen burning at Mariel Beach. 


14 


AUGUST 13,12 M. 


 &> < 
Cruiser San Francisco 


Monitor Miantonomah 





3 
a 
3 
g 
% 
a 


At daybreak there are in sight a monitor of the Miantonomoh type, 
two cruisers, the Vicksburg and San Francisco and five gunboats. At 
9 a cruiser with two masts and two smokestacks appears to the north- 
ward. At8.20.a gunboat appears to leeward. At 9.30 two gunboats 
disappear to windward. At 10 the cruiser with two masts and two 
smokestacks disappears to windward. At11acruiser with three masts 
and one smokestack and a gunboat appear to leeward. At 11.30 a 
eunboat appears to leeward. At 2.15 the monitor of the Miantonomoh 
type and a gunboat disappear to the north. At 8 red and white lights 
begin to be seen on the horizon, obviously from hostile ships. Nothing 
of interest occurred during the night. The searchlight of the navy 
was in operation. The news of the conclusion of peace was received 
this day. At daybreak not a single hostile vessel was to be seen on 
the horizon, so that it seems that the blockade has been raised. 


15 


The four electric searchlights-—three belonging to the artillery and 
one to the navy, the latter designed to guard the net of torpedoes— 
were subject to the authorities in command of the fortifications, and in 
accordance with their orders illuminated or left in darkness the mari- 
time region near the windward and leeward shores and the entrance to 
the harbor, thus establishing a system of perfect vigilance which would 
have furnished excellent results in case a formal battle had been fought, 
and which prevented the enemy from displaying too much audacity. 

The light-house at the Morro was lighted, when so ordered by the 
authorities, when some friendly vessel was expected, and when it was 
not necessary to keep it dark so as not to serve the blockading vessels 
asa guide. — 

The following are incidents of various kinds which occurred during 
the blockade of Habana: 


April 25.—At 4.50 p.m. the gunboats Nueva Espana and Marqués de Molins went 
out of Habana Harbor and returned from off Marianao, having gone outside a dis- 
tance of 8,100 meters. 

April 27.—A hostile cruiser ran aground near Dimas (Colorado Reefs). 

May 6.—At 5 o’clock a small gunboat with two masts and two smokestacks 
approached to within 4,700 meters of the windward coast of Habana. Batteries 
Nos. 1 and 2 received orders to open fire, after several consultations by telephone. 
The gunboat escaped at full speed at the first shot. Several shells fell near it. 

May 7.—Two gunboats chase a schooner near the mouth of Almendares River, 
4,700 meters from the advanced leeward batteries. Batteries Nos, 4 and 5 open fire, 
which is so accurate that the vessels are surrounded with the cartridges of our shells, 
and withdraw with injuries. The schooner was towed into the harbor. A 24-centi- 
meter shell of the Punta Brava Battery exploded on board one of the vessels. 

May 9.—The hostile gunboat Triton approaches to within 4,800 meters of Battery 
No. 4, which opened fire, whereupon the gunboat speedily withdrew. 

May 10.—The Triton approaches, and is fired upon by Battery No. 5. 

May 13.—Two hostile gunboats fire on the coast of Habana from Marianao, and 
withdraw. 

May 15.—A hostile vessel approached with a flag of truce, and the gunboat I’lecha 
went out to parley. 

May 23.-—The vessels of the blockading fleet disappear to the east, leaving only 
two gunboats. 

May 27.—The gunboat Marqués de Molins leaves the harbor under a flag of truce, 
to confer with a hostile ship. 

May 28.—Another vessel under a flag of truce. The Ydiez Pinzon goes out. 
Exchange of prisoners.! 

June 13.—Battery No. 2, at a distance of 7,020 meters, discharges a 30.5-centimeter 
shell against a hostile vessel. * 

June 14.—Another hostile vessel appears under a flag of truce and the gunboat 
Flecha goes out to parley. 





1 Colonel of cavalry Cortijo, Army Surgeon Julian, and assistants Faustino Albert 
and Antonio Emilio Zazo (of the Argonauta) were exchanged for two United States 
journalists taken prisoners at a landing. 


76 


June 16.—A United States gunboat approached to within 5,000 meters of the 
Velasco Battery, which opened fire on her, and the gunboat retreated at full speed. 
A hostile ship approaches under a flag of truce, and the Nueva Lspana goes out to 
parley. 

July 1.—At 7 p.m. a hostile gunboat approached to within 6,000 meters of the 
Cojimar Battery, which opened fire, and the gunboat escaped at full speed, 

July 19.—At 10 a. m. a cruiser approaches the Chorrera Battery, which opens fire 
on her at 7,000 meters. At 6.40 p.m. she returned and approached to within 6,400 
meters, was again fired upon and withdrew. 

August 2.—A boat with a flag of truce is detached from the hostile ship San Fran- 
cisco, and the Ydnez Pinzén goes out to parley. 

August 4.—Another vessel under a flag of truce. The Ydiez Pinzon goes out to 
confer with her. She returns to the harbor and then goes out again. 

August 12.—At 5 o’clock the cruiser San Francisco approached to within 4,000 
meters of the windward coast; the Velasco and Barco Perdido batteries open fire; 
she was hit by three shells and withdrew, hoisting a white flag.' 

A vessel carrying a flag of truce appears, and the Ydnez Pinzén goes out to confer 
with her. 

The following is an approximate record of foreign vessels which 
entered or left Habana Harbor during the blockade: 

The English cruiser Talbot entered May 2, went out the 11th, and 
returned again June 6. The French frigate Dubordieu entered May 6 
and went out the 17th. On the same day the French dispatch-boat 
Fulton also went out. On the 16th of May the French steamer Lafay- 
etteentered. This transatlantic steamer had attempted to enter several 
days earlier, but was prevented by the blockading vessels, which took 
her to Key West; she was released and entered Habana on the day 
stated; but after unloading part of her cargo she took it on again for 
certain reasons and went out May 10 and was once more taken to Key 
West. The steamer Cosme Herrera (Captain Sanson) entered April 22, 
having eluded the enemy. The Avilés, of the same company, also 
entered. On May 14 the Mexican schooner Arturo went out. On May 
25 a German cruiser went out. The German cruiser Geier entered June 
22 and left the 29th.2 On June 23 the transatlantic steamers Santo 
Domingo and Montevideo ran the blockade at half past 12 at night. 
On the 24th the Honduras brig Amapala went out and was captured 
by the enemy. On July 5 the English cruiser Talbot left the harbor. 
The same day the transatlantic steamer Alfonso XII attempted to 
enter, but was surprised and set on fire by hostile shells at Mariel, 
where she ran aground trying to reach the port. OnJuly 8 the French 
cruiser D’Hstaing entered without saluting the blockading vessels and 
went out again on the 28th. On July 29 the Talbot entered and went 
out again the 30th, saluting the blockading vessels. On August 1 the 
German cruiser Geier entered the harbor, after saluting the blockaders, 
and went out again on the 4th. On the latter day the French cruiser 
D’ Estaing entered again and went out the 14th. 

The blockade of Santiago Harbor offers the peculiar feature that the 
electric lighting of the mouth of the channel was effected by the block- 








1No white flag was shown, and San Francisco was hit but once.—O.N. I. 
2The Geier entered Cienfuegos June 16, where she was entertained by our officers. 


17 


aders instead of the blockaded, as it was to the interest of the latter to 
keep the entrance dark, while it was imperative for the former to keep 
it well illuminated in order that Cervera’s ships might not escape. . 
‘For the same reason, the position of the blockading ships was more 
definitely determined than was the case at Habana. 
In the beginning the ships withdrew at night to the open sea. After- 
wards they adopted the order shown in the following sketch: 


AT NIGHT. 











A Battleship with searchlight. D Three steam-launch pickets. 
B Supporting battleship ready to open fire E Blockade outer /ine. 
in case of appearance of enemy. F Spanish ships. 


C Three small cruisers as pickets. 


In daytime the blockading vessels extended their line so as to be 
entirely out of the range of the guns of Morro Castle and the Socapa 





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IN THE DAY-TIME. 


18 


Battery, and also to leave sufficient room for maneuvering in case our 
squadron should attempt to force the entrance. The radius of the 
bloekading circle was 6 miles, and the vessels nearest the shore were 2 
miles distant from it. The more powerful ships, such as the Lowa, 
Oregon, and Massachusetts, were usually opposite the entrance, and next 
to them the fastest cruisers, New York and Brooklyn, while the vessels 
of less tonnage, the gunboats and auxiliaries, kept nearer the shore. 
This disposition shows that there still existed in the United States fleet 
a fear of some exploit on the part of our destroyers. 

A constant watch was kept up from the heights of the Socapa bat- 
teries and Morro Castle, and as soon as there was the least indication 
of the enemy attempting to come nearer the rapid-fire guns of the 
lower battery and on the crest of the Socapa, the rifles of the infantry, 
and the guns at Morro Castle would open a lively fire, which compelled 
the enemy to retreat. The Cristébal Colon, stationed near Punta Gorda, 
the Reina Mercedes, near Cay Smith, and the torpedo-boat destroyers 
also had a share in the defense. 

We will follow the same plan that we adopted in connection with the 
blockade of Habana, and give first a brief account of the principal 
actions of the blockading fleet against the works at the entrance of 
Santiago Harbor, and speak more fully of them as opportunity offers. 

May 18.—First demonstration in front of Santiago. One hundred and sixty shelis 
were fired. Punta Gorda answered. 

May 18 to June 5.—A-few insignificant bombardments. 

June 6.—At 8.30 a. m. 10 vessels, forming two divisions, opened a lively fire, which 
lasted until 11.30, with two intervals of fifteen minutes each. The eastern division 
bombarded the Morro and Aguadores, the western division the Socapa and Maza- 
morra, In all, 2,000 shots were fired, 100 guns being in action for one hundred and 
seventy-five minutes, being equal to a shot per gun every two minutes. 

The Socapa fired only 47 shots, on account of the dense smoke enveloping the 
ships. A hostile shell of large caliber hit the Mercedes, killing the second in com- 
mand, Commander Emilio de Acosta y Eyermann, a native Cuban, also five sailors, 
and wounding Ensign Molins, several sailors, and one boatswain. 

June 14, 16, and 18.—Renewed bombardments. 

June 22.—The landing expedition disembarks. The Brooklyn, Iowa, and Texas 
bombard the Morro and Socapa, which return the fire. Punta Gorda fires only 
two shots. 

June 22 and 23.—Landing of army corps at Daiquiri, while the squadron is bom- 
barding the coast from Punta Cabrera to Punta Barracos; lively bombardment of 
Siboney. 

July 2.—Bombardment. 

July 3.—Our squadron goes out and is destroyed by the United States fleet. 


The most noteworthy event recorded during this blockade was the 
attempt to force the channel made by the Merrimac, a merchant vessel 
equipped for war, in command of Lieutenant Hobson. This is also the 
only act which the Americans have to record in which heroism was 
displayed during this campaign, for the operation carried with it the 
probability of death for those who effected it. 


(i 


It occurred early in the morning of June 3. The blockading ships 
opened a lively fire on the entrance, probably in order to prepare the 
way for the operation and divert attention from the principal object. 
Before daybreak the Merrimac entered the harbor, but was surprised 
and sunk at a spot where she constitutes no obstruction to the egress 
and ingress of the harbor. Our crews captured the crew of the Merri- 

mac, consisting of Lieut. Richmond Pearson Hobson and seven sailors, 
all of whom, by a miracle, escaped with their lives. 

The sketch which we give below has reference to this enterprise, as 
described by Lieutenant Hobson in a handsome book which he has 


Si 


UH Oe. 
41) Nes eA: 


ss 
; Estrella Pt. 
en's & yy,” 


Uj, Xv battery. 


\N ioe <p z: st > —~Kae Mine Station Nos. J234.$.6, 
soe Sf \\ 500 ibs. Gun Cotton sath) 
SOR AN i itt 


ee * 
ener 


\< STO L/y oe 
gro CASTLE. 


Ny e* ge 


LYS 





O Submarine Mines, Unexploded Mines, Nos. 3,10,77, le. 
= “s tired at Vessel, Nos. 1,2,34,5,6,78. 
* 6 “that struck Vessel, No. S$. 


Automatic Torpedoes fired by ‘Reina Mercedes” and ‘Pluton” 


recently published, and although it contains many exaggerations, as, 
for instance, the statement that all the submarine mines contained 
500 pounds of gun cotton, it gives nevertheless a clear idea of the 
operation. 

Sampson and Hobson worked out the plan of sinking the Merrimac 
in the channel and chose the hour of 3.30 a. m., June 2, for carrying it 
into effect. 

The method of sinking the vessel and the spot where she was to be 
sunk were fully discussed. As to the method, it was decided to secure 
to the sides of the Merrimac, below the water line, ten torpedoes of a 


80 


special type charged with brown powder and actuated by electric cir- 

cuits. As to the spot, the bend of the channel off the Estrella battery 

was selected. The operation was carried out, but was not successful. - 
Of the ten torpedoes, only two exploded; in the others, says Mr. Hob- 

son, the circuits were destroyed by the Spanish fire. Our shore bat- 

teries, the pickets near the entrance, the Pluton and Reina Mercedes, 

the lines of contact and electric mines, the infantry—in a word, all the 
different elements of defense—fired on the Merrimac, and she was sunk 

at a spot farther in than had been intended by Sampson and where she 

did not obstruct the entrance. Hobson and his crew, clinging to a raft 

which had been taken along for the purpose, gave themselves up, but 

none of our men touched them except to save them. Mr. Hobson states 

that he was rescued by Admiral Cervera himself in his steam launch. 

This is an act of chivalry in time of war which even the Americans are 

compelled to extol. 

At the last hour, the Reina Mercedes was also sunk in the ETE ETE, 
but likewise enone obstructing the entrance. 

In order to give a clear idea of the operations of the blockade of the 
coasts and ports of Cuba, we must not omit to mention some strange 
facts which occurred in the course of it. 

Among these we will mention, in the first place, the entrance of the 
transatlantic steamer Monserrat into Cienfuegos Harbor, under the com- 
mand of Captain Deschamps, who eluded the blockade on April 27, and 
went out again with great audacity without being caught. The valiant 
Captain Deschamps repeated the operation after a trip to the Penin- 
sula. This time he entered Matanzas, again eluding the blockade and 
keeping himself in readiness to go ont whenever he should be ordered 
to do so. He went out on the 16th, after the suspension of hostilities. 

When the war broke out, the steamer Purisima Concepcién, of the 
Menéndez Company (Captain Gutiérrez), was at Bataband. She went 
out in search of provisions, eluding the blockade, and reached the Cay- 
man Islands; not finding there what she wanted, she shaped her course 
for Jamaica. When she had taken on a cargo there, a United States 
cruiser came alongside; but during the night she eluded the latter’s 
vigilance and went out to sea, reaching Casilda on June 22. Here she 
was chased and fired upon, but succeeded in going out the 25th and 
unloading at Manzanillo. A Honduras steamer reached Batabané 
with provisions. The transatlantic steamer Reina Cristina (Captain 
Casquero) entered Cienfuegos, having also been chased unsuccessfully, 
The Villaverde, coming from Mexico with a cargo of provisions, entered 
Coloma, likewise escaping from her pursuers. 

The transatlantic steamer Antonio Lopez ran aground on June 30, 
near Arecibo on the southern coast of Puerto Rico, but succeeded in 
getting off, saving both vessel and cargo. 

As already stated, the Santo Domingo and Montevideo, under the com- 
mand of naval officers, succeeded in running the blockade of Habana 


81 


and reaching Mexico in search of provisions. They are said to have 
had some difficulty there in getting their clearance papers on account of 
their character as warships. The Santo Domingo,' on July 12, reached 
a small port situated between Bailén and Punta Cartas on the southern 
coast of Cuba. 

The Spanish colony in Mexico sent the island a great deal of assist- 
ance, thus furnishing an example of generous patriotism. 

The steamer Humberto Rodriguez rendered excellent services by 
resupplying the Holguin Gibara, near Nuevitas, with great risk to her- 
self. The Alava made several trips between Caibarién and Nuevitas. 
From the latter port, many officers, and even women and children, 
escaped from the blockade and went to Caibarién in small boats, navi- 
gating between keys and at times pushed by hand. The German 
steamer Polaria entered Santiago with a cargo of rice. An English 
sloop coming from Jamaica, and the steamer Reina de los Angeles (of 
the Menéndez Company) also entered Santiago. 

Among the strange facts it may also be stated that during the block- 
ade several vessels went out with sugar, and Yankee speculators took: 
advantage of this circumstance; but this was finally prohibited. 
Among the vessels which made trips from Sagua may be mentioned 
the steamers Bergen and Mirthelene. 

Another peculiar fact is that the Texas one night fired on the Marble- 
head and Vixen, mistaking them for some of our vessels; but they 
escaped without injuries. This circumstance shows that ships may 
move about at night with impunity and that it is difficult to hit them. 





'The Santo Domingo failed to reach port as here mentioned, having grounded 
between Punta Cartas and Bailén, and was captured and burned by the converted 
yacht Hagle.—O. N. I. 


6884—_6 


CHAPTER VII. 
COAST DEFENSE. 


STATIONARY DEFENSES—MOBILE DEFENSES—SHORE BATTERIES—SEA 
FORTS — FLOATING BATTERIES — TORPEDOES— TORPEDO BOATS— 
MONITORS—BATTLE SHIPS AND CRUISERS. 


Any country that has anything to lose must nowadays guard well its 
coasts and boundaries by providing them with such elements of defense 
as are sanctioned by modern progress. 

As far as our own coasts and boundaries are concerned, our admin- 
istrations have treated this essential point of military organization with 
even more neglect than is apparent at first sight. | 

In view of the imperious necessity of preserving what we have left 
and maintaining it against an enemy, should the case arise, it is a ques- 
tion of the highest importance to prepare for the defense of our coasts 
and boundaries, and this includes the plans for the rapid and efficient 
fortification and armament of our principal ports. 

That it is in this direction that the beginning should be made, there 
can be no doubt. 

Coast defense comprises two different aspects: 

(1) Stationary defenses. 

(2) Mobile defenses. 

To the first class belong the fortifications that are tied to tne earth; 
that is to say, either located on the shore or connected with it, forts 
having their foundations on shoals or on the bottom of the sea and 
surrounded by water, floating batteries, and torpedoes. 

The second class comprises fleets and vessels of every description 
operated by sailors and adapted to carry their offensive action as far 
as may be necessary. 

The nature of shore batteries, therefore, is defensive and stationary; 
that of fleets is offensive and mobile. 

The first question to be considered is: Which of the two classes 
mentioned should be given preference? 

Asa matter of fact, both are necessary. They should therefore be 
developed side by side, and that is what is being done by wealthy and 
powerful nations, which, while providing their coasts and ports with 
strong defenses, develop and strengthen their fleets at the same time. 

But our case is somewhat different. Weare at present almost entirely 
without ships, and the ports along our coasts without defenses. There 
is danger impending. What line of conduct should we follow? 

In considering this question, we should observe absolute impartiality 
and avoid everything that is akin to prejudice, The general opinion 

82 


83 


coincides with the fact that for offensive warfare nothing can be attained 
with a few battle ships. Many are required; they constitute the basis 
of a fleet, as the Spanish-American war has demonstrated. But they 
cost an immense amount of money and consume vast sums in their 
maintenance. Battle ships necessitate navy-yards and docks, which 
in their turn require the existence of naval industry and many other 
accessory and auxiliary branches of industry, which we lack. The 
attempts we made to improvise the same during the war proved disas- 
trous, and to this fact is attributed by many a considerable share of our 
disasters. Hence the beginning for the defense of our peninsula and 
adjacent islands can and should be made with stationary defenses—that 
is to say, those comprised in the first class, without, however, losing 
sight of the development of our offensive naval power; and we will add 
that it is not sufficient to possess a nucleus of active forces, but it is 
also necessary to have a well-organized reserve, and this increases the 
difficulty as well as the price. 

It is the question of money which at present preoccupies us and is of 
the utmost importance, rendering it necessary for us to begin with the 
most economical part, and provide, first of all, for the defense of our 
own mother country, which must always remain the base and refuge of 
the mobile defenses, if the happy time should ever arrive that we pos- 
sess such defenses. 

In connection with the Spanish-American war there has been a great 
deal of discussion as to these questions concerning the greater impor- 
tance of stationary defenses or mobile defenses, and their relation to 
each other, which might be called either strategic or tactical, according 
as reference is had to distant fighting and the places of refuge and 
bases of operations rendered necessary thereby, or to fighting close by, 
the actual defense of the coast or harbor which the enemy may elect as 
his objective, in which case the factors of mobile defense may be suc- 
cessfully combined with those furnished by the stationary defense. 

In our attempt to examine into the different theories in connection 
with this matter, we will refer to a naval authority of world-wide repu- 
tation, Gaptain Mahan, who, in recent articles entitled ‘‘The War on 
the Sea and its Lessons,” touches on this question in a very able 
manner. 

We take the liberty of availing ourselves of Captain Mahan’s argu- 
ments, which have indisputable merit. 

It is proper here to say, for the remark is both pertinent and most important, that 
coast defenses and naval force are not interchangeable things; neither are they 
opponents, one of the other, but complementary. The one is stationary, the other 
mobile; and, however perfect in itself either may be, the other is necessary to its 
completeness. In different nations the relative consequence of the two may vary. 
In Great Britain, whose people are fed from the outside world, the need for a fleet 
vastly exceeds that for coast defenses. 

With us, able to live off ourselves, there is more approach to parity. Men may 


even differ as to which is the more important; but such difference, in this question, 
which is purely military, is not according to knowledge. 


84 


In equal amounts mobile offensive power is always and under all conditions 
more effective to the ends of war than stationary defensive power. Why, then, pro- 
vide the latter? Because mobile force, whatever shape it take, ships or men, is 
limited narrowly as to the weight it can bear; whereas stationary force, generally, 
being tied to the earth, is restricted in the same direction only by the ability of the 
designer to cope with the conditions. Given a firm foundation, which practically 
can always be had, and there is no limit to the amount of armor—mere defensive 
outfit—be it wood, stone, bricks, or iron, that you can erect upon it; neither is there 
any limit to the weight of guns—the offensive element—that the earth can bear, 
only they will be motionless guns. 

The power of a steam navy to move is practically unfettered; its ability to carry 
weight, whether guns or armor, is comparatively very small. Fortifications, on the 
contrary, have almost unbounded power to bear weight, whereas their power to move 
is nil; which again amounts to gaying that, being chained, they can put forth offen- 
Sive power only at arm’s length, as it were. 

Thus stated, it is seen that these two elements of sea warfare are in the strictest 
sense complementary, one possessing what the other has not; and that the difference 
is fundamental, essential, unchangeable—not accidental or temporary. q 

Given local conditions which are generally to be found, greater power, defensive 
and offensive, can be established in permanent works than can be brought to the 
spot by fleets. When, therefore, circumstances permit ships to be squarely pitted 
against fortifications—not merely to pass swiftly by them—it is only because the 
builders of the shore works have not, for some reason, possibly quite adequate, given 
them the power to repel attack which they might have had. It will not be asserted 
that there are no exceptions to this, as to most general rules; but as a broad state- 
ment it is almost universally true. 

“‘T took the liberty to observe,” wrote Nelson at the siege of Calvi, when the 
commanding general suggested that some vessels might batter the forts, ‘‘that the 
business of laying wood against stone walls was much altered of late.” Precisely 
what was in his mind when he said “of late” does not appear, but the phrase 
itself shows that the conditions which induced any momentary equality between 
ships and forts when brought within range were essentially transient. 

As seaports and all entrances from the sea are stationary, it follows naturally that 
the arrangements for their defense also should, as a rule, be permanent and station- 
ary, for as such they are strongest. Indeed, unless stationary, they are apt not to 
be permanent, as was conclusively shown in the late hostilities, where all the new 
monitors intended for coast defense were diverted from that object and dispatched 
to distant points, two going to Manila, and stripping the Pacific coast of protection 
so far as based upon them. 

This is one of the essential vices of a system of coast defense dependent upon 
ships, even when constructed for that purpose; they are always liable to be with- 
drawn by an emergency, real or fancied. 

Upon the danger of such diversion to the local security Nelson insisted when 
charged with the guard of the Thames in 1801. The block ships (stationary bat- 
teries) he directed were on no account to be moved for any momentary advantage, 
for it might very well be impossible for them to regain their carefully chosen posi- 
tions when wanted there. 

Our naval scheme in past years has been seriously damaged, and now suffers from 
two misleading conceptions—one, that a navy is for defense primarily, and not for 
offensive war; the other, consequent mainly upon the first, that the monitor, being 
stronger defensively than offensively, and of inferior mobility, was the best type of 
war ship. 

The civil war being, so far as the sea was concerned, essentially a coast war, 
naturally fostered this opinion. The monitor in smooth water is better able to 
stand up to shore guns than ships are which present a larger target; but, for all 


85 


that, it is more vulnerable, both above water and below, than shore guns are if these 
are properly distributed. It is a hybrid, neither able to bear the weight that forti- 
fications do, nor having the mobility of ships; and it is, moreover, a poor gun plat- 
form in a sea way. 

There is no saying of Napoleon’s known to the writer more pregnant of the whole 
art and practice of war than this: ‘‘Exclusiveness of purpose is the secret of great 
Successes and of great operations.” If, therefore, in maritime war you wish perma- 
nent defenses for your coasts, rely exclusively upon stationary works if the con- 
ditions admit, not upon floating batteries, which have the weakness of ships. If 
you wish offensive war carried on vigorously upon the sea, rely exclusively upon 
ships that have the quality of ships and not of floating batteries. 

We had in the recent hostilities 26,000 tons of shipping sealed up in monitors, of 
comparatively recent construction, in the Atlantic and the Pacific. There was not 
an hour from first to last, I will venture to Say, that we would not gladly have 
exchanged the whole six for two battle ships of less aggregate displacement, and 
that although from the weakness of the Spanish defenses we were able to hug pretty 
closely most parts of the Cuban coast. Had the Spanish guns at Santiago kept our 
fleet ata greater distance, we should have lamented still more bitterly the policy 
which gave us sluggish monitors for mobile battleships. 

The unsatisfactory condition of the coast defenses deprived the Navy of the sup- 
port ofits complementary factor in the scheme of national sea power and imposed a 
vicious though inevitable change in the initial plan of campaign, which should have 
been directed in full force against the coast of Cuba. 

The four newer monitors on the Atlantic coast, if distributed among our principal 
ports, were not adequate singly to resist the attack which was Suggested by the 
possibilities of the case, though remote, and still more by the panic among certain 
of our citizens. 

On the other hand, if the four were massed and centrally placed, which is the cor- 
rect disposition of any mobile force, military or naval, intended to counteract the 
attack of an enemy whose particular line of approach is as yet uncertain, their slug- 
gishness and defective nautical qualities would make them comparatively inefficient. 
New York, for instance, is a singularly central and suitable point, relatively to our 
northern Atlantic seaboard, in which to station a division in tended to meet and thwart 
the plans of a squadron like Cervera’s if directed against our coast ports, in accord- 
ance with the fertile imaginations of evil which were the fashion in that hour. Did 
the enemy appear off either Boston, the Delaware, or the Chesapeake, he could not 
effect material injury before a division of Ships of the Oregon class would be upon 
him; and within the limits named are found the major external commercial interests 
of the country, as well as the ocean approaches along which they travel. But had the 
monitors beensubstituted for battle ships, not to speak of their greater slowness, their 
inferiority as steady gun platforms would have placed them at aserious disadvantage 
if the enemy were met outside, as he perfectly well might be. 

It was probably such considerations as these that determined the division of the 
battle fleet and the confiding to the section styled the Flying Squadron the defense 
of the Atlantic coast for the time being. The monitors were all sent to Key West, 
where they would be at hand to act against Habana, the narrowness of the field in 
which that city, Key West, and Matanzas are comprised making their slowness less 
of a drawback, while the moderate weather which might be expected to prevail 
would permit their shooting to be less inaccurate. The station of the Flying Squad- 
ron in Hampton Roads, though not so central as New York relatively to the more 
important commercial interests upon which, if upon any, the Spanish attack might 
fall, was more central as regards the whole coast, and, above all, was nearer than 
New York to Habana and Puerto Rico. The time element also entered the caleula- 
tions in another way, for a fleet of heavy ships is more certainly able to put to sea 
at a moment’s notice in all conditions of tide and weather from the Chesapeake than 
from New York Bay. In short, the position chosen may be taken to indicate that, 


86 


in the opinion of the Navy Department and its advisers, Cervera was not likely to 
attempt a dash at an Atlantic port, and that it was more important to be able to 
reach the West Indies speedily than to protect New York or Boston—a conclusion 
which the writer entirely shared. 

The country, however, should not fail to note that the division of the armored 
fleet into two sections, nearly 1,000 miles apart, though probably the best that could 
be done under all the circumstances of the moment, was contrary to sound practice, 
and that the conditions which made it necessary should not have existed. 

Thus, deficient coast protection reacts unfavorably upon the war fleet, which in all 
its movements should be free from any responsibility for the mere safety of the ports 
it quits. Under such conditions as then obtained it might have been possible for 
Spain to force our entire battle fleet from its offensive undertaking against Cuba and 
to relegate it to mere coast defense. Had Cervera’s squadron, instead of being dis- 
patched alone to the Antilles, been recalled to Spain, as it should have been, and 
there reenforced by the two armored ships which afterwards went to Suez with 
Camara, the approach of this compact body would have compelled our fleet to con- 
centrate, foreach of our divisions of three ships, prior to the arrival of the Oregon, 
would have been too weak to hazard an engagement with the enemy’s six. When 
thus concentrated, where should it be placed? Off Habana or at Hampton Roads? 
It could not be at both. The answer undoubtedly should be ‘‘Off Habana,” for 
there it would be guarding the most important part of the Spanish fleet and at the 
same time covering Key West, our naval base of operations. 


Mahan’s reasoning is such as to be convincing. We have filled sev- 
eral pages with his valuable opinions relative to coast defense, and do 
not regret it, for the question has come to be of the highest impor- 
tance, owing not a little to the admirable resistance which the deficient 
batteries at the mouth of Santiago Harbor opposed with great per- 
sistency to a powerful squadron, compelling it to stop before a few old 
guns. 

During the last few months attention has again been directed toward 
experiments as to the value of coast defenses, and the result is that the 
latter have been found efficient to such an extent against large squad- 
rons that new means of warfare have been taken under consideration, 
and that the greatest interest is being manifested in torpedo boats in 
connection with attacks on harbors, not as measures of main force, 
but as secret factors adapted to enter surreptitiously the anchoring 
place where a squadron is stationed and to attempt its destruction. 

Very near us, at Gibraltar, where very significant battle maneuvers 
are frequently held, of which we hardly take any notice until foreign 
reviews publish accounts of them, there took place recently thorough 
experiments in the nature of a simulated battle, in which the objective 
was a squadron attacked at night in the port of refuge by torpedo boats, 
while shore batteries, with the assistance of their electric search lights, 
were in operation in order to defeat and repulse them. 

The case is an extremely interesting one. An account of it has been 
published by Maj. Gen. J. B. Richardson in the Proceedings of the 
Royal Artillery Institution, and also in the Journal of the United 

States Artillery for January and February last, under tae title of 
‘Coast defense against torpedo-boat attack.” 


87 


This study shows that the subtle and daring torpedo boat is given 
a prominent: place in the attack of ports, and consequently rapid-fire 
guns and the electric illumination of the region controlled by the 
batteries are also placed in the foremost rank as far as the question of 
defense is concerned. 

It is not only in that bold offensive whose object it is to save the 
squadrons and keep them from being compromised in engagements with 
the guns of shore works that the torpedo boat is sought to be utilized, 
but also for coast defense. 

In this connection we deem it expedient to refer to the measure 
recommended in a recent essay, the publication of which was com- 
menced in the Revista General de Marina for the month of June last.! 
This article says: 


Maritime defenses, stationary as well as mobile, recognize as their base and prin- 
cipal foundation the most powerful weapon hitherto known for fighting battle ships, 
namely, the torpedo. The rapidity and efficacy of its effects, the security and sim- 
plicity of its operation, its immense moral force, and the constant improvement of 
the weapon itself and of the vessels destined to use it exclusively, increase its 
importance from day to day, and maritime defenses which dispense with them or do 
not give them the prominence they deserve are but incomplete. 

What monitors and coast-defense vessels are able to do is a matter of history, and 
while it can not be denied that they may be useful in certain cases—for in war 
nothing is useless that is capable of inflicting any injury, no matter how small, on 
the enemy—it is not to be supposed that nations will in future waste large sums of 
money in the construction of these factors of defense. We have never had any 
until recently, when we built a couple of them, the Numancia and Vitoria, the crit- 
icism of which not even the least charitably disposed are willing to undertake, 
because even to attempt to criticise them is equivalent to showing that they possess 
no defensive power. If we were to employ them as coast guards in a war, with 
what are they going to fight? With modern battleships? With torpedo boats and 
eruisers of high speed? Either hypothesis is absurd. In any case that we may 
imagine the employment of these two coast-defense vessels of ours could only 
lead to jeopardizing in vain the lives of a thousand men and enveloping in a cloud 
of censure the reputations of the hapless commanders whose sad duty it would be 
to lead them to destruction. But aside from this palpable example, to think that 
the maritime defense of our coasts could be intrusted to ships of large tonnage is to 
think of suicide. Five battle squadrons, distributed between Barcelona, Cartagena, 
Algeciras, Cadiz, and Ferrol, would hardly be sufficient to prevent the most ordi- 
nary coups de main on the rest of the coast. Theships would nearly always arrive 
too late to hinder them; and even if they should succeed in coming within sight of 
the aggressors, if the latter have cruisers of great speed, the avengers would play 
but asorry réle. It may be objected that they would be able in their turn to attack 

the hostile coasts, but that would depend on the system of defense which the enemy 
would employ there; and, moreover, to attack another country is not to defend our 
own, nor can there be much comfort in returning the injuries received when we 
might have obviated those inflicted upon us.? 

In the most favorable case—that is, if the point attacked is one where we have a 
squadron stationed—if the attack is made by a battle fleet, it is not to be supposed 





1 La defensa de las costas, by Salvador Diaz Carbia, Lieutenant, Spanish Navy. 

*The military and economic situation of our country will not permit us for many 
years to come to attack another country; we will be grateful if we succeed in 
defending our own. 


88 


that the enemy, who has taken the offensive, will commit the folly of presenting 
inferior forces just for the pleasure of having us defeat them; they will, on the con- 
trary, make sure of their superiority so as to render vain any effort on our part. 
And if the attack is effected by fast vessels they will place ours in great danger, 
unless we have a reserve on which to draw to replace those put out of action, especi- 
ally in such harbors as Cadiz or Algeciras, which, being so open, are particularly 
adapted for night surprises. Aside from offensive operations, which do not come 
into consideration here, and confining ourselves to coast defense, it is our opinion that 
hostile admirals would have to be very dull if our five hypothetical squadrons, in 
spite of their power, did not prove entirely inefficient, unless accompanied by other 
forces, which in that case would be the ones that would in themselves constitute: 
the defense. 

Of course, these hypothetical squadrons are, and always will be, nothing but a 
myth in our case. Their cost would amount to over 1,000,000,000 pesetas, and their 
maintenance would require an appropriation of over 100,000,000 a year. Is sucha 
plan feasible? Even if it were feasible we could not rely on its efficacy, because, as 
we stated at the beginning, the defense, in order to be complete, must be rational, 
and our hypothesis was nothing but an absurdity. 

If such sad results can be arrived at with such a large number of ships, what can 
we expect of the three, four, or five battleships which, in the course of time and by 
dint of sacrifices, we may be able to acquire? The only thing we can reasonably 
expect is that, when we do get them, we will not be much better off than we were 
before the disaster; and truly, rather than that it would be better to desist from 
the undertaking, for we shall never find an enemy such as the Americans found in us, 

The solution is to abandon the course which, as we have already seen, is a poor 
one, and embrace another which, though less well known, may give us better results. 
Do not let us accumulate factors without plan or method, without rhyme or reason; 
but let us study them from a technical and economic standpoint, select those which, 
with the least expense, represent the greatest power and are of the most general 
application, and finally combine them intelligently in order to obtain from them the 
best possible results. These are the bases on which any plan of mobilized defenses 
must be founded, and hence the type of vessel destined to form the main nucleus is 
the torpedo boat. From the destroyer, capable of crossing the ocean, down to the 
little 60-ton craft, it is adapted to repulse from our shores flotillas of the same type, 
as well as powerful squadrons, or trausports and convoys. It is true that torpedo 
boats require protection and ports of refuge, as they can not always operate in day- 
time; but large squadrons require such ports at night and are much more expen- 
sive, so that the disadvantage would be the same for both classes of ships. On the 
other hand, fast vesséls can always elude an engagement, while battleships have no 
other recourse but to accept a battle when it is offered them. 


It must be acknowledged, nevertheless, that in the Spanish-American 
war the torpedo boats do not appear to have realized in practice the 
expectations that were placed in them in theory. 

The superiority of stationary defenses and their relation to mobile 
defenses is defined in the following words of Mahan: 

The fencer who wears also a breastplate may be looser in his guard. Seaports can 
not strike beyond the range of their guns; butif the great commercial ports and 
naval stations can strike efiectively so far, the fleet can launch into the deep 


rejoicing, knowing that its home interests, behind the buckler of the fixed defenses, 
are safe till it returns. 


This argument alone lends considerable force to our defensive tenden- 
cies. If fortified harbors are indispensable in connection with squadrons 
so as to enable the latter to operate and put to sea in offensive actions, 


89 


it is evident that, in the absence of them, and being necessarily con- 
fined to a circumspect defensive, we must content ourselves with defend- 
ing our coasts if we wish to protect our commercial interests and the 
integrity of our territory. 

It is probably this last consideration that is most important as far as 
Spain is concerned. It is. obvious that, in view of the shock which our 
country has sustained, we can not, for years to come, think of battles 
and adventures. But the whirlwind of a European war, which is 
always threatening, might very easily involve us in such a manner as 
to render it difficult for us to maintain absolute neutrality, and in that 
case we should deeply regret our inability to prevent our becoming the 
toy of anyone whom it might please to make one of our ports on the 
Cantabrian or Mediterranean coast his base of operations or his naval 
Station. And perhaps that would not be the worst. It might also 
happen to us to become involved in the theory of compensations, under 
the rules of which the stronger takes from the weaker whatever he 
pleases, and countries are dismembered and distributed at the will of 
the more powerful party, unless the former have some power by which 
tocommand respect and attract the sympathy of some other strong party. 

An example of what fortified harbors in themselves are worth is fur- 
nished by Habana—many times referred to in these pages—which kept 
our defeat from being even worse than it was, and that although this 
harbor was in very poor condition to constitute what is termed a mod- 
ern fortified city and still less a military port. If this place had been 
Supported by a few battleships—the Oquendo and Vizcaya —there is 
no doubt but that it would have formed for the enemy a serious obsta- 
cle, capable of altering materially Sampson’s and Schley’s maneuvers, 
and compelled the United States to immobilize the greater part of its 
fleet for the defense of its extensive coasts and wealthy cities, which 
would have changed the terms of the problem. And it was not only 
the coasts that preoccupied the United States, but also its commerce, 
especially the coasting trade, which represents very important, and, at 
the same time, vulnerable interests. 

But applying this argument to our present sorry condition, we repeat 
that there is no use in trying to do the impossible. Admitting the 
urgent necessity of defense, we shall have to reduce our aspirations 
considerably, because the financial situation of our country makes it 
impossible to do all that is to be desired. 

Hence we must not count on powerful squadrons for a long time to 
come. But it will be possible, within the limit of our resources, to con- 
stitute a modest, regular force, which will have to be supplemented by 
the essential base, the armament and fortification of our coasts. 


CHAPTER VIII. 
WHAT A MILITARY PORT SHOULD BE. 


CHOICE OF LOCATION—COMMERCIAL CITIES—MILITARY PORTS— 
GEOGRAPHICAL SITUATION—SANTIAGO DE CUBA. 


For the defense of a country such places should be chosen as are best 
suited for the purpose, subject to the conditions imposed by the con- 
figuration of the coasts and boundaries. These places, as a rule, are 
easily apparent to the eye of the technical expert and even of the 
uninitiated. 

The exigencies of the defense, however, are subject to other conditions 
besides those represented by the nature of the soil. 

On the one hand—confining ourselves to the question of coasts—we 
must take into consideration the commercial and social development of 
certain ports, which are frequently bound to become strategic points 
and to constitute strongholds, even though not well adapted for defense. 

The difficulties are greater now than they used to be, owing to the 
increased distances at which defenses are able to strike, thanks to the 
ereater power and range of guns. 

Hand in hand with the military development of certain places on the 
coast, there have sprung up in the course of years, under the protec- 
‘ tion of guns, commercial colonies which have finally come to constitute 
large cities and wealthy commercial centers. But the day has arrived 
when the progress in the means of attack has rendered the old protec- 
tion useless, because projectiles can strike so much farther. And thus 
we have come to possess commercial cities, located right on the coast, 
which have all the requirements for traffic, but are little suited for 
defense. 

Still, the defense of such places can not be dispensed with, and there 
arises the material difficulty of carrying it into effect, especially if 
perfection is aimed at, which in this case would mean to secure the 
city against bombardment. 

This ideal can not at present be attained for cities located immedi- 
ately on the coast, or very near it, and devoid of natural protection 
from the fire of ships and without advanced positions of sufficient 
height and extent to install thereon powerful batteries, almost invul- 
nerable to fire from the sea and which would constitute a grave danger 
for warships at a great distance. And even then it would not be at all 
certain that bombardments could be obviated, because gunfire at ranges 
beyond 6,000 or 8,000 meters, when aimed at ships, is very inaccurate. 

But since cities so situated can not possibly be left unprotected, 
expensive means will have to be resorted to in order to advance the 

90 


91 


first line of battle and protect the destructible property by removing 
the line of bombardment to a greater distance, for to obviate it entirely 
seems almost impossible. 

Nowadays a bombardment is considered an incident of the attack, 
and not sufficient value is attached to it to surrender a place as a result 
thereof. We are returning to the times of a certain admiral who com- 
pared the effects of a bombardment to the results that would be attained 
by attempting to break windows with guineas. But what we want is 
to avoid having our windows broken, for we might come across some- 
one who had an abundance of guineas and would not mind spending 
them in this kind of diversion. 

If a commercial city does not possess natural advantages for defense 
it will be difficult to guard against bombardments, although the latter 
may be considered a danger little to be feared, because, when carried 
on from a great distance, its effects must necessarily be slight. 

This is the case with some of the cities on our coasts, and any nation 
with an extensive seaboard has cities in similar conditions. 

Habana is one of the cities which do not possess natural advantages 
for defense against bombardments. New York is not much better off, 
but the Americans are trying to remedy this defect by creating defenses 
by artificial means. Among the late plans for converting this immense 
metropolis into an impregnable city is the construction of sea forts on 
the Romer Shoals, 19 miles from the city, off Sandy Hook, where large 
armored cupolas are to be erected almost even with the surface of the 
water, to be armed with guns of powerful caliber, well adapted to keep 
any hostile ship beyond the distance from where bombardments would 
be effective. 

It was the well-known Brialmont who suggested the use of sea forts 
and floating batteries out to sea, in which the share of the Navy would 
be secondary to the armament, veritable platforms capable of support- 
ing the most powerful guns. 

A few years ago a distinguished engineer of our Army! suggested a 
similar system of floating batteries for the advanced line of the harbor 
and city of Barcelona, which, as is well known, does not possess natural 
advantages for defense. 

In our opinion this method has a disadvantage, as coast defense is 
characterized by the stationary nature of the works, and although the 
engines of floating batteries—formerly bomb ketches—permit only of 
slow movement, yet, having to deal with fickle temperaments like ours, 
the probability is that they would change their stations many times, 
and it might happen that just when we wanted them they would be far 
from the spot where they were most needed and to which they were 
assigned. Captain Mahan objects to monitors on similar grounds. It 
would therefore be preferable to have stationary coast defenses, and, if 








' Las baterias en la defensa de Barcelona, by Mariano Rubio y Bellvé, Lieutenant- 
Colonel of Engineers, published in the Memorial de Ingenieros, 1897, p. 365. 


92 


necessary to have them out to sea, sea forts are to be preferred whenever 
practicable. They cost more, it is true, but on the other hand they do 
not require the expense of maintenance, which is indispensable for 
floating batteries; they also last longer and are not put out of action 
as easily, nor are they subject to being blown up by torpedo boats. 

The share of the Navy in coast protection is the mobile defense, 
which must be able to attack and operate at a great distance and seek 
the hostile armorclad in its cruise, many miles from the shore, and for 
these purposes, as shown in the preceding chapter, the torpedo boat is 
best adapted. 

We have spoken of places which do not possess natural advantages 
for defense, and it is obvious that such places can not be considered 
military ports in the full sense of the word. 

A natural military port—and if not natural, its construction is 
extremely difficult and expensive in time and money—requires ample 
space for the shelter and protection of squadrons, also docks, depots, 
and navy-yards; and the anchoring places, workshops, storehouses, 
etc., must be protected from all attacks, including bombardments; for 
only thus can they be places of safety adapted to serve as bases of 
fleets. Hence, military ports are not identical with commercial cities, 
though frequently classed together. A military port must open into 
the sea by a long channel, preferably tortuous and not very wide, so 
that, while permitting the country’s own ships to pass through, it will 
not be easy of access for the enemy. At the head of this channel must 
stretch out a deep bay, on which the stationary resources and the city 
itself are located. The entrance to the channel should afford good 
positions of sufficient height and extent to install artillery thereon and 
erect works of defense.! 

The natural advantages which, as stated, Habana lacked, Santiago 
de Cuba, on the other hand, possessed to a high degree, and to this cir- 
cumstance is partially due the admirable resistance which, with a few 
old guns, was so long opposed to the whole United States squadron, 
armed with a large number of powerful modern guns. This resistance — 
filled with admiration the United States gunners and engineers, when, 
upon taking charge of the matériel at the Morro, they convinced them- 
selves that there were no other guns than those they saw. 

The principal defenses at the entrance to Santiago Harbor were as 
follows.” 

MORRO. 


About 200 meters east of the old castle is the light-house, and about 
100 meters east of the latter a new battery, about 63 meters above the 





'It seems almost superfluous to state that, in connection with the proper con- 
figuration, the geographical situation must also be taken into consideration, as it 
greatly affects the interests sought to be protected. 

°Streffleur’s Osterreichische Militiirische Zeitschrift says that some of the guns at 
Santiago dated from the years 1688, 1718, and 1769, and had been used in fighting 
the buccaneers. 





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level of the sea, had been erected. The parapet consisted of wooden 
boxes filled with cement, on top of which barrels, likewise filled with 
cement, had been placed. Thedistance between the guns was 6 meters, 
andthe spaces between them had been partially filled with cement and 
sand. Ten meters back of the. battery was a trench 1.50 meters deep 
and 60 centimeters wide, parallel with the front of the battery. From 

_this trench small trenches in zigzag line led to the guns. This battery 
was armed on May 28 with five 16-centimeter guns (old 15-centi- 
meter smooth-bore which had been converted into 16-centimeter 
rifled guns), and on June 25 it was reinforced by two 21-centimeter 
howitzers.! 


SOCAPA. 


i About 400 meters from the Morro, on the opposite side of the entrance, 
was a battery of three 21-centimeter muzzle-loading howitzers and 
two 16-centimeter Hontoria guns, with 3-centimeter shields; these 
~ latter guns could be fired every two or three minutes. The battery was 
- situated on the crest of the hill called Socapa. The guns were sepa- 
_ rated from the howitzers by a wide traverse. About 20 meters back of 
- the guns was the ammunition magazine, a tin-covered building. East 
_ of this battery was another, intended for the defense of the submarine 
- mines; it comprised one 57-millimeter gun, four 37-millimeter Hotch- 
_ kiss guns, and one 11-millimeter machine gun. 


PUNTA GORDA. 


ithe. ane) 


.'; This Tattery was 2,000 meters back of the entrance and comprised 
two 9-centimeter Krupp guns, two 15-centimeter Mata howitzers, 
and two 16-centimeter Hontoria guns. This as well as the Scene 
~ batteries were of similar construction to that of Morro Castle. 


oie Tae eed 


REINA MERCEDES. 


x She was practically useless owing to the unserviceable condition of 
_ her boilers, and it was from this vessel that the 16-centimeter Hon- 
- toria guns were taken for the Punta Gorda and Socapa batteries. The 
small guns were left on board. 

For a distance of 2,000 yards, which Sampson gives in his report for 
the bombardment of June 6, the protection of the parapet of the Morro 
battery was very effective, as shown in the figure. If the angle of sit- 
uation ¢ is taken into account it will be seen that the height of the crest 
is nearly equal to the maximum ordinate B D of the trajectory A B, 








1The data are taken from a notable work on the defense of the mouth of San- 
tiago, by Mr. Benoit, captain of the French artillery, published in the Revue 
d’Artillerie for April, 1899. There was also published in the Rivista di Artiglieria 
e Genio for the same month an interesting article on the same subject, condensing 
the data published by Mr. Lorente y Herrero, captain of engineers, in the Memorial 
de Ingenieros for December, 1898; also many articles by foreign writers in "/nited 
States and English periodicals. 


at te 


94 


corresponding to the firing data for United States 8-inch and 12-inch 
guns. Thus in this particular case the distance A D (2,000 yards) cor- 
responded exactly to the fire through the apex of the trajectory, and 
the angle of incidence being zero only accidental hits that would 
knock off the crest of the parapet could. be counted upon to strike the 
personnel or matériel. 

At shorter distances—that is to say, when the crest is situated 
between the maximum ordinate of the trajectory A, B and the ship A,;— 
the angle of incidence becomes negative and the fire of the ship’s guns 
becomes less and less effective. At great distances the fire acquires 
greater effectiveness, because the angle of descent will be more favor- 
able, but the fire will lose in precision. 





The height of 63 meters at which the battery was situated increased 
the protection of the parapet and explains to a certain extent the 
slight effects obtained by the United States guns. 

Captain Benoit, of the French artillery, says: 


In the location of their improvised batteries the Spanish were happily inspired, 
obviating traverses and earthworks, which, by forming parapets, increase to a con- 
siderable extent the effect of projectiles upon the personnel of the battery. But 
they do not appear to have taken any thought of trying to conceal these batteries, 
of too pronounced geometrical forms, and to attract the hostile fire toward fictitious 
batteries, losing sight of the fact that the principal defense of coast batteries when 
face to face with the guns of always visible ships is their invisibility. 

Streffleur’s Zeitschrift draws the conclusion that experience has 
shown once more that “coast batteries do not have much to fear from 
war ships.” 

The United States Army officers who were charged with taking an 
inventory of the defenses of the Morro said: 

It is unpardonable that the fleet has not destroyed the city and its defenses in all 
these days. 

Among the many articles devoted to these questions in the proceed- 
ings of the Royal Artillery Institution is one which was published in 
July, 1893, by Maj. KR. P. Johnson, who quotes Admiral Selwyn’s words: 


I hope that naval officers will consider that a fort is a thing to be avoided. 


95 


In the Naval Annual for 1898 Mr. J. R. Thursfield concludes an 
article on Naval Maneuvers as foliows. 


Un canon a terre vaut un vaisseau A la mer, and when it comes to defending a nar- 
row and tortuous estuary, a few guns not of extreme calibre, but well placed and 
well handled, are worth a whole armada of ships. Nevertheless, it remains as true 
now as it was in the days of the Armada, that the surest way of preventing attacks 
on the shore is to impeach the enemy’s fleets at sea.” 


We will add the opinions of some military authorities concerning the 
attack of coast batteries by ships. 
In a work published in 1896 Admiral Fournier says: 


In a battle between ships and cemented coast works, armed with powerful modern 
artillery, the risks incurred by the two parties can not be weighed in the same bal- 
ance. Such an operation is conceivable when commanded by necessity in order to 
support from the sea, by means of a bombardment at a great distance, the principal 
attack on land by a corps of troops having in view the capture and military occupa- 
tion of the obstacle. But when effected by ships alone, it can only lead to a retreat 
of the assailant. And indeed, whatever comparative success such bombardment 
may have had, the ships will be compelled to withdraw when, without having 
gained any material advantage, they find themselves weakened by the losses and 
injuries due to the enemy’s fire and by the exhaustion of the greater part of their 
ammunition, which exposes them to the danger of falling into the hands of a hostile 
naval force coming to the assistance of the defense, or of being at the mercy of a 
storm, which might surprise them on their return and fill them with water through 
the openings caused by the enemy’s shells and perhaps cause them to sink. 

* ‘ # * * * ¥ * 

In short, the main object of our naval forces should be, above all else, to fight the 
enemy afloat, anywhere and under all favorable circumstances, wherever he can be 
found, so as to maintain the empire of the sea after reducing him to impotence. 
But as long as this result has not been attained it will be imprudent to expose our 
ships to coast works in unproductive struggles, which, as a rule, are much more 
debilitating and demoralizing to the assailants on the sea than to the defense ashore. 


The Mémorial de l’Artillerie de la Marine for 1894! arrives at the 
following conclusions: 


The great power of guns, the precision of their fire, the use of telemetric devices, 
the course and speed of the target, the employment of powerful explosives in shells, 
the substitution of smokeless powder for black powder for gun charges, the improve- 
ments in the organization of works of defense, torpedo boats, stationary torpedoes, 
and electric lights have considerably increased the defensive value of shore batter- 
ies. The ship, on the other hand, which represents the offensive power, while 
carrying nowadays more powerful guns, armor of greater resistance, etc., has 
nevertheless, in spite of the greatly increased cost price, remained so frail that it 
can be put out of action by a single shell. This increased cost price constitutes 
another cause of inferiority, as it excludes the ship from any offensive, the result of 
which is not commensurate to the risks incurred. 


* * * * * * * 


As concerns the naval operations considered in this article, not only has the defen- 
sive power grown more than the offensive power, hut these operations themselves 
have lost their value almost entirely. 

We often hear of ravages wrought on a coast by the guns of fleets, but these are 
generally illusions which do not deserve much consideration. All that could be 








1 Des opérations maritimes contre les cétes et des débarquements, by M. D. B.G, 


96 


attained would be to cause the population along the coast some annoyance, and it is 
for something more than that that European nations fight nowadays. 

We are among those who believe that the establishment of too numerous batteries 
on the coast constitutes a useless expense. They should be established with great 
discretion. * * * Batteries are intended to prevent a sudden descent upon 
important cities, or to protect a navy-yard, the preservation of which is necessary 
for the national defense. 

That favorably situated and well-equipped batteries can attain this 
object is shown by the gallant resistance and accurate work of the 
batteries.at Santiago. There is no doubt that the latter were favor- 
ably situated, but their armament was inadequate and deficient, being 
confined to the few available guns mentioned, and as for protection, it 
was limited, as stated, to parapets of sand and earth, merlons of bar- 
rels filled with cement, and sandbags.! 

The effects of the fire from the United States vessels were very 
slight, in spite of their powerful guns. 

Morro Castle was riddled with shot holes, as also the houses to the 
right of it which were outlined against the sky. The light-house, built 
of 25-millimeter metal plate, was pierced by many small-caliber pro- 
jectiles and by two 15-centimeter shells. Another 20-centimeter shell, 
which had been fired without base fuse, was found back of the battery. 
No damage had been done to the works, except that a few sandbags 
had been shot through and the sand had run out. 7 

At the Socapa a 33-centimeter shell exploded on June 16, covering 
one of the Hontoria guns with earth; but by next morning it was again 
ready to fire. A 15-centimeter shell pierced the shield of a Hontoria 
gun and injured the carriage, but without dismounting the gun or put- 
ting it out of action. On July 2 a shell disabled the carriage of a 
Hontoria gun. 

Many small projectiles struck the works and guns without doing 
much damage. 

The metal-roofed building, which was used as an ammunition maga- 
zine at the Socapa, was not touched. 

A 16-centimeter Hontoria shell of the Socapa battery struck the 
Texas near the bow, entering and exploding in the berth deck, killing 
one sailor and wounding six others. 

A 21-centimeter shell from the Morro hit the Jowa? and exploded in 
the officers’ cabin without wounding any one. 





1For these works of fortification special credit is due to Col. Florencio Caula in 
command of the engineers’ corps at Santiago, and for the armament of the same to 
Col. Salvador Diaz Ord6iiez, in command of the artillery. They and the personnel 
of officers under their orders deserve the highest praise. Their names will be men- 
tioned in due time. 

2 Indiana.—O. N.I. 


of 


Among the personnel of our batteries there were many casualties, as 
shown in the following statement: 





























W ounded. 
Batteries. Date. | Killed. |\——————————_| Total. 
Officers. | Men. 

BIC els eee te eid ie ane ae lend a aetna Co Siaie wield eicw g.Sa days ceeicie wis June 6 2 5 25 32 
June 16 il 1 10 12 

eNO ye Ly eee ee ees Se oe cine wok 3 3 

OUIN Ge 26a eee eee cee aes 8 8 

July 2 1 1 33 35 

ON as oe ceo dw eins oa 2S oune wm aies o's «5 in SrinG WO eek «|. as Tasty 8 8 
LT Ow Aw levetete rere 1 6 qT 

June 16 2 3) 6 9 

UMM oe ee eae : He al ee pa 1 

July 2 3 1 6 10 

Pit VEAS ICME Eee oe ceo clare S cje a we a weld cieiee Seledec gels cam cc che. Ie: sete 2 3 
ediet eee nnn oe eee a cod eee Saas ae ee ete ot cisid we lece fie Seles 10 | 11 107 128 











We wish to mention here the names of some officers who were 
wounded and who distinguished themselves by their bravery in the 
defense of the entrance to Santiago Harbor: ! 

Colonel of Artillery Salvador Diaz Ordéiiez, commander of the artil- 
lery of Santiago. 

Commander of Infantry Antonio Ros, governor of Morro Castle. 

Captain of Artillery José Sanchez Seijas, commander of the battery 
on the esplanade of the Morro. 

Ensign Venancio Nardiz, commander of the Socapa Battery. 

Ensign Ricardo Bruquetas (wounded twice), commander of the Socapa 
Battery. 

Ensign Fernandez Pina, commander of the Socapa Battery. 

First Lieutenant of Artillery Pedro Irizar, of the Morro Battery. 

Second Lieutenant of Artillery Juan Artal Navarro, of the Morro 
Battery. 


1 We have already spoken of Commander Acosta, who was killed, and Ensign 
Molins, wounded, on board the Reina Mercedes. 


6884 7 





CHAPTER IX. 
CONCLUSIONS. 


THE POLITICAL ASPECT—THE NAVAL ASPECT—THE MILITARY 
ASPECT—THE NEEDS OF OUR NATION. 


Following our usual method of placing by the side of the facts the 
lessons arising therefrom, we will set forth those which may be logically 
derived from the pages of this book. 

In years to come, when the history of this war is written on the basis 
of absolutely impartial information, a different method may perhaps be 
pursued, giving all the facts first, and at the end deducing the results. 
But at present we must alternate the facts with the results, because all 
nations are waiting to profit by what Spain has experienced, and we 
must offer them data from which they can judge with impartiality. 

It is surprising how much has been written in foreign countries on 
the Spanish-American war during these few months. We have before 
us dozens of American, English, French, Italian, and German books, 
reviews, and periodicals, in which writers relate to their hearts’ con- 
tent the phases of our defeat. And in the face of this wonderful 
activity, which often interprets erroneously the causes of the appalling 
decline of Spain, we, on the other hand, preserve death-like silence. 

This is not as it should be. In the United States, for instance, there 
is not a single officer of high rank who took an active part in the war 
but has furnished, in books or reviews, an exposition of the facts, sub- 
stantiated by documents, and the Government, in its turn, has followed 
the same plan and has published reports of the Army and Navy. 
Among us, as stated, death-like silence reigns, and thus it is that for- 
eign critics lack all knowledge of our claims to vindication, which, 
though slight, may nevertheless throw light on many things; for, by the 
side of much that is bad, and for which we are being justly censured, 
there is also some good which is being ignored, while it should be 
truthfully and conscientiously set forth, so that we may not be judged 
without being heard and considered more inefficient and incapable 
than we really are. 

In the first place, it should be stated that the cause of our disasters 
lies much deeper and dates much further back than is generally 
believed. 

We do not mean to exonerate this or that branch of the Spanish Gov- 
ernment, nor do we wish to confine the blame to any particular one. 
The evil is so great that there is enough responsibility for all, But it 


98 


: ud 


is unjust, criminal even, to want to throw the whole burden of responsi- 
bility for the catastrophes upon the military institutions, and still that 
seems to be the tendency. 

(1) Because the Cuban war, the source of or pretext for our ruin, 
was due to causes of a political order, and even the measures for sup- 
pressing it and the election of those who were to bring this about were 
in obedience to considerations of the highest political order. 

(2) Because our principal enemy, the United States, without whose 
assistance the Cuban insurrection would not have existed and could 
not have been continued, was aided by our erroneous policy, which in 
these colonial questions went from one mistake to another, without 
heeding any warning or advice. 

(3) If there were deficiencies in the organization of our armed forces 
and in the direction and general strategic conception of the war, the 
cause must be sought, not in the army alone, but higher, in the disor- 
ganized condition of the highest branches of the Government, in the 
power whose duty it is to regulate and correct, without hesitation, 
whatever may be detrimental, and to keep a close watch always, so 
that everyone may be made to do his duty and strive for perfection. 

(4) We went to war without any support or Sympathy, led on by an 
erroneous conception of our strength, which may have been excusable 
in the common people, but it was inexcusable that it was fostered by 
fanatic speeches and by people whose duty it was to know the condition 
of our naval and military resources.! 

The London Times, in answer to Captain Mahan, says: 

The direction of warlike operations should never be influenced by the clamor of 
public opinion, and no government worthy of that name will sink millions in 
defenses merely for the purpose of calming the fears of people whom Lord St. Vin- 
cent appropriately designated as ‘‘old women of both sexes.” 

It is infinitely simpler and cheaper to educate public opinion by imbuing it with 
sound principles than to accede to mad demands, and one of the most important 
lessons of the recent war is that very modest coast defenses are sufficient for all 
actual needs, provided they are well armed and under efficient command. Even 
the miserable works hurriedly improvised at Santiago may be said to have fulfilled 
their object, since they compelled the Americans to resort to military operations on 
land. 

As to the naval aspect of the question, the publication of Cervera’s 
letters has confirmed abroad the opinion of experts. The most emi- 
nent critics who comment on our defeat, without losing sight of the 
naval responsibilities as to whether it was expedient or not for the 
Squadron to enter Santiago Harbor; whether or not it could have 
reached another port before it was blockaded here, and whether that 
would have been preferable; whether the sortie should have been 
ordered; whether, when ordered, it was better to go out at night or in 
daytime; whether it was better for the ships upon coming out to follow 








‘It is interesting to examine England’s decree of neutrality, which we expect to 
analyze in the course of this work. 


100 


divergent courses, or to hug the shore as they did—without losing sight 
of all this, we say, the naval experts of the world agree: 

(1) That the destruction of the squadron was decreed from the very 
moment that it received orders to leave Cape Verde, for our naval defi- 
ciency was unquestionable. | 

(2) That from that very moment the problem ceased to be naval and 
became a political problem, for to political motives only can we attrib- 
ute the fact that a squadron which amounted to so little was made to 
go out and fight with one so powerful. 

This statement is corroborated by the following words: 

The United States Navy has demonstrated its ability to carry out much greater 
enterprises than the one intrusted to it last year, and still it can not be said that 
the fleet as a whole was managed with great skill, by which circumstance the Navy 
has contracted a great debt of gratitude with the Spanish Government.—The 
Times. 

(3) That the main responsibility should not be sought in the disaster 
itself, but in events prior to the disaster, in order to ascertain the rea- 
sons why we had no fleet, and why the matériel that we did possess 
was in such poor condition, in spite of the enormous sums which the 
nation had expended upon it. 

(4) That even within the limits of our deficiencies and errors, having 
once launched on a mad war, we should have gone into it. with mad- 
ness, without considering means of attack, without considerations of 
any kind, making war upon commerce to the greatest possible extent.! 

From what we now know, it is clear that in the United States also 
great indecision prevailed and grave errors were committed, and if our 
ships had been distributed with more wisdom, allowing the Oquendo 
and Vizcaya to remain at Habana, and if our Hosea? had been handled 
more skillfully, such indecision and errors would have become more 
apparent, with not a little prejudice to the enemy. 

As to the military aspect, properly speaking, on land as well as on 
the sea, there may be found in this book accounts of a number of minor 
battles in which the enemy always retreated, perhaps in accordance 
with some system, or because it was found expedient; nevertheless 
these battles show— . 

(1) A desire on our part to fight, without measuring the forces, and 
thus we see at times troops of infantry fighting from the shore with 
only the fire of their rifles, and without any protection, against armored 
vessels equipped with powerful rapid-fire armament (Cienfuegos, Guan- 
tanamo, etc.), or small gunboats fighting hostile ships of great power 





'It has been positively stated that after the declaration of war a ship left Gibral- 
tar with a cargo of saltpeter without being molested, which is a proof of the lenity 
and fear with which we proceeded. It has also been widely reported that after the 
Maine catastrophe the City of Paris took to the United States from England a large 
quantity of war material; also men particularly skilled in the handling of modern 
guns. It is only too well known what difficulties our squadron encountered in the 
Suez Canal, and at whose hands. 


101 


(Cardenas and Cienfuegos); or, again, mountain and field batteries and 
old bronze guns cast a century ago, seeking to engage with modern 
ships (Santiago, Tunas, Manzanillo, and Matanzas). 

(2) That neither great strategy nor even great tactics have been dis- 
played in this campaign, which circumstance may also be partly 
attributed to the chaos reigning in the centers of the administration, 
for the heads of States have a considerable share in the conception of 
plans of campaigns. But when it was a question of testing personal 
valor, we find instances of desperate disregard of life—as, for example, 
in the battles of HE] Caney and San Juan Hill—which will find a placein 
history among the bloody battles of the world.! 

(3) That the blockade as a means of warfare was effective, owing to 
the weakness of our forces, and that blockades assume a very cruel 
character when applied to isolated cities which do not possess within 
themselves means of subsistence. On the other hand, no value is 
attached to bombardments.’ 

In conclusion, we will set forth certain doctrinal results relative to 
the question of coast defense. 

From our former book (Ships, Guns, and Small Arms) we deduced cer- 
tain principles relative to the matériel—the guns with which the bat- 
teries are armed—and from this book may be gathered principles rela- 
tive to the works—the fortifications in which the guns are mounted— 
as to the greater or less vulnerability from the fire of ships, accord- 
ing to the height above the level of the sea at which coast batteries are 
installed. 

This question is so essential that the old aphorism that ‘“‘a gun ashore 
is worth a ship on the sea” has again come into vogue, but if this saying 
is to prove true the gun must be located in the most favorable conditions. 

The great height of coast defenses has the disadvantage of being 
detrimental to the perforating effects of the fire against the vertical 
armored sides of ships, but it facilitates the perforation of horizontal 
armored decks by the use of howitzers or rifled mortars. Great 
height naturally results in the increase of the dead angle; but in 
most cases the danger of ships repairing to this angle can probably 
be obviated, as coasts are not often entirely rectilinear, and hence 
some of the batteries can flank the dead angles of others. 

Through the resistance of the batteries at the mouth of Santiago 
Harbor the value of coast defenses against squadrons has been con- 





‘This book is not intended to treat of the battles fought on land during the 
Spanish-American war. We expect to devote a whole volume of our work to this 
phase, at which time we shall further develop this conception. 

2In the Revue Maritime for April, 1899, it is stated that when the contact mines 
at Santiago were raised one was found in which the fuse had operated, probably 
upon contact with the Merrimac, but only one-half of the charge of gun cotton had 
become ignited as the result of the damaged condition of the latter. At Guanta- 
namo the stationary mines showed signs of having been touched, but did not oper- 
ate, owing probably to defective fuses. This information comes from the United 
States, and should therefore ‘‘ be put in quarantine.” 


102 


firmed to such an extent that it does not appear amiss to lay down a 
few principles on the situation of coast works. 

(1) Coast batteries, being designed to fight the different classes of 
war ships which may attack maritime cities, it is indispensable that 
their power, precision, and effect upon hostile ships be in harmony 
with the offensive and defensive conditions of such ships. To this end 
it becomes necessary to employ, in the first place, guns of extraordi- 
nary power and sufficient caliber to perforate the armor of ships 
and turrets; in the second place, guns adapted to assist the former, 
but which, besides producing perforating effects, are also capable of 
destroying the less strong parts of ships and disabling the rigging; 
and finally, guns which by means of so-called curved fire are adapted 
to batter the decks of hostile ships. 

(2) It will at once be understood that the guns designed to batter 
the armor of ships must be of great power and have projectiles of ade- 
quate shape to preserve the greatest possible amount of initial energy, 
which requires the greatest possible thickness of wall in the projectile 
compatible with its diameter. 

(3) The fire must have the requisite precision, the zone of fire rela- 
tive to the vertical height of the vessel must be extensive, and at the 
same time the impact of the projectile must be approximately in the © 
normal direction. In order to attain these requirements, the height of 
the battery above the level of the sea must be limited. But as the 
men who serve the guns (usually installed in barbette batteries) must 
be protected as far as possible, they should be placed in shelter from 
the fire of the rapid-fire guns of ships. These requirements must 
necessarily be harmonized, which can be done to a certain extent by 
giving the batteries heights of from 25 to 30 meters, although no 
general rules can be laid down on this question, because another 
requirement is that the batteries should be merged as far as possible 
with the topographic lines of the coast and give the enemy as few 
points of reference as possible. ! 

(4) As to the second class of guns referred to, there is no objection to 
increasing the height when deemed necessary, since the object will fre- 
quently be to play upon ships at greater distances, and therefore the 
height may be increased to 60 or 80 meters. 

(5) Finally, as concerns the howitzer batteries which are designed to 
batter the decks of ships, it is important to obtain an inclination of fall 





‘Major-General Richardson, speaking of the recent experiments at Gibraltar, 
above referred to, says: ‘To convince anyone of the necessity for control it is usu- 
ally sufficient to open fire from a number of absolutely independent batteries of 
Q. F. guns at a fairly fast target in broad daylight. No battery, except such as 
are very high-sited, say 600 feet, can distinguish its own shots, and the means of 
ranging and hitting is removed. Very low-sited Q. F.’s often never get on the 
target at all. If there is this confusion when working with the easiest possible of 
lights, what reasonable certainty of striking torpedo boats can be looked for when 
the difficulties of seeing are enormously increased ? ” 


103 


approximating as much as possible the vertical direction, and at the 
same time the piercing power, and hence the energy of the projectile 
should be as great as possible. These requirements make it advisable 
to place these batteries at a greater height (Italians consider that the 
height should exceed 100 meters). In this manner not only the objects 
referred to may be attained, but at the same time the ships will be com- 
pelled to take positious at a greater distance, so that the trajectory in 
passing over the parapet will be on the descent, and hence at this 
increased distance the precision of the fire will be less and the energy 
of the projectiles will be decreased. 

But all plans must be subordinated to topographic conditions, and 
therefore when no elevated positions are available (which, as a general 
thing, would require effective guns of small caliber on the flank to play 
on the dead angles), these howitzer batteries may be installed at less 
elevated points, and, if necessary, higher parapets may be used for the 
proper protection of the batteries, and the system of indirect firing may 
be resorted to. 

* * * * * * * 

The least that can be expected of us is to see that the defeat we have 
suffered may serve US as a warning, in order that it may not lead to the 
total obliteration of our nation. If we have been ruined because we 
were weak, let us make up our minds to be weak no longer; let us 
become strong in our own country, for there is still reason to believe 
that a day will come when we shall have something afloat capable of 
withstanding misfortunes, something of what some people call ‘‘the 
manifest destiny.” 

The expenses necessary for that purpose are within the limits of the 
attainable; but do not let us leave it for others to do; for if some 
ambitious foe should further reduce our territory, he would defend his 
new acquisition at the cost of the conquered or usurped country. In 
other words, if we do not reestablish our military power and defend our 
coasts and boundaries, the probability is that others will defend them 
at our expense. 











Perea baNe Ts GH S 














Pak bebe) Ly Xn Ay 


THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 


SHIPS, GUNS, AND SMALL-ARMS. 


By SEVERO GOMEZ NUNEZ, Captain of Artillery. 


CHAPTER X. 
CONCLUSIONS. 


RAPID-FIRE—REDUCTION OF CALIBER—LARGE CALIBER—TRAINING 
DEVICES—SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION—ARMOR PLATE—PROTECTION 
OF SECONDARY BATTERIES—STRENGTHENING OF DECKS—SUPPRES- 
SION OR GREAT RESTRICTION IN THE USE OF WOOD ON BOARD— 
MORTARS IN CONNECTION WITH BOMBARDMENTS—TORPEDO-LAUNCH- 
ING TUBES—SMALL-CALIBER RIFLES—THE NATIONAL DEFENSE. 


We have now reached the most difficult part. To draw conclusions 
when there is so little upon which to base them is a task fraught with 
difficulties. The fear of making mistakes, however, should not deter 
us in matters of such vital importance, in which the opinions of some, 
modified and strengthened by those of others, finally form a consecutive 
chain of ideas constantly perfected by the critical study of new cases 
arising in practical experience. 

The first natural result of the defeat we have sustained is the firm 
conviction, which is making its way to the heart of every Spaniard, 
that we have been living too long without compass or guide, without 
definite aim or fixed ideas, without a vigorous and strong hand to point 
out to the nation the horizon of its future greatness and compel it to 
follow the straight path, a concerted plan, a system, and a just gov- 
ernment, devoting to that purpose all the energies at the country’s 
command; and as these have not been entirely exhausted, we come to 
the conclusion that it may still be possible to repair our great losses by 
following a system diametrically opposed to the one which has brought 
us sO much sorrow and ruin. 

It would be unpardonable for us to go back to our former thought- 
lessness and indolence. ‘To profit by the severe lessons of the present 

) 107 


108 


in order to obviate disasters in the future is a noble task, and we should 
set to work on it as soon as possible. 

Every social organism needs revivitying modifications, and this applies 
especially to the army, the national defense, the navy; in short, the 
whole armed organization of our country. 

To accomplish this there is no better time than the present, while life 
is not yet extinct in what remains of our former power. 

If we examine the accounts published in the United States, it will be. 
found that they are almost unanimous in the opinion that. the victory 
in the battle of Santiago was due to the 20-centimeter gun, and the 
conviction is expressed that there will be a great revolution in favor of 
20-centimeter and 25-centimeter rapid-fire guns. 

The 57 mm. and 37 mm. guns suffer from the defect of short range, 
which fact should be taken into special consideration, because in the 
Spanish-American war the battles were fought at greatly reduced 
distances. 

Rapid fire has gained much ground, and Capt. A. 8S. Crowninshield 
attributes to it the majority of hits upon our ships. 

Universal praise is accorded the small-caliber rifle. The innocuity of 
bullets has not succeeded in coming into favor. Practical experience, 
the mortality in battles, the seriousness of wounds, the piercing and 
destructive effects of subtle projectiles, must be considered. 

To sum up, the following conclusions may be drawn from this book: 

(1) Powerful semi-rapid or rapid fire artillery, installed in such man- 
ner as to enable it to be utilized from the very beginning of the battle; 
to open fire from the-greater part of the guns—in fact, from nearly all 
the guns of a ship or battery, so as to cover the enemy with a hail of 
iron without giving him time to recover. This requires many guns and 
instantaneous training devices by means of which the fire can be regu- 
lated so as to enable the guns to enter upon the action at any given 
moment, for we should always bear in mind that these devices are 
delicate, and it is doubtful whether they can be kept intact during the 
whole of the battle. With the harmony of the whole should be com- 
bined a certain independence of action of the several parts; in other 
words, each battery, type, or section of guns should be permitted to 
operate on its own account, and be provided with all the elements 
required for firing. 

(2) Reduction of the large caliber in order to secure greater rapidity 
of fire without detriment to the effectiveness of projectiles. 

(3) Simplification of the apparatus designed for the handling of the 
guns. We should strive for simpler and more rapid mechanism to 
facilitate operation by hand at any given moment, so that the com- 
mander of a ship or battery may feel assured that some minor injury, 
such as the breaking or disabling of a tube or electric wire, will not 
cause a momentary suspension of fire and that the guns can only be 
silenced through the effects of hostile projectiles. 


109 


(4) Large supplies of ammunition, in order to make sure that the use 
of rapid fire will not entail a lack of ammunition in a fierce and pro- 
tracted battle. 

(5) Since it has been ascertained that the number of hits on the 
water line is very small, it may perhaps be possible to reduce the thick 
ness and enormous weight of the armor plate, which will permit an 
increase in the number of guns and supply of ammunition. On the 
other hand, it is obvious that the men who serve the secondary bat- 
teries are at present afforded too little protection, and means should 
be devised for providing better shelter for them. The necessity of 
better protection for decks is also generally conceded. 

(6) The upper works of ships should be fireproof. Little wood should 
be used in the construction, and where it is used it should first be sub- 
jected to a fireproofing process. Even aside from projectiles charged 
with incendiary substances, experience has shown that ordinary shells 
are sufficient to cause conflagrations when they explode in the midst of 
wood and other combustible material.! 

(7) Chief Constructor Hichborn is of opinion that for bombarding 
purposes auxiliary vessels fitted for war should be equipped with mor- 
tars, and that armor clads should be reserved exclusively for use in the 
destruction of the hostile fleet. 

(8) Torpedo-launching tubes should be done away with on board of 
large ships, because they constitute a serious danger through explo. 
sions which may be caused by projectiles entering the torpedo rooms. 
This is confirmed by what happened on board the Oquendo and Vizcaya, 
especially the latter. 

(9) The incontestable advantage of small-caliber rifles and smokeless 
powder. 


Before concluding these pages we deem it proper to speak of some 
matters of a less general character than the preceding conclusions— 
matters pertaining to us directly, to Spain, to our present condition. 

The national defense.—Ever since we can remember we have been 
hearing of plans for it, and have harbored hopes and listened to prom- 
ises tending toward the realization of this ideal. But the time passes, 
conflicts come up, we are defeated, and the much-talked-of national 
defense lives only in our remembrance and serves no other purpose than 
to make us regret that we did not have it when the critical moment 


! First Lieutenant of Enters Martin iki ihe eamined the contents of one of 
the 8-inch shells fired on May 1 against the battery of La Luneta at Manila, told us 
that it was charged with ordinary fine powder mixed with pieces of cloth saturated 
with pitch or impregnated with some other inflammable substance. We learned this 
when this book had already gone to press. 

[This statement is incorrect. Lieutenant Loma no doubt reported correctly wha 
he saw, but was ignorant of the fact that the bursting charge of the shell, consist- 
ing of place powder, is contained in a cloth bag, and, that as an additional precau- 
tion against premature ignition, it is customary to iacanee the inside of the shell, all 
of which would account for the conditions mentioned.—O. N. I.] 








110 


came, and to make us feel once more its peremptory need. At best, we 
see now and then some timid attempt, a place here and there being 
equipped with artillery in a desultory and incomplete manner, by piece- 
meal, while others of greater importance remain devoid of all protection. 

This is the way this serious problem has been treated for the last 
twenty-five or thirty years. Will it ever be thus? 

We think not. At present we have good reason to believe that 
national defense will enter upon a practical era. The question is being 
generally studied and there is a profusion of intelligent plans. 

As an illustration of the above statements we will mention Habana, 
where the plans that had been formulated for years would never have 
been carried into effect if a powerful will had not asserted itself and 
caused at least a few guns to be installed in the works along the coast; 
not a sufficient number, but enough anyway to check the audacity of 
the enemy. | 

The expense required will be profitable and is not unattainable for 
our treasury, exhausted though it be, as it can be adapted to our finan- 
cial conditions. We should not forget that economy in these matters 
would be equivalent to greater sacrifices in the future. 

There is nothing to prevent us from beginning on the execution of 
the plan of defense at once by installing in the fortresses along our 
coasts and on the coasts of Africa and the Balearic and Canary Islands 
medium-caliber rapid-fire guns. And since large-caliber steel guns are 
very expensive and take a long time to construct, let us resort for the 
present to howitzers and rifled mortars, which are cheap and can be 
manufactured at home. These guns are admirably suited for service 
against the weakest parts of ships—namely, decks—which are easy to 
hit with comparatively numerous batteries, good telemetric systems, 
and an adequate force of well-trained personnel, who in time of peace 
should be given a great deal of target practice and ample drill in cor- 
rection of fire. E 

All nations, even the wealthiest among them, like the United States, 
our fortunate rival, accord nowadays great preference to howitzers and 
rifled mortars for use in coast defense. 

Nor is there anything to prevent us from throwing off our lethargy 
and beginning at once on the reconstruction of our armada, so that we 
may be equal to the important role which we still play among maritime 
nations. A well-conceived and scrupulously executed plan might give 
us, in the space of a few years, the requisite number of true battleships. 

We will close here. Our ideas may be expressed in these few words: 
Less theory and more practice; less studies and more action. 


APPENDIX B. 


THE CAPITULATION OF SANTIAGO 
DE CUBA. 


DECK iE. 
[Translated from El] Mundo Naval Ilustrado, September 15 and October 1, 1899. ] 


The Diario Oficial del Ministerio de la Guerra publishes the sentence 
of the supreme council in the proceedings instituted concerning the 
capitulation of Santiago de Cuba, and although this document is quite 
extensive, we do not hesitate to reproduce it in full, so that a sentence 
on which the history of the war will be based may not be absent from 
El] Mundo Naval. The decree is as follows: 

The council assembled in the hall of justice on August 4, 1899. 
Present: The president, Castro, Gamarra, Martinez Espinosa, March, 
Muioz Vargas, Zappino, Lépez Cordon, Jiménez, Rocha, Piquer, 
Urdangarin, Campa, and Valearcel. 

It appearing that this cause has been prosecuted before this supreme 
council, as the tribunal of first and only instance, in the matter of the 
capitulation to the enemy of the army forces at Santiago de Cuba 
against the following defendants: José Toral Velazquez, general of 
division and commander in chief, having succeeded to the command of 
the Fourth Army Corps of the island of Cuba on theevening of July 1, 
1898, when the commander in chief of said corps, Lieut. Gen. Arsenio 
Linares, fell wounded; General of Brigade Félix Pareja Mesa, chief of 
the brigade of Guantanamo; Lieutenant-Colonel of Infantry Feliciano 
Velarde Zabala, military commandant of Baracoa; Lieutenant-Colonel 
of Infantry Rafael Serichol Alegria, military commandant of Sagua de 
Tanamo; Commander of Infantry Arturo Campos Hidalgo, military 
commandant of Alto Songo; Commander of Infantry José Fernandez 
Garcia, military commandant of San Luis; Commander of Infantry 
Romualdo Garcia Martinez, military commandant of Palma Soriano, 
and Commander of Infantry Clemente Calvo Peyro, military comman- 
dant of El Cristo. 

It appearing, further, that on the 18th day of May, 1898, two United 
States vessels appeared off the entrance of Santiago harbor and bom- 
barded the batteries under construction and fired a few shots which 
were answered by the forts, and that on the morning of the 19th they 

111 


, 112 


fired upon the detachment at the Playa del Este at Caimanera and the 
gunboat Sandoval. 

It appearing, further, that from the 20th to the 22d day of the same 
month, Calixto Garcia bombarded for two days the town of Palma 
Soriano with guns and small arms, and that General Vara de Rey 
crossed the Cauto River with two guns and compelled the enemy to 
withdraw to beyond 2 leagues, having suffered many casualties, while 
16 of our men were wounded. 

It appearing, further, that on the 29th day of May, the hostile squad- 
ron, among which were discerned the Massachusetts, Lowa, Brooklyn, 
Texas, Montgomery, 1 trans-Atlantic steamer, and 12 merchant vessels, 
approached to within 5 miles, and on the 31st, at 2.30 o’clock p. m., 
opened fire, which was answered by the Morro, Socapa, and Punta 
Gorda batteries and the guns of the Colon, firing in all about 100 shots 
in forty-five minutes, which was the duration of the battle. 

It appearing, further, that on the 1st day of June, the hostile squadron 
was sighted, reenforced by the battleship Oregon, the cruiser New York, 
and a gunboat, making a total of 19 vessels in sight; 4 battle ships, 
other ships not classified, a destroyer, the gunboat Vesuvius, another 
gunboat, 2 trans-Atlantic steamers, and 5 auxiliary tugs; that on 
the 3d day of June, a merchant vessel, the Merrimac, protected by a 
battle ship, attempted to force the channel; that the cruiser Reina 
Mercedes and the batteries of Punta Gorda and Socapa opened fire and 
succeeded in sinking the Merrimac and taking one officer and seven 
sailors prisoners, and that said vessel went to the bottom without 
obstructing the channel. 

It appearing, further, that on the 6th day of June, at 8 o’clock p. m., 
the hostile squadron commenced the bombardment with ten ships, dis- 
charging over 2,000 projectiles, causing serious injuries to the Reina 
Mercedes and the garrison quarters at the Morro, without dismounting 
any of our guns, which answered the fire with great assurance; that 
we had 1 chief and 8 men killed, and 2 chiefs, 5 officers, and 56 men 
wounded; that the Aonibara ene was repeated on the 14th, and that 
on the dat following the Asia column repulsed at Punta Cuneare an 
attack of insurgents who were attempting to communicate with the 
Americans; that the bombardment by the squadron was renewed on 
the 16th and 21st, while the Cebrero and Rabi detachments were at 
Aserradero and the Castillo detachment at Ramon de las Yaguas. 

It appearing, further, that on the 20th day of said month of June 
the transports of the hostile fleet, with the landing forces on board, 
appeared to the eastward, convoyed by the battle ship Indiana and 
other war ships, forming a total of 63 vessels; that General Vara de 
Rey, with three companies of the battalion Constitucién, a flying com- 
pany of guerrillas, and two guns, took position at El Caney, and four 
companies of the Asia Battalion, with a colonel, intrenched themselves 
at Punta Cabrera, another at Monte Real, two more at Cobre, together 


113 


with the garrisons of Loma Cruz and Puerto Bayamo, and another 
division of the Asia Battalion at Punta Cabrera; and in order to 
repulse any landing attempt at Cabafias Bay the commander of the 
‘Asia Battalion, Ramon Escobar, with one company of that battalion 
and one mobilized company, took position at Mazamorra. 

It appearing, further, that on the 21st and during the night part 
of the infantry and light material of the hostile forces was landed at 
Berracos, and on the 22d fire was opened by the whole squadron from 
Socapa to Daiquiri; that several hostile vessels, towing launches with 
landing forces, supported the bombardment of Siboney and Daiquiri, 
while the forces landed on the previous day made an attack on the flank, 
in conjunction with parties of insurgents. 

It appearing, further, that on the 25th day of June General Vara de 
Rey withdrew to El Caney with three companies of the Battalion Con- 
stitucion and several guerrilla companies, and entrenched himself for 
the purpose of checking the advance of the United States forces. 

It appearing, further, that the enemy was encamped from June 25 to 
July 1, in three lines, from Santa Teresa to Sevilla, and that for repuls- 
ing the attack of July 1 there were available six companies of the Tala- 
vera Battalion, three of the Porto Rico Battalion, three of the San 
Fernando Battalion, one and one-half companies of Sappers, three 
mobilized companies, 14 horse and 2 rapid-fire guns, In all 1,700 men, 
the forces of the West being at a distance and engaged in other 
objectives. 

It appearing, further, that at daybreak of July 1 the Ships of the 
hostile squadron approached Aguadores Inlet, while at the same time 
the landing forces opened fire, advancing in large numbers toward 
El Caney and Las Lagunas, supporting the gun fire on the positions of 
San Juan and Hl Caney, especially the latter point; that the advance 
echelon of San Juan, consisting of two companies under the command 
of Colonel Vaquero, was reenforced by another company, and Colonel 
Ordonez arrived with the section of rapid fire artillery to check the fire 
of the hostile batteries, and the battery situated at El Pozo succeeded 
in silencing their fire. 

It appearing, further, that in view of the intensity of the hostile fire 
from their artillery, machine guns, and small arms, and the number of 
wounded, among whom were Colonel Ordéiiez, Commander Lamadrid, 
and one-half of the officers, it was decided to have the cavalry advance 
to protect the retreat and save the artillery, which was successfully 
carried out and the enemy was compelled to withdraw upon San J uan; 
at that moment General Linares was wounded and General Vara de 
Rey killed, the latter having succumbed to the numerical superiority of 
the enemy and lack of ammunition, when the attack upon El Caney 
was renewed in the evening, having already been wounded and shot 
through both legs; and that on that glorious day over 500 men and 50 
generals, chiefs, and officers were killed and wounded, 


6884——8 


114 


It appearing, further, that General Toral having taken charge of the 
command in accordance with regulations, E] Caney being lost, the 
enemy in possession of San Juan Hill, the railroad left without defense, 
the water supply cut off, and the forces deprived of their commanders 
as the result of the fierce battle they had sustained, it became neces- 
sary to concentrate all the detachments of the forts, which was effected 
without casualties. 

It appearing, further, that on the 1st and 2d days of July the enemy 
fortified himself on the heights of San Juan and San Juan de Millares, 
attempting to install a battery close to our trenches, which was frus- 
trated by the sure fire of the Cuban regiment; that from 5 to 10 o’clock 
a.m. of the 2d the enemy attacked the positions of San Antonio, 
Canosa, Guayabito, and Santa Ursula, renewing the attack at noon 
with increased intensity until 5 o’clock p. m., and a third time from 9 
to 10 o’clock p. m., and being repulsed each time; that simultaneously 
with these attacks the squadron bombarded Aguadores, the Morro, 
and the batteries of Punta Gorda and Socapa. 

It appearing, further, that the enemy devoted the 3d day of July to 
intrenching themselves and installing batteries from Loma Quintero to 
the San Juan River, overlooking the positions of Santa Ursula and 
Canadas, and that on the same day, July 3, our squadron, in obedience 
to higher orders, left the waters of Santiago and was destroyed on the 
reefs of the coast a few hours later in unequal battle, General Toral 
thus finding himself deprived of the important factors of defense which 
the fleet had furnished him in the way of landing companies and light 
artillery, of which the land forces stood so much in need, owing to their 
inadequate artillery, the reduced contingent, and the extent of the line 
they had to defend. 

It appearing, further, that the city of Santiago, being more closely 
besieged by the enemy, had no permanent fortifications left except a 
castle without artillery at the mouth of the harbor and a few forts on 
the precinct of the city, all of little value, so that almost its only real 
defense consisted of the open trenches around the city and other earth- 
works thrown up in a hurry and with inadequate material, and that for 
the defense of said line, about 14 kilometers in length, there rere avail- 
able only about 7,000 infantry and 1,000 guerrillas, all of whom had per- 
formed constant service in the trenches, without any troops to support 
them and without reserves of any kind, since the remainder of the 
forces were garrisoning the Morro and the batteries of the Socapa and 
Punta Gorda, performing also the services of carrying water to dif- 
ferent points, patrolling the city, and rendering such other services as 
the inhabitants could have rendered had the city remained loyal. 

It appearing, further, that the extent of the line referred to, the posi- 
tion of the forces on said line, the difficulty of communication, and the 
proximity of the enemy rendered it difficult for the troops stationed at 
a certain point of the line to reach speedily some other point more seri- 


115 


ously threatened; that the troops had at their disposal only four 16- 
em. rifled bronze guns, one 12-cm. and one 9-cm. bronze gun, two long 
8-cm. rifled guns, four short ones of the same caliber, two 8-cm, Pla- 
sencia and two 75-mm. Krupp guns; that the 16 cm. guns, according to 
expert opinion, were liable to give out at the end of a few more shots, 
that there was hardly any ammunition left for the Krupp guns, and that 
the guns enumerated were all there was to oppose the numerous and 
powerful artillery of the enemy. 

It appearing, further, that the million Spanish Mauser cartridges, 
which was all there was on hand at the artillery park and in the army, 
would not last for more than two attacks on the part of the enemy, 
that the Argentine Mauser ammunition could not be utilized for want 
of weapons of that type, nor could the ammunition for Remingtons, 
these weapons being in the hands of the irregular forces only. 

It appearing, further, that the supply of provisions furnished by com- 
mercial enterprise was inadequate; that owing to the lack of meat and 
the scarcity of other articles of subsistence, nothing could be furnished 
the soldiers but rice, salt, oil, coffee, sugar, and brandy, and that only 
for about ten days longer, and that under these circumstances over 
1,700 sick persons at the hospital had to be fed, to say nothing of the 
soldiers who spent day and night in the trenches, after three years of 
campaign, during the last three months of which they seldom had meat 
to eat and were often reduced to the rations mentioned above—poor 
rations for soldiers whose physical strength was already considerably 
broken. 

It appearing, further, that the aqueduct having been cut, there arose 
serious difficulties in the matter of furnishing water to the majority of 
the forces in the trenches of the precinct, especially on the coast; and 
that these difficulties, owing to the bombardment of the city by land 
and sea, were increased to such an extent that there was well-grounded 
fear lest the soldiers, who could not leave the trenches, would find 
themselves deprived of this indispensable beverage. 

It appearing, further, that in view of the situation of the enemy in posi- 
tions close to ours, entirely surrounding the city and in control of all 
the approaches thereto, it was not possible for the.Spanish army to 
leave the city without engaging in a fierce battle under the most 
unfavorable circumstances, owing to the necessity of concentrating the 
forces under the very eyes of the enemy, and in view of the physicai 
debility of the soldiers, who were kept up only by their exalted spirit 
and the habit of discipline. 

It appearing, further, that, aside from the numerical superiority of 
the hostile contingent, they had, according to trustworthy information, 
70 pieces of modern artillery and the support of a powerful squadron, 
while no Spanish reenforcements could reach Santiago except by sea, 
which latter eventuality had become a vain hope from the moment 
when the American ships completely closed in the harbor entrance. 


116 


It appearing, further, that for the above reasons there was no possi- 
bility of reenforcements arriving before the total exhaustion of pro- 
visions. and ammunition. | 

It appearing, further, that under these sad circumstances the pro- 
longation of so unequal a struggle could, in the opinion of the acting 
commander in chief of the fourth army corps, lead to nothing but 
the vain sacrifice of a large number of lives without gaining any 
advantage, since the honor of arms had been entirely saved by the 
troops who had made such a valiant fight and whose heroic conduct 
was acknowledged by friend and foe, wherefore the said commander in 
chief convened the Junta for the purpose of drawing up the act, a copy 
of which appears on page 125 of these proceedings, setting forth that 
the necessity for capitulating had arrived. 

It appearing, further, that under the terms of the second article of the 
military agreement of the capitulation of the army forces at Santiago 
de Cuba, a copy of which appears on page 129 of these proceedings, the 
acting commander in chief of the fourth army corps, General of Division 
José Toral, included in said capitulation all the forces and war mate- 
rial occupying the territory of the province of Santiago de Cuba, so 
that the brigade of Guantanamo and the garrisons of Baracoa, Sagua, 
de Tanamo, Alto Songo, San Luis, Palma Soriano, and El Cristo were 
included in said capitulation. 

And considering that from the moment when the United States 
Squadron established the blockade of Santiago Harbor, the situation of 
said city, which was already a difficult one as the result of the internal 
war which had been waged in the island for three years, exhausting 
every resource of the country and preventing the prompt provisioning 
of the island by land, was very much aggravated through the closing 
of the harbor, which precluded the easiest and most expeditious means 
for receiving the aid that was indispensable under such critical 
circumstances. 

Considering, further, that for the effective defense of a maritime place 
when attacked by a squadron it is not always sufficient nor practicable 
to employ land forces, but that for a successful issue naval forces are 
also absolutely necessary, and as such forces were entirely lacking, the 
hostile squadron was enabled to acquire and hold undisturbed posses- 
sion of those waters, the control of which meant the exclusion of all aid 
from Santiago de Cuba. 

Considering, further, that said United States squadron, operating in 
comparative proximity to the coasts and harbors of its own nation, was 
able, without any sacrifice whatever, to maintain and constantly 
strengthen the blockade which it had established, frequently relieving 
the ships assigned to this service, and feeling always sure of opportu- 
nities and means for repairing any injuries of its ships, resupplying 
them with coal, provisions, and ammunition, and sustaining its base of — 
operations under all circumstances. 


117 


Considering, further, that for a large and powerful a.uadron, like 
that of the United States, it was an easy undertaking, 1n view of the 
resources at its disposal, to effect a landing at any of the many acces- 
sible points on that part of the Cuban coast, under cover of the fire of 
numerous guns, and without any danger of meeting resistance, since it 
had become a physical impossibility for our army to cover and defend 
the whole coast, and since the place where the landing was to be effected 
could not be surmised, and the scant contingent of the army at Santi- 
ago was not able effectually to guard so large an extent of coast. 

Considering, further, that in view of the lack of provisions at Santi- 
ago the situation of its defenders was further aggravated by the entrance 
of Admiral Cervera’s squadron in that harbor, whereby not only the con- 
sumption of food was increased, but which also made that city the prin- 
cipal objective of the Americans in that campaign, who from that time 
on assembled the greater and better part of their naval forces in front 
of Santiago and increased the number of their transports for the land- 
ing of their army with a large amount of modern field artillery, threat- 
ening serious assaults on the city, and making the blockade by sea so 
rigid that ingress and egress of the harbor became absolutely impossi- 
ble, thus shutting off from Santiago every hope of receiving aid and 
compromising the safety of our squadron, the capture or destruction of 
which was naturally assumed to be the principal aspiration of the enemy. 

Considering, further, that after the United States army had been 
landed and had established its lines and positions near Santiago, in 
conjunction with the insurgent parties, it was difficult for reenforce- 
ments, which were so much needed, to arrive by land, and when on the 
evening of July 3 Colonel Escario’s column did arrive, after having 
exhausted its rations on the march, it further aggravated the already 
serious situation, which was due principally to the great scarcity of 
provisions. 

Considering, further, that after the destruction of Admiral Cervera’s 
squadron, which ran out of Santiago Harbor on July 3, in obedience 
to superior orders, the enemy had no difficulty in realizing that they 
gould, with impunity, carry out all their plans without being impeded 
by an army reduced in number, short of ammunition and provisions, 
decimated by disease contracted during three years of hard fighting In 
a tropical country and in a climate fatal during the summer heat, 
devoid of all hope except in Providence, with no alternative except 
death or surrender to the mercy of an enemy, who alone by blockades 
on land and sea, without any other means, had succeeded in annihilat- 
ing those valiant troops. 

Considering, further, that the Spanish admiral, in order to leave 
Santiago Harbor with his squadron on July 3, had to recall from said 
city the landing companies and field artillery which, in compliance with 
naval regulations issued by the chief of staff of the squadron, had been 


118 


placed at the disposal of the commander in chief of the fourth army 
corps, for the purpose of cooperating with the latter in the defense 
ashore, and that by the withdrawal and reembarkation of these forces 
the number of combatants was considerably reduced and the army 
deprived of the use of the rapid-fire artillery, of which there was also 
great scarcity. 

Considering, further, that in view of the critical situation in which 
was placed the acting commander in chief of the fourth army corps of 
the island of Cuba, General of Division José Toral Velazquez, who, with 
anarmy reduced in number, decimated by sickness, without subsistence, 
and almost without ammunition, had to defend a city, the majority of 
whose inhabitants were likewise hostile to Spain, against an army 
superior in number and fighting resources, and supported by a power- 
ful squadron, the said acting commander in chief, having exhausted 
every resource available for sustaining the defense, deeming it impos- 
sible to persist, listening to the voice of humanity, and believing to 
have fulfilled the laws of military honor, decided that the necessity for 
capitulating had arrived. 

Considering, further, that the acting commander in chief of the 
fourth army corps of the island of Cuba, General of Division José 
Toral Velazquez, has used every means of defense required by the laws 
of honor and duty before surrendering to the enemy the forces under 
his command in the province of Santiago, as attested by the brilliant 
battles sustained from June 22 to the day of the capitulation, and the 
many casualties in generals, commanders, officers, and privates during 
said battles. 

Considering, further, that the situation of the remaining forces of 
the province, consisting of the brigade of Guantdinamo and detach. 
ments of said brigade at Baracoa and Sagua de Ténamo, had likewise 
become untenable, owing to the fact that the forces at Guantdénamo 
had been short of rations since June 15, that the hospital was crowded 
with patients, and the city cut off from all communication with the 
rest of the island, and the detachments of Baracoa and Sagua de 
Tanamo were completely isolated so that they could not even com- 
municate with the brigade of which they formed part. 

Considering, further, that the garrisons of the towns of Palma Soriano, 
Alto Songo, San Luis, and El Cristo, being small contingents and like- 
wise isolated, had to be considered echelons or advance posts of San- 
tiago de Cuba, and that after the surrender of the principal center 
they could not by themselves oppose any resistance whatever to the 
enemy in case they should be attacked. 

Considering, further that if all the forces above enumerated hae not 
been included in the capitulation they would necessarily have had to 
surrender under worse conditions, or perhaps to succumb, with neither 
glory nor profit, to the formidable attack of the numerous insurgent 
forces who besieged them in conjunction with the American forces, 


aL 


_ Considering, further, that the general in chief of the army of the island 
of Cuba, in his telegram dated July 13, 1898, authorized the inclusion 
of the forces at Guantanamo, Sagua de Tanamo, Baracoa, and other 
towns in the capitulation of Santiago, because otherwise they would 
have had to be abandoned. 

Considering, further, that according to the statement made by the 
general in chief of the army of the island of Cuba, Captain-General 
Ramon Blanco, the authorization to include in the capitulation the 
forces mentioned above was never withdrawn from General Toral, since 
the Captain-General in his telegram of July 15 notified the former that 
he was not empowered to include in the capitulation the division of 
Manzanillo which, together with that of Santiago, formed the fourth 
army corps. | 

Considering, further, that in signing the capitulation of all the forces 
in the province of Santiago de Cuba, General of Division José Toral 
Velazquez, acting commander in chief of the fourth army corps, did 
not act on his own initiative and was not cut off from communication 
with the general in chief of the army, but acted in compliance with 
instructions received from the latter. 

And considering, finally, that the General of Brigade Félix Pareja 
Mesa, commander of the brigade of Guantanamo, and the military 
commandants of Baracoa, Sagua de Tanamo, Alto Songo, Palma 
Soriano, San Luis, and El Cristo, when they complied with the order 
that the forces and territory under their immediate command should 
be comprised in the capitulation, which order was communicated to 
them by staff officers of their army corps, they only obeyed their 
general in chief. 

The defendants, General of Division José Toral y Velazquez, General 
of Brigade Félix Pareja Mesa, Lieutenant-Colonels of Infantry Feliciano 
Velarde Zabala and Rafael Serichol Alegria, and. Commanders of 
Infantry Arturo Campos Hidalgo, Romualdo Garcia Martinez, José 
Fernandez Garcia, and Clemente Calvo Peyré, are entirely acquitted, 
all of these proceedings being in conformity with article 591 of the 
code of military procedure and other articles of general application. 


SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE. 


In conformity with the recommendation of the attorneys-general, in 
their second supplemental bill of charges, testimony is to be procured 
as recommended therein and forwarded to the captain-general of New 
Castile, in order that he, as successor to the jurisdiction of the general 
in chief of the dissolved army of operations of the island of Cuba, may 
proceed to take such steps as in justice and equity may be necessary 
for the purpose of ascertaining the causes for and fix the responsibility 
of the fact that there was not sufficient war material in the city and 
province of Santiago de Cuba at the time of the breaking out of the 


war with the United States, although such war material had been asked 
) 


120 


for in good season by the artillery park; this being an important 
point which should be cleared up as being closely connected with the 
capitulation of said province. 


SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE. 


Testimony is to be taken from the document which appears at page 
1379 of these proceedings and forwarded to the captain-general of New 
Castile to be used in connection with the proceedings had under the 
auspices of this supreme council assembled in the hall of justice on 
July 7 last, to ascertain to what extent the administrative chief of the 
army of Cuba is responsible for not having complied with the order of 
the general in chief of the same to provision Santiago de Cuba for four 
months. : 

This decree is to be brought to the cognizance of the minister of 
war, aS provided by law, and for its execution the testimony in this 
cause is to be forwarded to the captain-general of New Castile. The 
necessary orders are to be issued. 


By royal order and in conformity with the provisions of article 634 
of the Code of Military Procedure I[ remit the same to your excellency 
for your cognizance and action thereon. 

1 General encargado del despacho: 

MARIANO CAPDEPON, 

MADRID, August 9, 1899. 


-) 


OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 
Wark Notes No. VII. 


INFORMATION FROM ABROAD. 





THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 


A COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS 


RELATIVE TO THE 


SQUADRON OPERATIONS IN THE WEST INDIES, 


ARRANGED BY 


REAR-ADMIRAL PASCUAL CERVERA Y TOPETE, 


TRANSLATED FROM THE SPANISH. 





OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 


WASHINGTON: | 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICZ. 
1899, | 





OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 
WAR Notes No. VII. 


INFORMATION FROM ABROAD. 


THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. 


A COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS 


RELATIVE TO THE 


SQUADRON OPERATIONS IN THE WEST INDIES. 


ARRANGED BY 


REAR-ADMIRAL PASCUAL CERVERA Y TOPHTE. 


TRANSLATED FROM THE SPANISH. 





OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 


WASHINGTON: 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 
1899, 


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INTRODUCTORY. 


In the Cortes at Madrid, on the 30th day of October, 1899, the minister 
of war was requested by the Count de las Almenas and Senators Gon- 
zalez and Davila to transmit to the senate chamber as early as pos- 
sible the proceedings held in the supreme council of war and navy, 
from August 1, 1899, to date, relative to the wars in Cuba, Puerto Rico, 
and the Philippines. 

The minister of war, replying, said in part: 

I do not know whether the Count de las Almenas and the worthy companions whom 
he represents have sufficiently considered the grave step of bringing into a political 
chamber and submitting to parliamentary discussion adjudged causes of the extreme 
gravity of those referred to. I repeat that, while I greatly respect such right, 1 
believe that there may be serious objections to a debate of this nature, because per- 
haps the high tribunal of the army and navy, which has adjudged these causes in 
accordance with law and its own conscience, and to whose functions and importance 
great respect is due, might suffer, though only apparently, in its prestige. For that 
reason I consider it neither expedient nor prudent to transmit to the chamber the 
documents asked for. 


It is not, therefore, probable that the proceedings of the courts in 
the cases of Admirals Cervera and Montojo will be made public. 

Admiral Cervera, having in view the vindication of himself, had 
obtained from the Queen in August permission to publish certain 
documents, given in this number of the War Notes, which make a 
most interesting and connected history of the naval operations of 
Spain during the war, and show without need of argument the causes 


of her weakness. 
RICHARDSON CLOVER, 


Oommander, U.S. N., Chief Intelligence Officer. 
Navy DEPARTMENT, December 6, 1899. 


Approved: : 
A. S. CROWNINSHIELD 
Chief of Bureau of Navigation. 


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TO THE READER. 


Being in possession of the documents herein collected, [have thought 
it my duty to publish them in order to enlighten the public, and that 
they may serve as a lesson for the future.and as data for history. 

I had thought first of having a short statement of facts precede 
them, but considering that the events are so very recent, and have 
affected our unhappy country so much, that any criticism might easily 
degenerate into passion, I have thought:it best to give simply the 
documents and let them explain for themselves everything that has 
happened. 

I should have liked to do this earlier, but put it off until the termina- 
tion of the cause in which I was made a defendant, and since then it 
has taken some time for me to obtain permission to publish these 
papers, owing to my position as a naval officer and the nature of the 
documents, most of which either came from the ministry of marine or 
were addressed to it. 

To that end I applied to Her Majesty in a petition, a copy of which 
follows, and secured a royal order, a copy of which also follows. 
~ The collection is printed in two kinds of type. The smaller type 
refers to documents printed in a certain work where errors and omis- 
sions have crept in, and the larger type refers to documents furnished 
by myself, the originals of most of which are in my possession, and to 
others taken from various publications and even from the journals of 
the sessions of the Chambers. 

If this publication should help us to mend our mistakes in the future, 
my wishes are granted, for all I ask is that I may be useful to my 
country. 


PASCUAL CERVERA. 
MADRID, August 30, 1899. 
i) 





PETITION. 


MApDAm: Pascual Cervera y Topete, rear admiral of the navy, sets 
forth to Your Royal Majesty, with the most profound respect as follows: 

It is well known that owing to the destruction of the squadron under 
my command in the battle of July 3, 1898, a cause was instituted in which 
the decree of the supreme council of war and navy has absolved your 
petitioner and others. But such decree, in which only a majority con- 
curred, is not sufficient to satisfy the opinion which, misied at the time 
of the events and for a long time afterwards, has been manifested in a 
fierce campaign against the honor of your petitioner, that of the squad- 
ron which he commanded, and of the entire navy. 

Upon noticing these symptoms the writer attempted to give the 
country a full explanation, and to that end he solicited and obtained 
the election as senator for the province of Albacete, but did not even 
- have a chance of discussing the proceedings of his election. 

When your petitioner had been made a defendant in the proceedings 
above referred to, he deemed it his duty not to speak until the court 
had pronounced.its sentence. 

The writer has in his possession many original documents and au- 
thentic copies of others, and among them there are not a few that have 
been published with errors, and others that have been printed without 
authorization, but have come to the knowledge of many people, and 
these likewise contained many errors which are bound to mislead pub- 
lic opinion. 

These documents, many of which were at the time of a confidential 
nature, need no longer be kept secret, since peace has been reestablished 
and the publication of the same would correct many of these errors and 
serve as a lesson for the future. For all these reasons your petitioner 
humbly prays that Your Majesty will permit him to publish, at his 
expense, the documents referred to in order to enlighten the Spanish 
people. 

Dated August 18, 1899. 


8 


ROYAL ORDER. 


His Majesty having been informed of the petition forwarded by your 
excellency on the 18th instant, asking for permission to publish, at your 
expense, certain documents in your possession relative to the squadron 
under your command in the naval battle of Santiago de Cuba, on the 
3d day of July, 1898, His Majesty the King (whom God guard), and in 
his name the Queen Regent of the Kingdom, in conformity with the 
opinion furnished by the counselor-general of this ministry, has been 
pleased to authorize your excellency to publish all orders issued by the 
ministry of marine relative to the squadron destroyed at Santiago de 
Cuba. The above having been communicated to me by royal order, 
through the minister of marine, I notify your excellency accordingly 
for your cognizance, and as the result of your petition referred to. 

Madrid, August 22, 1899. 

MANUEL J. MOZO, Assistant Secretary. 

Rear-Admiral PASCUAL CERVERA Y¥ TOPETE. 


COmeleC TION’ OF DOCUMENTS ~ 


RELATIVE TO THE 


SOUADRON OPERATIONS IN THE WEST INDIEs. 


PRIVATE. | THE MINISTER OF MARINE, 
Madrid, November 28, 1897, 
His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA. 

My Drar ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: In answer to your esteemed let- 
ters I wish to say that I entirely approve of the instructions issued to 
the squadron and of everything you state relative to speed, diameters, 
and tactical movements. With great pleasure I read the telegram rel- 
ative to firing trials on board the Vizcaya, after so many doubts and 
different opinions. But we should, nevertheless, not abandon ourselves 
to unlimited confidence, and your good judgment will know how to 
restrict the use of these guns! until we have the new cartridge cases, 
which, I have been promised, will begin to arrive early in November. 
Iam continuing my efforts toward fitting out the torpedo boats, but 
we have to contend with scarcity of engine personnel, and this need is 
further increased by the men working under contract who are about to 
leave the service. 

Wishing you every happiness, etc., 

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO. 

Nothing new in the Philippines. 





SANTA POLA, December 3, 1897. 


His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO. 

My DreAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: Upon my arrival hereI received 
your favor of the 28th. Iam much pleased to know that you approve 
of the instructions I have issued to the squadron. The Oquendo was 
ready day before yesterday, for all she needed was to have the dia- 
phragm of the condensers cleaned. Iam of your opinion that we should 
wait for the new 5.5-inch cartridge cases before using these guns for 








1 Reference is had to the 5.5 inch Gonzélez-Hontoria rapid-fire guns. 
; 9 


“ae 


10 


target practice, and [ am thinking of spreading the report that we are 
waiting in order not to decrease our supply. One thousand five hun- 
dred cartridge cases seems very little to me. I think we should have 
at least twice as many, which is the regular supply for this class of 
ships. In order to obviate any comment on the fact of our not using 
the 5.5-inch guns, I am thinking of having target practice with the 
11-inch guns only on certain days, and on other days with the small guns 
day and night, unless you should issue orders to the contrary. Night 
before last we had an exercise with the scouts of this ship and the Teresa, ~ 
which was very interesting; the vedettes were discovered with the aid of 
the searchlights. We are continuing experiments with the latter in 
order to ascertain the best installation for them. The highly interest- 
ing question of the radius of action of these ships can be only approxi- 
mately settled with the data furnished by this trip of mine. The 
reasons why it can not be definitely settled are that the Teresa has 
used an unreasonable amount of coal, for which fact I transmit to-day 
to her commander a reprimand for the firemen; and the Oquendo, 
owing to an erroneous interpretation of one of my signals, did not fol- 
low instructions, but we have data which may be presumed to be correct 
for the Oquendo. I will send you in the near future the computations 
relative to this matter. I believe I have already advised you in my 
former letter that I intended to go out with a squadron for a few days. 
I also want to give the steam launches and their officers some tactical 
exercises, under the direction of a superior officer. 
Yours, ete., 
PASCUAL CERVERA, 





{Private.] 


THE MINISTER OF MARINE, 
Madrid, January 9, 1898. 
His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA. 

My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I have just had a eall, not only 
from the committee of the Ansaldo Company, but also from the Italian 
. ambassador, relative to the 9.84-inch guns of the Colén, and I am 
afraid we will have some trouble concerning this matter. As the 
report of the advisory board (centro-consultivo) is utterly opposed to 
the acceptance of gun No. 325, and still more of No. 313, you will 
understand that the junta over which you preside should suggest to 
me some solution toward substituting for these guns, at least tempo- 
rarily, guns of other systems. For my part I have conveyed the 
impression that if two other guns, to the exclusion of Nos. 325 and 
313, could be tried within a very short*time, and such trials should 
show satisfactory results, the Government might perhaps terminate 
this unpleasant matter. 

Yours, ete., SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO. 


I have in mind, my dear Admiral, what constitutes the press in this 
country, and the way they have of always treating us unfairly. 


11 


The Governor-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of Colonies (R. Girén). 


{Extract.] 
HAVANA, January 8, 1898. 
Two and one-third millions are due the navy, and should be liquidated so as to 
make it possible to place in commission a number of vessels which are now at the 
navy-yard with injuries that can not be repaired for lack of funds. 





BATTLE SHIP VIZCAYA, THE ADMIRAL, 
Cartagena, January 29, 1898. 
His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO. 

My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: The telegram I sent you yester- 
day notified you that the Vizcaya was ready, with her fires lighted, to 
go out just as soon as she received instructions and money, the only 
things she now lacks. It is true that three or four men belonging 
to her crew, and who are absent with my permission, have not yet 
returned, but they have been telegraphed to and will be here very 
shortly. However, if the money and instructions should arrive before 
they do, the ships will go without them. She has about 600 tons of 
coal on board and will continue coaling until the instructions come, or 
until her bunkers are entirely filled. She has fires under six of her 
boilers and is filling the other four boilers with water. She has also 
commenced distilling water, which will be continued as long as may be 
necessary. She has provisions on board for forty days. The 2.24-inch 
gun mount which was sent to plasencia de las armas and has not yet been 
returned, has been replaced by another one fromthe Lepanto. The Vizcaya 
is short one lieutenant, as Alvargonzélez was sent ashore; and as none 
ean be furnished by the maritime district of Carthagena(departamento), 
I will send for one from the Alfonso; but owing to our hurried departure 
he may not arrive in time, and we can not wait. The other two Bilbao 
cruisers are also being fitted out. The Teresa begins to coal at once, 
and the Oquendo will receive her relieving tackle to-day, after which 
she will immediately commence to take on coal and lubricating mate- 
rial. As far as the water supply for these ships #s concerned, it is all 
right; for, thanks to the exertions of Bustamante and concessions of 
the Captain-General, the English company will be ready by to-mor- 
row to furnish us water at the dockyard at a price of 0.032 peseta 
per cubic foot. I have telegraphed to Barcelona to ascertain when we 
are to have the sea biscuit. If the coal arrives from England, the ships 
ean fill their bunkers again, and if not we will only have coal enough 
to reach Las Palmas. You are well aware that there is not in the 
squadron a man in the crews who has any savings; therefore there are 
two things lacking: First, they should be ordered to make assignments 
to their families, soas not to condemn 500 or 600 families to starvation, 
which might even affect the discipline; second, money should be con- 
signed to us at Havana for our own living, because if they count upon 
our having collected the pay for January and propose to pay us to date 


12 


we shall perish miserably. On this vital point I send a telegram. The 
Furor will be ready to go out in a couple of days. The Terror will 
require at least a week before her boilers will be ready. I gave the 
Captain-General your message concerning the torpedo boats and the 
crew of the Vitoria. We have not yet received the January con- 
signment, and I send a telegram relative to it. Three of our steam 
launches are not in condition to be used, and I have asked the Captain- 
General to let me have those of the Lepanto and keep ours here to 
have the boilers repaired, and they can then be used for the other ship. 
The fleet is short five lieutenants and five ensigns, and the departa- 
mento says that it has none to furnish. This scarcity will affect espe- 
cially the Alfonso, and in order to remedy it to a certain extent I am 
going to commission the four midshipmen at the head of the list and 
transfer them to the Alfonso, Ido not know whether I am forgetting 
anything. 
Yours, ete., PASCUAL CERVERA. 





CARTAGENA, January 30, 1898. 

DEAR COUSIN JUAN SPOTTORNO: About two years ago I wrote you 
a letter concerning our condition to go to war with the United States. 
I requested you to keep that letter in case some day it should be nec- 
essary to bring it to light in defense of my memory or myself, when 
we had experienced the sad disappointment prepared for us by the 
stupidity of some, the cupidity of others, and the incapability of all, 
even of those with the best of intentions. To-day we find ourselves 
again in one of those critical periods which seem to be the beginning of 
the end, and I write to you again to express my point of view and to 
explain my action in this matter, and I beg you to put this letter with 
the other one, so that the two may be my military testament. The rela- 
tive military positions of Spain and the United States have grown worse 
for us, because we are reduced, absolutely penniless, and they are very 
rich, and also because we have increased our naval power only with the 
Colon and the torpedo-boat destroyers, and they have increased theirs 
much more. What I have said of our industry is sadly confirmed in 
everything we look at. There is the Cataluia, begun more than eight 
years ago, and her hull is not yet completed. And this when we are 
spurred on by danger, which does not wake patriotism in anybody, 
while jingoism finds numerous victims, perhaps myself to-morrow. And 
the condition of our industry is the same in all the arsenals. Let us 
consider, now, our private industries. The Maquinista Terrestre y 
Maritima supplies the engines of the Alfonso XIII; Cadiz, the Fili- 
pinas. Ifthe Carlos V is not a dead failure, she is not what she should 
be; everything has been sacrificed to speed, and she lacks power. And 
remember that the construction is purely Spanish. The company 
of La Grada has not completed its ships, as I am told, and only these 


13 


( Vizcaya, Oquendo, and Maria Teresa) are good ships of their class; but, 
though constructed at Bilbao, it was by Englishmen. Thus, manifestly, 
even victory would be a sad thing for us. As for the administration 
and its intricacies, let us not speak of that; its slow procedure is kill- 
ing us. The Vizcaya carries a 5.5-inch breech plug which was declared 
useless two months ago, and I did not know it until last night, and 
that beeause an official inquiry was made. How many cases I might 
mention! But my purpose is not to accuse, but to explain why we 
may and must expect a disaster. But as it is necessary to go to the 
bitter end, and as it would be a crime to say that publicly to-day, 
I hold my tongue, and go forth resignedly to face the trials which God 
may be pleased to send me. I am sure that we will do our duty, for the 
spirit of the navy is excellent; but I pray God that the troubles may be 
arranged without coming to a conflict, which, in any way, I believe 
would be disastrous to us. I intrust to you a most interesting corre- 
spondence which I had with General Azcarraga, and which I desire and 
request you to preserve, together with this letter and the former one. 
In it you will see the opinion of Azcérraga. Without troubling you 
further, I remain your most affectionate cousin, who intrusts his honor 


to your hands. 
PASCUAL CERVERA. 


CARTAGENA, July 2, 1898. 
GINES MoNCADA, 
ANTONIO MARTI. 





Certificate—Ginés Moncada y Ferro, mining engineer, and Antonio 
Marti y Pagan, attorney at law, state upon their honor that they 
repaired this day to the residence of Juan Spottorno y Bienert, at the 
request of the latter, who exhibited to them a letter from His Excellency 
Rear-Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete, addressed to Mr. Spottorno, 
dated January 30, 1898; that the undersigned read said letter and 
affixed their signatures thereto. They were also shown a collection of 
documents, of which they read only the headings and signatures, which 
documents had been intrusted to Mr. Spottorno by Rear-Admiral 
Cervera, and which are as follows: Letters from their excellencies Gen- 
eral Marcelo Azcdrraga and Rear-Admiral Segismundo Bermejo; copies 
of letters addressed by Admiral Cervera to the last-named gentlemen, 
and to his excellency Segismundo Moret y Prendergast, and to Mr. Spot: 
torno; copies of official letters addressed to his excellency the minister 
of marine; the original proceedings of the council of war held on April 
20, 1898, ue St. Vincent, Cape Verde, by the captains of the Spanish 
Beet: an opinion written at said council of war, signed by Capt. Victor 
M. Concas; a copy of a telegram addressed by Capt. Fernando Villaa- 
mil to his excellency Praxedes Mateo Sagasta. A detailed account 
is made of all these documents, which we sign to-day. Mr. Spottorno 


14 


stated thathe must have among his papers at Madrid a letter which Rear. 
Admiral Cervera wrote to him two or three years ago from Cadiz, and 
which is referred to in the letter of January 30, 1898, which we have 
signed, and in which letter, which is in answer to one written by Mr. 
Spottorno to Rear-Admiral Cervera from Madrid, relative to naval 
matters, Cervera said in substance that he foresaw, through the fault 
of the whole country, a maritime disaster while he (Cervera) was 
placed in command of the fleet, and that he feared that he would be 
held responsible, as the Italian Admiral Persano was held responsible 
for the destruction of his squadron, for which the whole country was 
to blame. As men of honor we attest all that has been set forth. 
Dated at Cartagena, July 2, 1898. 
GINES MONOADA. 
ANTONIO MARTI. 


CARTAGENA, February 3, 1898. 
His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO. 

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: The Oolén has arrived, after 
encountering heavy weather in the Gulf of Leon, which carried away a 
ladder, a boat, and some other things of minor importance. I did not 
want to put this in my telegram, so as not to alarm the uninitiated. 
We have not yet received the consignments for January, and as the 
Squadron has very little money left it has been necessary, in order to 
get the Vizcaya off, to resort to private funds. On the other hand, the 
departamento has already received its monthly allowance for February. 
Can not something be done so that the squadron will not always be kept 
behind? A remedy must be found if it is desired to keep up the good 
Spirit now prevailing among the crews, and I beg and implore that you 
will be kind enough to remedy this evil. The storm which the Colén has 
encountered has shown the necessity of her having scupper holes, and 
I will see to this at once. I shall not have the Coldn fill up with coal, 
on account of the condition of her bunkers, unless you should give 
orders to the contrary. I have received the royal order corroborating 
the telegram concerning the consignments, and you will allow me to 
insist on my petition about which I wrote Moret. 


Yours, ete., 
PASCUAL CERVERA. - 





; CARTAGENA, February 3, 1898. 
His Excellency SEGIsmuNDO MORET. 

My DEAR FRIEND: I presume you know that upon my arrival here 
I found the Vizcaya ready to go out, and I have had the pleasure of 
telegraphing to that effect to the minister of marine, who ordered the 
fires to be lighted. I mention this because it shows the good spirit of 
the crews, which extends to every class, as evidenced by the fact that 


4 


15 


not a single man was absent at the roll call, although many of them 
had leave granted and some had gone to Galicia. There is no wealth 
in the Navy (1 am not speaking of the officers particularly, although 
I do not exclude them). There are many classes of boatswains, gun- 
ners, machinists, firemen, and dock-yard men who have nothing but 
their pay, which, as a rule, is small, and out of that at least two- 
thirds of this personnel have to take care of families, for I do not 
count the unmarried men; nor do I count the seamen and gunners’ 
mates, who can leave their prizes to their families, for while they 
have the same pay as the others they have fewer needs, and though 
I plead for all I want to base my argument on truth. Thus each one 
of these ships about to sail from the Peninsula, leaves intrusted to 
Divine Providence about 100 families, and yet every one of the men 
was there! Why? They trust that their Admiral will look out for 
them, and that the Government of His Majesty will act favorably on 
my just petition. But I telegraphed to the minister of marine, asking 
that the Government authorize the establishment of assignments to 
the families, and he answered that existing regulations would not 
permit this, and I therefore sent him a letter on the 31st, a copy of 
which I inclose, asking that you will read it. To-day I am in receipt 
of the corroboration of the telegram from the minister of marine, in 
which he says that the concession depends also on the minister of colo- 
nies, and that he will renew his petitions on that subject. It is for 
this.reason that I trouble you, feeling sure that you will pardon me 
for taking up your attention for a few moments. I don’t like to trouble 
anyone, and have a great aversion toward a certain class of business. 
As an illustration of this, I will tell you that while my son Angel was 
attached to the legation at Pekin, in order to protect it with the 
detachment under his command, he was the only one who received his 
pay in Mexican dollars. The whole legation with the exception of 
himself received theirs in gold. And although we are both poor, I 
never troubled anyone about this when the minister of colonies refused 
his entirely justifiable request that his pay be made the same as to the 
others... But the matter in question to-day is very different. I am not 
advocating my own interests nor those of my family, but of my sub- 
ordinates, and it is the admiral’s duty to look out for them. I there- 
fore beg that you will call this matter up and have it favorably dis- 
posed of as it should be. 
Trusting that you will do so, I remain, 
Yours, etc., PASCUAL CERVERA. 





1Three months after the date of the above letter he was partially indemnified— 
forty-three months after the termination of his commission in China. 


16 


(Confidential.} 


GENERAL CAPTAINCY OF THE SQUADRON, STAFF. 

Honorep Sir: Although I am sure that I am telling yourexcellency nothing new, 
I think it is not idle in these critical times to make a study of the condition of this 
fleet, if only to complete statistical statements of condition and power as to those 
matters which, for reasons I need not here set forth, do not appear in such state- 
ments. We must discount the Alfonso XIU, which has been under trials for so many 
years, and which we shall apparently not have the pleasure of counting amoug our 
available ships, which are therefore reduced to the three Bilbao battle ships,’ the 
Colén, the Destructor, and the torpedo-boat destroyers Furor and Terror. The three 
Bilbao battle ships are apparently complete, but you who have had so much to do 
with them while in command of the squadron, and since then in your present posi- 
tion, know only too well that the 5.5-inch guns, the main power of these vessels, are 
practically useless on account of the bad system of their breech mechanism and the 
poor quality of their cartridge cases, of which there are no more than those now on 
board. 

The Colén, which, from a military standpoint, is no doubt the best of all our ships, 
1s still without her heavy guns. In this matter I have, at your instructions, com- 
municated with General Guillén, in order to find a possible remedy, if there is one. 
The Destructor may serve as a scout, although her speed is deficient for that kind of 
service with this fleet. The torpedo-boat destroyers Furor and Terror are in good 
condition, but I doubt if they can make effective use of their 2.95-inch guns, As 
for the supplies necessary for the fleet, we frequently lack even the most indispen- 
sable. In this departamento we have not been able to renew the coal supplies, and 
at both Barcelona and Cadiz we could only obtain half the amount of biscuit we 
wanted, including the 17,637 pounds which I had ordered to be made here. 

We have no charts of the American seas, and although I suppose they have been 
ordered, we could not move at present. Apart from this deficient state of matériel, 
I have the satisfaction of stating that the spirit of the personnel is excellent, and 
that the country will find it all that it may choose to demand. It is a pity that we 
do not have better and more abundant material, better resources, and less hindrances 
to put this personnel in condition fully to carry out its réle. I will only add the 
assurance that whatever may be the contingencies of the future these forces will do 
their full duty. 

Yours, etc., PasCuAL CERVERA. 

CARTAGENA, February 6, 1898. 


[Private.] 


THE MINISTER OF MARINE, 
Madrid, February 6, 1898. 
His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA. 

My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I take advantage of this being 
Sunday to answer your esteemed letters, beginning with the political 
situation. This has not changed at all. We are still receiving visits 
in Cuba from American vessels, always with the assurance on the part 
of the United States that they are simply visits of courtesy and friend- 
ship. If they involve any other design—as, for instance, to exhibit 
their ships and show their superiority over those stationed in our 


a SL. 


1I have used this designation as being the official one; but I have never con- 
sidered these ships battle ships, and I deem it a fatal mistake not to designate ships 


properly. 


17 


colonies—their object is attained. The nucleus of their force is stationed 
at Dry Tortugas and Key West, under pretext of carrying out naval 
maneuvers, which are to last until the 1st of April. We shall see 
what will be the outcome of all this. It troubles me a great deal, and 
I am trying to concentrate in Spain all the forces we have abroad. 
What you tell me of the Vizcaya is entirely satisfactory to me, and I 
shall write to Havana all you have stated about this ship, and also as 
to her departure. 

The official report on the voyage of the Oolén has acquainted me 
with the work that is being done on her, and I have telegraphed the 
Captain-General to have the work done at once, aside from the scupper- 
holes, which you will have made on your own account. General Guillén 
has probably called on you. His plans can not be decided upon until 
this office is acquainted with them, for influences are being brought to 
bear here for the acceptance of the 10-inch guns, which I shall try to 
prevent, because it would be a second edition of the 9.45-inch guns and 
mounts of the Regente. To-morrow I expect to see a gentleman sent 
here by Perrone, no doubt for the purpose of discussing these guns, 
which matter is to be considered by the council of ministers. 

I am awaiting the result of the board sent out, and hope that no 
compromise will be made with Canet. As to the voyage of the Colén, 
[ want to thank her commander for his skillful seamanship. You did 
well not to cause any alarm, since her injuries can be easily repaired 
and will not prevent the ship from leaving. I should like to comply 
with your wishes and take the Alfonso XIII from you, but we must 
await her final official trials and find out what this ship is able to do— 
that is to say, whether she can be considered a cruiser or whether it 
will be necessary to assign her to special service. From what we 
know of her I think it will be the latter. Your report as to the lack 
of officers has been forwarded to the director of personnel with my 
indorsement. We are very short of officers, especially ensigns; ten 
have gone out this last six months and six will go out the next six 
months. These are all the ships fitted out in addition to those still 
abroad, with much reduced complements. 

To your petitions for dues for services, [ have answered by telegram 
that there has been no delay on the part of this ministry, and if any 
’ delay has occurred at all, it has been caused by the departamentos in 
honoring orders of payment without preference of any kind. 

Your communication concerning assignments, indorsed by me, is 
meeting, on the part of the minister of colonies, with the same interest 
which you manifest. 

The subject of the exchange of Philippine drafts has given me a 
good deal of trouble, their money being worth only 50 per cent. But 
in spite of the time elapsed, this transaction has not been reduced to a 
normal basis. You are well aware that this central department has no 
funds of any kind, nor any branch of the administration, to meet these 

10742——2 


18 


expenses. Consequently the minister of colonies must advance it, to 
be reimbursed by the tariff on the colony, since we have no colony 
fund, such as exists in the army, taking as a basis the funds of tie 
regiments and military institutions. 
I believe [ have overlooked nothing referred to in your letters. 
Yours, etc., 
SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO, 


CARTAGENA, February 8, 1898. 
His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO. 

My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: The engineer from Creusot has 
arrived. He tells me that the first guns will be ready in June, and as 
it is my belief that they never keep their promise, it will surely be later 
than that and this solution does not appear acceptable tome. Are 
there no other guns that could be used? If so, it would be better, and 
if not, the Armst’ong guns, although they are not as good as might be ~ 
desired. ‘he dynamo of the Colén can be fixed here; but as the injury 
is in the coil, and we have no spare one, I beg that you will ask for 
another coil. 

Yours, etc., PASCUAL CERVERA. ~ 


ES FO OH 


[Private.] 


THE MINISTER OF MARINE, 
Madrid, February 8, 1898. 
His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA. 

My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I telegraphed you to-day to have 
the Oquendo ready as soon as possible, as she is to perform the same 
mission as the Vizcaya in the Gulf of Mexico, conformable to the 
council of ministers, as the result of the opinion of the Governor- 
General of Cuba, transmitted in a cipher cable from Manterola. This 
will be the last detachment of ships from your squadron, for if it were 
necessary to send away any more, you would go with the Maria Teresa 
and some others of the ships that are now abroad and are to be incor- 
porated with the fleet. For the present we can count only on the 
Colén and Alfonso XITI, although the latter is still under trials; but 
I hope your flag will be better represented in the future. I have given 
orders for the training school to be transferred to the Navarra, and 
you will transfer the second commander to any ship as you may think 
best, because the ships that visit Cuban ports do so simply under the 
representation of their commanders. 

The division of destroyers and torpedo boats will assemble at Cadiz, 
and will proceed to Cuba under the protection of the Ciudad de Cadiz. 
Upon the arrival of the destroyers that are still in England, they will 
be incorporated in the squadron. As to the Coldn, I have an Italian 
committee here, but shall decide nothing until I know the result of the © 


19 


junta over which you preside. If they have any reasonable and equi- 
table proposition to make I shall advise you immediately. I have told 
them positively that guns Nos. 325 and 313 can not be accepted. I 
have received your confidential letter, but I do not quite share your 
pessimistic views as to the 5.5-inch guns, for the guaranty of Colonel 
Sanchez and the firing trials held on board the Vizcaya have demon- 
strated that our fear concerning them was greatly exaggerated, and 
with the new cartridge cases I hope it will be dissipated entirely. There 
will be 2,000 tons of coal left at Cartagena, in addition to the coal 
ordered yesterday. 

As to the other matters you referred to, I will do what I possibly can 
to remedy them. I should like to write more fully, but you will under- 
stand that I have not a moment’s time, with so many problems to solve 
and so many vessels abroad that I want to bring back to Spain. s 

I believe the Americans will reenforce their European station, 
although in my opinion their tendency will be rather toward the 
Canaries. 

Yours, ete., SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO., 


CARTAGENA, February 9, 1898, 
His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO. 


My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I received yesterday your letters 
of the 6th and 7th and your cipher telegram instructing me to get the 
Oquendo ready to be commissioned. As soon as I received the telegram 
I sent one to my adjutants to hurry matters at the arsenal, and the 
commissary of the fleet to buy the provisions, for as these can be had 
right here I did not want to get them until the last hour, and without 
having recourse to the departamento, for fear of the everlasting rounda- 
bout way which delays everything. I hope, when the instructions 
arrive, she will be in condition to have her fires lighted, if such should 
be the order, and day after to-morrow she will be able to go out. But 
if she is to leave the squadron, as would appear from the telegram giv- 
ing the order to transfer the gunnery training school to the Navarra, 
She must be supplied with money, for you know how little these ships 
have left. 

I shall wait for instructions and act in accordance therewith, in the 
meantime using my best efforts to do what may be necessary, or tele- 
graphing to you in case my efforts should be futile. I am very grateful 
to you for keeping me posted as to the political situation, which is very 
critical indeed and troubles us all a great deal, owing to the lack of 
means for opposing the United States in war. This is certainly no time 
for lamentations, and therefore I will say nothing of the many things 
that are in my mind, as I know them to bein yours. I thank you very 
much for expressing satisfaction about what I have said relative to the 
Vizcaya and for writing to Havana so that she may be kept in as good 
condition as she leaves here. My departure is not quite what the news- 


20 


papers made it out to be, although this time they have not changed the 
essence of the few words I said tu them. 

The boats of the Colén are to be ready to-day. Inote what you tell 
me about the heavy artillery of the Colén, and your instructions will be 
carried out. Itis very much to be regretted that there is always so 
much underhand work about everything, and that there should be so 
much of it now regarding the acceptance of the 9.6-inch guns, for, if we 
finally take them, it will seem as though we are yielding to certain 
disagreeable impositions, and if things should come to the worst—and 
you are better able to judge of this than I—it seems to me we should 
accept, as the proverb says, ‘‘ hard bread rather than none;” and if we 
have no other guns, and these can fire even 25 or 30 shots, we should 
take them anyhow, even though they are expensive and inefficient, and 
we should lose no time about it, in order that the vessel may be armed 
and supplied with ammunition as soon as possible. 

I neglected to tell you that the Oquendo has only a little over 700 tons 
of coal, because there is no more to be had here. I received a telegram 
from Moret relative to the assignments, and I beg that you will not 
drop this matter. As to the provisions, we shall do what you ordered 
in your letter of the 7th. I believe I have forgotten nothing of interest. 


Yours, ete., 
PASCUAL CERVERA. 





CARTAGENA, February 11, 1898. 


His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO. 

My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: Soon after dispatching my two 
cipher telegrams to you yesterday, relative to the 5.5-inch guns of these 
ships and the heavy guns of the Colon, I received your letters of the 
8th and 9th, which I now answer, giving you at the same time whatever 
news there is since yesterday. The Oquendo is ready to go out, except 
as to some things which are lacking, and which she will have to go 
without. To give orders to light the fires I am only waiting for an 
answer from you to the telegram which I sent you last night, asking 
whether she is to receive the same authorization as the Vizcaya, and the 
same amount of money as delivered to the latter vessel, for the Vizcaya 
carried £6,000 and the February pay, and surely there are not funds 
enough at this departamento to enable the Oquendo to leave under the 
same conditions as the Vizcaya. 

As soon as [ finish this letter I shall go ashore and look athe this 
very interesting matter. If we are to take the Alfonso, although she 
is of slow speed, it will be necessary to supply her with officers and 
many things that I have had to take from her, owing to the scarcity of 
everything here, in order to make her as useful as possible. The gun- 
nery training school has been transferred to the Navarra. The second 
commander is on board the Colén. The telegram I sent you yesterday, 
relative to the heavy artillery of the latter ship, is the result of my 
conference with Guillén. The junta will meet to-day, and I will at 


21 


once notify you of the result of the session, but I believe it will not differ 
essentially from my telegram of yester ate 

Guns numbers 325 and 313 are bad and should under ordinaree cir- 
cumstances be rejected; there is no doubt of it; but if the necessity is 
really urgent and we have ng others, there seems to be no remedy, 
except either to compel the firm to change them, or, if that is not 
possible, to take them, bad as they are. Yesterday the engineer of 
the Creusot people said that the first two 9.45-inch guns would not be 
ready until the latter part of June, if they are to be delivered as planned, 
but if they are to have trunnion hoops it will take longer. After they 
have been delivered they will have to be tried at the Polygon proving 
ground, transported to the harbor and mounted. When will all this 
work be finished? Itis safe to say that it will not be before September, 
and that prospect seems worse than to take the guns they offer us. 

Guillén went to see whether 7.87-inch guns could be mounted on 
board, and found that it was impossible with the present turrets, and 
so it seems there is no other remedy but to submit to the inevitable 
law of necessity and make the best of it. Wecan either have them 
exchanged for better ones later on, or we will pay less for them, or we 
can simply rent them. If we do not accept a solution of the problem 
in that direction, we will have to make up our minds that it will be six 
or eight months at least before the ship can be ready. As long as we 
use the 5.5-inch guns with the present extractors they seem to me 
utterly worthless, even more so than the guns of the Colén; and this 
is not pessimism, but sad reality. But I use with regard to them the 
same argument as with regard to the Colon guns. If we have no 
others, we must use these and fight with them, if the case should arise; 
but it would be very much better if it did not arise. 

Guns numbers 20 and 28 of this ship, which Guillén says are com- 
pletely useless, can be changed at once; that would be choosing the 
_ lesser of two evils. And when the Oquendo and Vizcaya return, the 
guns that Guillén may point out in those ships can be exchanged; I 
believe there are four of them, not six, as my telegram said yesterday. 
This, and the new cartridge cases, is the best we can do for the present; 
but as they are makeshifts, made necessary by the circumstances of the 
moment, they must be done away with eventually, as has long been the 
wish of all who have had anything to do with this vital matter. We 
must take to heart the lesson we are experiencing now, and not expose 
ourselves to another. You know that better than I do, as you have 
had more to do with these matters, and for a longer time than I. 

I always bear in mind what the press is in this country, and you will 
have noticed that I avoid in my telegrams the use of phrases which 
might cause alarm or stir up passion. With these private letters. and 
confidential communications it is quite different, and I believe that I 
owe you my frank opinion, without beating about the bush. 

May God help us out of these perplexities. 

Yours, ete., PASCUAL CERVERA. 


22 


CARTAGENA, February 12, 1898. 
His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO. 

My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: The Oquendo is ready and will 
go out this afternoon, after exchanging the large bills she has received 
for smaller ones or silver. She takes with her a little more than the 
10,000 pesetas mentioned in your telegram, not only because she would 
actually not have enough, but also in order to obviate the contrast in 
comparison with the Vizcaya, which carried 150,000 pesetasin gold. She 
lacks spare gear, and I have authorized her to buy the most indispensa- 
ble things in the Canaries, provided she can get them there. The lack 
of everything at this arsenal is quite incomprehensible. 

I am very anxious for this ship as well as the Vizcaya to complete 
their voyages and be incorporated with the fleet, either at Havana or 
in Spain, without running into the mouth of the wolf. I can not help 
thinking of a possible war with the United States, and I believe it would 
be expedient if I were given all possible information on the following 
points: 

1. The distribution and movements of the United States ships. 

2. Where are their bases of supplies? 

3. Charts, plans, and routes of what may become the scene of oper- 
ations. 

4. What will be the objective of the operations of this squadron— 
the defense of the Peninsula and Balearic islands, that of the Canaries 
or Cuba, or, finally, could their objective be the coasts of the United 
States, which would seem possible only if we had some powerful ally? 

5. What plans of campaign does the Government have in either 
event? I should like also to know the points where the squadron will 
find some resources and the nature of these; for, strange to say, here, 
for instance, we have not even found 4-inch rope, nor boiler tubes, nor 
other things equally simple. It would also be well for me to know 
when the Pelayo, Carlos V, Vitoria, and Numancia may be expected 
to be ready, and whether they will be incorporated with the squadron 
or form an independent division, and in that event what will be its 
connection with ours? If I had information on these matters I could 
go ahead and study and see what is best to be done, and if the critical 
day should arrive we could enter without vacillations upon the course 
we are to follow. This is the more needful for us, as their squadron is 
three or four times as strong as ours, and besides they count on the 
alliance of the insurgents in Cuba, which will put them in possession 
of the splendid Cuban harbors, with the exception of Havana and one 
or two others, perhaps. The best thing would be to avoid the war at | 
any price; but, on the other hand, it is necessary to put an end to the 
present situation, because this nervous strain can not be borne much 
longer. 

By this time you have probably received the telegram I sent you 
regarding the heavy artillery of the Colén, and I have nothing to add 
to the report which goes by this mail. To-day Guillén and I will look 


23 


into the matter of the 5.5-inch guns of these ships. There are not six 
useless ones, as I said in my telegram and as Guillén had told me, nor 
four, as I said in my letter yesterday, but five, two of them on board 
this ship, which can at once be exchanged for guns from the Princesa. 
I have talked with Guillén about the frequent injuries to the 2.24-inch 
Nordenfelt mounts, and it seems to me that it would perhaps be well to 
substitute for these mounts some of the old type, provided the conditions 
of resistance of the decks of these ships will admit of it. 


Yours, ete., 
PASCUAL CERVERA. 





[Confidential—Private.] 


THE MINISTER OF MARINE, 
Madrid, February 15, 1898, 
His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA. 

My DraR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I will answer your esteemed 
letters, in which you express your opinions with a sincerity and good 
will for which I am truly grateful to you. Last night a meeting was_ 
held of the council of ministers to discuss the serious Dupuy de Lome 
matter. With the acceptance of his resignation (without the usual 
formula, “Pleased with the zeal,” ete.), and with some explanations, 
this unpleasant incident will be disposed of satisfactorily. 

The Ool6n.—lI have received the report of the Junta, which expresses 
itself in favor of mounting at once on the Coldn 9.92-inch A. guns. 
Numbers 325 and 313 can not be accepted; to do so, even temporarily, 
would cause trouble, as the opinion on this question is final, and If it 
were carried to the Cortes, through the excitement of the press, it 
would place us in a very unfav6rable position. I believe it could be 
solved promptly by the delivery of two guns by the Ansaldo Company, 
with whom alone we will have to settle this matter, and this can be 
done by dint of tact and energy, a combination which is absolutely 
necessary in order to obtain satisfaction under our contract. 

In wy interview with the Italian ambassador, in which he explained 
the difficulties in which the Italian Government would be placed before 
the Chambers if we were to refuse guns of the type which they have 
accepted, I said to him: “It will not be difficult for me to prove to you 
by technical data that the guns which are offered to us are not accept- 
able. But the Italian navy, through the Ansaldo Company, can easily 
propose two other guns which, after having been tried according to our 
practice and found satisfactory, would be accepted.” Through differ- 
ent channels I know that this question will soon be solved to our satis- 
faction—the 5.5-inch guns. I understand the defect of the extractors 
and realize how it affects the rapid fire. This defect can not be 
remedied for the present. You ordered some made by hand, and this 
step was approved. 

The two guns of the Maria Teresa will be changed, and as to the new 


24 


cartridge cases, I have very specially impressed this matter upon Faura, 
who has gone to England. The decks of cards asked for are on the 
way. Bustamante torpedoes will be furnished as far as possible, for I 
have to bear in mind the Philippines and Cabrera Island. As to the 
squadron, I want to get it away from the departamento, but that is 
difficult just at present until we see what is decided as to the Colén; 
for it seems to me that the rear-admiral’s flag should not show itself 
with less than three ships. The Carlos V and Pelayo are to join the 
Squadron; when that is done, your force will be as large as is at pres- 
ent within our power to make it. 

As to the war with the United States, I will tell you my ideas about 
it. A division composed of the Numancia, Vitoria, Alfonso X1IT (or 
Lepanto), the destroyers Audaz, Osado, and Proserpina, and three tor- 
pedo boats would remain in Spain in the vicinity of Cadiz. In Cuba 
the Carlos V, Pelayo, Colén, Vizcaya, Oquendo, Maria Teresa, three 
destroyers, and three torpedo boats, in conjunction with the eight larger 
vessels of the Havana Navy-Yard, would take up a position to cover 
the channels between the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic and try to 
destroy Key West, where the United States squadron has established 
its principal base of provisions, ammunition, and coal. 

If we succeed in this, and the season is favorable, the blockade could 
be extended to the Atlantic coast, so as to cut off communications and 
commerce with Europe—all this subject to the contingencies which may 
arise from your becoming engaged in battles in which it will be decided 
who is to hold empire of the sea. For your guidance in these matters, 
you are acquainted with the preliminary plans of the staff of this min- 
istry, which I placed at your disposal, including the attack upon Key 
West. I will advise you as to the location of the United States ships 
and other data for which you ask. 

I will alsoinform you that twelve or fifteen steamers will be equipped 
as auxiliaries to our fleet, independent of privateering, and in confidence 
I will tell you that if any ship of real power can be found, either cruiser 
or battle ship, we shall buy it, provided it can be ready by April. My 
life is getting to be a burden, for to all that is already weighing upon 
me under the circumstances are now added the elections and candidates 
for representatives. 

I believe, my dear Admiral, that all the energy and all the good will 
of those who are wearing uniforms can do but very little toward 
preparing for the events which may happen. 

Yours, ete., 
SEGISMUNDO BERMBJO. 





CARTAGENA, February 16, 1898. 
His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO. 
My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I received your favor of yester- 
day, which I hasten to answer, leaving my letter open until to-morrow 
in case there should be anything new by that time. To the grave 


25 
Dupuy de Lome affair is added the news of the explosion of the Maine, 
which has just been reported to me, and I am constantly thinking of 
the Vizcaya, which should have arrived in New York to-day. God 
grant that no attempt is made against her. 

I shall be very glad if the matter of the armament of the Colén can 
be settled satisfactorily. The letter from Perrone Hijo which I sent 
you may have contributed to this. As Guillén is going to Madrid, I 
will say nothing to you concerning the 5.5-inch guns. I shall be very 
glad if the two of this ship are changed. I do not know when the 
Pelayo and the Carlos V will be able to join the fleet, but I suspect 
that they will not arrive in time. Of the former I know nothing at all, 
but 1 have received some news concerning the latter and certainly not 
very satisfactory as regards the time it will take for her to be ready. 

It seems to me that there is a mistake in the calculation of the 
forces we may count upon in the sad event of a war with the United 
States. In the Cadiz division I believe the Numancia will be lacking. 
I do not think we can count on the Lepanto. Of the Carlos V and the 
Pelayo I have already spoken. The Colén has not yet received her 
artillery, and if war comes she will be caught without her heavy guns. 

The eight principal vessels of the Havana station, to which you 
refer, have no military value whatever, and, besides, are badly worn- 
out; therefore they can be of very little use. In saying this I am not 
moyed by a fault-finding spirit, but only by a desire to avoid illusions 
that may cost us very dear. Taking things as they are, however sad 
it may be, it is seep that our naval force when compared with that of 
the United States is approximately in the proportion of 1 to 3. It 
therefore seems to me a dream, almost a feverish fancy, to think that 
with this force, attenuated by our long wars, we can establish the 
blockade of any port of the United States. A campaign against that 
country will have to be, at least for the present, a defensive or a disas- 
trous one, unless we have some alliances, in which case the tables may 
be turned. 

As for the offensive, all we could do would be to make some raids 
with our fast vessels, in order to do them as much harm as possible. It 
is frightful to think of the results of a naval battle, even if it should 
be a successful one for us, for how and where would we repair our dam- 
ages? I, however, will not refuse to do what may be judged necessary, 
but I think it proper to analyze the situation such as it is, without 
cherishing illusions which may bring about terrible disappointments. 

I will leave this painful subject and wait until to-morrow. 

The 17th.—Nothing has happened since yesterday and I will trouble 
you no further. The explosion of the Maine seems to have occurred 
under circumstances which leave no doubts of its being due to the ves- 
sel herself; nevertheless, I fear this may cause new complications and 
a painful position for the Vizcaya, which God forbid. 

Yours, etc., 
PASCUAL CERVEBRA. 


26 


{Private.] 


THE MINISTER OF MARINE, 
Madrid, February 23, 1898. 
His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA. 

My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: Pardon me for not answering your 
letters before. In spite of the Maine catastrophe—at least, so far—and 
in spite of the pessimistic tenor of some newspapers, our relations with 
the United States have in no manner changed. Eulate, who had to be 
given new instructions so that he might judiciously shorten his stay in 
New York, and use every manner of precautions, especially in coaling, 
has conducted himself with rare tact and refused to attend any festivi- 
ties, alleging as an excuse that he considers himself in mourning. 
But as usual there are other things that worry me. Sobral, whom I 
have telegraphed to come home immediately, is making unfavorable 
statements on the organization and discipline of the United States 
Navy in his interviews with reporters of United States newspapers, 
and remonstrances are beginning to arrive. 

How anxious some people are, my dear Admiral, to make themselves 
conspicuous and talk. It never occurs to military and naval attachés 
at Madrid to have these interviews with reporters, and express their 
opinions. Just think how this country would rise up in arms if the 
United States attaché should say that there was no discipline or organ- 
ization in our navy, or things on that order. As to your squadron, 
instructions have been sent to Cadiz for the delivery of the three 5.5- 
inch guns, and I am in receipt of advices from London that the first 
installment of cartridge cases will shortly be forwarded to Cadiz. 

As for the two gunsof the Colén, Ansaldo has been notified that Nos. 
325 and 313 are not acceptable, and that he must, within a very short 
time, snbmit two others for trial. He tells me that the Italian navy is 
very kindly disposed toward us; so 1 am hoping for a favorable solu- 
tion. However, you are aware that I am not a partisan of guns of that 
caliber. I think their military value is imaginary rather than real. 
Moreover, I have an idea that they might affect the stability of the 
Col6n. In my opinion the most desirable solution would be to take 
7.87-inch guns instead, as I believe that there is great military value in 
medium-caliber guns, owing to their rapidity of fire. Monstrous guns 
and torpedoes are terrible weapons, but only on special occasions. 

You will receive a less number of torpedoes than you asked for, 
because I have to bear in mind Cabrera Island and the Philippines. 
In reply to your questions relative to studies on the war. with the 
United States, I have sent you information on the location of their 
ships in commission, bases of supplies, coaling stations, etc. They 
really only have Key West; the others are at San Luis (Atlantic), 
and at their navy-yards on the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico. 
Their ships, as far as the draft is concerned, are calculated for banks 
extending a long distance into the sea, as at New Orleans, for instance. 


27 


You will realize what my situation is. I am working as hard as I 
can to assemble in Spain all the elements of power we have abroad. I 
am also trying to develop our forces, especially as to speed. As I have 
told you before, my idea, though perhaps somewhat optimistic, is to 
establish two centers of resistance, one in Cuba, the other in the pen- 
insula; and by the end of April our position will probably have changed. 
We shall have to be very careful, and if possible avoid until then any 
conflict with the United States; but we have to reckon with the excit- 
able nature of our nation and the evil of a press which it is impossible 
to control. 

I should like to make dispositions relative to your ships, but the 
Teresa is waiting for the 5.5-inch guns, and the Colon for a solution of 
the question as to her 9.84-inch armament. The Alfonso XI/I, although 
probably not permanently under your orders, must be included for the 
present while her trials are going on. When you consider the Colon 
ready for target practice let me know, and orders will be issued for her 
to go to Santa Pola. I will close this letter and see what I can do 
toward procuring funds for getting those ships ready—in this poor 
country which has to send 16,000,000 pesos to Cuba every month. 

Yours, ete., 
SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO. 


I am also looking after provisions, coal, and extra guns, 


{Confidential.} 


Honorep Sir: His excellency the chief of staff of the ministry sent me, with 
the confidential letter of the 19th instant, two reports and two statements relative 
to studies made with a view to a possible war with the United States. A careful 
examination of these documents, followed by profound reflection, has suggested to 
me the following considerations, which I respectfully submit to your excellency: 

If we compare the Navy of the United States with our own, counting only modern 
vessels capable of active service, taking the data in reference to the Americans as 
published in the December number of the Revista General de Marina and in our 
general statistics of the navy, we find that the United States have the battle ships 
Iowa, Indiana, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Texas; the armored cruisers Brooklyn and 
New York; the protected cruisers Atlanta, Minneapolis, Baltimore, Charleston, Chicago, 
Cincinnati, Columbia, Newark, San Francisco, Olympia, Philadelphia, and Raleigh, and 
the rapid unprotected cruisers Detroit, Marblehead, and Montgomery. Against this 
we have, following the same classification, the battleships Pelayo, Infanta Maria 
Teresa, Vizcaya, and Oquendo, armored cruiser Colén, and protected cruisers Carlos a 
Alfonso XIII, and Lepanto; no fast unprotected cruisers; and all this, supposing the 
Pelayo, Cérlos V, and Lepanto to be ready in time, and giving the desired value to 
the Alfonso XIII. 

I do not mention the other vessels on account of their small military value, surely 
inferior to that of the nine gunboats, from 1,000 to 1,600 tons each, six monitors still 
in service, the ram Katahdin, the Vesuvius, and the torpedo boats and destroyers, 
which I do not count. I believe that in the present form the comparison is accurate 
enongh. Comparing the displacements, we find that in battle ships the United 
States has 41,589 tons, against our 30,917 tons; in armored cruisers they have 17 yA71 


28 


tons, against our 6,840; in protected cruisers, 51,098, against 18,887; and in fast 
unprotected cruisers they have 6,287 and we have none. 

The total vessels good for all kinds of operations comprise 116,445 tons, against 
our 56,644 tons, or something less than one-half. In speed our battleships are 
superior to theirs, but not to their armored cruisers. In other vessels their speed is 
superior to ours. Comparing the artillery, and admitting that it is possible to fire 
every ten minutes the number of shots stated in the respective reports, and that only 
one-half of the pieces of less than 7.87 inch are fired, and supposing that the efficiency 
of each shot of the calibers 12.6, 11.8, 11, 9.84, 7.87, 6.3, 5.9, 5.5, 4.7, 3.94, 2.95, 2.24, 1.65, 
and 1.45 inches be represented by the figures 328, 270, 220, 156, 80, 41, 33, 27, 17, 10, 4, 2, 
and 1, which are the hundredths of the cubes of the numbers representing their cali- 
bers expressed in inches oe )s we find that the artillery power of 
the American battle ships is represented by 43,822, and that of ours by 29, 449; that 
of the American armored cruisers by 138,550, and that of ours (Colén) by 6,573; that 
of the American protected cruisers by 62,725, and that of ours by 14,600; that of the 
American unprotected cruisers by 12,300. 

Therefore, according to these figures the offensive power of the artillery of the 
United States vessels will be represented by 132,397, and that of ours by 50,622, or a 
little less than two-fifths of the enemy’s. To arrive at this appalling conclusion I 
have already said that it has been necessary to count the Pelayo and Carlos P, 
which probably will not be ready in time; the Lepanto, which surely will not be 
ready, and the Alfonso XII, whose speed renders her of a very doubtful utility. 

Now, to carry out any serious operations in a maritime war, the first thing neces- 
sary is to secure control of the sea, which can only be done by defeating the enemy’s 
fleet, or rendering them powerless by blockading them in their military ports. Can 
we do this with the United States? It is evident to me that we can not. And even 
if God should grant us a great victory, against what may be reasonably expected, 
where and how would we repair the damages sustained? Undoubtedly the port would 
be Havana, but with what resources? I am not aware of the resources existing 
there, but judging by this departamento, where there is absolutely nothing of all 
that we may need, it is to be assumed that the same condition exists everywhere, 
and that the immediate consequences of the first great naval battle would be the 
enforced inaction of the greater part of our fleet for the rest of the campaign, what- 
ever might be the result of that great combat. In the meantime the enemy would 
repair its damages inside of its fine rivers, aided by its powerful industries and 
enormous resources. 

This lack of industries and stores on our part renders it impossible to carry on an 
offensive campaign, which has been the subject of the two reports which his excel- 
lency the chief of staff has been kind enough to send me. These two reports con- 
stitute, in my judgment, a very thorough study of the operations considered, but 
the principal foundation is lacking, namely, the control of the sea, a prime necessity 
to their undertaking. For this reason they do not seem practicable to me, at any 
rate not unless we may count upon alliances which will make our naval forces at 
least equal to those of the United States, to attempt by a decisive blow the attain- 
ment of such control. 

If the control of the sea remains in the hands of our adversaries, they will imme- 
diately make themselves masters of any unfortified ports which they may want in 
the island of Cuba, counting, as they do, on the insurgents, and will use it as a base 
for their operations against us. The transportation of troops to Cuba would be 
most difficult and the success very doubtful, and the insurrection, without the check 
of our army, which would gradually give way, and with the aid of the Americans, 
would rapidly increase and become formidable. 

These reflections are very sad; but I believe it to be my unavoidable duty to set 
aside all personal considerations and loyally to represent to my country the resources 
which I believe to exist, so that, without illusions, it may weigh the considerations 


: 29 


for and against, and then, through the Government of His Majesty, which is the 
country’s legitimate organ, it may pronounce its decision. I am sure that this deci- 
sion will find in all of us energetic, loyal, and decided executors, for we have but 
one motto: ‘ The fulfillment of duty.” 
Yours, etc., PAscuUAL CERVERA. 
CARTAGENA, February 25, 1898. 
His Excellency the MINISTER OF MARINE. 





CARTAGENA, February 25, 1898. 
His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO. 

My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I am in receipt of your favor of 
the 23d and will answer your questions. I am very glad to know that 
our relations with the United States have not changed, for I believe a 
rupture would mean a terrible catastrophe for poor Spain, who has 
done all she can and is by no means ready for such a blow, which 
would surely be fatal. The reports and statistics forwarded to me by 
the staff of the ministry have suggested to me certain considerations, 
which I shall send to-morrow or the day after, also officially, the same 
as I received the reports that suggested them. 

We must not indulge in any illusions relative to our situation, 
although we are ready and willing to bear whatever trials God may be 
pleased to send us. It is one thing to meet with energy and manliness 
whatever may befall us, and another thing to indulge in illusions as to 
the results to be expected. Eulate’s conduct has afforded me much 
pleasure, and I have written to him at Havana, congratulating him. 
Sobral is disgusting. I can hardly believe that he could have been 
guilty of such indiscretion; I should rather believe that our numerous 
crafty enemies have invented all that. 

According to a letter received from Cadiz the 5.5-inch guns need a 
slight alteration in order to be installed in the mounts of this ship, and 
it would perhaps be easier to have that done at Cadiz. It is very 
important that the new 5.5-inch cartridge cases should arrive and be 
charged, to replace those we now have. I am glad the Colén is almost 
ready. I believe you are right; the ship would be worth more with 
four 7.87-inch guns than with two 9.84-inch, which are about equivalent 
in weight; but as she is built for the latter it can not be helped. I 
have received the royal order regarding the torpedoes, but the torpedoes 
themselves have not yet arrived. 

I realize how hard you must be working and how many disagreeable 
things you have to contend with and as we all have who love our 
country. I believe you are really optimistic in your views about a 
rupture with the United States. You think that if we can hold off 
until April our relative positions will be considerably changed. I 
believe that is an illusion, for, from what I know, it is my opinion that 
the Pelayo and Carlos V will not be ready by that time, and at the rate 
we are now progressing it is very doubtful whether the Colén will be, ¢ 


30 


Nor will the Lepanto be ready, and the Alfonso XIII will never be 
anything more than she is now. The Vitoria may perhaps be ready 
for service, but the Numancia will not be. The Coldn can go out for 
target practice whenever it may be desirable. 


Yours, etc., 
PASCUAL CERVERA. 





CARTAGENA, February 26, 1898. 
His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO. 

My DraAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: When I received yesterday, the 
letter in which, among other things, you asked me if the Colon could 
go out for target practice, I answered that the vessel was ready, and 
at the same time I took measures so that the cartridge cases which 
might be used in that practice should be recharged, but it appears 
that there is no furnace in which they can be reannealed, nor a machine 
to re-form the cartridge cases. The extra charges which the vessel 
brought (72 per gun) are therefore useless. | 

To obviate this, two ways are open, one a slow one, which is to bring 
the appliances that are lacking and to construct a furnace in which to 
recharge the cartridge cases; and the other, a rapid one, which is to 
purchase cartridge cases for the charges on hand, and this could be 
done at once, as the manufacturers have some on hand which they would 
let ushave. Moreu has asked them and they answered that they had, 
and gave the prices, but those were unintelligible. For this reason I 
telegraphed you suggesting the purchase of the cartridge cases compris- 
ing 720 5.9 inch and 432 4.7 inch. Isend to-day the official letter which 
lI announced yesterday. Its conclusions are indeed afilicting, but can 
we afford to cherish illusions ? 

Do we not owe to our country not only our life, if necessary, but the 
exposition of our beliefs? Iam very uneasy about this. I ask myself 
if it is right for me to keep silent, and thereby make myself an accom- 
plice in adventures which will surely cause the total ruin of Spain. And 
for what purpose? To defend an island which was ours, but belongs to 
us no more, because even if we should not lose it by right in the war we 
have lost it in fact, and with it all our wealth and an enormous number 
of young men, victims of the climate and bullets, in the defense of what 
is now no more than aromantic ideal. Iurthermore, I believe that this 
opinion of mine should be known by the Queen and by the whole council 
of ministers. 

Yours, ete., PASCUAL CERVERA, 





(Private.] 


THE MINISTER OF MARINE, 


Madrid, February 28, 1898. 
His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA. 


My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I am in receipt of your confi. 
dential communication and letter, both on the same subject. I want 


31 


to wait till I have somewhat recovered from the painful impression 
caused by the reading of your letters before answering them. As to 
the cartridge cases of the Colén, I am trying to find the means I lack 
for solving the question you suggest. 

Yours, etc., SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO. 


CARTAGENA, March 3, 1898. 
His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO. 

My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: Yesterday I received your letter 
of the 28th, and I regret very much the painful impression caused by 
my remarks; but Iam not surprised, because they are truly sad, and 
still, perhaps, they fall beneath the mark, judging from everything one 
sees. In your very letter we have another proof of this in the fact that 
the difficulty of obtaining cartridge cases for the Coldén arises from the 
want of means (money), and this on the eve, perhaps, of a war against 
the richest nation in the world. The question is to recharge the old 
cases. This was asked for relative to some empty 5.5-inch cases which 
it was ascertained arein this departamento, and the answer is that they 
can not be recharged here. 

I do not wish to dwell too much on this point, for no practical result 
could be obtained. But every detail points out either our lack of means 
or our defective organization, and, above all, our utter lack of prepara- 
tion. I have deemed it my duty to express my opinions to the proper 
authorities—that is, to you and to the whole Government through 
you—clearly and without beating around the bush. Now, let orders be 
given to me; I will carry them out with energy and decision. I am 
ready for the worst. 

Yours, etc., PASCUAL CERVERA. 





(Private and confidential. ] 


THE MINISTER OF MARINE, 
7 Madrid, March 4, 1898. 
His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA. 

My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I notified you that, when I should 
have recovered somewhat from the painful impression caused by the 
reading of your confidential letter, I should answer it, and I now do so, 
and will first take up the comparative study of the United States naval 
forces and ours, which, taken absolutely as you have done, omitting 
some of our vessels at Havana, which are available for a conflict with 
the United States, show a difference of tonnage, but not so excessive 
as would appear from your lines. 

In my opinion, the matter should be studied from the standpoint of 
the present distribution of the United States forces, remembering that 
it will be to their interest to maintain the ships now in the Pacific for 
the protection of San Francisco and the San Diego arsenal, as also 


32 


their costly trans-Pacific liners plying between the former city and 
Australia and China, and also to protect the Hawaiian Islands, about 
to be annexed to the United States, for which reason naval forees are 
being maintained there. 

With your good judgment you will understand that the long and 
difficult voyage which these forces, among them the Oregon, would have 
to make in order to join the Atlantic forces, leaving the Pacific region 
unprotected, could not be effected without the knowledge of others, 
and so far all such knowledge is absolutely lacking. I must therefore 
refer you to the inclosed statement. While it shows deficiencies, which 
the Government is endeavoring to remedy at any cost by the acquisi- 
tion of new elements, if only in the matter of speed, they do not exist 
to such an extent as stated in comparison with the United States 
Atlantic Squadron. There is no doubt that, in order to concentrate 
our nucleus of forces, we shall require some time—the whole month of 
April, in my estimation. 

Since I have been in charge of this department His Majesty’s Gov- 
ernment has known the situation of the great nucleus of our naval 
forces, which are being remodeled or repaired abroad, and in conformity 
with such knowledge the Government has endeavored, and is endeavor- 
ing by every possible means, with a view also to the general interests 
of the country, to pursue in its relations with the United States a policy 
of perfect friendship, although at times points have come up which were 
not easy of solution. 

But with your good judgment you will understand, and I. want there- 
fore to remove some misapprehensions regarding the island of Cuba. 
Our flag is still flying there, and the Government, to meet the senti- 
ments of the people, even at the cost of many sacrifices, desires that 
this Spanish colony should not be separated from our territory, and is 
trying by every possible means—political, international, and military— 
to solve satisfactorily the Cuban problem. That is the prevailing 
opinion of the country, and it conforms its actions thereto. As already 
stated, the Government is acquainted with our situation, and for that 
reason is endeavoring to collect all possible resources at Havana har- 
bor, fortifying it so that it may serve as a base for our naval forces, 
equipping it with a dock, already in operation, where our ships will be 
able to repair slight damages, for it is my opinion that it will not be 
possible, either on our side or the enemy’s, to repair those injuries which 
may be caused by the action of a battle in the short period of time in 
which international military campaigns are enacted, compared with the 
material interests they affect. 

The other harbors of the island, such as Cienfuegos, Santiago de 
Ouba, etc., are prepared to be closed by means of torpedoes. In your 
estimate you do not count for anything the effect of homogeneous 
troops, well trained and disciplined, as against the United States crews 
of mercenaries (mercenarias), and you might find historical facts, evok- 


33 


ing sad memories for us, to confirm what I say. I will close, never 
doubting for one moment that you and all of us will fulfill the sacred 
duty which our country imposes upon us, and in giving you my opinions 
in answer to yours there is nothing that I desire more than peace. 
Yours, etc., 
SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO. 





North Atlantic Squadron—Possible formation. 

















United States. Tons. Spain. Tons. 

CNN OEM Met ae co scccictnadcssnsceseecers By 200 HA VIZCR VS senekescabreicadtaerseeseiees. 7, 000 
ll A ee LOT SSORPEL BIB V Op sree urenc gets tec weaes or eles 9, 900 
MASS MEBOLES Ss canst cesca cone cevcecess- LOO t CORlogt V4 sceccee tse cee. cere ee ea) 9, 250 
OREO RE Ee kes nine pws 65 gs awagsic ese SToLoc Masia Oesiks swcus cece oe otek a doses cee 7, 000 
See iee eee swcccuccetccateacesss SERS PBs (a Fe Bee lee A pil Seay ed pe ta 7, 000 
LUISE A + ee eee Sart etl LalitcOlOI: 2oe5 tite don wai chk eke nahn ely oct 6, 800 
EE ire adc pacceancsccccrsceens ACU TALOORG ALD ceuae yet tecce cere ce: 4, 826 
SNE aay he's vw awisinc ows dciewcoucs. mpnO0 | NE PNSOHAUR oe oe lpsneacccgas shiewe ccc} 1, 064 
INE es See caus necssccscuse Mee a POL LONRG AL acd esto scare cadence cette os 3, 900 
UI kr 1,071 | Venadito-....... Se tisinds coos eae c tee rece 1, 189 
UO Ss ee ae 3,600 | Reina Mercedes. 2... 2c ccecccccnnccnce 3, 900 
erniown, dispatch boat J. 20... ccccsecsleccccucns Entant Lan bela a cssee s Stacks peeeacs 1,189 

PERU IODNEE Ooo... cacteessssccees 66, 537 Total tongagen. ss deuce ec Leeee a 62, 818 
Five torpedo boats; average speed, 21 Three destroyers apd three torpedo 

knots. boats; average speed, 25 kuots. 
ee eae 
@ 63,018. 
{Private.] 


THE MINISTER OF MARINE, 


March 5, 1898. 
His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA. 


My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I am in receipt of a telegram 
from Ansaldo, in which he says: “We yesterday repeated our request 
to Messrs. Armstrong, of Elswick. They telegraphed would order 
ammunition for guns by letter, which we shall communicate to you. 
The constructing firm uses great diligence, but can not furnish cartridge 
cases before August. We make another request of the Italian navy.— 
G. Ansaldo.” 

Yours, eta, | SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO, 


{Confidential.} 


CARTAGENA, March 7, 1898. 
flis Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMBEJO. 

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: Yesterday I received your per- 
sonal letter of the 4th, to which I am about to reply, but you must first 
permit me to give you a general idea of our situation asI seeit. That 
it is the intention of the United States to engage us in a war appears 
beyond all doubt, aud it therefore becomes more important each day to 

10742——3 


34 


examine into the advantages and disadvantages which such a war may 
have for us. 

Inspired by these ideas, I deemed it my duty as a patriot to reply to 
the official communication through which I was advised of the distri- 
bution of the American vessels and the condition of certain points on 
the United States coasts, and I did so in my confidential letter of Feb- 
ruary 25 last. To-day, feeling at liberty to express my ideas more 
freely in a confidential letter, 1 will reply to your communication. 

An examination of our forces, based upon what I already knew and 
upon recent information and observation, not only confirms what I 
said, but shows it to be still worse. I have visited the Vitoria, on 
which I counted, and from my examination of her | have drawn the 
conviction that we can not count on her for the present conflict. 
Neither does my information permit me to count on the Pelayo, Carlos V, 
nor Numancia.! And yet, as this opinion is not based upon personal 
observation, I include them in the inclosed statement, solely because 
you have included them in yours. | 

Whatever may be the direction given to the conflict—either war, 
negotiations direct or through a third party, an arbitrator, or other- 
wise—the longer the decision is delayed the worse it will be for us. If 
it is war, the longer it takes to come the more exhausted we will be. If 
it is negotiation of any kind, the longer it is postponed the greater will 
be the demands, each time more irritating, which will be presented by 
the United States, and to which we will have to yield in order to gain 
time in the vain hope of improving our military position. And as our 
position can not be improved, let us see what we can expect from a war 


under such conditions. 
It would be foolish to deny that what we may reasonably expect is 


defeat, which may be glorious, but all the same defeat, which would 
cause us to lose the island in the worst possible manner. But even sup- 
posing an improbability—that is, that we should obtain a victory—that 
would not change the final result of the campaign. The enemy would 
not declare hi:wself defeated, and it would be foolish for us to pretend 
to overcome the United States in wealth and production. The latter 
would recover easily, while we would die of exhaustion, although victo- 
rious, and the ultimate result would always be a disaster. 

Only in case we could count on some powerful ally could we aspire 
to obtain a satisfactory result. But, besides having to discount the 
high price to be paid for such an alliance, even then we would only be 
postponing the present conflict for a few years, when it would become 


1 This prediction was actually fulfilled, since, after the signing cf the peace pro- 
tocol, it was necessary to send the Pelayo back to La Seyne to be completed, and 
even before the signing the 3.94-inch guns of the Carlos V had to be dismounted. 
The Numancia is in the arsenal at La Carraca receiving her artillery, and it can not 
be said when this will be ready. None of these vessels, therefore, were ready at the 
declaration of war. 


: 35 


graver than it is to-day, as is the present insurrection in comparison 
with the last. Even admitting the possibility of retaining Cuba, this 
island would cost us enormous sacrifices by the necessity of being con- 
stautly armed to the teeth. And here the problem, already pointed out 
by somebody, arises, Is the island worth the ruin of Spain? (Silvela, 
in Burgos.) 

I do not speak on the subject of privateering, because it seems to me 
that no man acquainted with history can attach any value to privateer- 
ing enterprises, which nowadays are almost impossible on account of 
the character of modern vessels. Although I do not attach much 
importance to certain details which can have but little influence on the 
general events, I shall nevertheless speak of some upon which you 
touch, in order to set forth my point of view in answering your letter. 
The accompanying statement, which appears to me to be more correct 
than the one inclosed with your letter, shows that our forces in the 
Atlantic are, approximately, one-half of those of the United States, 
both as regards tonnage and artillery power. 

I have never thought of the forces which the United States have in 
the Pacific and Asia in connection with the development of events in 
the West Indies; but I have always considered these forces a great 
danger for the Philippines, which have not even a shadow of a resist- 
ance to oppose them. And as regards the American coasts of the 
Pacific, the United States has no anxiety about them. I think you are 
mistaken in believing that during the month of April our situation 
will change. As I have said above, I am sure that neither the Carlos 
V, the Pelayo, the Vitoria, nor the Numancia will be ready, and nobody 
knows how we will be as regards 5.5 inch ammunition. 

It seems sure that by the end of April the 10-inch guns of the Colén 
will not be mounted. Even if I were mistaken, then our available 
forces in the West Indies would be 49 per cent of those of the Amer- 
icans in tonnage and 47 per cent in artillery. Our only superiority 
would be in torpedo boats and destroyers provided all of them arrive 
there in good order. I do not know exactly what are the sentiments 
of the people concerning Cuba, but I am inclined to believe that the 
immense majority of Spaniards wish for peace above all things. But 
those who so think are the ones who suffer and weep inside of their 
own houses, and do not talk so loud as the minority, who profit by the 
continuation of this state of affairs. However, this is a subject which 
is not for me to analyze. 

Our want of means is such that some days ago three men went over- 
board while manning the rail for saluting, through the breaking of an 
old ridge rope. <A new line had been asked for fifty days ago, but it 
has not yet been replaced. .More than one official letter has been writ- 
ten on this interesting subject. In times past, forty-three days after 
the Herndn Cortés was laid down, the vessel was at sea. It is now fifty- 
one days since I requested the changing of certain tubes in the boilers 


36 : 


of a steam Jaunch of the Teresa, and I do not yet know when it will be 
finished. This will probably be the proportion between us and the 
United States in the repair of damages, in spite of our having the 
Havana dock, which is the principal thing, but not all. 

As for the crews, I do not know them, but I may say that the crews 
that defeated our predecessors at Trafalgar had been recruited in the 
same way. I beg that you will not consider this an argument against 
yours, for that would be accusing me of great presumption in speaking 
of what I do not know. It is simply a thought that occurs to me. 
These are my loyal opinions, and for the sake of the nation J express 
them to you with the request that you will transmit them to the Gov- 
ernment. If you should deem it advisable for me to express them per- 
sonally, I am ready to do so at the first intimation. After I have done 
this, thus relieving my conscience of a heavy weight, I am quite ready 
to fulfill the comparatively easy duty of conducting our forces wherever 
I may be ordered, being sure that all of them will do their duty. 

Yours, etc., 
PASCUAL CERVERA. 


NortH ATLANTIC SQUADRON.—COMPARISON WITH THE UNITED STATES FLEET. 


Vessels more or less protected now composing the squadron, or unprotected, but with a speed 
of over 15 knots. 

















Spain. United States. 

Displace-| Arma- Displace-| Arma- 

ment. ment. ment. ment. 
WAZCRV Bivercuccceccecsccuiennee 7,000 Git30"| New Vorkgocesecccaseueeeeens 8, 200 6, 400 
Oquendos cess sseeaseccieccies i 7, 000 6,130\) Indiana. coos. scsecsses sec ceee 10, 288 9, 304 
M. dela Ensenada.:...60..26: 1, 064 1*°100)) Massachusetts .cce-secesee ee 10, 288 9, 304 
— —— LOXaS8Jccck ceapesicccoetracens 6, 315 4, 550 
15, 064 1398604) Brooklyn 225-5. coseseeeeeeeee 9, 271 7, 880 
OW diacnmiscisicia a/ssaise(vieetae eens 11, 410 8, 360 
23° per |(23> per |; Montromery sce seceedeses 2, 089 4,100 
cent. cent, -.| Marblehead:. 2... .scesncecuse 2, 089 4,100 
Detroit tive concce eee 2, 0&9 4, 100 
‘POLTOLE ccoscu cocccesecumeseere 3, 600 2, 896 





65, 639 60, 994 
To these may be positively 





added: 

Infanta Maria Teresa ...--.... 7, 000 6, 1308 Minneapolis wcccectaceeaee cease 7,375 4,790 
CVIATO DAL OOM eos oaan-s a crciinis 6,840 | a@8,490 | Columbia............. io nea 7, 375 4,790 
FAN LONSOPN LL Lereercn wane ce se wae 4, 826 4, 340 —— | —____ 
; ———_- | —--- -— 14, 750 9, 580 

18, 666 18, 960 

Doubtful additions: : 

(ROIRVOl-peaccscecsiccravcuesees 9,917 6,987 |*A tanta... senccesecmecemenmene 3, 000 4,270 
Carloswl jesensdedecpolet cos eock 9, 250 5,520 |) Charleston. see sence seeeees 3, 730 4, 570 
——-- ——|-—---- Chicagortciteccasee cones 4, 500 4, 470 
19, 167 12, 607.|, Newark = 2. > eee eae ee 4, 098 6, 740 
Ehiadelphiaencs-sccecneeeee 4, 324 7, 640 
Dolphin eo. is ences ceneaeeees 1, 485 700 
FY OrKtOWD-ceccsececeteameee 1, 703 3, 320 


22, 840 31,710 





a Without the 9.84-inch guns, the value of which is represented by 1,248. 
In the South Atlantic they have the Cincinnati, 3,200 displacement; 4,795 armament. 


All the other vessels have very little military value, with the excep- 
tion of the torpedo boats and destroyers, not mentioned in this state- 
ment, and also the Katahdin and Vesuvius. 


37 


{Private.] 


THE MINISTER OF MARINE, 
Madrid, March 13, 1898, 
His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA. 

My DEAR ADMIRAL AND I’RIEND: I take advantage of this being 
Sunday to write to you in answer to your confidential lines on our 
respective opinions relative to the events which may develop in Cuba, 
if it should come to the worst. I have informed the Government of our 
deficiencies, and I repeat to you what I have said before, namely, that 
the Government will act prudently in order to maintain friendly rela- 
tions with the United States, and try by every means to ward off any 
conflict, since the opinion as to our unfavorable situation is unanimous. 

I will now speak of matters relative to your squadron and the reen- 
forcement which it may receive. I have a telegram from Ansaldo, 
saying that the question of the 9.84-inch armament of the Coldn will 
be solved this month, by means of two new guns at Spezia. He also 
tells me that he has applied to the Italian navy for 5.9 and 4.7 inch 
cartridge cases. The first installment of 5.5-inch cartridge cases is now 
on its way to Cadiz, and others will soon follow. 

By letters from Ferrandiz I am advised that the engines will be tried 
by the 15th, and that the ship will be ready to go out by the beginning 
of April. The Carlos V, I am told, will also be ready by the middle of 
that month. 

What the newspapers say as to the purchase of ships is true, although 
I deny it. I doso because it is owing to publicity that the negotiations 
for the two Brazilian cruisers,! which were commenced under favorable 
auspices, came to naught. My efforts are bent on cruisers, torpedo 
boats, and even steamers of over 1,000 tons displacement and 20 knots 
speed to serve as dispatch boats. The squadron is being kept at Car- 
tagena, because it has not been decided what course it is to follow. 
It will probably go to Cadiz, but the Colon, if her armament can be 
completed, which is to be hoped, will have to go to Genoa, and that 
will leave only the Maria Teresa, Alfonso XIII, which has not yet 
completed her endless trials, and the Destructor. 

Arrangements have been made to send the testing and recharging 
machinery to Cartagena. 

I will close now. I leave it to you how arduous my workis. ‘To-day, 
Sunday, which the Lord has set aside as a sacred day of rest, I com- 
menced my work at 8 o’clock in the morning and close it at 9 o’clock 
at night with these lines. 

Yours, etc., SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO. 


1The two cruisers referred to are the Almirante Abreu and the Amazonas, which 
were purchased by the United States while Spain was negotiating for them. They 
are now the New Orleans and the Albany.—O. N. IL. 


38 


{Confidential.] 


CARTAGENA, March 16, 1898. 
His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJo. 

My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: Yesterday I received your favor 
of the day before, by which I see that our opinions agree concerning 
the conflict which threatens our unfortunate country. As both of us 
are animated by the best desires, such agreement was sure tocome. It 
also appears that the whole Government participates in this opinion, 
but I am afraid that there may be some minister who, while believing 
that we are not in favorable conditions, may have been dazzled by the 
names of the vessels appearing in the general statement, and may not 
realize how crushing a disproportion really exists, especially if he is not 
thoroughly aware of our lack of everything that is necessary for a 
naval war, such as supplies, TUM MEE coal, provisions, etc. We 
have nothing at all. 

If this fear of mine is well founded, I think it is of the greatest 
importance that the whole council of ministers, without exception, be 
fully and clearly informed of our terrible position, so that there may 
not remain the least doubt that the war will simply lead us to a terrible 
disaster, followed by a humiliating peace and the most frightfal ruin; 
for which reason it is necessary not only to avoid the war, but to find 
some solution which will render it impossible in the future. If this is 
not done, the more time is spent the worse will be the final result, 
whether it is peace or war. 

From this reasoning, as clear as daylight to me, it appears that since 
we can not go to war without meeting with a certain and frightful dis- 
aster, and since we can not treat directly with the United States, whose 
bad faith is notorious, perhaps there is nothing left for us to do but to 
settle the dispute through arbitration or mediation, provided the enemy 
accepts. However, this order of consideration does not come within 
my sphere of duty, which, as the chief of the squadron, is limited to 
reporting the state of military affairs and then carrying out the orders 
of the Government. The latter, however, must be fully informed of 
the situation. Before dropping this subject to answer the other points 
of your letter, permit me to repeat what I said in my last communica- 
tion, and to which no reply has been made in yours. 

Perhaps it would be well for me to inform the members of the cab- 
inet myself. If this is deemed expedient I am ready to start at the first 
intimation. Concerning the available forces and what may be expected 
of them, I will be very glad if Ansaldo carries out his promise about 
the 10-inch guns of the Colén. He has disappointed us so many times 
already. The 5.5-inch cartridge cases are absolutely necessary. You 
know that this vessel has only 30, and it is to be supposed that the 
stores of the Oquendo and Vizcaya are not better supplied. For the 
present the firm is supplying only 100 per week, and supposing that 
the first ones have already arrived or will arrive in Cadiz in the near 
future, at this rate we will not have finished until October. Then they 


39 


have to be charged, ete.; therefore they can never be ready in time for 
the present conflict. I thought I would have the first ones by January, 
and I will not have them until April. 

The engines of the Pelayo are ready and the vessel can sail, but how 
about the secondary battery and the armored redoubt? ‘These will not 
be ready. If the old battery could be mounted temporarily! But I 
doubt it; the ports will not permit it. I have heard it said that the 
erew which brought the Pelayo was taken from the Vitoria, which is 
another proof of our excessive poverty. I shall be very glad if the 
Carlos V is soon ready, but I understand that the 3.94-inch battery has 
not yet been mounted, and then the trials are to be made. I never 
had great confidence in the purchasing of vessels. 

Too much fuss is made over every detail by ignorant people. It was 
through this that we lost the Garibaldi, and now we have lost the Bra- 
zilian cruisers. In fact, we have only secured the Colon, an excellent 
ship, but which has not yet been equipped, and the Valdés. And sup- 
posing that we had everything our own way and that Providence should 
grant us a victory, which is highly improbable, we would then find 
ourselves in the condition explained in my last and which it is not nec- 
essary to repeat. It only rests for me now to be informed of the desti- 
nation of the fleet. 

I believe the Teresa ought to be in Cadiz, where the cartridge cases 
are to be recharged, and she could sail as soon as all her guns were 
mounted. Really, if the Coldn goes to Italy, the admiral’s flag will not 
be very well represented, but this consideration should not be placed 
above the requirements of the service, and if the dissolution of the fleet 
should make it advisable I could lower my flag and leave the ship, and 
hoist it again when the ships now scattered were united again in a body, 
unless the reunion should be for a few days only. ‘I say this to you to 
remove all idea of personal considerations, which I have always made . 
subject to the interests of the service. Moreover, the flag is the same 
here as at Cadiz. 

When the English fleet arrived there were three ships in the harbor— 
the Navarra, with the flag of the Captain-General; this ship (Teresa), 
with my fg, and the Colon, with that of Paredes. I will trouble you 
no more; believe me, [ regret having troubled you so much, but the 
voice of my conscience, which, animated by love for my country, tells 
me that I thus fulfill a high duty, is what impels me to do so in order 
to aid, in this way also, the old and cherished friend to whose lot it has 
fallen to bear this heavy cross. 

Yours, etc., PASCUAL CERVERA. 


| CARTAGENA, March 19, 1898. 
His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO. 
My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: When I received your cipher 
telegram night before last, | asked for rectification of the name of the 
ship to be fitted out, but with a strong presentiment that it was the 


40 


Colén. I had her enter the dock yesterday morning, and at once com- 
menced coaling, which I hope to complete to-day, although over 500 
tons are required to replenish her bunkers. When I received your 
other cipher telegram this evening, I answered at once, and will now 
add that this ship (Maria Teresa) is already in the dock, and we are 
about to begin putting in the 180 tons of coal which she needs. The 
gun that is ready will be mounted in a little while. It is a pity that 
we do not have the other two; they will not be ready for ten or twelve 
days. 

In the way of 5.5-inch ammunition we carry 78 rounds per gun, but 
of these only 30 cartridges have been pronounced serviceable by 
Guillén. I saw Pedro Aguirre yesterday and asked him concerning 
the ships at Havana. He says that there is but one ship ready, 
namely, the Venadito. I had him repeat this statement several times. 
He also told me that the dock did not work. If the defects can not be ° 
remedied we will have to do something about the Vizcaya, as she has 
not had her bottom cleaned for eight months. As I know nothing 
further than what your telegrams tell me, I am very much perplexed 
and do not know what orders to issue relative to the berthing of petty 
officers. Could you make any suggestions, I should be greatly obliged 
to you. I presume you have received my letter of the 15th, which I 
hereby contirm. 

Yours, ete., PASCUAL CERVERA. 





[Private.] 


THE MINISTER OF MARINE, 
Madrid, March 21, 1898. 
His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA. 

My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: You ask me about the commis- 
sion of the Colén. Itis as follows: Since it is desirable to shorten the 
itinerary laid down for the torpedo-boat flotilla there is some idea of 
having the Colén accompany it to Puerto Rico. As this ship can not 
enter there, she would have go to St. Thomas for coal and return to 
Spain to complete her armament. As two captains will take part in 
this expedition, the second in command of the squadron is to go. Ido 
not know yet whether this will be carried out. As it is posssible that 
she may go to Cadiz when she has finished mounting her guns, she can 
get her charts there and begin to take on the cartridge cases. 

Yours, etc., 
SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO. 


CARTAGENA, March 27, 1898. 
His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO. 
My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: Your favor of the 24th was 
received yesterday. I am ready and waiting for orders to proceed to 
Cadiz. 


Al 


As I stated in one of my former letters, I take with me all of the 
5.5-inch projectiles which are in this departamento, namely: 





Ball Cartridges... .- 2.222 ooo. one oe ene cee nee cee ta ene cence wees 500 
Ordinary shells of English manufacture .....-...----- .----. +--+ ee ee eee eee 333 
Ordinary shells made at Cartagena ...... ......------ +22 oe eee eee ee eee eee eee 216 
Segmental shells of English manufacture.......--.--.-----------------+------ 67 
Segmental shells made at Cartagena..-........--.--- 2-2 - eee ees eee eee 112 

MMIETERCEOT DLO |OCCLER Ir. costes seuss as can cece susccticentalecceceen Lpaeo 


The Cadiz Departamento, which I asked on the 21st for a statement 
of the projectiles on hand, answered that they have: Ball cartridges, 
27; ordinary shells, 460; segmental shells, 150; steel shells, 40; total 
number of projectiles, 677, which, added to those now on board, shipped 
from this Departamento, namely, 1,228, make a total of 1,905; but 
as the number of cartridge cases contracted for is, I believe, 4,500, we 
are short 2,595. Even if we use all the shells that we have, some of 
which, of English manufacture, are quite defective. Moreover, we 
should have spare ones for those that are fired. The shell workshop 
here is not in operation, and if you think well of it, an order might be 
issued to resume work. I think the Colén should have target practice, 
but at anchor, not under way. It would be worth while to stop a day 
to that end, or have her go out from Cadiz expressly for that purpose. 

Yours, etc., . ; 
PASCUAL CERVERA. 


PUERTO REAL, April 2, 1898. 
His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO. 

My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: It seems hardly credible that 
since my arrival here I have not had time to write to you, as I have 
been wanting to do. But owing to long distances and many things to 
be done I have not been able to write. In spite of the heavy weather 
we arrived safe and sound, and the injuries of the Colén-were of much 
less importance than I thought at first. Only a few tubes were dis- 
abled, and-for that reason I asked you by telegram to procure from 
Niclausse the 50 tubes which he has ready. I have made requests for 
the coal and lubricating material, in order that we may always be ready 
for any emergency. My fears are realized, for the conflict is approach- 
ing at a rapid rate, and the Coldén does not have her heavy guns; the 
Carlos V has not been delivered, and her 3.94-inch armament is not 
mounted; on the Pelayo the redoubt is not completed, and I believe she 
lacks her secondary battery; the Vitoria is without her armament, and 
of the Numancia we had better not speak. , 

But after all, it is well that the end is coming; the country can not 
stand this state of affairs any longer, and any arrangement will be 
good, however bad it may seem, if it can save us from lamenting a 
great disaster, which we may expect if we go to war with ships half 


42 


armed, and only a few of them, and with want of means and excess of 
incumbrances. I shall take along all the ammunition that is ready, so 
that these two ships, such as they are, can be counted upon at any 
moment. The circumstance that the Vizcaya and Oquendo are so far 
away is very unfortunate, because if they are not incorporated soon 
they may be separated from the squadron. 


Yours, ete., 
PASCUAL CERVERA. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


Capiz, April 4, 1898. 

I believe it very dangerous for torpedo-boat flotilla to continue voyage. As I have 
no instructions, deem it expedient to go to Madrid to receive them and form plan of 
campaign. The Canaries trouble me; they are in dangerous situation. If during 
my absence it should be necessary for squadron to go out, it could do so under second 
in command, 


The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera). 


MADRID, April 4, 1898. 
Your cipher telegram received. In these moments of international crisis no defi- 
nite plans can be formulated, 


(Private.] 


THE MINISTER OF MARINE, 
April 4, 1898, 
His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA. 

My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I am in receipt of your telegram 
and letter. In these moments of an international crisis, while diplo- 
macy is exerting its influence and while a truce is being discussed, and 
even the situation of the respective naval forces, nothing can be for- 
mulated or decided. Next time I shall write you more fully. 


Yours, ete., 
SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO. 


Capiz, April 6, 1898. 
His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO. 

My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: In last night’s mail I received 
your letter of the 4th, having previously received your telegram con- 
cerning the same matter. It is precisely on account of the general 
anxiety prevailing that it is very important to think of what is to be 
done, so that, if the case arises, we may act rapidly and with some 
chance of efficiency and not be groping about in the dark, or, like Don 
Quixote, go out to fight windmills and come back with broken heads. 
If our naval forces were superior to those of the United States the ques- 
tton would be an easy one; all we would have to do would be to bar 
their way. 


43 


But as our forces, on the contrary, are very inferior to theirs, it would 
be the greatest of follies to attempt to bar their way, which could only 
be done by giving them a decisive naval battle. That would simply 
mean a sure defeat, which would leave us at the mercy of the enemy, 
who could easily take a good position in the Canaries, and by estab- 
lishing there a base of operations crush our commerce and safely bom- 
bard our maritime cities. It is therefore absolutely necessary to decide 
what we are going to do, and, without disclosing our proposed move- 
ments, be in a position to act when the time comes. 

This was the substance of ny telegram, and my ideas have not 
changed since then. If we are caught without a plan of war, there 
will be vacillations and doubts, and after defeat there may be some 
humiliation and shame. You will understand these frank and loyal 
statements of an old friend and comrade, who desires nothing more 
than to help the Government and act with circumspection. 


Yours, ete., 
PASCUAL CERVERA. 


The Governor-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of Colonies (R. Giron). 


: Havana, April 7, 1898. 
Public opinion remains dignified and quiet, though somewhat excited by reports 
of impending war. Some dissatisfaction expressed over lack of ships in island. 
Those now here not in condition to render service. Detention of flotilla at Cape 
Verde leaves our coasts unprotected. You know international situation better than 
I under present circumstances, and will realize expediency of sending ships. 


The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera). 


MADRID, April 7, 1898. 
Squadron must go out to-morrow. Proceed to St. Vincent, Cape Verde. Imme- 
diately upon arrival take coal and water. Communicate with semaphore Canaries 
to notify you of anything new. Instructions, which will be amplitied, are in sub- 
stance to protect torpedo-boat flotilla, which is placed under your orders, Amazonas 
and San Francisco being in Europe. These are the only American ships there at 
present. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


Capiz, April 7, 1898. 
These battle ships are ready for any duty. Beg that you will permit me to insist 
on having general plan of campaign to obviate fatal vacillations. No doubt Govern- 
ment has formed its plan; I must know it without fail if [am to cooperate with it 
intelligently. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 
Capiz, April 7, 1898. 
Will leave to-morrow evening for Cape Verde, where torpedo-boat flotilla is 


placed under my orders. Not knowing plan of government, and not having been 
told what to do next, I shall await instructions, protecting the Canaries. 


ad 


44 


The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera). 
MADRID, Aprit 7, 1898. 
Hurry of departure prevents for the moment making you acquainted with plan 
you ask for, but you will receive it in detail a few days after arrival at Cape Verde, 
as steamer loaded with coal is following in your wake. 





The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


Capiz, April 8, 1898. 
Your cipher telegram of yesterday received. Shall await instructions at Cape 
Verde. 





The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


CaviZ, April 8, 1898. 
It is 5 o’clock p. m., and I am about to leave with Teresa and Colén. 





CADIZ, April 8, 1898. 
His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO. 

My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I have received all your tele- 
grams. The ships are ready and I expect to go out this evening. I 
have just sent the paymaster to San Fernando for the money, as the 
Captain-General advises me that it has been received there. At 
Cape Verde I shall await the instructions which you are to send me. 
The reproduction of the cipher telegram differs in one word; it says 
that the instructions sé ampliardn (will be amplified), while the first 
telegram received said se empleardn (will be used). That is the reason 
why I indicated my idea of protecting the Canaries, and now, as a 
viously stated, [ shall wait. 

I regret very much to have to sail without having agreed upon some 
plan, even on general lines, for which purpose I repeatedly requested 
permission to go to Madrid. From the bulk of the telegrams received 
I think I see that the Government persists in the idea of sending the 
flotilla to Cuba. That seems to me a very risky adventure, which may 
cost us very dear, for the loss of our flotilla and the defeat of our 
squadron in the Caribbean Sea may entail a great danger for the Cana- 
ries and perhaps the bombardment of our coast cities. Ido not men- 
tion the fate of the island of Cuba, because I have anticipated it long 
ago. 

I believe a naval defeat would only precipitate its ultimate loss, while 
if left to defend itself with its present means perhaps it would give 
the Americans some annoyance. We must not deceive ourselves con- 
cerning the strength of our fleet. If you will look over our corre- 
spondence of the last two months you will see, not that I have been 
a prophet, but that I have fallen short of the true mark. Let us not 
have any illusions as to what we can do which will be in proportion to 
the means available. Without troubling you any further, 

Yours, etc., 
PASCUAL CERVERA. 


45 


[Private.] 


THE MINISTER OF MARINE, 
Madrid, April 7, 1898. 
His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA. 

My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: We are in the midst of a serious 
international crisis. While I have not yet lost all hope of a peaceable 
solution, it being the wish of the Government to avoid war at any cost, 
we have now reached the utmost limits of concessions by using the in- 
fluence of foreign powers; but the President of the United States is 
surrounded by the waves which he himself has raised and which he is 
now trying to appease. It devolves upon you as the Admiral of the 
squadron, and owing to the prestige which you are enjoying in the 
navy—or God himself has singled you out for that purpose—to carry 
out the plans which will be formulated and intrusted to your intelli- 
gence and valor. 

I believe that I have done all that you asked me to do, as far as it 
was in my power; if I have not done more it is because I have not had 
the necessary means at my disposal. In this, as in everything else, 
my conscience is entirely clear. In the instructions which you will 
receive a general idea is outlined, which you will work out with your 
captains. I will close, begging that you will express my regards to 
the personnel under your orders and confirming the confidence which 
His Majesty and the Government place in your high ability. 


Yours, etc., 
SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO. 


INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED AT THE CAPE VERDE ISLANDS. 
The Minister of Marine (Bermejo) to the Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cervera), 
{Confidential.] 


HONORED S1r: Although up to date the friendly relations existing between Spain 
and the United States of North America have not changed, yet, in anticipation of 
possible complications, and in view of the probable presence in European waters of 
the United States cruisers San Francisco and Amazonas, it becomes necessary to pro- 
tect the first torpedo-boat division, which has recently reached the Cape Verde 
Islands, whether it be deemed expedient for such division to proceed to the West 
Indies, or whether it be necessary for it to return to the Canaries. 

Immediately upon receipt of this order you will therefore proceed with the flagship 
and the Cristébal Colon to St. Vincent, Cape Verde, where the division referred to is 
to join your fleet and remain for the present under your orders, together with the 
trans-Atlantic steamer Ciudad de Cadiz, which accompanies it. At St. Vincent you 
will await instructions, which will be forwarded in good season, and if the exigen- 
cies of the service should make it advisable for the squadron and torpedo boat divi- 
sion to proceed to Puerto Rico you will do so, bearing in mind that if prior to your 
departure the situation should have become aggravated the battle ships Vizcaya and 
Oquendo will join you at Cape Verde or meet you at 18° 30’ north latitude and 53° 
30’ west longitude. This point has been determined from the general Spanish chart 
of the Atlantic Ocean, and you will stand for that point for the purpose indicated. 

The protection given the torpedo boats by you will place the division in much 


46 


better condition from a military standpoint, as each battle ship, as well as the trans- 
Atlantic steamer, can take charge of two of the torpedo boats for the purpose of 
provisioning them and lending them such other aid as may be necessary during the 
voyage, which under these circumstances can be made in less time and with greater 
safety. As far as the contingencies feared make it possible to determine the objec- 
tive of the expedition, it will be the defense of the island of Puerto Rico. In this 
operation you will take charge of the naval part, in cooperation with the army, 
with the concurrence of the Governor-General of the island, withont forgetting, 
however, that the plan rests with you alone, in view of your incontestable ability, 
in your capacity as admiral, to measure the forces of our probable enemy, estimate 
the significance of their movements, as well as the best purposes to which the ships 
under your command can be put. 

If the case in question should arise, you will deploy the squadron so that the 
different tactical units composing it will sustain each other, supported by the 
destroyers and torpedo boats, and not present a compact mass to the enemy, unless 
the hostile forces should be equal or inferior, in which case it will be expedient for 
you to take the offensive. It ison these bases that your plan must rest, considering 
as the principal factor the speed of our ships, which, as a general rule, is superior 
to that of the enemy’s ships, and taking into account that the hostile forces which, 
if the case should arise, will operate in Puerto Rico will probably not exceed 7 ships, 
including 3 auxiliary vessels. 

As it may become necessary to give you further orders during your voyage from 
Cadiz to the Cape Verde Islands, you will pass within sight of the semaphore of 
the Canaries (Punta Anaga). As to the provisioning of your ships at St. Vincent, 
the necessary instructions have been given to the commander of the torpedo-boat 
division; and in Puerto Rico, in case it should be necessary to go there, you will 
find every kind of supplies, including ammunition. 

In everything compatible with these instructions you will observe the orders 
transmitted to the commander of the torpedo-boat division, as far as relates thereto. 
The foregoing is communicated to you by royal order, and at the same time I beg to 
tell you that, in view of the grave circumstances through which the nation is pass- 
ing at present, the Government of His Majesty places full confidence in your excel- 
lency’s zeal, skill, and patriotism, and in the incontestable valor of all who are 
subject to and will obey your efficient orders. 

Yours, etc., SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO. 


MADRID, April 8, 1898. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


CAPE VERDE, April 14, 1898. 
Arrived here safely. Am anxious to know instructions. I beg for daily telegram. 
Need 1,000 tons of coal to refill bunkers. 


The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde. 


MADRID, April 14, 1898. 
Serious news. Transatlantic San Francisco leaves for Cape Verde with instruc- 
tions and 2,000 tons of coal. But begin coaling anyhow from the coal ordered to be 
purchased by commander of flotilla. Vizcaya and Oquendo under way since 9th to 
join you. 


The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde. 


MADRID, April 15, 1898. 
Situation continues to be grave. Violent and humiliating speeches against our 
country in United States Congress. Great powers appear desirous of peace. Con- 


47 


fidential information received from Washington that flying squadron, composed of 
New York, Texas, Columbia, Minneapolis, and Mussachusetts, put to sea the 13th to 
prevent our battle ships from joining you. Doubt this to be true, war not having 
been declared, but you should nevertheless be warned. Provide yourself with 
everything necessary, and upon arrival of battle ships refit them immediately. 


Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine (Bermejo). 


CAPTAINCY GENERAL OF THE SQUADRON, STAFF. 

HONORED SiR: In compliance with the orders of your excellency, and as I have 
had the honor of telegraphing you, I sailed from Cadiz on the evening of the 8th 
with the Colén and Teresa, shaping my course for Punta Anaga, island of Teneriffe, 
where I communicated with semaphore on the morning of the 11th, and received 
your order to proceed, and the information that indications were more favorable. I 
advised you that the squadron had arrived there safely. 

The Colén was waiting for mb off the city of Santa Cruz. A tug had brought her 
an Official letter from the commandant of marine, transmitting to me said telegram 
from the semaphore, adding that on the previous evening a steamer had been wait- 
ing for me at Punta Anaga, to communicate the telegram to me. At 9 o’clock a.m. 
of the 11th I shaped my course for St. Vincent, Cape Verde, casting anchor at Puerto 
Grande on the 14th at 10 o’clock a. m. Here I found the first division of torpedo 
boats, whose commander placed himself under my orders and advised me that noth- 
ing of importance had occurred. 

We had a good voyage, with wind and sea in the first quadrant (from northward 
and eastward), calming down as we reached a lower latitude. Our usual speed was 
12 knots, at times reduced to 11 knots, so as to arrive in daytime and have no trouble 
in reconnoitering. Thecoal consumption of the Coldn has been enormous, and that of 
the Teresa also quite large. During the voyage of 1,570 miles, with the speed above 
mentioned, the Colén has used about 500 tons and the Teresa about 400. ‘The consump- 
tion, therefore, of the Colén has been 3,758 pounds per horsepower per hour, at 12 knots 
speed, and 3,919 pounds at 11 knots, and that of the Teresa 2,546 and 2,969 pounds, 
respectively. Upon arrival here the Colén had only 550 and the Teresa 570 tons left. 
1 wish to call your excellency’s attention to another point, also of great importance, 
Thinking about this extravagant consumption of fuel, I attribute that of the Coldn 
to the type of her boilers and lack of experience in managing them, and that of the 
Teresa to the very low pressure in the boilers, considering that the engine is of the 
triple-expansion type. When I gave an order to raise the pressure from 100 to 150 
pounds the first engineer in chief made certain explanations to me, which I impart 
to your excellency under separate cover, and as I fear that his objections are well 
founded I have decided not to raise the pressure in the boilers of this ship, except 
in peremptory cases.! 

Upon arrival here I dispatched to you the following telegram: ‘‘Arrived here 
safely. Am anxious to know instructions. I beg for daily telegram. Need 1,000 
tons of coal to refill bunkers.” This evening the captain of the Ciudad de Cadiz 





1The engineer in chief says that he has noticed that whenever the pressure in the 
boilers has been raised above 115 pounds there has been some injury, especially in 
the joints of the auxiliary steam piping, which he attributes to the lack of expan- 
sion joints, in conjunction with the facts that the boiler tubes have lost much of 
their resistance, and that there area few slight leaks in the seams where the furnaces 
are joined to the boilers, which might become serious if the pressure were raised in 
the latter, and he therefore advises not to do so under ordinary circumstances, 
because the saving in fuel would not compensate for the expense of repairs and 
interference with the service. 


48 


notified me that he had received the following telegram, dated at Cadiz the 14th, at 
5.05 o’clock p. m.: ‘‘Steamer San Francisco has sailed from las Palmas with 1,000! 
tons of coal for the fleet. Notify the admiral.” This morning I received your excel- 
lency’s telegram of the same date (7.50 p.m.) referring to the same matter and to 
the battle ships Vizcaya and Oquendo. After consulting with the second in command 
and the captains, I answered as follows: ‘‘For coal they ask 51 shillings per ton paid 
in London. As it is much needed I have ordered it to be bought. Nothing new.” 
Just as I am about to close this letter, which is to go by a steamer leaving to-night, 
I received your other telegram, dated to-day (12.50 p. m.), referring to the movements 
of American ships. 
Yours, etc., PASCUAL CERVERA, 
On Boarp INFANTA MARIA TERESA, 
St. Vincent, Cape Verde, April 15, 1898. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


CAPE VERDE, April 16, 1898. 
Nothing new. Owing to last report of your cipher telegram concerning flying 
squadron, the torpedo boat flotilla is fitting for battle, lightening the coal which 
hampers it. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


CAPE VERDE, April 17, 1898. 
Owing to heavy weather, have been unable to complete taking on coal purchased. 
San Francisco has not arrived. Am impatiently awaiting her arrival. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


CaPE VERDE, April 18, 1898. 
San Francisco has arrived. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


: CaPE VERDE, April 19, 1898. 
Oquendo and Vizcaya have safely arrived. 


| St. VINCENT, CAPE VERDE, April 19, 1898. 
His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO. 

My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: The San Francisco, and with it 
your instructions and letter, arrived yesterday. If the Oquendo and 
Vizcaya have really sailed for here, they have now been out ten days 
and must arrive to-day or to-morrow, for that is all the timethey would 
require to make the voyage of 2,400 miles from Puerto Rico. But I am 
thinking that perhaps the date stated, the 9th, is that of the cablegram 
issuing the order, and not the date of sailing, in which case they will 
arrive later. 

The boilers of the Ariete are practically unserviceable, so that this 
vessel, instead of being an element of power, is the nightmare of the 


‘Telegram from minister to Cevera says 2,000.—O. N. I. 





49 


fleet. She could only be used for local defense. The boiler of the Azor 
is 11 years old and is of the locomotive type, and that tells the whole 
story. As for the destroyers Furor and Terror, their bow plates give 
as soon as they are in a sea way, and some of their frames have been 
broken. Villaamil has had this remedied as far as he has been able. 
The Pluton had an accident of this kind when coming from England, 
and had her bows strengthened at Ierrol. 

1 do not know whether the port of San Juan de Puerto Rico affords 
good protection for the fleet. If it does not, and if the port of 
Mayaguez can not be effectively closed, the fleet would be in a most 
unfavorable position. However, before forming a judgment, I shall 
await the arrival of the Vizcaya, whose captain, Eulate, is thoroughly 
acquainted with Puerto Rico. I am constantly preoccupied about the 
Canaries. 

It wil! be necessary to close and fortify the port of Graciosa Island, 
as well as the small island commanding the port of La Luz in Gran 
Canary. From your instructions it seems that the idea of sending the 
fleet to Cuba has been abandoned, I believe very wisely. Concerning 
Puerto Rico, [ have often wondered whether it would be wise to accumu- 
late there all our forces, and I do not think so. If Puerto lico is loyal, 
it will not be such an easy task for the Yankees; and if it is not loyal, 
it will inevitably follow the fate of Cuba, at least as far as we are 
concerned. 

On the other hand, I am very much afraid for the Philippines, and, 
as I have already said, for the Canaries; and above all I fear the possi- 
bility of a bombardiment of our coast, which is not unlikely, considering 
the audacity of the Yankees, and counting, as they do, with four or 
five vessels of higher speed than our own. 

For ali these reasons, I am doubtful as to what it would be best for 
me to do, and I will not take any decision without your opinion and that 
of the council of captains, as indicated in your letter. I leave this 
letter open until to-morrow, in case anything should happen. 

I was here interrupted by the information that the Vizcaya and 
Oquendo were in sight, and I have had the pleasure of seeing them 
come in and of greeting their captains. The crews are in the best of 
health and spirits, but the Vizcaya needs docking badly. 

During the trip from Puerto Rico she burned 200 tons more coal than 
the Oquendo, which means a diminution of her speed of from 3 to 5 knots 
according to my reckoning, and a diminution of ‘her radius of action of 
from 25 to 30 per cent, thus losing the advantage of speed to which you 
called special attention in your instructions. Both are now coaling, 
but it.is slow work, for, unfortunately, we do not feel at home here. 
We are indeed unlucky! Until to-morrow. The mail has come in 
and will shortly go out again, I will therefore close this. 

Yours, ete., 
PASCUAL CERVERA, 
10742———4 


50 


The Governor-General of Puerto Rico (Macias) to the Minister of Colonies (R. Girén). 


[Extract.] 
PuERTO Rico, April 20, 1898. 
Your excellency and the minister of war know scant resources at my disposal. 
I should know what our naval forces are doing. Do not know situation of our 
squadron. : 


CAPTAINCY-GENERAL OF THE SQUADRON, STAFF. 

Honorep Sir: Upon reaching this harbor I had the honor of notifying your 
excellency of my arrival under date of the 15th. Agreeable to your orders I acquired 
and distributed between the Colén and Teresa the 700 tons of coal, which was all I 
could obtain here at the exorbitant price of 51 shillings per ton. I also purchased 
all the lubricating oil I could find (about 125 gallons of olive and 132 of mineral 
oil), so as to be able to supply the Colén, Oquendo, and Vizcaya. At the same time I 
made efforts to get boats for unloading the coal of the San Francisco, and succeeded, 
though not in as large number as desired. 

The San Francisco arrived on the 18th at noon, and at daybreak of the 19th the - 
unloading of the coal was commenced. Her captain delivered to me the instructions 
which you mentioned. The custom-house raised some difficulty and wanted to col- 
lect duty on the coal landed; but the matter was settled by the governor of these 
islands, after conferring with the government by telephone. 

On the 19th, at 11 o’clock in the morning, the Oquendo and Vizcaya arrived; the 
latter at once commenced to coal, working all night. The Oquendo, which has about 
200 tons left, could not begin to coal until the following morning. ‘The fitting out 
of the vessels will be continued with all possible speed. The battle ships had nothing 
special to report. In the torpedo-boat division slight defects have been noticed in 
the joints of the bow plates of the Terror and Furor, which we have remedied tem- 
porarily. (The Plutén had these same repairs made at Ferrol.) 

The boilers of the Ariete are in poor condition, so that this torpedo boat, far from 
being of use, is an impediment. Her engines are very delicate. In a separate letter 
I confirmed to your excellency all the telegrams which I have dispatched since my 
last communication. The sanitary condition of the fleet is good. 


Yours, etc., 
PASCUAL CERVERA. 
ON BoaRkD INFANTA MARIA TERESA, 


St. Vincent, Cape Verde, April 20, 1898, 


The Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine ( Bermejo). 


CAPTAINCY-GENERAL OF THE SQUADRON, STAFF. 

Honorep Six: I have the honor to forward herewith a copy of the proceedings of 
the meeting of the captains which I called to-day at your suggestion. As the mail. 
is about to go out I do not have time to speak about it fully, but will do so in my 
next letter. 

Yours, etc., PascuaL CERVERA. 


St. VINCENT, CAPE VERDE, April 20, 1898. 


PROCEEDINGS. 


The second in command of the nayal forces and the captains of the vessels, having — 
met on board the cruiser Cristébalt Colén, by order of his excellency the commander 


51 


in chief of the squadron, and under his presidency, the president submitted for dis: 
cussion the following question: ‘‘Under the present circumstances of the mother 
country, is it expedient that this fleet should go at once to America, or should it 
Stay to protect our coasts and the Canaries and provide from here for any contin- 
gency?” Several opinions were exchanged concerning the probable consequences 
of our campaign in the West Indies; the great deficiencies of our fleet. compared with 
that of the enemy were made manifest, as well as the very scanty resources which 
the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico are at present able to offer for the purpose of ~ 
establishing bases of operations. 

In consideration of this and the grave consequences for the nation of a defeat of 
our fleet in Cuba, thus permitting the enemy to proceed with impunity against the 
Peninsula and adjacent islands, it was unanimously agreed to call the attention of 
the Government to these matters by means of a telegram, as follows : 


COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE SQUADRON TO THE MINISTER OF MARINE: 


In agreement with the second in command and the commanders of the vessels, I 
suggest going to the Canaries. Ariete has boilers in bad condition; boiler of Azor 
is very old. Vizcaya must be docked and have her bottom painted if she is to pre- 
serve her speed. Canaries would be protected from a rapid descent of the enemy, 
and all the forces would be in a position, if necessary, to hasten to the defense of the 
mother country. 

PASCUAL CERVERA, 
JOSE DE PAREDES, 
JUAN B. LazaGa. 
EmILio Dfaz MoreEv. 
Victor M. Concas. 
ANTONIO EULATE. 
JOAQUIN BUSTAMANTE, 


FERNANDO VILLAAMIL. 
ON BOARD CRUISER CoLén, April 20, 1898. 


The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde. 


MADRID, April 20, 1898. 
Both Houses of United States Congress have approved armed intervention, declar- 
ing Cuba free and independent. It is thought President will sign resolution to-day. 
Urgent to complete fitting out. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


CAPE VERDE, April 20, 1898. 
If you approve going to Canaries, I beg you will send at once all the torpedoes to 
that point. 


(Confidential.] 


HONORED Sire: For lack of time I could not tell you yesterday 
about the council which met on board the Colén, and only sent you a 
copy of the proceedings. The council lasted nearly four hours. The 
prevailing spirit was that of purest discipline, characterized by the 
high spirit which animates the whole fleet, and especially the distin- 
guished commanders, who are an honor to Spain and the navy, and 


52 
whom it is my good fortune to have for companions in these critical 
and solemn circumstances. 

The first and natural desire expressed by all was to go resolutely in 
quest of the enemy and surrender their lives on the altar of the mother 
country; butthe vision of the same mother country abandoned, insalted, 
and trod upon by the enemy, proud of our defeat—for nothing else could 
be expected by going to meet them on their own ground with our inferior 
forees—compelled them to see that such sacrifice would not only be 
useless but harmful, since it would place Spain in the hands of an 
insolent and proud enemy, and God cnly knows what the consequences 
might be. I could see the struggle in their minds between these con- 
flicting considerations. All of them loathe the idea of not going imme- 
diately in search of the enemy and finishing once for all. 

But, as I said before, the vision of the country trampled upon by the 
enemy rose above all other considerations, and inspired with that 
courage which consists in braving criticism and perhaps the sarcasm 
and accusations of the ignorant masses, which know nothing about 
war in general and naval warfare in particular and believe that the 
Alfonso XII or the Cristina can be pitted against the Jowa or Massa- 
chusetts, they expressly and energetically declare that the interests of 
the mother country demanded this sacrifice from us. 

One of the captains had certain scruples about expressing his opin- 
ion, saying that he would do what the Government of His Majesty 
should be pleased to order; butas all of us, absolutely all, shared these 
sentiments, it is hardly necessary to say his scruples were soon over- 
come. My only reason for mentioning this is to give you an exact 
report of everything that happened. Another of the captains, certainly 
not the most enthusiastic, but who may be said to have represented 
the average opinion prevailing in the council, has, by my order, written 
down his ideas and I send you a copy of his statement which reflects 
better than I could express them the opinions of all. 

This document represents exactly the sentiment which prevailed in 
the meeting. Believing that I have fulfilled my duty in giving your 
excellency an accurate account of all that happened, I reiterate the 
assurance of the excellent spirit of all. 

Yours, etce., PASCUAL CERVERA. 

His Excellency the MINistrER OF MARINE, 

APRIL 21, 1898, 





[Docume t referre | to.} 


Capt. Victor M. CoNncas, 
Commander of the Battle Ship Infanta Maria Teresa: 

Concerning the subjects presented for discussion by the Admiral of ~ 
the fleet at the council of war held on board the battle ship Cristdébal 
Colén, my opinion is as follows: 

(1) The naval forces of the United States are so immensely superior 


53 


to our own in number and class of vessels, armor, and armament, and 
in preparations made, besides the advantage given the enemy by the 
insurrection in Cuba, the possible one in Puerto Rico, and the latent 
insurrection in the East, that they have sufficient forces to attack us in 
the West Indies, in the Peninsula and adjacent islands, and in the 
Philippines. 

Since no attention has been paid to that archipelago, where it was, 
perhaps, most urgent to reduce our vulnerable points, which could 
have been done with a single battle ship, any division of our limited 
forces at this time and any separation from Huropean waters would 
involve a strategic mistake which would carry the war to the Penin- 
sula, and that would mean frightful disaster to our coasts, the payment 
of large ransoms, and, perhaps, the loss of some island. 

As soon as this fleet leaves for the West Indies it is evident that the 
American Flying Squadron will sail for Hurope, and even if its purpose 
were only to make a raid or a demonstration against our coasts the just 
alarm of all Spain would cause the enforced return of this fleet, although 
too late to prevent the enemy trom reaping the fruits of an easy victory. 
The only three vessels of war remaining for the defense of the Penin- 
sula—the Carlos V, the Pelayo, whose repairs are not yet finished, and 
the Alfonso XIII, of very little speed, and even that not certain—are 
not sufficient for the defense of the Spanish coasts, and in no manner 
for that of the Canaries. 

The yacht Giralda and the steamers Germania and Normania, of the 
acquisition of which official notice has been received, are not vessels of 
fighting qualities and add no strength to our navy. 

(2) The plan of defending the island of Puerto Rico, abandoning 
Cuba to its fate, is absolutely impracticable, because, if the American 
fleet purposely destroys a city of the last-named island, in spite of all 
the plans of the Government on the subject, and even though it would 
be the maddest thing in the world, the Government itself would be 
forced by public opinion to send this fleet against the Americans, 
under the conditions and at the point which the latter might choose. 

(3) Even deciding upon the defense of Puerto Rico alone, the trip 
across at this time, after the practical declaration of war, without a 
military port where the fleet might refit on its arrival, and without an 
auxiliary fleet to keep the enemy busy—who, I suppose, will make St. 
Thomas his base of operations—is a strategic error, the more deplorable 
because there have been months and even years in which to accumulate 
the necessary forces in the West Indies. It seems probable, judging 
from the information acquired, that the supplies accumulated at St. 
Thomas are intended by the enemy to establish a base of operations in 
the vicinity of our unprotected Vieques (Crab Island). For all these 
reasons the responsibility of the voyage must remain entirely with the 
Government. 

(4) Adding these three battle ships and the Cristébal Colon, with- 


54 


out her big guns, to the two remaining in the Peninsula and to the few 
old torpedo boats which we have left, it is possible to defend our coast 
from the Guadiana to Cape Creus, including the Balearic Islands and 
the Canaries, thanks to the distance of the enemy from his base of 
operations. This defense, however, will have to be a very energetic 
one if the enemy brings his best ships to bear on us, and it will not be 
possible to save the coasts of Galicia and of the north of Spain from 
suffering more or less if the enemy should bring along a light division, 
nor even the protected coasts from an attack here and there, as our 
ships are too few in number to be divided. 

(5) It is very regrettable that there are not enough vessels to cover 
all points at one time; but duty and patriotism compel us to present 
clearly the resources which the country gave us, and the needs which 
present circumstances bring on the country in danger. 

(6) Lastly, I believe, with due respect, that the military situation 
should be laid before the minister of marine, while I reiterate our pro- 
foundest subordination to his orders, and our firm purpose most ener- 
getically to carry out the plans of operations he may communicate to 
these forces. But, after pointing out the probable consequences, the 
responsibility must remain with the Governinent. 


Victor M. Concas. 
St. VINCENT, CAPE VERDE, April 20, 1898. 


The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde. 


MADRID, April 21, 1898. 
Torpedo boat Ariete may return to Spain, towed by San Francisco. Issue such 
instructions as you may deem necessary. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


CAPE VERDE, April 21, 1899. 
The more I think about it I am convinced! that to continue voyage to Puerto Rico 
will be disastrous. I can leave for the Canaries to-morrow. The coaling is proceed- 
ing slowly, there being a lack of appliances. The captains of the ships are of same 
opinion as I, some more emphatically. I need instructions. 


The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde. 


MapDrip, April 21, 1898. 
As Canaries are perfectly safe, and you are aware of telegrams on impending sail- 
ing of flying squadron, you will go out with all the forces to protect Puerto Rico, 
which is menaced, following the route which your excellency has traced, bearing in 
mind the free scope which the instructions give you, and which I hereby renew. 
The phrase Am going north will advise me that you have sailed. Absolute secrecy 
must be maintained as to your movements.” 





1This is the text in the pampblet referred to, but the telegram as sent by me from 
Cape Verde says: “ The more I think about it the more I am convinced.” 

2In the pamphlet the last part of this telegram has been suppressed. It says: 
“The nation, in these extreme moments of the declaration of war, follows your 
squadron in its expedition, and sends to it its enthusiastic greetings.” 


55 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


CAPE VERDE, April 22, 1898. 
Have received cipher message concerning the Ariete. San Francisco will not finish 
unloading coal for at least five days. As the Ariete can cooperate in the defense 
of Canaries, I beg that you will recall the order for her to return to Spain. Her 
boilers would not hold out for long trips, but will do for local defense, I reiterate 
my request of cipher telegram for further destiny of fleet. 


Governor-General (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa). 


{Extract.] 
HAVANA, April 22, 1898. 
Public spirit very high; great enthusiasm among all classes. But I must not con- 
ceal from your excellency that if people should become convinced that squadron is 
not coming, disappointment will be great, and an unpleasant reaction is possible, 
Beg that your excellency will advise me whether I can give them any hope of more 
or less immediate arrival of squadron. 


The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde. 
MADRID, April 22, 1898. 


The Government is inquiring constantly about your sailing. It is absolutely 
necessary to go out as soon as posssble. Have Aricte towed to Canaries by San 
Francisco. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


CaPE VERDE, April 22, 1898. 
Havereceived cipher telegram at instructions to proceed to Puerto Rico. Though 
I persist in my opinion, which is also the opinion of the captains of the ships, I shall 
do all I can to hasten our departure, disclaiming all responsibility for the conse- 
quences.! 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


OAPE VERDE, April 22, 1898. 
I do not know location of hostile ships, nor on what the instructions 
are based. Beg your excellency to send me all possible information. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


CaPk VERDE, April 22, 1898. 

I do not know officially whether war has been declared. It is absolutely neces- 
sary that I should know in order to treat the American flag as an enemy. 
ae SS 2 ea Os ak 

1In the pamphlet the last part of this telegram is omitted, which is as follows: 
‘We are grateful for the greeting of the nation, whose happiness is our only wish, 
and in the name of all I express our profound love for our country.” 


56 


The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), 


MADRID, April 22, 1898. 

If war had been declared I should have advised you; but, as a matter of fact, a 
state of war exists, since the United States fleet will begin to-morrow the blockade 
of Cuba. The ships of the flying squadron, which I mentioned to your excellency, 
and about which I have had no further information, are to blockade Puerto Rico, but 
have not yet left Hampton Roads. The foundation of the instructions is to intrust to 
your excellency the naval defense of Puerto Rico. I have no special news to commu- 
nicate to you to-day. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


CaPE VERDE, April 22, 1898. 
I need precise instructions by which I can shape my conduct in case war has been 
declared officially by the time I sail. 


The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde. 


MADRID, April 22, 1898. 
Have received your second telegram. Can not give you more definite instructions 
than you have, leaving you free to choose the route to be followed, eluding, if 
possible, an encounter with the hostile fleet, and reaching some point on the coast 
of Puerto Rico, The Ciudad de Cadiz will accompany you with as much coal as 
possible, 


St, VINCENT, CAPE VERDE, April 22, 1898. 


His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO. 

My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I have not yet answered your let- 
ter of the 7th, which the San Francisco brought me, because, though I 
have written you since, I did not have it before me. It is impossible 
for me to give you an idea of the surprise and consternation expe- 
rienced by all on the receipt of the order to sail. Indeed, that surprise 
is well justified, for nothing can be expected of this expedition except 
the total destruction of the fleet or its hasty and demoralized return, 
while in Spain it might be the safeguard of the nation. 

It is a mistake to believe that the Canaries are safe, which is only 
the case with reference to Santa Cruz, Las Palmas, and one or two 
other places. But is Graciosa Island safe, for instance? If the Yan- 
kees should take possession of it and fortify the port they would have 
a base for any operations they might wish to undertake against Spain, 
and surely the battalions will not be able to eject them from there. 
Such a thing will not be possible at present, with the squadron at the 
Canaries, but it will be inevitable when the squadron has been destroyed. 

You talk about plans and in spite of all efforts to have some laid out, 
as would have been wise and prudent, my desires have been disap- 
pointed to such an extent that if the circumstances had been different 
I should have applied to be placed on the retired list, and I shall ask 
for it, if God spares my life, just as soon as the danger isover. Ishould 


Ta 


- 


57 


even apply for it to day, without caring a straw for being accused of 
cowardice, if it were not for the fact that my retirement would produce 
among the squadron the deplorable effect of a desertion of its admiral 
before the enemy. How can it be said that I have been supplied with 
everything I asked for? | . 

The Colon does not yet have her big guns, and I asked for the poor 
ones if there were no others. The 5.5-inch ammunition, with the 
exception of about 300 rounds, is bad. The defective guns of the 
Vizcaya and Oquendo have not been changed. The cartridge cases of 
the Colén can not be recharged. We have not a single Bustamante 
torpedo. There is no plan nor concert, which I so much desired and 
have suggested in vain. The repairs of the servomotors of my vessels 
were only made in the Infanta Maria Teresa and the Vizcaya after they 
had left Spain. — | 

In short, it is a disaster already, and it is to be feared that it will be 
amore frightful one before long. And perhaps everything could be 
changed yet. But I suppose it is too late now for anything that is not 
the ruin and desolation of our country. I can understand that your 
conscience is clear, as you state in your letter, because you are a good 
man and your course is clear before you, but think of what I tell you 
and you will see that I amright. I assembled my captains, as you told 
me, and sent you by telegraph an extract of their opinions. 

1 have since forwarded you a copy of the proceedings, and by this 

“mail! send you an official letter commenting thereon. I have nothing 
further to add. The Vizeaya can no longer steam, and she is only a 
boil in the body of the fleet. But I will trouble you no more. I con- 
sider it an accomplished fact, and will try to find the best way out of 
this direful enterprise. 

Yours, etc., | PASCUAL CERVERA. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister ( Bermejo). 


CAPE VERDE, April 22, 1898. 

I beg your excellency to permit me to insist that the result of our voyage to 
America must be disastrous for the future of our country. That is the opinion of 
all men of honor. I beg your excellency to read this telegram and my whole official 
and confidential correspondence to the president of the council, in order to ease my 
conscience. 


The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera). 


MADRID, April 22, 1898—6 o’clock p.m. 
As result of heavy seas, Audaz had bow bent at right angles to port 
as far as second bulkhead. 1 notify you so.that you may have bows 
of destroyers strengthened as much as possible. 


58 


The Minister (Bermejo) 'to the Admiral (Cervera). 


PALACE, Madrid, April 23, 1898—noon. 
I call meeting of general officers. Awaiting their decision. Advise 
me immediately whether torpedo boats are ready. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


CAPE VERDE, April 23, 1898. 
At principal ports West Indies, where these ships are likely to touch, we should 
have confidential agents to give me authentic information, and credits should be 
opened. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


CAPE VERDE, April 23, 1898. 
Received cipher message last evening. We are working night and day to fill 
bunkers. Have telegraphed already, that appliances are lacking. Eight hundred 
tons still remain and it will take three days longer. Before sailing I must know 
whether war has been declared. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Beymejo.) 


CapPE VERDE, April 23, 1898. 
Torpedo boats ready for war; destroyers likewise, except 2.95-inch guns. ‘They 
carry coal instead. Guns can be mounted in a few hours. 


Proceedings of meeting of general officers of the navy, held at the ministry of marine, under 
the presidency of the minister of marine, Rear-Admiral Segismundo Bermejo, on April 
23, 1898. 


Present: Admiral Guillermo Chacén y Maldonado; Vice-Admirals Carlos Vale4rcel, 
José M. Berdnger, Eduardo Butler, and Fernando Martinez; Rear-Admirals Manuel 
Pasquin, José Navarro, Antonio de la Rocha, Ismael Warleta, Manuel Mozo, Manuel 
de la Camara, Eduardo Reinoso, and José de Guzmén; and Captains José Gomez 
Jmaz, Antonio Terry, Joaquin Lazaga. Joaquin Cinctinegui, and Ramon Aufién. 

The session opens at 3 o’clock p.m. 

The Minister explains the situation of the country relative to the state of war with 
the United States of North America, the distribution of the Spanish ships, and the 
information he has concerning the enemy, and reads to thera the instructions which 
he has issned to the admiral of the fleet for his departure from Cadiz, which 
instructions he did not receive until he artived at Cape Verde, his departure having 
been hastened by subsequent telegraphic orders. 

Mr, Berdnger says that if the explanation made by the minister has no other object 
than to inform them of what has happened, he thanks him and takes notice thereof. 
But if the object is to ask for opinions on the subject, he should abstain from every- 
thing not conformable to discipline, reserving judgment thereon until such time 
when he will have a right to express it. 

The Minister replies that so far he has simply explained the situation. But now 
that the general officers are acquainted with it he begs them to assist him with 
their advice as to what they deem most expedient for the plan of campaign to be 
followed. 


59 


Mr. Pasquin says that the members have a right, without prejudice to discipline, 
to express their opinions, since they have been convened for that purpose; that the 
question is not a technical one, but appertains to the Government, and it is for the 
latter to form the plans of campaign; that that is no reason why each one of them, if 
the minister so desires, should not express his opinion; but before doing so they 
should be informed whether it is the Government which convenes them as a council 
of war or whether the minister simply asks them as comrades for their private 
opinions; becanse in the former case each one is responsible for the opinions he . 
expresses, while in the latter case they have no other value but that of friendly 
advice; and that, in any event, since they have been convened without being 
informed of the object of the meeting, they have not been able to prepare for setting 
forth plans of the importance and gravity of the one about which they are being 
consulted. 

The Minister explains that the plan of the Government was to send the squadron 
now at Cape Verde, together with the first torpedo boat division, to Puerto Rico, 
and intrust to the admiral the defense of that island, which he (the minister) con- 
siders in great danger from hostile attacks, being poorly defended, having very open 
coasts, and inadequate garrisons in case of an uprising; that it was further intended 
to keep in Spain all other available ships, so as to be able to send them at the proper 
time wherever it might be necessary; but that the instructions issued to the admiral 
and received by him at Cape Verde had not yet been carried out, for the reason that 
the admiral made certain objections to the plan, which he did not consider expedient. 

A short controversy followed between Messrs. Berdnger and Butler, the former 
maintaining the possibility that certain opinions to which he attributes great 
weight might get out, and the latter asserting that the discretion of the members is 
a complete guaranty for the secrecy of whatever might be discussed. 

Mr. Chacon asks whether the squadron had already received the order to start 
from Cape Verde, as has been reported, since, if the squadron had actually sailed, 
there was no need of discussing the point. 

The Minister replies that the order to start has been issued, but has not yet been 
carried out, because the Admiral’s remonstrances, reenforced by the opinions of the 
captains of the ships, has given him much to consider, and since then he has not 
reiterated the order, deeming it proper that the president of the council should be 
made acquainted with such remonstrances. 

Mr. Berdnger calls attention to the fact that they are being consulted after the 
breaking out of hostilities, which is hardly a time for asking advice; that he should 
never have advised the assembling of the squadron at Cape Verde, nor the forma- 
tion of a flotilla of heterogeneous vessels, some of which impede the march of others, 
for which reason the destroyers can not do what they might be able to do by them- 
selves; that he should have preferred the formation of a comparatively numerous 
squadron, letting the ships go separately or in small divisions, so as to enable them 
to operate with greater freedom in seeking or refusing battle, as may be best; that 
the idea of going back now could not be entertained, because the advance toward 
Puerto Rico could be made by the fleet either as a whole or in divisions by different 
routes; some of the vessels might even be sent-to the Bermudas, in order to compel 
the enemy to divide his forces; that, whatever plan might be adopted, he harbored 
the hope that the victory would be on the side of Spain, owing to the good qualities 
of her ships, the skill of those who commanded them, and the valor of the crews, 
citing in support of his belief the fact that during the war of Independence of the 
United States it happened that eleven English ships, after maintaining a blockade 
for forty-two days, during which time they were constantly attacked by gunboats 
manned by valiant crews, had to return to England without attaining their object. 

The Minister replies that the flotilla was formed while peace was reigning and in 
ample time to reach Puerto Rico, and that the stop at Cape Verde was not part of the 
Government’s plan, but was due to subsequent unfortunate causes. 


60 


Mr. Gémez Imaz says that there is no use in losing time over the discussion of 
what has happened, or had to happen, but that a resolution should be adopted as to 
what the squadron is to do in the future. 

Mr. Mozo states that when the minister convened the general officers of the min- 
istry on Holy Thursday, April 6, for a similar purpose as the present, a majority of 
them expressed themselves in favor of concentration at Cape Verde; that the 
speaker was still of opinion that all possible forces should have been assembled and 
concentrated at a port in the Canaries; that the war should be carried on in the 
nature of an active defense, placing every available resource at the disposal of the 
admiral of the fleet, since it was he who would be held responsible hereafter. 

Mr. Berdnger says that his opinion is diametrically opposed to that of Mr. Mozo, 
because an unfortunate encounter of the united fleet would be the ruin of the coun- 
try; that the concentration should never have taken place at any port abroad, but 
that since such had been the case it was imperative for the fleet to start at once for 
the West Indies, together with the destroyers, leaving the torpedo boats at Cape 
Verde to return to the Canaries. 

The Minister says that he deems it important for the discussion to make the mem- 
bers acquainted with the last telegram received from the Governor-General of Cuba, 
stating that all the Spanish of that island were animated by the very best spirit for 
resistence; but that this was due to a great extent to the hope they harbored that 
the fleet would promptly return to Cuban waters, and if the return was delayed, or 
the hope lost, the Spanish population might at the same time lose the spirit ani- 
mating it. 

Mr. Aunén says that, although he is the youngest of the members and can shed no 
light on the discussion, he deems it nevertheless proper that he should take part in 
it, if not to formulate plans of campaign, which could not be done without the 
knowledge of further data than had so far been brought out in the discussion, yet to 
particularize the debate so that it might produce some good result and fix on the 
minds the value of the opinions expressed; that the first remarks of the minister 
might be divided into two parts—the exposition of what has already occurred, and 
a request for advice for the future. 

Relative to the first, he coincided with Mr. Berdnger in believing that they had 
not been consulted on what had already been done and could not be helped, bad 
though it might appear, and that all they could do was to take up matters from the 
present moment, inquiring carefully into the future, and not deny the minister nor 
the comrade the advice for which he asks, since anyone occupying his high position 
under the present circumstances would need advisers to keep up his courage and 
spirit to carry him through the critical period, as to which everyone would demand 
explanations and require responsibilities to be fixed in one manner or another. 

As to the question of forming plans of campaign, though on a forced basis and 
under the pressure of present circumstances, it was not an easy undertaking and 
without a knowledge of all the antecedents which is indispensable for the purpose 
of formulating opinions as to possible contingencies; that the superficial knowledge 
of matters derived from the press, so often erroneous, can not be taken as a basis. 
For that purpose he wished to call upon the minister to explain to them the condi- 
tion of the ships composing the nucleus assembled at Cape Verde and the time 
required before those still in the Peninsula would be in condition for active service. 

As to the instructions to be issued to the admiral, they were probably not definite, 
except as to the objective which the Government had in view, leaving him free to 
develop the same as the circumstances of the moment might require, since instruc- 
tions to be complied with two weeks after they were issued, and at a distance of 
2,000 miles from where they emanated, had the disadvantage that they either must 
be followed blindly, or must be violated, leaving it for the outcome of events to 
decide whether the. man following the latter course would be hailed as a hero or 
court-martialed for disobedience. 


61 


Finally, in view of the gravity of the situation, he called upon the esteemed 
admirals and comrades, if need be, to examine the future calmly and dispassion- 
ately, leaving the past out of the question, and giving the benefit of their opinions 
for the good of the country and the assistance of their comrades, upon whom are 
fixed just now the eyes of the nation, which is not well informed as to the true cir- 
cumstances under which fate has driven the country into the disaster of a war so 
unequal, as far as material resources are concerned. 

The Minister thanks Mr. Aunoén for the sentiments which have inspiréd his words, 
and offers to exhibit whatever data may be necessary to found thereon an opinion 
as to the future. He says that the two battle ships coming from Puerto Rico carry 
provisions for forty-five days, and those coming from Spain for thirty days; that he 
had sent them 2,000 tons of coal by a trans-Atlantic steamer and instructed the 
admiral to get at Cape Verde whatever he might need, and that he therefore con- 
sidered the battle ships in perfect condition to engage in a naval campaign; that the 
three destroyers were in similar condition, but of the torpedo boats only two were 
able to put to sea, because the Ariete had arrived with her boilers disabled. 

The fitting out of the Carlos V could not be completed until the beginning of May, 
the Pelayo would be ready before that time, and the Alfonso was ready now, but 
the greater part of the supply of ammunition for the Carlos V was on the way and 
he could not tell exactly when it would arrive. The Pelayo had so limited a radius 
of action that she could hardly go from the Canaries to Puerto Rico without being 
embarrassed, and the speed of the Alfonso XIII was so low that she might prove 
an impediment to the movements of the fleet. As to the Vitoria, he did not con- 
sider her fit to join the squadron on account of her slow speed, and as to the Numan- 
cia, although she would return to Spanish waters in a short time, the remodeling of 
this ship was not completed, owing to strikes which had interrupted the work. 

Mr. Pasquin asks that the communications from the admiral of the squadron, in 
which he speaks of the dangers he fears for the expedition to Puerto Rico, be read. 

The Minister reads a telegram from the Admiral in which he expresses a desire to 
have it plainly understood that it is his opinion and the opinion of the captains of 
the ships that the voyage to Puerto Rico may mean a disaster for the future of the 
country; but that, obedient to instructions, he is hastening all the preparations, so 
as to carry out the order the moment it is received. He also reads his reply advis- 
ing the Admiral that he submits the resolution to the assembly of general officers of 
the navy. 

Mr. Berdnger states that the telegram read by the Minister is of such importance 
that, in his opinion, it should not have been read, but now that it is known, he in- 
sisted that the squadron at Cape Verde should at once start for the West Indies, no 
matter what risks it might run, the same as Tegetthoff, when he was ordered to 
attack asuperior Austrian’ squadron at Lissa. 

Mr, Lazaga says that he has given some thought to the plan of campaign, and he 
submits his plan, such as it is, to the consideration of all. At first he was in favor 
of scattering the forces, but since reading the cablegram from the Governor-General 
he has modified his opinion. The Carlos V should go out immediately to join the 
squadron, taking workmen along to complete the electrical installation for operat- 
ing the turrets. The Pelayo should complete the work of fitting out, working night 
and day, and purchasing without delay whatever might be required. At Cadiz they 
should join the Alfonso XIIJ and the two destroyers now in Spain and go in search 
of the squadron, after first agreeing on a geographical point of rendezvous 100 miles 
west of Cape Verde. 

The united forces should then proceed to Puerto Rico and fight a battle there under 
regular conditions, after which they should continue their course south of Santo 
Domingo and Cuba, appear off Havana from the west, and enter that harbor, or, if 
necessary, engage in another battle with the blockading forces. The torpedo boats 


1Ttalian.—o.N. I. 


62 


should return to the Canaries or to Spain with the transatlantic steamers. The 
cruisers Patriota and Rdpido should be detached and sent to the Bermudas to divert 
some of the hostile forces to that vicinity and prey upon the enemy’s commerce. 

Mr. Cincinegui expresses the opinion that to compel the squadron to remain at 
Cape Verde or on the sea until the arrival of the ships to be concentrated at Cadiz 
would mean a further delay in the appearance of the Spanish naval forces in Cuba; 
but that the squadron now at Cape Verde could be sent to the West Indies at once 
and the Cadiz ships could be ordered later to the United States coasts for the purpose 
of causing alarm, attracting some of the hostile forces in that direction, and perhaps 
carrying out some bold operation on hostile cities. Headds that the departure from 
Cape Verde is absolutely necessary, because if the squadron should remain there any 
longer it would probably be requested to leave by the Portuguese Government, in 
virtue of the law of neutrality. 

The Minister says that for operations on the United States coast speed is an impor- 
tant factor; that the Alfonso XIII has very little speed, the Pelayo a very limited 
radius of action, and that neither the latter vessel nor the Carlos V can enter and 
refit in the harbor of San Juan, Puerto Rico, by reason of their draft. 

Mr. Butler states that, while he realizes the necessity for the squadron to start at 
once from Cape Verde, he thinks that it should be notified of the Government’s 
intention to reinforce it with the ships now in Spain, as an encouragement in the 
difficult task upon which it is about to embark; that the Admiral should be given 
every possible facility for shaping his actions according to circumstances; for, while 
it is deemed necessary for the ships to go to the West Indies, they should not be led 
to a useless sacrifice, especially as there are not in Puerto Rico the necessary facili- 
ties for repairing injuries. 

Mr. Chacén speaks of the difficulty of harmonizing so many different opinions, and 
states that they can be only in the nature of advice and not of precepts. He believes 
that public opinion is greatly mistaken in its estimate of the value and efficiency of 
the Spanish squadron, but that it is, nevertheless, necessary to satisfy it within rea- 
sonable bounds. He deems the departure from Cape Verde necessary, not only in 
view of the considerations deduced from the cablegram from the Governor-General 
of Cuba, but also for the reason pointed out by Mr. Cinctinegui, namely, that the 
fleet can remain no longer in a neutral port; that it is reasonable to calculate that 
it will take from ten to fifteen days to complete fitting out the ships now in Spain, 
and that the departure of the squadron from Cape Verde can not be delayed so long, 
and therefore it should start at once for the West Indies, even at the risk of having 
to face the results of an unfortunate encounter. If the fleet blockading Puerto Rico 
should retreat or be defeated, the Spanish squadron should there await the reinforce- 
ments to be sent to it before proceeding to Cuba. As to future operations, he thinks, 
it is hazardous to say anything before knowing the result of the first operations. 

Mr. Valcdrcel says that, in view of the situation and the gravity of the question, 
he thinks that the squadron at Cape Verde should leave for the West Indies. He 
does not think that there is any hope of reenforcing it with the ships fitting out in 
Spain, since from what the minister has said they would require a number of days 
before they could undertake the trip. 

Mr. Aunén wishes to state that, when the minister first spoke of the opinions 
expressed by the admiral of the fleet, he did not read the whole cablegram, which 
might cause an unfavorable impression among those present; but that from its 
whole context it was clear that Admiral Cervera had acted wisely in setting forth 
his opinion, while at the same time declaring himself ready to use all possible dili- 
gence in doing the very thing which in his conscience he believed to be prejudicial 
to subsequent operations; that his declaration could have no other object than to 
set down his opinion, fearing perhaps that in case of his death—a glorious death, 
no doubt—his far-seeing advice would remain forever unknown. 

Relative to the answer that the minister had sent him, he believed it proper to 
sall attention to the phrase, ‘‘submit to the resolution of an assembly,” since the 


63 


assembly could not and should not adopt resolutions, but only give advice, leaving 
it wholly to the Government to dictate resolutions and accept the responsibility 
therefor, whether in conformity with the advice received or not. 

Mr. Gomez Imaz insists on his opinion that the squadrons should be united before 
exposing them to an encounter, because the result of a delay of ten days could not 
be as serious as a possible disaster. 

The Minister, deeming the matter erficiently discussed, suggests that each mem- 
ber present express his opinion in a concise form, not in ne shape of votes and reso- 
lutions, which are inherent in the Government, but by condensing their opinions for 
the purpose of ascertaining which is the prevailing opinion among the many 
expressed. 

The Minister’s suggestion was adopted, and the following résumé was the result: 
Résumé of the opinions expressed by the general officers of the navy upon the question which 

the Minister addressed to them, in the nature of a consultation, on the 23d day of April, 

1898, after explaining to said officers the situation of our naval forces and acquainting 

them with the last cablegrams from the Governor-General of Cuba and the commander in 

chief of the squadron at Cape Verde. 


QUESTION. 


In view of the present state of war and the situation of our naval forces in Europe 
and at Cape Verde, what orders should be issued to said forces relative to their 
movements? 


ANSWERS OF OFFICERS IN THE ORDER FROM THE JUNIOR TO THE SENIOR. 


Capt. Ramén Aunén y Villalén. The four battle ships and three destroyers now 
at Cape Verde should start immediately for West Indian waters, and after the 
imperative necessity of defending the island of Puerto Rico has been pointed out to 
the admiral, he should be given entire freedom of action as to the route, port to be 
entered, and as to the cases and circumstances in which battles should be sought or 
eluded, according to the condition in which the ships arrive, the strength of the 
hostile forces, and the information which the admiral may acquire or which may 
be transmitted to him prior to his arrival. 

The three torpedo boats now at Cape Verde should return to the Canaries when 
aud as best they can under conditions of comparative safety. Theships Pelayo, Car- 
los V, Alfonso XIII, Vitoria, Patriota, and Rapido, the destroyers which are in Europe, 
and other available ships which may be purchased or fitted out should be con- 
centrated at Cadiz and speedily equipped; but the final destiny of these vessels 
should not be determined a priori, but according to the situation of the war at the 
time when these vessels are ready. 

Capt. Joaquin Cinciinegui y Marco expresses the same opinion as Mr. Aunoén, adding 
that the cruisers Patriota and Rdpido should simultaneously be sent to the coasts of 
the United States in order to create alarm, call the enemy’s attention to other points, 
compel him to divide his forces, and thereby enable the Spanish squadron to seek a 
port under more favorable conditions. 

Captain Joaquin Lazaga y Garay maintains the opinion he expressed in the course 
of the debate; but if nevertheless the opinion in favor of the immediate departure 
of the squadron from Cape Verde should prevail, at least the Alfonso XIII and the 
destroyers now in Spain should be incorporated with the squadron, and simul- 
taneously the cruisers Patriota and Rdpido should go to the United States coasts, 
provided they are in condition to do so. 

Capt. Antonio Terry y Rivas. Same opinion as Mr. Aufién. 

Capt. José Gomez Imaz, presents his answer in writing as follows: ‘ The squadron 
assembled at Cape Verde should not go out immediately, but only when the Carlos V, 
Pelayo, and other available vessels are ready to reenforce the syuadron, either 
directly or, preferably, by strategic maneuvers (similar to the one mentioned by 


64 


Captain Lazaga), so that the battle, if inevitable, may take place under more 
favorable circumstances. When the forces are united, Admiral Cervera should be 
permitted to operate with the freedom of action inherent in an admiral.” 

Rear-Admiral José Guzmin y Galtier. Same opinion as Mr. Aufion. 

Rear-Admiral Eduardo Reinoso y Diez de Tejada. Same opinion as Mr. Aufién. 

Rear-Admiral Manuel de la Cémara y Libermoore. Same opinion as Mr. Auton. 

Rear-Admiral Manuel Mozo y Diez-Robles formulated his opinion in writing as fol- 
lows: “If His Majesty’s Government, for reasons of the country’s highest interests, 
thinks best that the squadron should start immediately for Puerto Rico, the under- 
signed rear-admiral is of the same opinion. If not, he thinks that the squadron 
should be reenforced, because, like the admiral of the fleet, he is convinced that a 
disaster is impending, and such a disaster within sight of Puerto Rico would surely 
not contribute toward raising the spirits of the inhabitants of that island nor of 
the isiand of Cuba.” 

Rear-Admiral Ismael Warleta y Ordovas. Same opinion as Mr. Autién. 

Rear-Admiral Antonio de la kocha y Aranda. Same opinion as Mr. Autién, 

Rear- Admiral José Navarro y Fernandez. Same opinion as Mr. Aufnon. 

fear Admiral Manuel Pasquin y de Juan. Same opinion as Mr. Aufoén. 

Vice-Admiral Fernando Martinez de Espinosa. Same opinion as Mr. Aufién. 

Vice-Admiral Eduardo Butler y Anguita. The four battle ships and three destroyers 
now at Cape Verde should start immediately for the West Indies, with instructions 
to accept or elude battle as may be necessary. But being convinced that in union 
is strength, he is of Captain Lazaga’s opinion relative to the increase of the ships 
and reinforcement of the Cape Verde squadron by all available vessels, in such man- 
ner and at such point as the Government may deem expedient; but he believes that 
this can not be done without prejudice to the immediate departure for the West 
Indies. 

Vice-Admiral José Berdnger y Ruiz de Apodaca confirms what he has stated at the 
beginning of the debate, namely, that the squadron now at Cape Verde should under 
no circumstances return to the Canaries, and still less to Spain, but should start 
immediately for the West Indies, using the destroyers as scouts to procure informa- 
tion prior to going into port. 

Vice-Admiral Carlos Valedrcel y Ussel de Guimbarda. Same opinion as Mr. Auton. 

Admiral Guillermo Chacén y Maldonado thinks that the squadron now at Cape 
Verde should start immediately for the West Indies, before being compelled by inter- 
national order to leave the neutral port where it is now. Its admiral should have 
full authority to proceed according to the requirements of war and the exigencies of 
national honor. The ships remaining in Spain should be concentrated at Cadiz and 
completed and equipped as speedily as possible, so as to be in readiness to comply 
instantly with any instructions which the Government may see fit to issue to them, as 
the situation of the country may demand. 

In virtue whereof and by order of the minister of marine the foregoing proceed- 
ings have been drawn up and signed by the gentlemen taking part therein. 

Segismundo Bermejo, Guillermo Chacén, Carlos Valedrcel, José Maria 
Berdnger, Eduardo Butler, Fernando Martinez, Manuel Pasquin, José 
Navarro, Antonio de la Rocha, Ismael Warleta, Manuel Mozo, Manuel 
de la Camara, Eduardo Reinoso, José de Guzmédn, José Gémez Imaz, 
Antonio Terry, Joaquin Lazaga, Joaquin Cinctinegui, Ramén Aufon. 


The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde. 


MADRID, April 24, 1898. 
Assembled genera! officers of the navy. Opinion is that the four battle ships and 
three destroyers should start immediately for West Indies. Have submitted this 


65 


opinion to His Majesty’s Government, which ratifies it, ordering that your excel- 
lency be given complete freedom of action in proceeding to West Indies, trasting in 
your skill, knowledge, and valor. You can obtain information in West Indian 
waters before entering port in Puerto Rico, or in Cuba, if deemed more expedient in 
view of information received. You are given entire freedom of action as to route, 
port, and cases and circumstances in which battle should be sought or eluded. Fif- 
teen thousand pounds are at your disposal in London. The torpedo boats are to 
return to Canaries with auxiliary vessels. You will prescribe their route. The 
United States flag is hostile.) 





‘In the pamphlet so many times referred to the last sentence of this telegram is 
omitted, which says: ‘I renew the enthusiastic greeting of the nation and Govern- 
ment.” 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


CAPE VERDE, April 24, 1898. 
Hope to finish coaling to-morrow. After turret Oquendo does not obey horizontal 
training. Have been trying in vain for two weeks to ascertain cause. We continue 
to work incessantly. 





ST. VINCENT, CAPE VERDE, 
7 April 24, 1898. 
His Excellency SEGismuNDO BERMEJO. 

My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: The telegram ordering us to start 
has just arrived, and I have given orders to tranship from the Cadiz to 
these vessels coal, supplies, crews, and the artillery of the destroyers, 
which was on board the Cadiz. I intended to sail without finishing 
the provisioning of the ships, but since the Cadiz is to remain here I 
have decided to ship as much coal as possible. I will try to sail 
to-morrow. As the act has been consummated, I will not insist upon 
my opinion concerning it. May God grant that I be mistaken! 

You see I was right when I told you that by the end of April the 
Pelayo, Carlos V, Vitoria, and Numancia would not be finished ; that the 
Colon would not have her big guns unless we took the defective ones; 
that we should not have the 5.5-inch ammunition for the new guns, ete, 
With a clear conscience I go to the Sacrifice, but I can not understand 
the unanimous! decision of the general officers of the navy indicating 
disapprobation and censure of my opinions, which implies that some 
one of them should have relieved me. 

I have been informed of the sailing of a cargo of 5,700 tons of coal 
for Puerto Rico, where it is expected to arrive on the 11th or 12th of 
May, but I am much afraid that it may fall into the hands of the 
enemy. It is a mistake to suppose that I can accept or avoid a naval 
battle at will. The Vizcaya, on account of her stay in Havana and not 
having had her bottom cleaned for nine months, is nothing more than 
a buoy, and I can not abandon her. 

Yours, etc., PASCUAL CERVERA. 


1 At that time I thought the vote unanimous. It will be seén from the proceedings 
of the meeting of the general officers that this was not the case. 


10742 5 





66 


P. S., 27th.--I am almost in despair at the slowness of the Cadiz. 
She is well prepared for a voyage, but very poorly for loading and 
unloading. I think we can start to-morrow. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Rermejo). 


Carr VERDE, April 24, 1898. 
Taking advantage of delay, am having boiler tubes of Ariete repaired. If ready 
shall take her along. 


The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde. 


MADRID, April 24, 1898. 
The Gaceta to-day publishes decree that neutral flag covers merchandise, except 
contraband of war. Neutral merchandise, except contraband of war, is not subject 
to confiscation under hostile flag. The Government reserves the right to issue let- 
ters of marque and reprisal, although for the present it will use only the auxiliary 
cruisers of the navy. In compliance with foregoing, warships and auxiliaries will 
exercise right of search on the high seas and in waters within jurisdiction of enemy. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


CaPE VERDE, April 24, 1898. 
Have received urgent telegram ordering departure of squadron. To-morrow, after 
completing coaling, filling vacancies from crew of Cadiz, and transshipping arma- 
ment of destroyers, will comply with your excellency’s instructions. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


CAPE VERDE, April 25, 1898. 
Is it certain that San Francisco and Amazonas are at Madeira? Answer direct to 
captain of Cadiz in case I should start before reply is received. 





The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde, 


MADRID, April 25, 1898. 
The ships mentioned are at Hampton Roads. Columbia and Minneapolis helieved 
to have sailed for Europe. I am told there are numerous spies among coal trimmers, 
Immediate departure imperative. Maintain absolute secrecy as to route, 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


CAPE VERDE, April 25, 1898. 
Much swell prevents transshipping coal and supplies from Cddiz to-day. 


The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde. 


MapriD, April 25, 1898. 
Situation unchanged. Flying Squadron has not yet left Hampton Roads. The 
£15,000 will be deposited in England, and to that extent you can draw on London 


67 


for what you need. San Juan, Puerto Rico, will be advised of signal agreed upon with 
pilot.} 
The Spanish Minister at Lisbon (Ayerbe) to the Minister of State (Gullén), 


MADRID, April 26, 1898. 
Minister foreign affairs asks me confidentially to inquire of your excellency 
whether you can state time that squadron will remain at Cape Verde. Same request 
made of Portuguese minister at Madrid in case United States should remonstrate, 
as stated in a newspaper to-day. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


CAPE VERDE, April 26, 1898. 
Work continues night and day shipping coal and cartridges of destroyers, but pro- 
gresses slowly, as hatchways of trans-Atlantic do not permit rapid work; 400 tons 
still lacking. The battle ships have engines all ready, so as not to delay departure, 
Villaamil follows with squadron. . 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


CAPE VERDE, April 26, 1898. 
Irn. view of departure of fast hostile cruisers, of which you notify me, and slow 
speed of Cadiz and San Francisco, believe it expedient that you should issue instruc- 
tions direct to commander of Azor, in charge of expedition. 


The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde. 


MADRID, April 26, 1898. 
Have given orders London send 5,000 tons of coal to Curacao at disposal of your 
excellency and commandant of Porto Rico. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


CAPE VERDE, April 27, 1898. 
Transshipping progresses slowly. Am in despair, but impossible to work more 
rapidly. Three hundred tons of coal remain to be shipped. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


CAPE VERDE, April 27, 1898.- 
I go out to-morrow evening. Before that I wish last reports of war and situation 
in Spain. 


The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Cape Verde. 


MADRID, April 28, 1898. 
Hope this will arrive in time. Havana and north of Cuba still blockaded. San 
Juan, Puerto Rico, so far free. No hostile ships in European waters. Quiet and har- 
mony reigning in Spain. Reiterate enthusiastic greeting of nation.? Great activity 
displayed in fitting other ships. 
Se Mt ek Se Bat AS SS a 
1The sentence in italics is omitted in pamphlet. 


*The sentence in italics is omitted in the pamphlet. 





68 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


CAPE VERDE, April 28, 1898. 
In spite of every effort made working at night, can not go out until morning. Not. 
withstanding hard work can not do all that is desired. Turret of Oquendo ready. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


CaPE VERDE, April 29, 1898. 
Am going north.! 





{Confidential.]} 
The Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine (Bermejo). 


CAPTAINCY-GENERAL OF THE SQUADRON, STAFF. 

HONORED S1ir: Under date of the 20th I had the honor of sending you a report on 
the squadron up to that date. The unloading of the San Francisco was continued, ~ 
working day and night, and completed on the 24th. AsI told your excellency ina 
separate communication, the coal was 180 tons short of the 2,000 she was to bring, — 
owing no doubt to the hurry with which the steamer shipped the coal and the loss 
from coal dropped in the water during the work of unloading, especially at night. 
This must also have been the case with the Cadiz. I purchased a]1 the lubricating 
oil I was able to find at Cape Verde, and the ships are well supplied in that respect. 

In this connection I wish to point out to your excellency the expediency of always 
accompanying supplies of coal with a corresponding quantity of lubricating mate- | 
rial. On the evening of the 24th I received your telegraphic instructions to start 
for the West Indies and detach from the fleet the three torpedo boats and the Ciudad 
de Cadiz, and as these vessels were also short of coal, and I deemed it necessary that 
they should carry as large quantities as possible, I gave orders at once for them to 
take 625 tons of the coal on board the Cadiz, also engine supplies and provisions; 
and the 2.95-inch guns and ammunition of the three destroyers which are to follow 
me were transshipped. ~ 

Owing to the conditions of the hold of the Cadiz, the lack of transshipping appli- 
ances, and the heavy swell, this work was very arduous and slow; but I thought it 
was better to lose these few days than to reach our destination badly provisioned. 
The ships of the Teresa type leave with 1,080 tons each, and the Colén with 1,270 tons. 
The latter ship consumes considerably more coal than the others, owing to the type 
of her boilers. The destroyers carry about 140 tons each, which is’34 in excess of 
their bunker capacity. With this supply they have theoretically an approximate 
radius of action of 2,800 miles at the rate of 10 knots an hour. But I feel sure I shall 
have to resupply them before reaching our destination, in case the state of the sea 
should not permit me to tow them. The great weakness of their construction will 
have to be taken into consideration in this connection. 

The Vizcaya, as I advised you, is very much fouled. During her ten days’ run from 
Puerto Rico here she burned 200 tons more than the Oquendo. This is a weak point, 
but as I see no remedy for it at present, I contracted here for having her cleaned by 
divers, but this could only be done toa limited extent. I had the divers of the fleet 
clean her screws and sea cocks. Owing to pressure of time and lack of space on 
board the battle ships, already much overloaded, I left 1,500 spare boiler tubes of 
the destroyers with the Cadiz. 

If your excellency thinks that the campaign will last long enough and that there 
will be chances for changing boiler tubes, I beg that you will send these wherever 





1 Tbe phrase agreed upon in telegram from minister dated April 21. 


69 


you may deem best. I also repeat my request for Bustamante torpedoes, which 
would surely be of great service. I take with me to-day the torpedoes brought by 
the Ciudad de Cadiz and San Francisco. The expedition, as I have already told your 
excellency, will go in command of the oldest lieutenant, Claudio Alvargonzdlez, com- 
mander of the Azor. 

In a separate letter I confirm to your excellency the telegrams I have sent since my 
former communication. There only remains for me to tell you that there is nothing 
special to report relative to the crews of the fleet, and that they are all firmly 
resolved to sacrifice their lives in the fulfillment of their duty. May God grant our 
forces the success worthy of the justice of our cause. 

On board flagship, St. Vincent, Cape Verde, April 28, 1898, 

Yours, etc., 
PASCUAL CERVERA. 





The Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine (Bermejo). 
[Confidential.] 


CAPTAINCY-GENERAL OF THE SQUADRON, STAFF. 


Honorep Sir: Under this date I issue the following instructions to the commander 
of the first division of torpedo boats: ‘About 450 miles from the port of Fort de 
France, Martinique, you will, upon signal made, detach your division from the squad- 
ron, with the torpedo-boat destroyers Furor and Terror, and proceed to the last- 
named port, at the rate of 20 knots an hour, and will there obtain information on the 
points I have stated to you and return at once to communicate such information to 
me, bearing in mind that the squadron will run parallel to the southern point of 
Martinique at the rate of about 8 knots an hour. Being acquainted with my plans 
you will operate within the limits of the same with complete freedom of action. 

“Signals of recognition during the night will be the letter R of the Morse alphabet, 
made with a searchlight, it being understood that the point is to be represented by 
maintaining the luminous ray for a certain length of time at an elevation of 45 
degrees and flash it for a greater length of time at the same elevation. Between 
one R and the next, three horizontal movements are to be made with the luminous 
ray; the first, for instance, from left to right, the second from right to left, and the 
third again from left to right, or vice versa. The answer on the part of the flagship 
will be the letter A, made in the same manner, and three horizontal movements. 
To enable you to communicate speedily any information you may have, I inclose 
herewith a sheet of conventional signals to be used on this occasion only. 

‘“‘You may also communicate information by using key A B 0755. In the unlikely 
case that in the performance of this mission you should meet hostile forces, you 
will act as you may deem expedient, according to circumstances, bearing in mind 
that your principal mission is to communicate to me the information referred to.” 
I have the honor of advising your excellency of the foregoing for your knowledge 
and approval. 

On board Teresa, on the sea, May 1, 1898. 

Yours, etc., PASCUAL CERVERA. 


AT SEA, May 5, 1898. 
DEAR JUAN: To complete our collection of documents, I think proper 
that you should have the inclosed copy of a telegram from Villaamil to 
Sagasta. I forward this letter by two destroyers, which I am sending 
to Martinique in search of news. All is well on board and the spirit 
is excellent. We shall see what God has in store for us. The final 


70 


result is not doubtful, but if we could only start with a good lucky 
stroke. God be with us. Good-bye. Regards to your family, etc. 
PASCUAL, 


{Telegram.—To be deciphered by naval key.—Key CD 4393.] 
MADRID, April 22, 1898. 
PRAXEDES SAGASTA: 

In view of the importance to the country of the destination of this 
fleet, I deem it expedient that you should know, through a friend who 
does not fear censure, that, while as seamen we are all ready to die with 
honor in the fulfillment of our duty, I think it undoubted that the sacri- 
fice of these naval forces will be as certain as it will be fruitless and 
useless for the termination of the war if the representations repeatedly 
made by the admiral to the minister of marine are not taken into 


consideration. 
FERNANDO VILLAAMIL. 





[Private.] 
The Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine (Bermejo). 


CAPTAINCY-GENERAL OF THE SQUADRON, STAFF. 

HONORED SiR: As [ had the honor of advising your excellency in my communica- 
tion of the 28th ultimo, dated at St. Vincent, Cape Verde, I left that port on the day 
following with the four battle ships and three destroyers, leaving instructions behind 
for the departure of the three torpedo boats and the steamers Cadiz and San Fran- 
cisco. Upon starting I issued to the second in command and the captains of the 
ships certain instructions, of which I herewith inclose a copy, as also of my address 
to the crews, which was read to them after we had left the harbor and received with 
great enthusiasm by all. 

After mature consideration and in view of the wide scope of the instructions 
received and the unusual situation in which these forces will be placed, I formulated 
a plan (which I did not announce until after we had left) of shaping my course for 
Fort de France, Martinique, there to obtain information, and, if possible, coal and 
provisions, which would permit me greater freedom of action. To that end I shall 
detach to-morrow morning, about 470 miles from the port referred to, the Terror and 
Furor, under the commander of the first torpedo-boat division, who will take with 
him this letter and the following cipher telegram: 

“All wellin the squadron. Spiritexcellent. Villaamil is to obtain information on 
which the future operations of the squadron will depend. Five hundred and 
seventy thousand pesetas are required for the pay now due. The funds on board 
and those deposited in London amount to 675,000. I donot wish to exhaust resources 
completely. It is therefore necessary to increase credit.” 

In confirming this telegram I have the honor of impressing upon your excellency 
the necessity of increasing the credit placed at my disposal, so that these crews who 
have received only a small advance for their families and for messes may get their 
pay for May, which they would already have received if they were in Spain. So far 
our voyage has progressed without anything worthy of mention. We have encoun- 
tered fair weather, as is usual in this season and latitude. Although with some 
misgivings, 1 had the three destroyers taken in tow the day of our departure, and 
started out at the rate of 10 knots an hour. 

As I feared that these frail vessels might be injured by yawing, I had the speed 


71 


reduced to 7.2 knots, and we continued at that rate until yesterday, when I increased 
it to8 knots. In doing this I have taken into consideration not only the trouble and 
delay it would cause if we had to recoal them on thesea before reaching our destina- 
tion, but also the advantage of their crews arriving fresh and in condition to render 
services at once and the saving of coal by the battle ships at this rate of speed. 

I also inclose herewith copy of a proclamation, addressed principally to the sub- 
altern classes, and which I distribute to the ships to-day, embodying instructions 
which I have drawn up for the exercise of the right of search; also copy of the 
instructions which I gave to Villaamil. I can tell nothing as yet as to my future 
plans. I only repeat that I place my trust in God, and being animated by the most 
ardent desire to serve my country I shall do so to the best of my ability and strength. 

On board the Infania Maria Teresa, on the sea, 14° 42’ north latitude and 44° 26/ 
west longitude, May 8, 1898. 

Yours, etc., PASCUAL CERVERA. 


- 


INSTRUCTIONS REFERRED TO, 


CAPTAINCY-GENERAL OF THE SQUADRON, STAFF. 

HonoreED Sir: Under date of April 27 last, I issued the following instructions to 
the captains of the ships of this squadron: 

During the voyage the squadron will proceed in the order and at the respective 
distances indicated in sketch No. 1, hereto annexed. 

(The sketch referred to as No. 1 shows the squadron forming a square, the length 
of the side of which being 5 cables, with the Teresa at the forward left-hand corner, 
the Vizcaya in the center of the square, the Colén at the forward right-hand corner. 
Two of the torpedo boats fill the remaining corners of the square, and the third 
torpedo boat is inline with them, but 5 cables on the left flank of the square. The 
Oquendo’s station is on the left flank of the square midway between the Teresa and 
the third torpedo boat.) 

‘«The above order will be adopted immediately upon starting, without further 
signal, but subject to the provisions of evolution No. 15 (for order with ships dis- 
persed) of the Tactical Evolutions, which are to remain in force. This order has 
been adopted so that each destroyer may be in easy contact with the battle ship to 
which she is assigned. When so ordered (which will probably not be the case until 
near destination or in sight of the enemy) the formation shown in sketch No. 2 will 
be adopted; that is to say, the battle ships in line ahead, with the Teresa leading and 
the Vizcaya forming the rear, at the distances indicated, and the destroyers in 
another line ahead, each destroyer between two battle ships, observing between 
themselves the same distances as the latter, and the two lines 6 cables apart, unless 
otherwise ordered. 

(Sketch No. 2 shows the ships in double column, the left column consisting of the 
Teresa, Oquendo, Colén, and Vizcaya, and the right column consisting of the three 
torpedo boats.) 

‘When this order in line ahead is adopted, the commander of the division: of 
destroyers will go on board one of them, and if it should become necessary to fight 
he will remove the destroyers to a distance, out of the range of hostile projectiles, 
if possible, closely observing the phases of the battle for the purpose of descending 
upon the enemy when a favorable opportunity offers. 

“The commander of the division is given entire freedom of movements, as also the 
captains, in case for some reason or other they can not be directed by their com- 
mander in chief, who enjoins each one of them not to allow their zeul to lead them 
into firing before the proper time. For passing from the order of the voyage to the 
order of line ahead, evolutions Nos. 10 and 11 of the Instructions will be observed, 
it being understood that the Teresa and Oquendo will form one group and the Colén 
and Vizcaya another. 


12 


“The destroyers, in a countermovement, will follow the movements of the head of 
the line. If signal Z 96 is made (take in tow, etc.), the battle ships will gradually 
slow down, after hoisting pennant Z, to the slowest speed (unless otherwise 
instructed), and each destroyer will proceed at once to take the tow of her respective 
battle ship. When the flagship orders the destroyers to be supplied with provisions, 
she will make the signal Q 02, and the destroyers will maneuver accordingly, after 
hoisting pennant of execution. 

“Tf the speed is to be moderated, it will be indicated by signals, but the captains 
of the battle ships are authorized to do so without signal, if, in their opinion, it 
should become necessary. If the destroyers themselves ask for provisions, they will 
make signal Q 11, and with that signal hoisted they will at once stand for their 
respective battle ships. If water is wanted in place of provisions, signals Q 61 and 
Q 65, respectively, will be made, and in case of coal the signals will be J 76 and 
J 84. When standing inshore, the order of occupations of the crews will be changed 
as follows: 

‘1. The reveille will be sounded early enough 80 that all the men can be at quarters 
and the ship in battle trim one hour before sunrise, and everything will remain in 
this condition until full daylight and until it has been ascertained, after careful 
reconnoitering, that a surprise is improbable. 


‘*2. The crews will then breakfast. 

“3, After breakfast such exercises will be had as may be deemed necessary for a 
desired length of time, and the different apparatus which it may be necessary to use 
in battle shall be carefully examined. 

“‘4, The men will then rest until 10 o’clock, at which time the cleaning shall take 
place. 

“5, After dinner the men will rest until 2 or 3, after which such work as the ship 
may require will be done. Supper at6 o’clock, and immediately after supper clear- 
ing for action, everything being left in position for battle as far as it involves no risk. 
The partitions of the bunks shall remain in position and the bunks made up, but 
without the blankets, as each man will have his own, while one bunk serves for two. 

“These instructions shall go into effect once for all upon signal A5 2 being made 
(hang out nets, etc.). 

“T have the honor of advising you of the foregoing for your information and 
approval. 

“Yours, etc., ‘*PASCUAL CERVERA, 

ON BoarRD MARIA TERESA, On the Sea, May 8, 1898.” 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 
MARTINIQUE, May 12, 1898. 
Squadron arrived safely. Spirit excellent. Villaamil isto obtain information 
on which the future operations will depend. Five hundred and seventy thousand 
pesetas are required for the pay now due. The funds on board and those deposited in Lon- 
don amount to 675,000. I do not wish to exhaust resources completely. It is therefore 
necessary to increase the credit. } 


The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Martinique.® 


MADRID, May 12, 1898. 
Government is pleased to hear of your arrival at Martinique. Nothing new in the 
Peninsula. Telegram received to-day announcing attack San Juan, Puerto Rico, by 
hostile fleet composed of New York, Indiana, Terror, Puritan, two cruisers, one torpedo 


1The part in italics is omitted in the pamphlet. 
2T did not know of any of these three telegrams until I returned to Spain. I sus- 
pected the last one at Santiago de Cuba, 


13 


boat, and two colliers. Island of Puerto Rico is watched by auxiliaries Paris and 
New York. Admiral at Havana says four hostile ships in sight yesterday, one at 
Mantanzas and several off Cienfuegos. News of bombardment of Cardenas by a 
battle ship, monitor, and another vessel; enemy repulsed. 

Credit increased; another £15,000 on same house London. Steamer Alicante must 
have arrived at Martinique, and an English steamer with 3,000 tons is to make that 
harbor under orders of captain of Alicante. Both vessels at your disposal. 


The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Martinique.' 


MADRID, May 12, 1898. 
According to late information battle ship Oregon, accompanied by Marietta and 
another similar ship, are on the way from Rio Janeiro to West Indies. 


The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Martinique. 


MADRID, May 12, 1898. 
Situation changed since yourdeparture. Your instructions amplified so that if you 
do not believe that your squadron can operate there successfully may return to 
Peninsula, choosing route and destination, preferably Cadiz. Acknowledge receipt 
and indicate decision, 


PROCEEDINGS. 
[Document No. 2 referred to on p. 76.] 


The second in command of the squadron, the captains of the battle ships, the chief 
of staff, and the commander of the first torpedo-boat division, being assembled in 
the admiral’s cabin on the 12th day of May, the admiral acquainted them with 
the information obtained on the day previous at Fort de France by the commander 
of the torpedo-boat division. 

Having carefully studied the situation of the squadron, which is extremely criti- 
cal, owing to the scant supply of coal, the governor of Martinique having refused 
to give aid in that direction, and it having been learned that there is no coal in San 
Juan, nor probably at Santiago, and in view of the bad condition of the boilers of 
the destroyers, those of the Terror being practically unserviceable, so that it became 
necessary to send her back to Fort de France this morning to await orders from the 
Government, these officers seeing no other solution—on penalty of placing the squad- 
ron in a position where it will be unable to move and will hence become an easy prey 
for the enemy—except to go to Curacao, in hopes of finding there the coal announced 
by the minister of marine in his telegram of April 26. 

In witness whereof they sign the foregoing, on the sea, off Fort de France, 


Martinique, 
PASCUAL CERVERA, 


JOSE DE PAREDES. 
EMILIO DfaAz MoREU. 
JUAN B. LAZAGA. 
ANTONIO EULATE. 
Victor M. Concas. 
JOAQUIN BUSTAMANTE, 
FERNANDO VILLAAMIL. 


A true copy: 
CERVERA. 





1T did not know of any of these three telegrams until I returned to Spain. I sus- 
pected the last one at Santiago de Cuba. 


TA 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


CuRAGAO, May 14, 1898. 
After consulting with the second in command of the squadron and the captains of 
the ships, I came here in hopes of finding the coal announced in your telegram of 
April 26. Collier has not arrived, and I have not been able to obtain here the coal I 
need. There is a controversy about it, and I must see what 1 can do. Only two 
ships have been allowed to enter, and their stay has been limited to forty-eight 
hours. 


The Governor-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of Colonies (R. Girén). 


Havana, May 14, 1898.: 
I beg your excellency that you will tell me truly whether the squadron is coming, 
Telegrams denying this are arriving and I stop them on the way. 1 must positively 
know the truth, so as to be able to act accordingly. I assure your excellency that 
absolutely no one besides myself shall know your reply. 


The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Curacao} 


Maprip, May 15, 1898. 
Your telegram received. Transatlantic Alicante anchored at Martinique (with 
coal)? has been ordered to leave immediately for Curacao. If you can not wait, tele- 
graph immediately to captain (of Terror) where you want the coal. In view of your 
going to Martinique, steamer sent to Curagao was ordered to go to Martinique. Do 
not know whether latter has arrived. 


The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Curacao.® 


MADRID, May 15, 1898. 
If you can not await trans-Atlantic Alicante leave orders at Curacao, so that said 
steamer may go immediately upon arrival wherever you order; likewise English 
steamer Tuickhand, which also carries coal. 


The Minister (Bermejo) to the Admiral (Cervera), Curacao. 


Manprip, May 15, 1898. 
Our minister from Toronto communicates to-day, 15th, the following telegram: 
“Tt is reported that hostile squadron under command of Sampson was at Puerto 
Plata yesterday.” 


The Minister (Bermejo) to the First Commandant Puerto Rico (Vallarino). 


MADRID, May 15, 1898. 
Use every means possible to get to Admiral of squadron, who is at Curagao, the 





1This telegram was not known to me until I arrived at Santiago de Cuba, where I 
received it. 

*The words in parentheses did not appear in the telegram as received. 

$ This telegram was not known to me until I arrived at Santiago de Cuba, where I 
received it. 


15 


telegrams you have for him, as also information on situation hostile squadron, and 
arrange for immediate departure of English steamer Roath, if she has coal on board 
for squadron.! 





(Confidential.] 
The Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


CAPTAINCY-GENERAL OF THE SQUADRON. 

HonoreD Sir: Through my official letter of the 8th, written on the sea, your 
excellency knows of the few incidents of our monotonous voyage across the Atlantic, 
during which I sacrificed everything in order that our frail torpedo-boat destroyers 
might arrive fresh and in condition to render useful service. But my efforts were 
in vain, for hardly had the Furor and Terror been made for twenty-four hours to 
maintain two-thirds of their trial speed, when the boilers of the latter became dis- 
abled, putting us to the necessity of losing still further time, and finally leaving the 
Terror in the neutral port of Fort de France in the island of Martinique. 

The accompanying copy of the official report of her captain, marked “ Document 
No. 1,” will give your excellency further details as to what has occurred. It wasa 
great and very unpleasant surprise to me whenI saw our two destroyers at day- 
break of the 11th, the Terror nothing but a buoy, and the Furor guarding her, so that 
she might not be abandoned in the midst of the ocean until she was sure of being 
seen by the squadron. When we reached her! took her in tow, and we had to pro- 
ceed even more slowly than at the beginning, as the destroyer no longer had the 
protection of the swifter with which the commander of the flotilla had provided 
her. 

I will say nothing further of this accident, since it has occurred to a ship under 
very efficient command, and with an engineer in chief who enjoys the highest repu- 
tation. It only proves the frailness of these ships. They have another defect, 
almost worse, namely, the temperature which develops in them and which is unbear- 
able for all, but especially for the engineers and firemen, who are frequently over- 
come by the heat. 

The commander of the flotilla, who, as your excellency is aware, went to Marti- 
nique in search of information, went out with the Furor at daybreak of the 11th, and 
at midnight of the 11th he rejoined the squadron, brimful of news, but all bad, and, 
among other obstacles encountered, having had to contend with a chase by a hostile 
cruiser. The commander, Captain Villaamil, has once more demonstrated in this 
enterprise the rare intelligence, energy, and presence of mind with which he is gifted. 
The information he brought me, in answer to the questions I gave him upon trusting 
the mission to him, is as follows: That the hostile ships are blockading the western 
part of Cuba, from Cardenas to Cienfuegos, with the nucleus of their fleet; that just 
now, according to secret information which, however, is not entirely reliable, they 
are off San Juan de Puerto Rico, with their Admiral, and bombarded the capital on 
the 11th; that San Juan appears to be blockaded and Santiago free; tha,two of the 
enemy’s auxiliary cruisers, the Harvard and St. Louis, are at Guadeloupe and Marti- 
nique, respectively; that the Americans have taken possession of Puerto Plata and, it 
is believed, also of Samana; that the war of insurrection in Cuba is still going on, 
and the last news is of a fierce battle at Sierra Maestra; that Spain is passing through 
a ministerial crisis; that we should not be permitted to take coal in Martinique, but 
that we could get provisions there; fete finally, that there was no special news from 
the far East. 

He also brought me a bundle of press telegrams containing a great deal of news; 
among others, of the destruction of our poor fleet in the Philippines, which, glorious 
though it may be, is nevertheless a great disaster. In view of the very serious 


SS 


1] did not know of this telegram until long after my return to Spain, 


76 


news, and although my opinions on the subject have been manifested (too frankly, 
perhaps) in my correspondence with the Government, by telegrams as well as official 
letters, and in my confidential communications to the minister of marine, I con- 
sidered it my duty to assemble the captains and second in command of the squadron, 
whom I acquainted with the situation and consulted as to what, in their opinion, 
was best to be done. 

After discussing this very serious question, it was decided that there was no advan- 
tage in going to Martinique, since we would gain nothing thereby and only consume 
coal. To go to San Juan would be madness, as we would only be preparing an easy 
triumph for the enemy. And as we have hardly coal enough to reach Santiago de 
Cuba, with the speed necessary on the sea of operations, and as our destroyers would 
probably not be able to withstand the trip, it was the unanimous opinion of the offi- 
cers that we should go to Curacao in search of the coal which was promised us by 
telegram of April 26. Proceedings were drawn up to that effect, a copy of which, 
marked ‘Document No. 2,” accompanies this letter.! As I was of the same opinion, 
we proceeded to that island, adopting at first a wrong course in the direction of Santo 
Domingo, until at a distance of 30 miles from Martinique. Permit me here to make 
a few observations to explain and justify my operations. 

There is not the least doubt that a sacrifice, such as made by our comrades in the 
Philippines, is worthy of the highest honor, and I take pleasure in expressing to 
them from here my enthusiasm and admiration. But is there any practical result in 
such sacrifice? Evidently not, and from pitting vessels like the Castilia and Chris- 
tina against modern ships no other result than the one obtained can possibly be 
expected. The result will always be the same where there is great disparity between 
the opposing forces, whether in the number of ships, their efficiency, or the stores 
they carry. : 

This painful result therefore justifies the crude ideas I have expressed in my cor- 
respondence above referred to, upon which I insist no further, as I do not want to 
be a bore, which is always a bad thing, especially when addressing a superior. I 
therefore proceed with the report of our voyage. The run from the waters of Mar- 
tinique to those of Curagao offered nothing worth mentioning. At 7 o’clock a. m. of 
the 14th, about 5 miles from Little Curagao, I gave orders to. the destroyers to enter 
the port first; but at 8.30 I saw them off the entrance. The Plutén signaled: 
“‘Awaiting permission of governor.” The squadron stopped and soon after the Plu- 
ton signaled that only two ships were permitted to go in. This was confirmed by 
the pilot, who arrived soon after, demanding to know the names of the ships, their 
complements and armament, and the amount of coal required. I selected the Teresa 
and Vizcaya, whose coal supply was lower than that of the others. I gave the 
information asked for, stating that each ship needed 700 tons, and the pilot went 
back. 

I gave instructions that the Furor should be recoaled from the Coldén, and that the 
latter ship, together with the Oquendo and Plutén, should remain outside. The pilot 
returned, accompanied by the Spanish consul, who told me that the stay in the 
harbor must be limited to forty-eight hours. At 12.30 we cast anchor inside, after 
which I had an interview with the governor, who told me that this was a necessity 
imposed upon his Government by both belligerents. I accepted the 600 tons of coal, 
which was all that could be had in the town, and ordered the purchase of provisions 
so as to supply each ship for thirty days, from the captain down to the cabin boy. 

At 5 o’clock p. m. I dispatched to your excellency the following cipher message, 
which I hereby confirm: ‘‘After consulting with the second in command of the 
squadron and the captains of the ships, I came here in hopes of finding the coal 
announced in your telegram of April 26. Collier has not arrived, and I have not 
been able to obtain here the coal I need. There is a controversy about it, and I must 





1'The document referred to is given on p. 73. 


(i 


see what I can do. Only two ships have been allowed to enter, and their stay has 
been limited to forty-eight hours.” 

I tell your excellency nothing of my plans, as I do not wish to intrust them to 
paper, and furthermore, when this letter reaches you, you will certainly have received 
telegraphic news from me. The coaling proceeds slowly owing to lack of means for 
shipping it, but I intend to go out by any means this evening, no matter what quan- 
tity I may have on board, for while the question of coal is of the utmost importance 
to me, I do not want to spend another night with the squadron divided. 

On board Infanta Maria Teresa, St. Ann Harbor, Curagao, May 15, 1898. 

Yours, etc., 
PAsCUAL CERVERA. 


DOCUMENT NO. 1 REFERRED TO ON P. 75. 


HonoreD Sir: Agreeable to the orders of your excellency, we left the squadron 
on the morning of the 9th instant, together with the Furor, having on board the 
commander in chief of the division. We had three boilers in operation, and pro- 
ceeded at the rate of 18 knots. About 1.30 several tubes of the forward boilers 
burst. They were therefore disconnected and the fires put out. We lighted the 
fourth boiler, and as soon as the injured boilers were cold we examined them and 
proceeded to repair No. 2, which had suffered the least. 

By daylight the injured tubes had been stopped up, the fire was relighted, and by 
8.30 a. m. we had steam up. By 10.30 the three boilers had neither water nor steam, 
the fires were put out, and we called the Furor to take usintow. After reconnoiter- 
ing, we commenced once more to repair No. 2, and had steam up by 7 o’clock a. m., 
when we stood for the squadron, which was sighted at that moment. In conformity 
with my duty, I have the honor of reporting the foregoing to your excellency for 
your information. 

Yours, etc., FRANCISCO DE LA ROCHA. 

On BoarD TERROR, On the Sea, May 11, 1898. 


A true copy. 
JOAQUIN BUSTAMANTE, 


Chief of Staff. 





{Confidential.] 
The Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo). 


CAPTAINCY-GENERAL OF THE SQUADRON, STAFF. 

- HONORED Sir: I believe it to be my duty, in view of the change of government, 
to call your excellency’s attention to the main deficiencies with which this squadron 
went out to war. The principal deficiency, not of this ship alone, but of the whole 
squadron, is in the lack of reliable 5.5-inch ammunition, of which all the ships 
together have only about 620 rounds out of the whole 3,000. Moreover, the Vizcaya 
has two 5.5-inch guns and the Oquendo one which can not be relied upon and which 
had been ordered to be changed for others. Among the fuses there are a large num- 
ber which are not safe, owing to defects of original construction. 

The squadron has not a single one of the 60 Bustamante torpedoes which it was 
to have. The Coldn does not have her heavy guns, nor apparatus for re-forming and 
. charging the cartridge cases of the 5.9 and 4.7 inch guns. The Vizcaya has not been 
cleaned since July, and she has consequently lost her speed to such an extent that 
she can not-now make more than 13 or 14 knots an hour. By reason of this fact the 
squadron has lost the only advantage which it might have had over the hostile fleet, 


78 


for so important a ship can not be abandoned. And here I close, not because there 
are not many other things, but because they are of less importance in connection 
with the campaign, and it is not my object to trouble your excellency, but only to 
acquaint you with the true condition of our forces. 

Yours, etc., PASCUAL CERVERA. 


On BoarpD TERESA, St. Ann, Curacao, May 15, 1898, 


The Governor-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of Colonies (R. Girén). 


Havana, May 17, 1898. 


(To be deciphered by your excellency personally.) 

Have asked commandant navy whether he has received news on situation of our 
squadron. He tells me received from San Juan confidential cipher message saying 
that telegram has been sent to commander in chief of squadron at Fort de France 
that his instructions are amplified, and if he can not operate there successfully may 
return to Peninsula. If this should happen, situation here would be wholly unten- 
able, andI could not prevent bloody revolution in this capital and whole island, 
feelings being already overmuch excited by delay in arrival of our squadron. 
Therefore, beg your excellency to tell me whether it is true that order has been 
issued to squadron to return to Peninsula, and if so does Government realize the sig- 
nificance of such a decision, which might be the cause of a bloody page staining our 
history, and of final loss of this island and the honor of Spain? If our squadron is 
defeated, it would increase here determination to vanquish or die; but if it flees, 
panic and revolution are certain. 


The Governor-General, Puerto Rico (Macias), to the Minister of Colonies (R. Girén). 


PUERTO Rico, May 18, 1898. 
Order for squadron to return to Peninsula will end enthusiasm and high spirit 
in island. Inhabitants will say Spain abandons them and situation may become very 
critical. Consider it my sacred duty to tell you so. 


The Governor-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of Colonies (R. Girén). 


HAVANA, May 19, 1898—9 a. m. 
Our squadron has just entered Santiago de Cuba. Congratulate its Admiral on his 
arrival and skillful voyage. 


The Minister of State (Gullén) to the Minister of Marine (Auftén), 


MINISTRY OF STATE. 

HONORED Sir: The Spanish minister at Caracas, in dispatch No. 79, dated May 18, 
advises this ministry as follows: 

“‘On Friday, the 13th instant, a report was circulated in this city that the Spanish 
squadron was in the port of Higuerote, in this Republic. The origin of the rumor 
could not be ascertained because, owing to the revolution which is still devastating 
this country, there is no telegraphic communication with that point. Troubled by 
this report, I received on Saturday, the 14th, a telegram from our intelligent and 
energetic vice-consul in charge of the Spanish consulate at Curagao, Mr. Morris E. 
Curiel, telling me that the Spanish squadron, composed of six ships, was sighted in 
that harbor. I telegraphed immediately, asking for frequent information, and at 


19 


the same time dispatched to your excellency a cipher telegram as follows, ‘[Span- 
ish] squadron [in] sight to-day [off] Curagao,’ in order that the Government might 
know as early as possible the whereabouts of the squadron. 

Mr. Morris telegraphed me the same day, the 14th, at 6.45 p. m., that the Infanta 
Maria Teresa and Vizcaya had entered the harbor, the Oquendo, Cristébal Colén, and 
destroyers Plutén and Furor remaining outside. Sunday, the 15th, I learned that 
the squadron was in search of coal, and that 500 tons, all there was in that port, had 
been sold it by Captain Smith, United States consul. The latter being severely 
reprimanded by the United States minister here, replied that the coal did not belong 
to him, but to a friend, upon whom he had prevailed not to sell any more than had 
already been shipped at the time he made complaint to him, namely, about 300 tons. 

I am waiting for the mail from Curacao to confirm or correct this and other infor- 
mation which I have received and from which it would appear that the squadron 
purchased a large amount of provisions and that the destroyers had their bunkers 
full of coal. I was also informed that the United States minister had telegraphed 
to Washington and to the American dispatch boat at St. Thomas that the United 
States fleet was awaiting ours in Mona Passage, between Santo Domingo and Puerto 
Rico. I at once telegraphed to Curagao, and the consul answered at 5.30 p. m. that 
he had given warning and that the squadron was going out. 

“‘As I knew that the United States fleet was expected at Curacao, where two tele- 
grams have been waiting for Admiral Sampson since the 13th, and knowing further 
that the French Cable Company has telegraphed its agents at La Guayra, Puerto 
Cabello, and Curacao, opening unlimited credits to said admiral for telegraphing 
purposes, I sent a trustworthy person with precise instructions to our consul at 
La Guayra, Mr. Perera, and urged him to have one of the pilots of the port, all of 
whom happened to be Spanish, in readiness in case our squadron should be sighted, 
to start immediately and notify Admiral Cervera of all this, as also of the fact that 
there is coal available in the port of Guanta, near Barcelona, in this Republic. 

“‘By secret information I learned that same day, the 15th, that the correspondent 
here of the New York Herald had received a telegram from that paper asking him 
to telegraph whether the Spanish squadron was at Barranquilla, United States of 
Colombia, which shows that it is believed in the United States that our ships are off 
the Leeward Islands and Colon. All this strictly confidential information I have 
received from different persons who are desirous of proving to me their loyalty to 
Spain, and none of this information has cost this legation asingle cent. On the 16th 
the consul at Curacao telegraphed me that the Spanish vice-consul at Puerto Plata, 
Santo Domingo, had informed him of the arrival of the United States fleet. 

‘On the same day I dispatched to you a cipher telegram, saying: ‘Spanish squad- 
ron composed (of) six ships has obtained (at) Curacao only 300 tons (of) coal, weigh- 
ing anchor yesterday, notified by me (that) United States fleet is awaiting (them in) 
Mona Passage.’ ‘United States fleetis in Puerto Plata (and is) expected (at) Curagao 
and Venezuela. Coal available at Guanta.’ 

‘‘To-day the consul at Curacao has transmitted to me a telegram from our consul 
at Santo Domingo in key 74, and as I do not have this it was deciphered by the 
secretary of the Spanish legation, who, fortunately, has an excellent knowledge of 
the cipher keys of your ministry. The telegram said: ‘Hostile fleet went out 
Saturday Samana.’ I do not know whether this telegram has reference to a move- 
ment prior to the arrival of said fleet at Puerto Plata, Monday thel6th. I have also 
received a telegram from the Governor-General of Puerto Rico, asking me whether I 
had cipher key 74, and, trusting to the cryptographic knowledge of the secretary of 
this lezation, Mr. Mariategui, I answered that I had. 

‘“‘The consul at Curagao has received and forwarded to me a telegram from the 
commandant-general at Havana, Rear-Admiral Manterola, and one from the com- 
mandant-general of Puerto Rico, one yesterday and the other to-day, both in the 
naval key, which neither he nor I have been able to make out. I have asked both 


80 


to telegraph to me in the key of the ministry of state, but have so far received no 
reply. 
. “About a week ago a United States officer arrived here as military attaché to the 
legation, and he and his minister are working hard, the former making frequent trips 
to the port of La Guaira. But I do not lose sight of them, and shall de whatever I 
can to frustrate their plans.” 

Obedient to royal order from the minister of state, I transmit the above to your 
excellency, for your information and to such ends as may be deemed expedient. 

Palace, June 17, 1898. 

L. POLO DE BERNAB#,! 
Assistant Secretary. 





The Minister (Aufién) to the Captain of the Terror, at Martinique, and Naval Commandant 
at Santiago de Cuba.? 


MADRID, May 19, 1898. 
If possible to communicate with Admiral our squadron, notify him that Govern- 
ment cancels telegram as to return to Spain. 


The Spanish Minister at The Hague to the Minister of State (Gullén).3 


THE HAGUE, May 19, 1898. 
Minister plenipotentiary United States has called attention Dutch Government to 
quantity of coal furnished Spanish squadron at Curacao, believing it to be more 
than 400 tons. Has insisted on the island not being converted into a base of opera- 
tions. 
The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aunén). 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 19, 1898. 
The squadron entered the harbor this morning. Imperative to clean engines and 
boilers, which will make it necessary for me vo, remain here several days. Moreover, 
I need more coal than I have. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco). 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 19, 1898. 
Have cast anchor to-day in this harbor, whence whole squadron 


sends you greeting, desirous of cooperating in the defense of the 
country. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commandant-General of the Navy-Yard 
(Manterola). 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 19, 1898. 
Cast anchor in this harbor this morning, and nee the pleasure of 
placing myself at your disposal. 








1T did not learn of this communication and three preceding telegrams until long 
after my return to Spain. 

*I learned of this telegram at Santiago on the 20th. 

3I did not know of this telegram until long after my return to Spain, 


81 


The Minister (Aundn) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago de Cuba. 


MaApDRID, May 19, 1898. 
Ministry congratulates your excellency and squadron on skillful maneuver. 
Have ordered commandant navy-yard to supply you with whatever you require, 
Act in cooperation with the Governor-General and give me frequent news. 


Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to General Linares, Santiago. 


HAVANA, May 19, 1898. 
Kindly advise Admiral Cervera that I congratulate him on safe 
arrival and skillful voyage, and offer him my cooperation in everything. 
Need hardly tell your excellency that I am always at your service. My 
last information is: Sampson’s fleet at Samana and Puerto Plata. 
Flying Squadron on the way from Charleston to Key West, where it is 
expected to arrive to-day. 


The Commandant Navy- Yard, Havana (Manterola), to the Admiral 
(Cer en Santiago. 


HAVANA, May 19, 1898. 
Your telegram received. Learning of your arrival through com- 
mandant, navy, hasten to congratulate you in name of all on safe 
arrival. From information received United States squadron of evolu- 
tion was to sail for Key West, unite with Sampson’s, and seek ours, A 
transport, two cruisers, and a gunboat are blockading this harbor, 


The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).} 


HAVANA, May 20, 1898. 

As I notified your excellency, Cervera’s squadron arrived at Santiago minus 
Terror, which was left at Martinique with Alicante, both blockaded by hostile ships. 
Squadron without provisions and coal. Taking coal at Santiago where it can not 
remain long; danger of being blockaded and entirely cut off; resources of place 
limited. If Pelayo, Carlos V, and torpedo-boat flotilla had come with them might 
attempt. some action and lend powerful assistance in defense of islands. But 
reduced as it is, squadron must elude encounter and confine itself to maneuvers 
which will not compromise it and which can not have great results. Has brought 
no transports with coal and provisions which would have helped so much, nor 
weapons and ammunition. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aunén). 


SANTIAGO DE CuBA, May 20, 1898. 
Intend to refit ships in shortest possible time, because, in my opinion, Santiago 
Will soon be in difficult situation if it does not receive aid. 





1T learned of this telegram long after my return to Spain, 


10742 6 





82 


The Minister (Aundn) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago. 


MADRID, May 20, 1898. — 

It is reported that island of Cuba will be invaded latter part of next week by 

28,000 men. Hostile ships stationed south of Santiago and St. Thomas and near 

meriniaca to capture Terror and Alicante. (The enemy supposes defensive power 
of Puerto Rico very slight.) ! 





The Commandant. General of Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Admiral 
(Cervera), Santiago. 


HAVANA, May 20, 1898. 
Necessary to notify admiral of squadron that English steamer with 
3,000 Cardiff coal leaves for Curacao to-day, by superior order, car- 
rying urgent telegram from minister marine. Consul St. Thomas says 
hostile squadron, reenforced by another Key West, has gone out to 
meet ours in direction Martinique. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commandant-General of Navy- Yard 
(Manterola). 


SANTIAGO DE OUBA, May 20, 1898. 

These ships must have engines repaired. I do not know composition 
of hostile squadrons nor distribution of their other naval. forces. 
Would be grateful to you for this information. Also beg you will 
advise me whether 5.5-inch ammunition and other stores have been 
received for this squadron, and whether Cienfuegos has resources and 
communication by land with Havana. Deem it absolutely necessary 
to send coal and large quantity provisions here at once. We are very 
grateful to your excellency and personnel of navy- -yard for congratu- 
lations, 





The Captain of Terror to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago. 


FoRT DE FRANCE, May 20, 1898, 
Repair of boilers completed. 





The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain of the Terror. 


SANTIAGO DE CuBA, May 20, 1898. 
Congratulate you on repairing boilers. When you can proceed to 
Puerto Rico in comparative safety, start. But I understand at present 
hostile ships stationed at St. Thomas to capture you and Alicante. 
Notify Alicante. 





1 The sentence in parentheses was not transmitted to Santiago. 


83 


The Minister (Aundn) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago. 


MADRID, May 21, 1898. 
Your telegram received. Advise me whether you have received sufficient coal and 
whether you have news of Terror,! Thirty thousand pounds at your disposal in 
London, 


The Minister (Aundn) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago. 


MADRID, May 21, 1898. 
Our transports in Martinique and Puerto Rico are urged to carry coal to you and to 
the naval officer assigned to Kingston, Jamaica, who is instructed to place himself 
under your orders. 


The Minister (Aunén) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago. 


MADRID, May 21, 1898. 
Received information that Sampson’s fleet left Key West last night. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aunén), 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 21, 1898. 
Congratulate your excellency on elevation to ministry, of which we hope great 
results. Santiago de Cuba very short of provisions, and if it does not receive any it 
must succumb. As this squadron is greatly inferior to American, we can not accept 
decisive battle, which would mean certain defeat, and if we are blockaded before we 
finish taking coal, which is (scarce) difficult,? we shall succumb with the city. If 
provisions are received, resistance will be possible as long as they last. 


The Minister (Aunén) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago. 


MADRID, May 21, 1898. 
Her Majesty charges me to congratulate your excellency in her name 
on your skill and sends greeting to crews of squadron, whose movements 
she follows with interest. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aunén), 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 21, 1898. 
Received telegram from Terror yesterday, Abi GaHIE me boilers 
repaired. Have instructed her to go to Puerto Rico if opportunity 
offers, notifying her that enemies are at present watching for her. 


‘The part in italics omitted in pamphlet. 
2In the pamphlet the word in italics is omitted and the word in parentheses, which 
does not occur in the original, is inserted. 


84 
The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aun). 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 21, 1898. 
Beg your excellency will express to ifer Majesty our profound grati- 
tude and loyalty, hoping only to render ourselves worthy of distinction 
shown us. 





The Captain- General of Cuba (Blanco) to the General (Linares), Santiago. 


HAVANA, May 21, 1898. 
Tell Adntiral Cervera that English ship with coal has left Curagao 
for Santiago. You can afterwards use said vessel for provisions. 





Commandant- General of Navy- Yard (Manterola) to the Admiral ( Cervera), 
Santiago. 


HAVANA, May 21, 1898. 
Guantanamo, Mulata, Cardenas, Matanzas, Mariel, and Nipe have 
Bustamante torpedoes; latter place doubtful. Cienfuegos and Havana, 
electric torpedoes. 





The Commandant- General of Navy- Yard (Manterola) to the Admiral (Cer- 
vera). 


HAVANA, Jay 21, 1898. 
Cienfuegos has resources and communications by land with this 
capital. I send this now and will answer other questions to-morrow. 


The Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Admiral 
(Cervera). . 


HAVANA, May 21, 1898. 

The hostile forces are composed of seven cruisers, namely: Brooklyn, 
Massachusetts, Minneapolis, Columbia, New York, Indiana, Iowa, and 
Oregon. Two of 6,000 tons, Texas and Puritan, expected in the near 
future. Five of from 3,000 to 4,000, seven of from 1,000 to 2,000, six 
torpedo boats of from 127 to 180, and another cruiser have been sighted 
off Havana and Cienfuegos. Also large number of tugs and trans- 
ports, more or less well armed, but of high speed; number reported to 
exceed sixty, which I can neither deny nor confirm. 

At present there are off the harbor cruiser New York, Indiana, 
Puritan, and five other cruisers, six gunboats, and two dispatch boats. 
Have in store only 150 rounds for 5.5-inch guns, twenty-five rounds for © 
11-inch, three boxes fuses for Vizcaya. On April 1Ireported to minister 


85 


in Key AB 05538: ‘Of the fifty-five vessels composing this fleet thirty. 
two are auxiliary launches of little usefulness, even for police service 
on the coast, being intended only for service against filibustering 
expeditions. The two cruisers are wholly useless. 

‘ Hngines of Alfonso XII totally disabled. Reina Mercedes, seven of 
the ten boilers useless and three almost so. Of Marqués de la Ense- 
nada, Isabel II, and Venadito, the latter is the only one in condition to 
put to sea; all others will not be able to move fora month. Magallanes 
can not light fires, either. Gunboats converted into cruisers, for which 
purpose they were not constructed, have lost their speed, which consti- 
tutes their principal defense. Transport Legazpi, highest speed 7 knots. 
Of the small English gunboats I believe I need say nothing.” 

A look at the Keina Mercedes will give an idea of what my forces are. 
Infanta Isabel and Marqués de la Ensenada will soon be ready. ‘Tor- 
pedo gunboats Martin A. Pinzon, Nueva Espana, Marqués de Molins, 
and Vicente Y. Pinzén can be used, or at least are able to move. Pro- 
visions for two months for this fleet and the one under your excellency’s 
command. Our coal, 9,000 tons; an embargo on private stores prob- 
ably about 20,000. I had counted on your arrival with your squadron 
and numerous convoy of provisions and stores of every kind, and 
torpedo. boat flotilla. 

Your arrival, as it is, compels me to tell you that it is necessary for 
me to know i inform captain-general if more ships and convoys are 
coming, so that, if we can count on nothing more than what we have, 
we may agree with your excellency upon a plan for uniting all we have 
in the most efficacious manner according to circumstances. We have 
not a single fast vessel for that purpose, neither government nor private, 
and the fastest one we have, the Santo Domingo, isin dock. I await 
your answer. 





The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aunén). 


SANTIAGO DE CuBA, May 22, 1898, 
Have been compelled to engage firemen to increase complements inadequate for 
this service. 





The Minister (Aunoén) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago. 


MADRID, May 22, 1898 
I repeat my telegrams of April 26 and May 12, advising you that you 
have at your disposal in London, banking house Mildred Goyoneche, 
£15,000. 





The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aufén). 


SANTIAGO DE CuBA, May 22, 1898. 
We are still cleaning engines and boilers, which is absolutely neces- 
sary. Weare taking coal, but there is not enough to refill bunkers; 


86 


but if collier arrives from Curacao we can refill, and there will be some 
left over. Sent you information about Terror by telegraph yesterday. 





The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commandant-General of Navy- Yard 
(Manterola), 3 


SANTIAGO DE CuBA, May 22, 1898. 

Have received your cipher telegram advising me of pitiful condition 
of your naval forces. Believe no more can come from Spain, as none 
were available except Carlos V, Alfonso XIII, and a few destroyers 
and torpedo boats. Pelayo has not, I believe, her secondary battery 
installed. Possibly some of the trans-Atlantics purchased may come 
with stores. I believe there are four; speed good. My coming here 
has been somewhat accidental; according to instructions I was to go to 
Puerto Rico. Do not believe convoys have been thought of at all, since 
I have always been told that I should find everything here. These 
ideas may perhaps have changed with ministerial crisis. 


Captain of Alicante (Genis) to the Admiral (Cervera). 


FORT DE FRANCE, May 22, 1898. 
Marquis Oomillas tells me to go to Santiago and leave coal. Captain 
of destroyer advises on the part of your excellency that hostile ships 
are stationed to capture me. Beg that you will give me instructions. 





The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain of Alicante (Gents). 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 22, 1898. 
Do not go out for the present. 





The Commandant- General of Puerto Rico ( Villarino) to the Commandant, 
Navy, Santiago de Cuba. 


SAN JUAN, May 22, 1898. 
English steamer Restormel, 3,000 tons Cardiff coal for squadron, left 
_ Curagao yesterday for Santiago. Speed, 7 knots. 





The Minister (4undn) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago. 


MADRID, May 23, 1898. 

I approve increase of firemen. Coal left San Juan for Santiago. There are 3,000 
tons at Cienfuegos. Hostile squadron, Admiral Schley, left Key West for south 
Cuba on night 20th, and afterwards Sampson’s. It is believed [4] monitors and 
several cruisers watching Yucatan Channel. If trans-Atlantic Alfonso XIII, armed, 


87 


arrives with coal and provisions, you may, if desired, incorporate her in squadron. 
I notify commandant-general of navy-yard. If impossible to pass through channels, 
may go roundabout way or create diversion on hostile coast, but not considered 
necessary. 


The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa). 


Havana, May 28, 1898. 
Yesterday enemy reenforced blockading line to 21 vessels, among them 3 battle 
ships; to-day there are only 6; 3 battle ships off Cienfuegos. 





The Oaptain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the General (Linares), Santiago. 


HAvANA, May 23, 1898. 
To-day 12 hostile ships off Cienfuegos. 





The Oaptain-General of Ouba (Blanco) to the General (Linares), Santiago. 


Havana, May 23, 1898. 
Of the ships off Havana yesterday, the battle ship Indiana, cruiser 
New York, cruiser Montgomery, dispatch boat Dolphin, large gunboat 
Wilmington, and other cruisers have gone to windward. 





The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the General (Linares), Santiago, 


Havana, May 23, 1898. 
Since 10 o’clock this morning almost the entire horizon Havana 
free from hostile ships, only four insignificant gunboats remaining to 
windward. The others have gone out with course to windward. 





The Oaptain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the General (Linares), Santiago. 


HAVANA, May 23, 1898. 
Secret information from Montreal that Schley’s fleet goes to south of 
Ouba (afterwards Sampson’s), and that four monitors and several 
cruisers are watching Yucatan Channel. Nothing new from Puerto 
Rico. English cruiser with coal sailed yesterday from Curagao for 
Santiago. Have already advised you of ships off Havana this evening. 





The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commandant Puerto Rico ( Villarino). 


SANTIAGO DE CuBA, May 23, 1898, 
The trans-Atlantic steamer is not to go out for the present. 


88 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aunén). 


SANTIAGO DE CuBA, May 24, 1898. 

Squadron being ready to leave anchorage in search of stores it needs, have assem- 
bled captains of ships, which are wnanimously! of following opinion: In view maximum 
speed this squadron reduced to 14 knots, account of Vizcaya bottom fouled, lack of 
coal, location of hostile fleets, and condition of harbor, certain danger of sortie 
greater than advantages gained by reaching San Juan, only (near) harbor where we 
could go. Proceedings drawn up signed by me. Shall await more favorable oppor- 
tunity. Meanwhile will get all possible supplies, and in conjunction with com- 
mander in chief of army division aid in defense of harbor and city. To supply city, 
necessary to run blockade with fast vessels 20 knots at night, after agreeing on day 
and hour to send (a boat) out of harbor (with) pilot and keep channel clear. Have 
instructed trans-Atlantic steamers Havana and Martinique not to go out because 
(according to information) would certainly be captured. 


PROCEEDINGS. 


The second in command of the squadron, the captains of the battle 
ships, the chief of staff, and the commander of the first torpedo boat 
division having been convened by the admiral, assembled in the latter’s 
cabin on the 24th day of May, 1898. 

The Admiral acquainted the officers present with the information 
received since the preceding evening, from the Governor-General of the 
island, the commandant-general of the navy-yard, and Her Majesty’s 
Government, to the effect that Admiral Schley’s fleet had left Key 
West on the 20th instant, bound for the south of the island of Cuba, 
and that Admiral Sampson’s fleet had been sighted off Cienfuegos 
yesterday. As these forces are each far superior to this Squadron, 
and as the truth of such information was confirmed by the fact that 
four ships remained in front of the harbor entrance all day yesterday, 
the Admiral desired to hear the opinions of said officers as to what was 
best to be done by the squadron under the circumstances. 

It had been decided yesterday that the best plan was to start at day- 
break for San Juan, Puerto Rico, where the necessary telegrams had 
been sent to detain there the collier and the trans-Atlantic steamer 
Alfonso XITTI, which the Government had, by telegraph, placed at the 
disposal of the squadron. 

Owing to the location of the hostile forces and their number and 
strength, it was unanimously considered. impossible to carry out said 
plan, as the maximum speed of this squadron is calculated to be 14 
knots, which is the speed of the Vizcaya as the result of the fouled 
condition of her bottom. Taking into consideration that the ships had 
not been able to get more than one-third of their coal supply, that tlie 
conditions of the harbor make it necessary for the sortie to be effected 
by the ships one by one, at slow speed, which might make it necessary 
for the first ship, or ships, that go out to return, though only for the 


ee Eee 
1'Words and praises in italics are omitted in the pamphlet; those in parentheses 
were not in the telegram as dispatched. 


89 


purpose of reconnoitering, with a consequent loss of moral strength, 
all the officers present were of opinion that the certain danger of the 
Squadron was much greater than the few advantages which might be 
derived from reaching the harbor of San Juan de Puerto Rico, and that 
it was therefore necessary to abandon this plan and remain at Santiago, 
refit as far as possible from the stores to be had here, and take advan- 
tage of the first good opportunity for leaving the harbor, at present 
blockaded by superior forces. 
All the officers present were also of opinion that the present situa- 
tion of the squadron compels it to remain in this harbor. 
Pascual Cervera, José de Paredes, Juan B. Lazaga, Victor M. 
Concas, Fernando Villaamil, Joaquin Bustamante, Antonio 
Eulate, Emilio Diaz Moreu. 


The Captain- General of Cuba (Blanco) to the General (Linares), Santiago. 


HAVANA, May 24, 1898. 
Oregon has reaghed Key West. Flying Squadron proceeding to San- 
tiago, where Sampson also intends to arrive to-morrow, unless notified 
of departure of Cervera’s squadron. If latter does not go out, may be 
closed in. 


The Captain of Terror to the Admiral (Cervera). 


FORT DE FRANCE, May 24, 1898, 
I go out early to-morrow morning. 





{Private.] ; 


ADVISORY BOARD (CENTRO CONSULTIVO) OF THE NAVY, 
| | Madrid, May 24, 1898. 
His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA. 

My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I send you these few lines to 
express to you my best wishes on your arrival in Santiago Harbor with 
the squadron under your able command. I assure you I was very 
happy to know of your safety, as I had thought it unavoidable that 
you would meet one of the two hostile fleets cruising in those waters, 
and as each of them is superior in strength to the squadron under your 
command, it was feared that the latter, though gloriously, would be 
defeated and destroyed. 

Thanks to your skillful seamanship and efficient management, and 
above all to Divine Providence, we do not have to lament to-day the 
lives of many victims and the loss of the best ships of our small navy. 


90 


Upon this I congratulate you with all my heart, as also the crews 
under your orders, and I pray that God may further be with you. 
Keep well; give my love to your son Angel, and believe always in the 


affection of your devoted friend, 
ANTONIO DE LA ROOHA, 





MADRID (LA CONCEPCION), November 16, 1898. 
His Excellency ANTONIO DE LA RocHA. 

My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: Upon my return from the island 
of Cuba I received day before yesterday your affectionate letter of 
May 24, which I appreciate very much, and which has given me a great 
deal oF pleasure, as it is a iecrnisie: of value to myself, first of all, 
but also to you and all the officers who at the meeting of ponere! 
officers voted in favor of the squadron going to the West Indies. 

I went to the ministry yesterday to thank you and talk with you of 
these matters, but did not find you and was sorry to hear of the-cause 
of your absence. I therefore write to you, as it will be impossible for 
me to go to your house either to-day or to-morrow to express my sym- 
pathy and tell you what I think of your letter and what I expect to do 
with it. The letter is of the greatest importance to me, because your 
Saying that you had thought it unavoidable that I would meet one of 
the two hostile fleets cruising in those waters, and as each of them 
was far superior in strength to the squadron under my command, it 
was feared that the latter, though gloriously, would be defeated and 
destroyed, shows that it was not my opinion alone, but that of my 
comrades, and it removes all doubt of the fact that we were forced on 
to certain destruction, and it is of the greatest importance to me to 
make this point clear. 

For yourself and the comrades who voted with you the letter is of 
importance because, in shdwing that in spite of your belief that the 
Squadron was going out to defeat, you voted that it should go out, it 
demonstrates that it was neither ignorance nor lack of consideration, 
but much higher motives that impelled you, and although I believe that 
such motives should not have altered your opinions, it is comforting 
to see in the service that spirit of sacrifice, even though the sacrifice 
had to be made by others than those who did the voting. 

I have not told you what I intend to do; simply this, I am going to 
‘ preserve your letter like a precious jewel and let its contents appear in 
my statement. 

Reiterating to you my sympathy, I remain your affectionate friend 
and comrade, 

PASCUAL CERVERA. 


91 
The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aunon), 


SANTIAGO DE CuBA, May 25, 1898. 
We are blockaded. I qualified our coming here as disastrous for 
interests of country. Events begin to showI wasright. With disparity 
of forces any effective operation absolutely impossible. We have pro- 
visions for one month. 





The Minister (Aunén) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago. 


MADRID, May 25, 1898. 

Received your message A D 0391. I approve your determination 
and reiterate your freedom of action as well as confidence of Govern- 
ment. Squadron must not be sacrificed in vain. Am studying to 
attract hostile ships to their own coasts. We have no vessels 20 knots, 
but if you know of any you are authorized to take any steps to carry 
-out operation you propose. Do you know whereabouts of destroyer 
Fuior?} 





{Urgent.] 
The Captain- General of Cuba (Blanco) to the General (Linares), Santiago. 


HAVANA, May 25, 1898. 
Private telegrams from the United States say it is intended to close 
in squadron Santiago. Entrance should be watched to prevent carry- 
ing out of this plan. 





(Confidential.} 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commander in Chief of the Army, Division 
of Santiago (Linares). 


HONORED Sir: I have the honor of acknowledging the receipt of 
your two official and confidential letters on the movements of the hos- 
tile fleets, for which I thank you very much. It is much to be regret- 
ted that the squadron did not go out yesterday while it had all the 
fires lighted. Butinformation received from the Government confirmed 
the report that Schley’s fleet had started for Santiago on the night of 
the 20th and that Sampson was following with his fleet, and for that 
reason all the captains of this squadron were unanimously of opinion 
that the sortie was impracticable, and, owing to the scarcity of our 
coal, I ordered three-fifths of the fires to be put out. 

As these ships require a number of hours to get up steam, they would 
not be ready before night, and that would be too late, especially in view 


1This telegram, which is an answer to mine of the 24th, was completely omitted 
in the pamphlet. 


92 


of the rapid consumption of coal. For these reasons there is no other 
course open at present but to take up positions, as we agreed yesterday, 
to defend the harbor and city in case an attempt should be made to 
force the entrance. The Coldn is already at her post and the Teresa 
will be there shortly; the others will not be there until to-night or 
to-morrow, as they have to get water for their boilers. If another 
opportunity presents itself, I intend to try and take advantage of it, 
but as I can not hope with these scant forces to attempt any definite 
operations, it will only be a matter of changing this harbor for another 
where we would also be blockaded. 

It is to be regretted that bad luck brought me to this harbor, which 
is so short of everything we need, and I had chosen it in preference 
because, not having been blockaded, I supposed it to be well supplied 
with provisions, coal, and stores of every kind. Although I always 
thought that it would be blockaded, I flattered myself that I could keep 
the greater part of the hostile fleet busy here, which is the only effective 
service that can be expected of this small and and poorly equipped squad-: 
ron. I beg that you will transmit these explanations to his excellency 
the Captain-General, as the highest representative of the nation in this 
island, so that he may know the causes of my apparent inaction. 

Yours, ete., 


PASCUAL CERVERA. 
SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 25, 1898. 





(Confidential.] 


The Commander in Chief of the Army division (Linares) to the Admiral 
(Cervera). - 


HONORED S1R: I am in receipt of your favor in which you acknowl- 
edge the receipt of my former two letters and express the desire that 
his excellency the Captain-General of the island should be advised of 
the reasons which have kept your excellency from weighing anchor 
from this harbor with the squadron under your efficient command. I 
have transmitted. this information to the Captain-General by cable, 
making accurate extracts from your letter. I have the honor of for- 
warding you herewith a copy of the telegram dispatched. 

Yours, ete. 


ARSENIO LINARES. 
SANTIAGO DE CuBA, May 25, 1898. 





[Copy of cablegram referred to.] 
SANTIAGO DE CuBA, May 25, 1898. 
The CAPraIn-GENERAL, Havana: 
Have transmitted to Cervera information from your excellency of 
yesterday and this morning relative to location United States fleets. 


93 


His official answer for your information is, in substance, as follows: 
Regrets extremely not having gone out early yesterday morning. 
Opinion unanimous to remain, owing to direct information from Gov- 
ernment that Schley’s fleet had gone out night of 20th for Santiago, fol- 
lowed by Sampson. Scarcity of coal made it necessary to put out 
three-fifths of boilers. Lighting fires again and takirig water would 
not permit going out before night, which he considers too late. 

Decided to remain here for the present, changing anchoring place, 
putting ships in position to repulse engmy if he attempts to force 
entrance. Regrets bad luck brought him to this harbor lacking every- 
thing necessary, which he selected account of not being blockaded, 
believing abundantly supplied with provisions, coal, and stores of every 
kind. Though subsequently blockaded, flattered himself with keeping 
busy greater part hostile fleet, only effective service he can render with 
small and poorly.equipped squadron. Adds he will try to take advan- 
tage of opportunity for sortie, if possible, changing for another harbor 
where he will also be blockaded, being unable to attempt any other 
kind of operations. He makes the above explanations to you as the . 
highest representative of nation, so that you may know causes of 
apparent inaction. 

LINARES. 


The above is a copy. 
LINARES. 





{Extract.] 
The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa). 


HAVANA, May 26, 1898. 
An English steamer carrying coal our squadron appears to have been captured 
near Santiago yesterday.. Terror eluded American ships at Martinique. Is now at 
San Juan. 


al 


The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa). 


Havana, May 26, 1898. 
Admiral Cervera decided to remain in Santiago for present, in view superiority 
enemy, lack of coal, and inadequate armament of ships. Report of another squad- 
ron fitting at Cadiz. If true, absolutely necessary to be accompanied by transports 
with provisions and coal, and the guns, small arms, and ammunition requested of 
your excellency. 





The Minister of Marine (Aunén) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago. 


MADRID, May 26, 1898. 
Kindly transmit to commander army, Santiago (Linares), following 
telegram from minister war: ‘Advise me for how long you have provi- 
sions and whether you can receive any by land, indicating in that case 
to what nearest port they can be sent. Have asked Captain-General 


94 


whether city blockaded by land also, but he has not answered. I must 
know to take measures for provisioning. Let me know whether you 
have received war key to communicate with this ministry. . Answer 
in that or through commander in chief squadron if you do not have 
key.” 


- 





The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aufén). 


SANTIAGO, May 26, 1898. 

Kindly transmit the followin g to the minister of war: “ Santon can 
hold out until middle July. Three hundred and fifty thousand rations 
used by personnel per month; 20,000 corn, 5 pounds each, for horses 
and mules. Guantanamo brigade provisioned until middle June; uses 
200,000 rations for personnel, 9,000 corn for horses and cattle. Baracoa 
faut Sagna Tanamo, ports northern coast, provisioned until end August, 
have garrisons 900 and 700 respectively ; ; no horses or mules; also need 
drugs for hospitals, especially quinine and bismuth; men received April 
pay last year in January this year. 

“Generals, captains, regular officers, nine months’ pay due with extra 
allowances, three in one consignment received in bills not current here. 
Blockade by land broken by troops every time they go out, but rations 
can only be received at ports referred to for respective forces. Have 
not received key to communicate with your excellency. Making efforts 
to get for Santiago and Guanténamo two months’ provisions from Hali- 
fax, Canada, and cattle from South American republics. Have no 
hopes they will succeed running blockade; very strict since arrival of 
Squadron. Absolutely necessary to send sandaie 1,800 pair Baracoa, 
1,400 Sagua Tanamo, 24,000 Santiago, and 16,000 Guantanenn 

‘“¢ LINARES.” 


The Captain- General of Cuba (Blanco) to the General (Linares), Santiago. 


HAVANA, May 26, 1898. 

Communicate to Admiral Cervera: “Have received your communi- 
cation through General Linares. Thank you very much for your cour- 
tesy. It seems to meif I had been permitted assistance in case of such 
importance result might have been better, as no one better than I could 
have given you information on condition of island and location hostile 
fleets daily, which might have been of great service to you in carrying 
out your plans. But no one notified me of your route and points to be 
touched, and I could not communicate with your excellency, although 
I tried ahs 13th at San Juan de Puerto Rico, in case you should touch 
there, advising you of position hostile ships, as I have done since your 
arrival at Santiago. — 

“Regret with your excellency that these causes and inadequate 
armament ships have placed you in unenviable position, Great pity 


95 


you were not accompanied by fast trans-Atlantics with provisions and 
coal, which in my opinion you need most, since without them it will be 
impossible for you to attempt any operation, which your well-known 
skill and valor must surely make you wish for. Report of another 
squadron being ready at Cadiz, which might solve problem, but I 
doubt it, and if it also comes without coal and provisions better it 
should not come. In any event I have great confidence in you, and 
hope everything from your ability and patriotism. Your task, like 
mine, is very difficult, as we have to do it all with scant means. 
Always count on me and Linares, who is very efficient, and let us trust 
in God. Have received information arrival Terror at San Juan, elud- 
ing every difficulty.” 





The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine (Aufién), 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 26, 1898. 
Kindly transmit minister war following: “In addition to former 
cable, 1 beg you will send 12,000 cotton suits Santiago, 7,000 Guan- 
tanamo, 1,000 Sagua Tanamo, with necessary underwear, shirts and 


drawers, 
6¢ LINARES,” 





PROCEEDINGS. 


The second in command of the squadron, the captains of the battle 
ships, the chief of staff, and the commander of the torpedo-boat flotilla, 
being convened by the Admiral, assembled in his cabin on the 26th day 
of May, 1898. 

The Admiral acquainted the officers with recent information received 
relative to the movements of the hostile fleets, and asked for their 
opinions as to the expediency of going out that day, taking advantage 
of the bad weather prevailing. It was unanimously decided that the 
squadron should proceed to San Juan, and orders were issued to spread 
the fires of all the boilers and be ready by 5 o’clock p. m. 

At 2 o’clock the semaphore signaled the presence of three hostile 
ships. In view of this fact, in connection with the circumstance that 
the weather was clearing, the admiral again convened the officers afore- 
said. Doubts as to whether the prevailing swell would permit the 
going out of the ships were expressed more forcibly than at the meet- 
ing in the morning. 

To settle this question, Pilot Miguel was called, who had piloted in 
the flagship, and who, in the opinion of the captain of the harbor, is 
the most intelligent of the pilots (with the exception of the chief pilot, 
who is ill). 

Miguel stated that with the weather prevailing there would be no 
trouble whatever about taking out the Teresa, Vizcaya, and Oquendo 


96 


any time, day or night, their draft being only from 23.3 to 23.6 feet, but 
that the going out of the Colén, whose draft is 24.9 feet, might present 
difficulties on account of a flat rock in the water oft Point Morrillo, 
where the water is only 274 English feet deep. 

The pilot was sent to the harbor entrance to form a more exact opin- 
ion on the state of the sea, and returned, saying that he thought it very 
probable that, owing to the swell, the Colén might touch bottom on the 
flat rock referred to. Under these circumstances the admiral pro- 
pounded the following question, on the assumption that the whole 
squadron should go out together, leaving only the torpedo-boat destroy- 
ers in the harbor: Is it expedient to risk the Colén being injured, or 
Should the sortie not be effected, awaiting more favorable circumstances? 

The question being put in this form, Captains Concas and Busta- 
mante were in favor of the sortie, for reasons hereinafter set forth, and 
all the other officers were in favor of not going out, with the exception 
of the admiral, who reserved his opinion. Upon his instructions the 
foregoing proceedings were drawn up. 

JOSE DE PAREDES, 
ANTONIO EULATE. 
JUAN B. LAZAGA. 
EmiILio Dfaz MorEv. 
FERNANDO VILLAAMIL. 


SEPARATE OPINIONS. 


My reasons for expressing the opinion that the squadron should go 
out immediately, in spite of the statement of Pilot Miguel, are as fol- 
lows: My impression on the probable situation of the hostile squad- 
rons is the same as that formulated by the admiral. To-day we are cer- 
tain that they are not off this harbor; they are almost sure to be there 
to-morrow. On this basis, which I believe well founded, I reason as 
follows: Our squadron, blockaded by far superior forces, has very 
little prospect of going out united by forcing the blockade. For each 
Ship to go out alone, at a venture, does not seem practicable in my 
opinion, and would expose us to the loss of one or more ships. 

To go out openly and accept battle seems to me almost inhuman, 
because our defeat would be certain, and unwise, because it would be 
preparing an easy triumph for the enemy. Outside of this there seems 
to me no other recourse than to capitulate with the city when, in a 
month from now or little more, we shall find ourselves without provi- 
sions, since we are completely cut off by land and sea. This last solu- 
tion is to my mind even more inadmissible than any of the former. 

This is, in my opinion, the situation of the squadron at the present 
time, and in view of its terrible gravity, I am in favor of saving three 
of the ships, even at the risk of losing the fourth ship, as I do not believe — 
such loss very probable, since pilots always leave a margin of safety, 
and so do hydrographers. The Colén’s draft, according to her captain, 


97 


is 7.60 meters, that is to say, 24.93 English feet. The rock, according 
to the pilot, has 27.50 feet of water and is of very little extent (he says 
considerably less than the width of the admiral’s cabin. Hence 
there would be a margin of 24 English feet, and the swell did not seem 
excessive to me this morning, when I was at the mouth of the harbor 
and the wind was blowing harder than it is now. Moreover, the Colén 
might pass over the rock without being struck by any sea, and even if 
she should be struck it would not be at all certain that the resulting 
injury would disable her from continuing the voyage. 

Above all, I repeat, within the range of possibilities, I believe it 
preferable for the Colon (which, in my mind, should be the last to go 
out) to remain disabled at the harbor entrance than for us to await 
what I fear is in store for us. This is my opinion. I sincerely hope 
that I may be mistaken, but my conscience dictates it to me, and I can 
not hold it back. 

JOAQUIN BUSTAMANTE. 


Concurring entirely in the opinion of Captain Bustamante, I wish to 
add that the hostile squadron which is coming from Cienfuegos and 
which we expected this morning, having probably been detained by 
the storm, may be here at daybreak, and the blockade we should have 
to run in that case would be immensely superior even without counting 
the other squadron which is reported to be coming by way of the Old 
Channel. 

In order to realize the seriousness of the situation of the city, it 
should be remembered that eleven months’ pay is due the army as well 
as the navy; that the army owes for its provisions for almost the same 
length of time, and that commercial enterprise does not care to increase 
the debt, there being back in the minds of all the thought that with 
the autonomy of the island the treasury will pass out of our hands. 
Consequently the city of Santiago de Cuba, being blockaded by land 
and sea, is besieged by itself, which is the most effective kind of block- 
ade, for there are no provisions and no one is doing anything to supply 
any. Therefore the capitulation will become necessary in a very short 
space of time, and will drag the squadron along with it. 

The same as Uaptain Bustamante, I do not believe the loss of the 
Oristébal Colén at all probable, and while under ordinary circumstances 
we should not go out and probably should not have entered, to-day cir- 
cumstances demand our running the risk even of total loss, which I 
consider very remote, however. A delay of twenty or twenty-five 
days, which is all that remains to us, is not sufficient to warrant @ 
hope of a favorable opportunity or a change of circumstances. 

Santiago de Cuba, May 26, 1898. 

Viotor M. CoNOAS. 


I do not consider the circumstances so extreme as to make it neces- 
sary to risk the loss of the Qoldn at the rock where the Gerona, of less 
10742——~-7 


98 


draft than the former, lost part of her false keel, and in hopes that the 
sea will calm down and that another opportunity will present itself 


the sortie is deferred. 
CERVERA. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aufén). 


SANTIAGO DE CuBA, May 27, 1898. 

I intended yesterday to run the blockade, taking advantage of storm, but the best 
pilot was of opinion that Colén would run great risk of touching bottom on a rock 
in the entrance of the harbor where Gerona lost false keel. Do not feel justified in 
running this risk and deferred sortie, second in command and captains being of same 
opinion except chief of staff and captain of Infanta Maria Teresa, who were of the 
contrary opinion. There are not at this harbor sufficiently fast vessels to run the 
blockade. 


The Minister (Aufén) to the Admiral (Cervera). 


MADRID, May 28, 1898. 
Your telegram of 27th received.1 Notify you that enemy intends to sink hulks in 
entrance to harbor. 
[Extract.] 


The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa). 


Havana, May 28, 1898. 

Although your excellency already has direct news from Santiago de Cuba, believe 
proper to tell you that that province is the one I have tried to make best provisions 
for on account of distance Havana and probable attack or blockade Americans and 
insurgents. Have reenforced it to 4 battalions, 3 squadrons, 1 Krupp mountain 
battery, 4 companies engineers, 10 field guns, 47 siege guns and corresponding aux- 
iliary troops. Besides provisions paid for here by drafts on ministry have sent there 
166,000 pesetas gold, 10,000 silver, 100,000 notes, and placed 100,000 pesos at Madrid 
and £10,000 at Birmingham. Of all this and other details referring to defense I 
send your excellency detailed official statement.? 

Where provisions are most needed is at Gibara and Nuevitas. Appearance Cer- 
vera’s squadron much impression on Americans, who have stationed 7 ships off San- 
tiago de Cuba. 


The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa). 


HAVANA, May 28, 1898. 
General Linares says twelve hostile ships arrived off Santiago yesterday, about 
15 miles, disappearing to westward except one. 





The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aufén). 


SANTIAGO DE CuBA, May 28, 1898. 
The harbor is blockaded by hostile squadron more powerful than ours, and we are 
on lookout for opportunity to run the blockade. Meanwhile we are vigilant to 


a ee ee 
1The words in italics are omitted in the pamphlet. 


*It is certain that very much less than stated in this telegram reached Santiago, 


99 


frustrate enemy’s plans. Under these conditions the battle would be unequal, 
Shall therefore try to elude it if possible. Coal is being shipped slowly. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commander in Chief of the Army Division 
at Santiago (Linares). 


HONORED SiR: I am in receipt of your official letter of the 26th, 
in which you transmit to me the ideas of the Captain-General, to whom 
I beg you will extend in my name many thanks for everything. I must 
try to get out of this dilemma, but am in despair over the slowness of 
coaling, and without a reasonable amount of coal nothing can be 
attempted.. We are constantly watching the mouth of the harbor and 
I believe any enterprise against us will be prevented by your disposi- 
tions and our cooperation. If we only had what we need. 

Yours, etc., 


PASCUAL CERVERA. 
SANTIAGO DE OUBA, May 28, 1898, 





The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa). 


HAVANA, May 29, 1898. 
According to information brought by exchanged prisoners, arrival our squadron 
at Santiago de Cuba has caused sensation. United States and their admirals are 
being charged with lack of ability. Twelve vessels off Santiago yesterday; this 
morning the majority have disappeared in a westerly direction. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auftén). 


SANTIAGO DE CuBA, May 31, 1898. 
Hostile ships have fired about 60 shots, apparently for purpose of reconnoitering, 
Firing was done by Brooklyn, Iowa, Massachusetts, Texas, Amazonas, and auxiliary 
cruiser. Batteries and Cristébal Colén answered. Auxiliary cruiser retreated, prob- 
ably with injuries. From shore it seems two projectiles were seen hitting the 
Lowa. Nothing new from squadron. 


The Minister of Marine (Auién) to the Admiral (Cervera). 


MADRID, May 31, 1898. 
Deputies, senators, and officers, Andalusia ask me to send your excel- 
lency and squadron affectionate greeting.! 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aunén). 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 1, 1898. 
Blockading fleet has received large reenforcements. ‘To make successful running 
of blockade possible attempt should be made to draw off armored cruisers Brooklyn 
and New York, calling their attention somewhere else. 





' This telegram is suppressed in the pamphlet. 


100 


The Minister (Aunén) to the Admiral (Cervera). 


MavrRID, June 2, 1898. 
“Received B C 5448 (telegram May 31). Her majesty bids me congratulate your 
excellency and combatants of squadron; Government also congratulates you. Report cur- 
rent of intention of landing near Santiago.” ! 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auién), 


SANTIAGO, June 2, 1898. 
I beg Your Excellency to extend our deep gratitude to Her Majesty. Blockading fleet 
has 21 ships, 6 of them armored. The city lacks modern artillery; have therefore 
otiered two 2.95-inch guns which TZerror has on board.? 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aunén). 


SANTIAGO DE CuBA, June 8, 1898. 
Early this morning a battle ship and merchant steamer tried to force harbor 
entrance. Destroyers and scouts which are at mouth of harbor opened fire, fol- 
lowed by Reina Mercedes and batteries of Socapa where guns of said vessel have been 
mounted. Merchant steamer was sunk; battle ship repulsed. A lieutenant and 6 
sailors taken prisoners. No casualties on our side from hostile fire; slight injuries 
to installations of 2.95-inch guns of destroyers. 


The Minister of War (Correa) to the Governor-General (Blanco). 


MADRID, June 3, 1898, 

Very serious situation in Philippines compels us to send there ships 
and reenforcements of troops as early as possible. To be able to cope 
with hostile squadron at Manila it will be indispensable to send an 
equally strong fleet there. At present only two warships there and one 
of them I believe can not pass through canal. The only thing we can 
do is to send all the ships of Cervera’s squadron that can get out of 
Santiago. But before deciding, the Government wishes to know your 
opinion as to effect the withdrawal of Cervera’s fleet might produce 
in Cuba. This movement would be only temporary, and as soon as 
object is attained in Philippines the squadron would return to Cuba 
without loss of time and strongly reenforced.? 


The Governor-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa). 


HAVANA, June 4, 1898. 

I would be failing in my duty if I concealed from your excellency that departure 
of Cervera’s squadron at this time would be of fatal effect on public opinion. Doubt 
Se 11) ere RESTON NE Se 

‘The part in italics does not appear in the pamphlet. 

*The part in italics omitted in pamphlet. 

’ The wording of this telegram is not literal, as I do not have the original; but it 
has been published and has appeared in the Diario de Sesiones. 


101 


whether the situation that would surely result could be controlled. Volunteers 
already much exercised over inadequacy Cervera’s squadron, and only kept up from 
one moment to another by hope arrival second squadron. Would rise in body upon 
learning that instead of reenforcements the few ships here are withdrawing. The 
repression would necessarily be bloody. Attitude of army in that case doubtful. 
Loss of island certain, in view of horrible conflagration it would kindle here. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auton . 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 6, 1898. 

Hostile squadron, 10 ships strong, has bombarded this harbor for three hours, 
being answered by batteries at mouth of harbor, among which are guns of Reina 
Mercedes. Our casualties: Killed, executive officer Reina Mercedes and 5 other (sail- 
ors); wounded, Ensign Molins (and) 11 other (sailors) and 5 bruised. Army has 1 
dead; wounded, a colonel (of artillery), 4 officers and 17 privates. I do not know 
loss of enemy. Reina Mercedes has suffered much. Vizcaya received two shells, 
Furor one shell (in the) bunker without serious injury. Works of defense have suf- 
fered slight injuries of no military importance. Subsequently hostile fleet bom- 
barded other points on coast.! 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aufién). 


SANTIAGO, June 6, 1898. 
Fear enemy will succeed in obstructing harbor entrance, We can not prevent 
them with their great superiority. Beg your excellency to give me instructions, 


The Commandant- General of Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Admiral 
(Cervera). 


HAVANA, June 6,'1898. 
Received from minister marine following cablegram: ‘Received 
telegrams. Her Majesty bids me in her royal name to conerauulayg 
defenders Santiago de Cuba.” 


The Minister (Auiién) to the Admiral (Cervera). 


MADRID, June 8, 1898. 

As it is impossible to foresee and properly solve from here all cases that may arise 
in the campaign, the Government, which knows the means at your disposal, your own 
high qualities, and the wide scope given you, is confident that you will make of them 
best possible use in every case, and will consider that you have fulfilled your diffi- 
cult mission if you satisfy the letter and spirit of our ordinances.” 

a 8 a 

‘Words and phrases in parentheses are not in the original; those in italics occur 
in the original, but were omitted in the pamphlet. 

*General Ordinances of the Navy, part 3, Chap. I, art. 153: “ You will fight as far 
as lies in your power agaiust any superior forces, so that, even though necessary to 
surrender, your defense will be considered honorable by the enemy. If possible, you 
will run your ship aground on ownor hostile coast rather than surrender, if there is 
no immediate risk of the crew perishing in the shipwreck; and even after running 
aground, it will be your duty to defend the ship and finally burn it, if there is no 
other way of preventing the enemy trom taking possession of it,” 


102 
PROCEEDINGS. 


On the 8th day of June the Admiral convened in his cabin the cap- 
tains of the squadron to hear their opinions relative to the situation of 
said squadron. Being requested to express their opinions, they did so 
in the following order and manner: 

Bustamante, taking into account all the circumstances of the existence 
of provisions, error in superiority of hostile forces, etc., is of opinion 
that the squadron should take advantage of the present dark of the 
moon and resolutely effect the sortie, and as the situation of the hostile 
fleet at night and the difficulties of the sortie make it impossible for the 
squadron to go out in a body, the sortie should be effected as follows: 
The torpedo-boat destroyers should go out first, shaping their course to 
the south and passing at their utmost speed by the 7exas and the three 
large battle ships. 

Shortly after the Colén, the fastest of the four ships, should go out 
with a west-southwesterly course, heading straight for the Brooklyn, 
whose position is usually in that wing of the blockading line. Then 
should follow the Teresa to the east-southeast, and finally the Vizcaya 
and Oquendo. He believes that this would create confusion in the 
hostile fleet and permit us to save at least 50 per cent of our squadron, 
which solution, in his opinion, is vastly preferable to that other solution 
which he foresees and which he does not wish to admit as possible, 
namely, of the fleet being compelled to surrender from lack of provisions. 

He is also of opinion that the squadron should prepare for this step 
by resting a few days, especially the destroyers, upon whose. crews 
such severe demands are being made night after night that it is a 
wonder they withstand the fatigues of their service. He also deems it 
of advantage from every point of view (one of them being to wear out 
the enemy) to keep firing, especially on the searchlights, which explore 
the vicinity of the harbor entrance during the hours of darkness. And 
finally, not being conversant with the means adopted by the admiral, 
he is of opinion that, before attempting the extreme step which he sug- 
gests, the Government should be given an accurate idea of the very 
serious situation of the squadron. In view of the manner in which 
the ships would go out, he believes that the point of rendezvous should 
be Havana rather than San Juan, which latter point he would prefer if 
the squadron went out in a body. .. 

Captain Concas is of opinion that in case one of the rapid cruisers, 
Brooklyn or New York, should at any time disappear, the sortie should 
be attempted fanateabbaeaky ; if not it should be attempted about the 
time of the new moon; but in that event with the whole squadron 
united and all the ships following the same course provided the nucleus 
of hostile forces is stationed, as at the present time, 5 or 6 miles from 
the harbor entrance. 

The second in command of the ah aes the captains of the Colén, 
Oquendo, and Vizcaya, and the commander of the first torpedo-boat 
division, in view of the impunity with which the blockading fleet 


103 


approaches to within a mile of the harbor entrance, counting on 
the inadequate defenses of the harbor, and in view of the present 
conditions of the harbor, the sortie having been rendered more diffi- 
cult by the position of the Merrimac, so that it would require a cer- 
tain length of time to effect it, thus giving the enemy an opportunity to 
concentrate still superior forces off the entrance, even if they should 
not discover the going out of the first ship that undertook the sortie, 
are of opinion that the sortie should not be attempted as long as the 
present situation continues, and in the meantime every military means 
should be used to reenforce the defenses at the harbor entrance, so as to 
guard against an attack of torpedo boats and small craft which might 
appear in the entrance protected by one or more battle ships, the squad- 
ron in this harbor making the best possible resistance, keeping in front 
of it the greater part of the hostile naval forces, this being the most 
important service the squadron can render toward the general defense 
of the island. 

They also deem it expedient to shelter the torpedo-boat destroyers, 
not only to permit them to rest their crews, but also to prevent their 
being boarded by a coup de main in a night attack by small craft. 


JOSE DE PAREDES. 
JUAN B, LAZAGA. 
Victor M. Concas. 
Eminio Diaz MoREUv. 
ANTONIO EULATE. 
FERNANDO VILLAAMIL. 
JOAQUIN BUSTAMANTE. 





The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aufién). 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 9, 1898. 

I called a meeting of captains for the purpose of hearing their opinions on future 
operations. Second in command, captains of Colén, Oquendo, and Vizcaya, and com- 
mander of torpedo division were of opinion that we should not go out, owing to superior 
forces blockading fleet. Captain Teresa was of the opinion that, in case of detach- 
ment or withdrawal of the Brooklyn and New York, we should go out immediately, 
and, in any event, at the new moon, even though hostile fleet should remain 
together. Chief of staff was in favor of effecting sortie immediately, scattering our 
squadron. The fires of the ships remained lighted so as to take advantage of first 
opportunity, but as the blockade is very strict and the hostile fleet four times 
superior, I doubt (much)! that opportunity will present itself. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commander in Chief of the Army of Santiago 
(Linares). * 


HONORED Sir: Last evening I made personal observations from the 
high battery of the Socapa on the position of the hostile squadron, and 





1The word much is omitted in the pamphlet. 


104 


have come to the conclusion that it will be absolutely impossible for 
the squadron under my command to go out without being seen, taking 
advantage of the darkness of the night, as long as the coast defenses 
do not succeed in removing the hostile ships to a greater distance, as 
they constantly illuminate the whole harbor entrance with their electric 
searchlights. 
Santiago de Cuba, June 11, 1898, 
Yours, etc., PASCUAL CERVERA. 





The Commander in Ohief of the Army of Santiago de Cuba (Linares) to 
the Admiral (Cervera). 


HoNnoRED Sie: Since you made personal observations last night on | 
the position of the hostile squadron, and have come to the conclusion 
that it will be absolutely impossible for your squadron to leave the 
harbor without being seen by the enemy, as long as the coast defenses 
do not succeed in removing the hostile ships to a greater distance, as 
they constantly illuminate the whole harbor entrance with their search 
lights, I beg that you will advise me whether you deem the fire of the 
6.3-inch Hontoria guns, which have the longest range of all the guns 
installed in the coast batteries, suitable for the purpose stated, so that 
I may give the necessary instructions to the captain of the high bat 
tery of the Socapa. 

But as it is not advisable to cause unnecessary alarm in the city 
and to waste ammunition, nor to let our enemies see how limited are 
our means of defense and attack in case we should not succeed in facili- 
tating the sortie of the squadron, I beg to represent to your excellency, 
in order that you may take this fact into account, if you deem proper, 
that the rays of the search lights are clearly seen over the city, and it 
would therefore be necessary to add to the distance at which the United 
States vessels are usually stationed at least the distance which sepa- 
rates the city of Santiago from the coast, namely, 4.35 or 4.97 miles, 
the total being the distance to which the squadron would have to 
retreat in order that its search lights may no longer illuminate the 


harbor entrance. 
ARSENIO LINARES. 
SANTIAGO DE OUBA, June 11, 1898. 





The Commander in Chief of the Army of Santiago (Linares) to the Admiral — 


(Cervera). 


HONORED Sir: The Captain-General, in a cablegram dated to-day 
at 11.25 a, m., Says: 


I remind your excellency that in case of an attack on land you may find a power- 
ful auxiliary for repulsing the enemy in the landing companies of the squadron with 
their excellent field guns, which Admiral Cervera would no doubt be willing to fur 


105 


nish for the defense, which I am sure will be glorious, and the army and navy 
united will triumph over Americans. 

The foregoing telegrain I transmit to your excellency for your 
information, advising you that I have answered the Captain-General 
that your excellency had already offered the landing forces. At the 
same time I beg your excellency, if the case should arise, to permit 
that one landing company be stationed at the Socapa, one at Punta 
Gorda, another at Las Cruces Pier, and the remaining one at Punta 
Blanea, all with such number of suitable guns as you may deem 
Ne€Cessaly. 

Santiago de Cuba, June 12, 1898. 

ARSENIO LINARES. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commander in Chief of the Army of Santiago 
(Linares). 


HonoreEp Sir: I am in receipt of your communication dated yester- 
day relative to the landing columns of this squadron, and [ take pleas- 
ure in again assuring your excellency of my entire willingness to lend 
whatever aid may be necessary for the defense of the city. 

PASCUAL CERVERA. 

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, Jane 13, 1898. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Autién.) 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 14, 1898. 
The enemy fired several shots last night. This morning they again bombarded 
the defenses at harbor entrance for thirty minutes. Ensign Bruquetas and two 
others in Socapa battery slightly wounded. Vizcaya hit by shell without serious 
results. Army has three slightly wounded.' 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aufién). 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 16, 1898. 
During night projectile, apparently dynamite, burst on the water near Plutén, 
causing injuries which are beingexamined. At daybreak the enemy kept up galling 
fire for an hour and slower fire thirty minutes, then withdrawing. Ensign Bruquetas 
and 8 men wonnded, 2 killed; army, 1 officer and 8 men wounded, 1 killed. Verw- 
vius fired during night. Bight ships in sight this morning. 





The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aufién). 


° SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 16, 1898. 

I have a suspicion that the enemy has planted torpedoes in (this) the entrance to the 
harbor.?. Have therefore ordered careful investigation in charge of Bustamante. 
Have purchased provisions, though expensive and bad, which will last until end of 
July at least. 


i 


1'The words in italics were omitted in the pamphlet. 
2The word in parentheses was not in original; the words in italics were sup- 
pressed in the pamphlet. 


106 


The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa). 


Havana, June 20, 1898. 

It is to be regretted independence which Cervera’s squadron enjoys has prevented 
me from aiding in his operations, although the results are weighing on my mind, 
because the entrance and stay of the squadron at Santiago has completely changed 
the objective and aspect of the campaign, the existence of provisions and coal, and 
provisioning of certain places. If an attempt had at least been made of consulting 
with me, General Linares, and the commandant-general of the navy-yard, perhaps 
between us we might in the beginning have found a better solution than those now 
awaiting the squadron, namely, either to await the result of unequal battle in the 
harbor, or break hostile line to go to some other harbor, Haiti or Jamaica, where it 
would again be closed in. It would perhaps be preferable to go to Cienfuegos or 
Havana, which is still possible; or, if not, reinforce and proceed to Spain, which 
would be the best; anything rather than remain closed in at Santiago with the 
prospect of having to surrender from starvation. 

The situation is extremely serious, and I have no doubt that the Government 
under these critical circumstances would order what is best for the good of the 
country and the honor of our arms. I therefore respectfully suggest the expediency 
of uniting military action in the present war under one head, ordering that I be 
invested with the command in chief of all the land and naval forces assigned to 
these waters. 





. 


The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa). 


Havana, June 20, 1898. 

I am much troubled, as your excellency may imagine, over situation of division 
Santiago, against which is principally directed action of enemy, attracted to that 
harbor by presence Cervera’s squadron, whose sortie it is intended to prevent. It is 
there that is engaged honor of our arms and fate of our best ships, which must be 
saved at any price. To counteract their efforts, have prepared for every possible 
aid. Have organized convoy of ammunition to Manzanillo, where every imaginable 
effort will be made to get it to Santiago. I reinforce Linares by brigade from this 
province, which will march through interior in conjunction with forces of said con- 
voy of provisions and ammunition, forming with both divisions Fourth Army Corps, 
under the command of said general, who will thus have 19 battalions, 5 squadrons, 
7 companies engineers, mounted artillery, mobilized guerrillas, and other factors, to 
be used as the general deems best against enemy within and without. Hope by 
these measures to sustain war successfully in that region without stripping Center, 
Matanzas, and West, which are also constantly menaced.! 





The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa). 


HAVANA, June 20, 1898. 
Seventy American vessels with landing corps off Santiago. General Linares states 
if Government does not have means to help them by sending a squadron against 
United States coasts, object to draw off part of United States fleet which attacks 
them, so that our squadron can go out, or squadron to arrive from Spain run the 
blockade in cooperation with Cervera’s sortie, circumstances will take care of solv- 





1Tt should not be forgotten that Santiago received no aid whatever from the out- 
side except Escario’s column, which arrived without provisions. 


107 


ing conflict. I have done and shall do everything within human power to aid him— 
a difficult undertaking, on account of his being entirely cut off, enemy being in com- 
plete control of the sea. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aunén), 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 20, 1898. 
Lookout advises me there are 70 hostile vessels in sight, among them 7 modern 
battle ships. 


The Commandant-General of Navy- Yard (Manterola) to the Admiral 
(Cervera). 


HAVANA, June 22, 1898. 
The minister tells me to order ammunition by number, class, and 
caliber. I advise you so that you may let me know what you require. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commandant of Navy- Yard (Manterola). 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 22, 1898. 

The squadron being blockaded and the city invested, it is too late to 
order ammunition, for which I have sent many requests to Spain. It 
can not arrive in time, since the question must be solved within next 
few days. Six-sevenths of the 5.5-inch ammunition is useless, the fuses 
not reliable, and we have no torpedoes. These are the main deficien- 
cies. If the Government could send supplies so that they could arrive 
this week, it might still be time. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auitén), 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 2%, 1898. 
The enemy (has landed)! és landing at Punta Berracos. As the question is to be 
decided on land, I am going to send ashore the crews of the squadron as far as the 
rifles will hold out. The situation is very critical. 


The Minister (Auién) to the Admiral (Cervera). 


MADRID, June 28, 1898. 
Upon return from departamentos received D C 8041, D C 9948, C D 4892, C D 
4890.2? The Government approves plan of sortie (taking advantage) of first favorable 
opportunity which presents itself. Provisions have reached Cienfuegos. Expedi- 
tion to be sent overland to Santiago, and auxiliary cruisers will be sent to hostile 
coast.3 i 





' Words in parentheses did not occur in the original text, while those in italics did. 

* The four telegrams referred to are the four preceding ones, but it will be noted 
that no news had been received from Madrid since June 8, 

’The auxiliary cruisers never went to the hostile coast. 


108 
The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auftén). 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 98, 1898. 

The enemy took possession of Daiquiri yesterday. Will surely occupy Siboney 
to-day, in spite of brilliant defense. The course of events is very painful, though 
notunexpected. Have disembarked crews squadron toaidarmy. Yesterday five bat- 
talions went out from Manzanillo. If they arrive in time agony will be prolonged, 
but Idoubt much whether they will save city (from catastrophe). 

As it is absolutely impossible for squadron to escape (doubting if squadron can go out) 
under these circumstances, intend to resist as long as possible and destroy ships as 
last extreme. Although others are responsible for this untenable situation into 
which we were forced in spite of my opposition, it is very painful to be a (shackled) 
actor therein.} 


The Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Admiral 
(Cervera). 


HAVANA, June 23, 1898. 

Captain-General states that your squadron and the city are very 
short of provisions, the rations of sailors being reduced to hard-tack and 
those of soldiers to rice, and even this for only short time longer. This 
being the case, the serious situation might become even worse in case 
city should surrender from lack of provisions or the garrisons abandon 
it and go west, in which case your squadron, being without provisions, 
the harbor blockaded, and the city in hands of enemy, your situation 
would be extremely grave. 

In view of this I wanted to understand situation blockade at night 
and inquired of commandant navy. Have learned it to be So strict 
that I see but one chance in a hundred to elude vigilance, but some- 
thing must be done. Intend to send three or four small vessels, hoping 
one or other may succeed. But, as you must see matters more clearly 
than I, do not want to act without consulting you. In case you should 
know of anything else to be done to change situation, beg you will let 
me know your opinion, 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Oommandant- General of Navy- Yard (Man- 
terola). 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 24, 1898. 
Believe it impossible for any vessel to run present blockade of this 
harbor. With provisions we have can hold out until end of July, but 
believe the siege will be terminated before thattime. Bustamante tor. 
pedoes have been planted, but entrance west of Cay Smith is free. We 
congratulate on brilliant battle Zsabel IZ, 





1The original text does not contain the words in parentheses, but, on the other 
hand, does contain those in italics, which considerably change the meaning. 


109 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aufién). 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 24, 1898. 
Received C D 4898 (of 23d). Immediately convened second in command, captains 
battle ships, and commander torpedo division, to ask their opinions on what could 
be done under circumstances. Opinion unanimous that sortie has not been and is 
not now possible. I then read them my telegram of yesterday, in which they con- 
eurred and which I hereby confirm. Have little news of enemy, but our forces 
continue to fall back upon city.! 


PROCEEDINGS. 


On the 24th day of June in the Admiral’s cabin assembled the second 
in command of the squadron and the undersigned captains. The chief 
of staff was not present, being ashore with landing forces. The admiral 
read a telegram from the minister of marine dated yesterday (received 
to-day) in which he says that the Government approves of plan of sortie 
at the first opportunity. When each officer had stated his opinion on 
the present situation, it was unanimously agreed that the sortie is now, 
and has been ever since the 8th instant, absolutely impossible. 

The Admiral then read the telegram which he dispatched yesterday 
to the minister, notifying him of the above fact and of the possibility 
of its becoming necessary in a very few days to destroy the ships, in 
which all present concurred as being an accurate expression of the 
painful situation in which these forces are placed. 

In virtue whereof they signed the foregoing proceedings on board 


the cruiser Infanta Maria Teresa, 
JOSE DE PAREDES. 


JUAN B, LAZAGA. 
FERNANDO VILLAAMIL. 
EmiLio Diaz MOREU. 
ANTONIO EULATE. 
Victor M. Concas, 
Secretary, Acting Chief of Staff. 
SANTIAGO DE OvuBA, June 24, 1898. 





The Minister of War (Correa) to the Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco). 


MADRID, June 24, 1898. 
With consent of Government, minister marine will notify Admiral Cervera that 
squadron under his command, hitherto without definite destination, will cooperate 
in that island to its defense, and in that case your excellency will exercise over it, 
as over the other naval forces operating in the territory under your command, the 
powers with which you are invested by the ordinances of the army and navy, con- 
firmed by royal order of October 29, 1872. 





1The words in italics were suppressed in the pamphlet. 


110 


The Minister (Auftén) to the Admiral (Cervera). 


MADRID, June 24, 1898. 

To give perfect unity to conduct of war in island, your excellency, while operating 
in Cuban waters, will consider yourself commander in chief of the squadron of 
operations, and in your relations with the Captain-General you will observe royal 
order of November 13, 1872, dictated by this ministry, and the articles of ordinance 
therein referred to. You may at once enter into direct communication with the 
Captain-General and cooperate with the squadron toward the execution of his 
plans. 





The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aufién). 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 25, 1898. 
Although I have always considered myself under the orders of the Captain- 
General, I thank your excellency for instructions which give legal force to the rela- 
tions already established, and by giving unity to the military operations (relieve 
me) will relieve me from taking on my own responsibility extreme measures of the 
utmost importance.! 


The Commander in Chief of the Army (Linares) to the Admiral (Cervera). 


HONORED SiR: I have returned to the city. Numerous American 
troops, in conjunction with rebel parties, attacked the column under 
my orders twice yesterday and once this morning with artillery, and 
were repulsed with many casualties, as we could see, since they were 
unprotected. We had 7 killed, 20 seriously wounded, among them 3 
officers, and several slightly wounded and bruised. We took posses- 
sion of ammunition and a cloth cape with metal button with eagle. 
On the march to-day they did not trouble us, in spite of good positions 
they might have occupied. By reason of the rain and the troops being 
wholly without shelter, there is much sickness among them, and as it is 
impossible to assume the offensive until reenforcements arrive, I have 
decided to have the defense fall back on the outer precinct of the city. 

Yours, etc., 
ARSENIO LINABES. 

SANTIAGO DE OUBA, June 24, 1898 





The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco). 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 25, 1898. 

Minister of marine commands me to place myself under orders of your excellency 
in conformity with regulations of royal order of November 13, 1872, which I do 
with the greatest pleasure. I believe it my duty to set forth condition of squad- 
ron. Out of 3,000 rounds for 5.5-inch Hontoria guns, only 620 reliable, rest have 
been pronounced useless, and were not replaced by others for lack of stores when we 
left. Two 5.5-inch Hontoria guns of Vizcaya and one of Oquendo defective, and had 
been ordered to be changed for others. Majority of fuses not serviceable. We lack 





1 The original text contains the words in italics but not those in parentheses. 


I1t 


Bustamante torpedoes, Colén is without heavy armament. Vizcaya is badly fouled 
and has lost her speed. Teresa does not have landing guns, and those of Vizcaya and 
Oquendo are unserviceable. We have little coal; provisions enough for month of 
July. Blockading fleet is four times superior; hence our sortie would be positively 
certain destruction. 

I have a number of men ashore reenforcing garrison, of which I consider myself a 
part. Believe it my duty to tell your excellency that on the 23d I addressed to 
Government the fullowing telegram: ‘‘The enemy took possession of Daiquiri 
yesterday. Will surely occupy Siboney to-day, in spite of brilliant defense. The 
course of events is very painful, though not unexpected. Have disembarked crews 
squadron to aid army. Yesterday five battalions went out from Manzanillo. If 
they arrive in time, agony will be prolonged, but I doubt much whether they will 
save city. As it is absolutely impossible for squadron to escape under these cir- 
cumstances, intend to resist as long as possible and destroy ships as last extreme.” 
The foregoing telegram expresses my opinion as well as that of the captains of the 
ships, I await instructions from your excellency. 





THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 
OF THE ARMY OF SANTIAGO, 


June 25, 1898. 
His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA. 


My DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: In a cipher cable received last 
night the Captain-General says, among other things, as follows: “I beg 
that your excellency will tell Admiral Cervera that I should like to 
know his opinion and plans. . It is my opinion that he should go out 
from Santiago as early as possible whenever he may deem best, for the 
situation in that harbor is, in my judgment, the most dangerous of all. 
Last night there were only 7 warships there, 3 at Cienfuegos, and 9 
here, yet the Santo Domingo and Montevideo had no trouble in running 
the blockade, going out at 2 o’clock a.m. If we should lose the squad- 
ron without fighting, the moral effect would be terrible, both in Spain 
and abroad.” 

Yours, ete, | ARSENIO LINARES. 


CRrra career? 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 25, 1898, 
His Excellency ARSENIO LINARES. 

My DEAR GENERAL AND FRIEND: I am in receipt of your interest- 
ing letter of this date, which I hasten toanswer. The Captain-General 
is kind enough to want to know my opinion, and I am going to give it 
as explicitly as I ought to, but will confine myself to the squadron, as 
I believe that is what heasksfor. I have considered the squadron lost 
ever since it left Cape Verde, for to think anything else seems madness 
to me, in view of the enormous disparity which exists between our own 
forces and thoseoftheenemy. For thatreason I energetically opposed 
the sailing of the squadron from Cape Verde, and I even thought that 
I would be relieved by some one of those whose opinions were opposed 
to mine. | 


112. 


I did not ask to be relieved, because it seems to me that no military 
man should do so when he receives instructions to march against the 
enemy. You are familiar with the history of the squadron since its 
arrival here. If I had gone to San Juan de Puerto Rico when a tele- 
gram from the Government caused me to change, my situation would 
be the same, only the scene would have been a different one and the 
avalanche which has fallen upon this island would have come down 
upon Puerto Rico instead. I believe the mistake was made in sending 
the squadron out at all. The Captain-General says that the blockade 
at Havana has been run, and I will add that I myself with a 7-knot 
vessel entered Escombreras and remained there an hour and a half, 
although it was occupied by the provincial (cantonal) squadron. 

But is there any similarity to the present situation? Certainly not. 
The sortie from here must be made by the ships, one by one. There is 
no possibility of stratagem nor disguise, and the absolutely certain 
result will be the ruin of each and all of the ships and the death of the 
greater part of their crews. If I had thought there was even the 
remotest chance of success I should have made the attempt, although, 
as I have said before, it would only have amounted to a change of the 
scene of action unless we had gone to Havana, where things might, 
perhaps, have been different. For these reasons, and in order that my 
forces might make themselves useful in some manner, I proposed to 
you to send them ashore, just at the time when the Captain-General 
made the same suggestion. | 

To-day I consider the squadron lost as much as ever, and the dilemma 
is whether to lose it by destroying it, if Santiago is not able to resist, 
after having contributed to its defense, or whether to lose it by sacri- 
ficing to vanity the majority of its crews and depriving Santiago of 
their cooperation, thereby precipitating its fall. What is best to be 
done? I, who am a man without ambitions, without mad passions, 
believe that whatever is most expedient should be done, and I state 
most emphatically that I shall never be the one to decree the horrible 
and useless hecatomb which will be the only possible result of the sor- 
tie from here by main force, for I should consider myself responsible 
before God and history for the lives sacrificed on the altar of vanity, 
and not in the true defense of the country. 

As far as I am concerned, the situation has been changed to-day from 
a moral standpoint, for I received a telegram this morning which places 
me under the orders of the Captain-General in everything relating to 
the operations of the war. It is therefore for him to decide whether I 
am to go out to suicide, dragging along with me those 2,000 sons of 
Spain. I believe I have answered your letter, and trust you will see 
in this letter only the true and loyal expression of the opinion of an 
honorable old man who for forty-six years has served his country to 
the best of his ability. 

Yours, etc., PASCUAL CERVERA. 


113 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco). 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 25, 1898. 

Since dispatching my last telegram received letter General Linares transmitting 
telegram from your excellency wanting to know my opinion. Have already 
expressed it in former telegram and give it more fully to-day. It is incorrect that 
the blockading fleet has ever been reduced to seven vessels. The six principal ships 
alone represent more than three times the power of my four. On account of the 
lack of batteries to keep the hostile squadron at a distance, it remains constantly 
near harbor entrance, illuminating it, which makes any sortie except by main force 
altogether impossible. 

In my opinion the sortie will entail the certain loss of the squadron and majority 
of its crews. I shall never take this step on my own account, but if your excellency 
so orders I shall carry it out. The loss of the squadron was, in my judgment, 
decreed when it was ordered to come here. Therefore its painful situation is not a 
surprise tome. Your excellency will give instructions whether we are to go out to 
this sacrifice, which I believe fruitless. 


The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera). 


HAVANA, June 26, 1898. 

Your two telegrams received. I thank you for the satisfaction you express over 
being under my orders. I consider myself greatly honored thereby and trust that 
you will see in me a comrade rather than a superior. It seems to me you somewhat 
exaggerate difficulties of sortie. It is not a question of fighting, but of escaping 
from that prison in which the squadron is unfortunately shut in, and I do not believe 
it impossible, by taking advantage of favorable circumstances in dark night and 
bad weather, to elude enemy’s vigilance and escape in whichever direction you deem 
best. Even in case you are discovered, fire is very uncertain at night, and although 
it may cause injuries it would mean nothing compared with safety of the ships. 

You say that loss of Santiago is certain, in which case you would destroy ships, 
and this is an additional reason for attempting the sortie, since it is preferable for 
the honor of arms to succumb in battle, where there may be many chances of safety. 
Moreover, the destruction of the ships is not certain, for the same thing might hap- 
pen that occurred at Havana last century when the English included in the capitu- 
lation the surrender of the squadron which was inclosed in the harbor. 

For my part, I repeat I do not believe that the hostile fleet, no matter how strong, 
can do so very much damage if our squadron, choosing a dark night and favorable 
opportunity while part of enemy’s ships are withdrawn, steams out at full power in 
a direction agreed upon, evenif discovered. This is shown by the running out of 
the Santo Domingo and Montevideo from this harbor with nine ships in the blockad- 
ing line, the Purisima from Casilda with three, and the entering of the Reina Cristina 
into Cienfuegos, also blockaded by three ships. I am very well aware that the 
situation of your squadron is a very difficult one. Still, the preceding cases bear 
comparison. 

If your cruisers are in some manner captured in Santiago Harbor, the effect in the 
whole world wili be disastrous and the war may be considered terminated in favor 
of the enemy. The eyes of every nation are at present fixed on your squadron, on 
which the honor of our country depends, as I am sure your excellency realizes. The 
Government is of the same opinion, and to my mind there can be no doubt as to the 
solution of the dilemma, especially as I have great confidence in the success. 

I leave entirely to the discretion of your excellency, who are so highly gifted, the 
route to be followed and the decision as to whether any of the ships should be left 
behind on account of slow speed. As a favorable item, I will tell your exceilency 
that the captain of German cruiser Geier has expressed the opinion that the sortie of 
the squadron can be effected without running great risks. 


10742——8 


114 


The Minister (Aunén) to the Admiral (Cervera). 


MADRID, June 26, 1898. 

Government thinks in extreme case referred to in cablegram of the 23d, before 
ourselves destroying our squadron in harbor, should attempt to save it, in whole or 
part, by sortie at night, as was opinion of some of the officers of your squadron in 
meeting May 26 and June 10,1 and as you stated on May 28. Advise me whether 
landing of crews was at request military authority and whether they were reembarked 
after rendering assistance. 

The object of my cablegram of the 24th, for which you thanked me, is not per- 
sonal consideration, but the best service of the nation. Avoid comments (which 
cause) to which are attributed? unfavorable interpretations. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aunén). 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 27, 1898. 

Have received C D 4097 (preceding telegram). Very sorry I incurred displeasure 
of Government by opinion expressed long time ago, and to your excellency in cipher 
telegram dated May 21. With the harbor entrance blockaded, as it now is, the 
sortie at night is more perilous than in daytime, on account of ships being closer 
inshore. 

Landing of crews was at request of military authority, through Captain-General. 
]1 have asked for reembarkation, but doubt much if it can be effected before reen- 
forcements arrive. Your A D 0491 (telegram of the 24th), the same as all acts of 
your excellency, have for object the best service, but inure, nevertheless, to my 
benefit, because (it will not be to me that will be due) J will not be the one to decide 
upon the useless hecatomb which is being prepared.® 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco). 


SANTIAGO DE CuBA, June 27, 1898. 

I am in receipt of your cable, and thank your excellency very much for kind 
words in my behalf. I have to respect your excellency’s opinions without discussing 
them, especially after having given you my own opinion formed after mature con- 
sideration. I have always believed that there are many sailors more able than I am, 
and it is a pity that one of them can not come to take command of the squadron, 
and under whose orders I would be placed. I construe your excellency’s telegram 
as an order to go out, and therefore ask General Linares for reembarkation of forces 
which were landed at your excellency’s suggestion. I beg that you will confirm the 
order of sortie, because it is not explicit, and I should feel very sorry if I did not 
interpret your excellency’s orders correctly. 


The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Commander of the Army at Santiago (Linares). 


[Extract.]} 
HAVANA, June 27, 1898. 


Tell me candidly your opinion on squadron, whether you believe it can go out and 
what solution seems best to you. 





1 Although June 10 is the date as it appears in the original telegram, it refers to 
the meeting of the 8th, as no meeting was held on the 10th. 

*The words in parentheses are not in the original; in place thereof the words in 
italics occur. 

‘The words and phrases in italics are the ones that occur in the original text; 
those in parentheses do not. 


115 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco). 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 28, 1898. 
General Linares answers me that it is not possible to reembark my forces until 
oops arrive from Manzanillo. 


The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago. 


[Personal and confidential.]} 


Havana, June 28, 1898. 

Your telegram received last evening. Being desirous of improving as much as 
possible situation Santiago, am making every effort to forward rations to you. If 
I succeed (and can send) I shall be able to send! more reenforcements, thus pro- 
longing the defense, perhaps raising siege, salvation squadron. If I do not succeed 
it is necessary, as you will realize, for squadron to leave that harbor in spite of 
difficulties, which I appreciate. 

Therefore my plan, which f desire your excellency to carry out, is as follows: The 
squadron willremain in harbor, and without precipitation, provided it has provisions 
left, it will watch for a favorable opportunity to go out in whatever direction your 
excellency may deem best. But in case the situation should become aggravated, so 
that the fall of Santiago is believed near, the squadron will go out immediately as 
best it can, intrusting its fate to the valor and ability of your excellency and the 
distinguished captains commanding it, who no doubt will confirm by their actions 
the reputation they enjoy. Acknowledge receipt. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco). 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 29, 1898. 

Your telegram received. Beg forrepetition from the words “ become aggravated” 
to the end of sentence, this being unintelligible. The rest I shall carry out as far as 
possible, the scant supply of coal rendering it difficult. It takes these ships twelve 
hours to get up steam, and if the fires are kept going and the ships in readiness to 
take advantage of opportunity each uses 15 tons a day. But I think I understand 
meaning your order: If favorable opportunity presents itself, to avail ourselves of 
it; and if not, to go out at the last hour, even though loss of squadron be certain, 
Difficulties might also arise by enemy taking possession of harbor entrance. 


The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Minister of Marine (Auftén). 


HAVANA, June 80, 1898. 

In conformity with terms of your excellency’s telegram of 24th instant have dic- 
tated to admiral the following instructions: ‘‘The squadron will remain in harbor, 
and without precipitation, provided it has provisions left, it will watch for a favora- 
ble opportunity to go out in whatever direction your excellency may deem best. 
But in case the situation should become aggravated, so that the fall of Santiago is 
believed near, the squadron will go out immediately as best it can, intrusting its 
fate to the valor and ability of your excellency and the distinguished captains com- 
manding it, who no doubt will confirm by their actions the reputation they enjoy.” 
I tell your excellency of this for your information, and beg that you will advise me 
whether the foregoing instructions meet with Government’s approval. 


1 The telegram as received contains the words in italics and not those in parentheses, 


UA 


14 


A 


116 


The Minister (Aundn) to the Commandant-General of Navy- Yard (Manterola). 


MADRID, July 1, 1898. 
Advise Captain-General that Government approves his instructions to Admiral 
Cervera. 





The Admiral (Cervera) to the Lieutenant-General, Commander in Chief of 
the Fourth Army Corps of Santiago de Cuba (Linares) 


HONORED SiR: I have the honor of notifying your excellency of a 
cablegram which I have received from the Captain-General and which 
is as follows: ‘‘ Your telegram received last night. Being desirous of 
improving as much as possible situation Santiago * * * will con- 
firm by their actions the reputation they enjoy.” I therefore beg that, 
if at any time you think that the unfortunate situation referred to in 
the telegram may arise, you will kindly advise me in time, so that 1 
may be able to reembark the men I have ashore and put to Bo in com- 
pliance with the instructions. 

Yours, ete., PASCUAL Cunraeen 


SANTIAGO DE OUBA, June 30, 1898. 





The Commander in Ohief of the Fourth Army Oorps (Linares) to the 
Admiral (Cervera). 


HONORED SiR: In reply to your official favor transmitting to me a 
cable from his excellency the Captain-General, in virtue of which you 
ask me to advise you when the city may be in danger of falling into 
the hands of the enemy, I have the honor to state that this being an 
open city, for whose defense earthworks have been thrown up on the 
heights and lines of trenches dug along its wire inclosure, it is not 
possible to determine the moment when to notify your excellency, for 
as soon as an attack is commenced there is danger that the powerful 
column will break through the outer line, along which all my scant 
forces are deployed, without reserves to be sent to the points which 
may be threatened the most. Nevertheless, I shall endeavor to keep 
your excellency posted as to the course of the battle, although, if the 
battle should be unfavorable, the moment would not be propitious for 
effecting the reembarkation of your forces. 

Yours, ete., ARSENIO LINARES. 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 1, 1898. 





The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco). 


SANTIAGO DE CuBA, July 1, 1898. 
In addition to my cablegram of yesterday I advise your excellency that General 
Linares replies that, as the city is open, having only earthworks and wire inclosure, 


1This new title was conferred upon General Linares about that time. 


117 


it will not be possible to determine the moment for notifying me, as there is danger 
of the powerful column breaking the line along which all his scant forces are 
deployed, without reserves to be sent to the most advanced points, bat that he will, 
nevertheless, keep me posted as to the course of the battle, although, if the battle 
should be unfavorable, the moment would not be propitious for effecting the reem- 
barkation of my forces. As these ships can not go out without the forces, since 
they must expect a fierce battle at the sortie, and will, in my judgment, be destroyed 
or captured, as I have already advised you, the case might arise that I could not 
carry out your orders, I therefore notify you accordingly and beg for instructions. 


PROCEEDINGS. 


The undersigned officers being convened by the Admiral on the 1st 
day of July, at 7 o’clock p. m., said Admiral read to them the telegrams 
exchanged with the Captain-General at Havana, in which the latter 
states, in spite of the observations made as to the disaster awaiting 
the squadron at the harbor entrance, that the sortie should be effected 
by main force, especially if the loss of Santiago de Cuba is impending. 
The admiral then gave an account of the military operations that have 
taken place this day, in which the enemy took possession of the town 
of El Caney and San Juan Hill. 

Upon being asked for their opinions as to whether they thought that 
the case had arisen in which the Captain-General had ordered the 
sortie, the officers assembled stated unanimously that they thought the 
case had arisen in which the Captain-General ordered the sortie, but 
that it is absolutely impossible to effect it without the reembarkation 
of the men now ashore for the defense of the city, being at present 
more than two-thirds of the total forces of the squadron, and that at 
the same time the chief of the army corps, in an official communica- 
tion, has stated that he can not do without their aid, being absolutely 
without reserves and forces with which to relieve the men on the exten- 
Sive lines to be defended. As the result of the foregoing, it is the 
opinion of the undersigned that, in order to cooperate in the most effect- 
ive manner and with some prospect of success in the defense of the 
city, it would be necessary to obstruct the harbor entrance. 

JOSE DE PAREDES, 
JUAN B. LAZAGA. 
FERNANDO VILLAAMIL. 
Victor M. Concas., 
ANTONIO EULATE. 
EmILio Diaz MOREU. 





The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco). 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 1, 1S98S—At night. 
Through General Toral your excellency knows of the events of this day. He 
believes it certain that the withdrawal of my landing forces will entail the imme. 


118 


diate loss of the city. Without them the sortie can not be attempted. My opinion 
is the same as Toral’s, and our sortie would look like flight, which is repugnant to 
all. My captains are of the same opinion. I entreat you will send instructions I 
have asked for. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aunén), 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 1, 1898, 
The enemy to-day made fierce attack on city with overwhelming forces. Has not 
accomplished much, as the defense has been brilliant. But we have 600 casualties, 
among them commander in chief army seriously wounded, and general of brigade 
_ killed; captain of navy, Bustamante, seriously wounded. Crews have not been 
reembarked because it would entail immediate loss of city. Have asked Captain- 
General for instructions. 


The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera). 
{Very urgent.—Key L.] 


HAvANa, July 1, 1898—10.80 p. m. 

In view of hostile progress in spite of heroic defense garrison, and in conformity 
with opinion Government, you will reembark crews, take advantage of first op- 
portunity, and go out with the ships of your squadron, following route you deem 
best. You are authorized to leave behind any which on account of slow speed or 
circumstances have no chance of escaping. I will tell your excellency for your in- 
formation only, not in the nature of instructions, that there are only three ships at 
Cienfuegos and nine here, none of them of great power. 


The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera). 
[Urgent.—Key 0.] 
Havana, July 1, 1898—10.45 p.m. 


In addition to my former telegram of this evening, ask you to hasten sortie from 
harbor as much as possible before enemy can take possession of entrance. 


The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Commander of Army at Santiago (Toral). 
[Extract.] 


Havana, July 1, 1898—10.65 p. m. 
It is absolutely necessary to concentrate forces and prolong defense as much as 
possible, by every means preventing enemy from taking possession of harbor 
entrance before sortie of squadron, which is to go out as early as possible, so as not 
to have to surrender nor destroy ships. 


The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa). 


HAVANA, July 1, 1898. 
Admiral Cervera is troubled about leaving the harbor, fearing squadron will be 
destroyed in the operation, and asks for new instructions. Have answered, in con- 
formity with your excellency’s telegram No. 90, that he is to leave the harbor, taking 
advantage of first opportunity before enemy occupies entrance, 


119 


The Minister (Aundn) to the Admiral (Cervera). 


. MADRID, July 1, 1898. 
Notify you that our colliers Alicante and Remembrance are at Martinique; Marie 
and Burton at Guadeloupe. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco). 
[Urgent.] 


SANTIAGO DE CuBA, July 2, 1898 (at daybreak). 
Your urgent telegrams of last night received. Have sent my chief of staff to 
show them to General Toral, and have given orders to light fires, so as to go out as 
soon as my forces are reembarked. 


The Captain- General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera), Santiago, 
[Very urgent. ] 
: Havana, July 2, 1898—5.10 a. m. 
In view of exhausted and serious condition of Santiago, as stated by General Toral, 
your excellency will reembark landing troops of squadron as fast as possible, and go 
out immediateley. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Acting Commander in Chief of the Fourth 
Army Corps of Santiago de Cuba (Toral). 


HoNORED Sir: Since the receipt of the telegrams from his excel- 
lency the Captain-General, which my chief of staff showed you this 
morning, I have received the following: 

‘In view of exhausted condition * * * go out immediately.” 

I notify your excellency of this in order that you may give the nec- 
essary orders for immmediately carrying out the instructions of the 
Oaptain-General. 

Yours, etc., PASCUAL CERVERA. 

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 2, 1898. 


The Acting Commander in Ohief of the Fourth Army Corps (Toral) to the 
Admiral (Cervera). 


HonorEpD Sir: Upon being informed of the cablegram from the 
- Captain-General to your excellency, ordering the reembarkation of the 
forces of the squadron, I immediately issued instructions tor the com- 
pany at San Miguel de Parada to proceed to San José for reembarka- 
tion; the company at Mazamorra to go to the Socapa; that at Las 
Cruces to the pier of that name; the company between the forts of the 
gasometer and furnaces to go to Punta Blanca, and the remainder of 


120 


the landed naval forces to the Royal Pier. I have the honor of advis- 
ing you of the foregoing for your information and in order that meas- 
ures be taken for the reembarkation of the companies referred to. 
Yours, ete., 
JOSE TORAL, 
SANTIAGO DE OUBA, July 2, 1898, 





The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Commander in Chief of the Army Corps of Santiago 
(Toral). 


HAVANA, July 2, 1898. 

Your cablegram of 1.30 a.m. received, and I reiterate the instructions which I 
gave your excellency in my last telegram of this morning. It is absolutely neces- 
sary to concentrate the forces and prolong the defense as much as possible, prevent- 
ing the enemy from taking possession of the harbor entrance before sortie of squad- 
rou, for which orders have been issued to Admiral Cervera, in view situation of city 
as reported by you, to obviate surrender or destruction of ships. 

If your excellency and valiant troops can hold out until arrival of Escario or 
Pareja brigade, situation would be much improved; but if it is so critical as to 
make continuation of defense impossible, you will gather all troops and loyal citi- - 
zens, try to open a path, and fall back upon Holguin or Manzanillo, destroying what 
can not be taken along and burning everything left behind, so that not the least 
trophy of victory will fall into the enemy’s hands. At all events, I trust to your 
excellency to adapt compliance with my instructions to condition of city and forces, 


Phe Commander in Chief of Army Corps Santiago ( Toral) to the Captain-General (Blanco). 


SANTIAGO DE CuBA, July 2, 1898. 

At daybreak the enemy renewed attack upon city, which is still going on, simul- 
taneously with attacks upon Cuebitas, railroad line, and El Cobre, the latter being 
made to believe that Escario’s column has been held up by landing forces at Aserra- 
dero. At request Admiral Cervera have ordered immediate reembarkation troops of 
squadron, thereby weakening defense by 1,000 men, as Asia battalion, arrived this 
morning, and remnant of Battalion Constitucion are hardly sufficient to fill places of 
killed and wounded yesterday. Situation becoming more and more untenable. 





The Captain- General (Blanco) to Commander in Chief of the Army Corps, Santiago (Toral). 


HAVANA, July 2, 1898. 

Your telegram of 1.30 a. m. received. I understand situation difficult, but not 
desperate. Would be much improved by incorporation Escario or Pareja. In any 
event maintain city at any price, and before capitulation make attempt to join 
either of said forces, leaving wounded and sick at hospitals with assistance Red 
Cross. City must not be destroyed, in spite of what I said last night. Main thing 
is that squadron go out at once, for if Americans take possession of it Spain will be 
morally defeated and must ask for peace at mercy of enemy. A city lost can be 
recovered; the loss of the squadron under these circumstances is final, and can not 
be recovered. Be sure to telegraph and keep me advised of events and your opinions. 


121 


The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa). 


{[Extract. ] 
HAVANA, July 2, 1898. 
Have ordered immediate sortie of squadron, for if enemy takes possession of har- 
bor entrance it is lost. 


The Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Minister (Auién). 


HAVANA, July 3, 1898. 
Commandant-general navy, Santiago, telegraphs: ‘Our squadron went out, keep- 
ing up galling fire, which could hardly be heard for hostile fire. Has apparently 
succeeded in running blockade, taking westerly course.” 


The Commander in Chief of the Army Corps, Santiago (Toral), to the Captain-General 
(Blanco). 


SANTIAGO DE CuBa, July 3, 1898. 

Escario column arrived last night. Enemy attacked our forces several times this 
morning, killing Ramén Escobar, captain Asia Brigade, and wounding 7 men. 
Several shipwrecked from destroyers and a sailor from Maria Teresa, appearing at 
Socapa this morning, stated that latter ship was lost when out of sight of harbor, 
and that Oquendo was on fire. Other men from Maria Teresa have since arrived. 
Whereabouts of Admiral Cervera unknown. Will give your excellency further 
details as soon as I ascertain. 

According to torpedo officer, the electric torpedoes of the first line do not work, and 
only four of the second line, and as two of the seven Bustamante torpedoes have 
become unserviceable and two others are defective, he thinks it will be easy for 
enemy to force the harbor entrance and close it, as I told your excellency. Com- 
mandant navy states that no merchant vessel could enter, and advises sinking of 
cruiser leina Mercedes, though he says it will not obstruct navigation for ships 9 to 
13 feet draft. I consult your excellency whether operation may be effected. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco). 


PLAYA DEL ESTE, July 4, 1898. 

In compliance with your excellency’s orders, I went out from Santiago yesterday 
morning with the whole squadron, and after an unequal battle against forces more 
than three times as large as mine my whole squadron was destroyed. Teresa, 
Oquendo, and Vizcaya, all with fire on board, ran ashore. Coldén, according to infor- 
mation from Americans, ran ashore and surrendered. The destroyers were sunk. Do 
not know as yet loss of men, but surely 600 killed and many wounded (proportion 
of latter not so large). The survivors are United States prisoners. Gallantry of 
all the crews has earned most enthusiastic congratulations of enemy. Captain of 
Vizcaya was allowed to retain his sword. I feel very grateful for generosity and 
courtesy with which they treat us. Among dead is Villaamil, and,I believe, Lazaga; 
Concas and Eulate wounded. We have lost everything, and I shall need funds. 


1T sent this telegram through Admiral Sampson, begging him to dispatch it, and 
for this reason it was not received by the Captain-General until the day following. 


122 


The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa). 


Havana, July 5, 1898. 
Admiral Cervera under this date telegraphs as follows from Playa del Este: “I 
went out from Santiago yesterday morning with the whole squadron, etc. (see 
foregoing telegram).” 


The Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Minister (Awién). 


HAVANA, July 5, 1888, 

At last report transmitted commandant navy, Santiago, news was uncertain. 
This morning I received the following two items: Sailors from Maria Teresa are 
arriving, and report that said ship and Oquendo, Plutén, and Furor ran aground with 
fire on board; that Coldén and Vizcaya were lost from sight without being pursued by 
enemy. So far 108 have arrived from Plutén, Furor, and Teresa, among them ofiicers; 
no captain. Do not have certain information concerning admiral; have asked for 
it, but so far not received. Was advised unofficially last night that he was prisoner 
on board hostile ship. Shall transmit as usual whatever official information I 
receive. 


The Commandant-General Navy- Yard (Manterola) to the Minister (Auftén). 


2 Havana, July 6, 1898. 

No communication with Santiago. Last cables received are the two forwarded 
yesterday. By request, Captain-General gave me the following, with proviso that 
he did not order Cervera to go out of Santiago at 9.45 a. m., the time when he 
effected the sortie. “In compliance with your excellency’s orders, I went out from 
Santiago yesterday morning, etc.” (The balance of telegram has already been given.) 


The Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Minister (Aujfién). 


HAVANA, July 8, 1898. 

Commandant navy, Santiago, states as follows: “According to apparently trust- 
worthy information the four battle ships and two torpedo boats succumbed in battle 
of 3d. Killed, captain of Oquendo, sailors, and soldiers; wounded, captain of Teresa 
and officers; slightly wounded, both commanders in chief; many prisoners; latter 
all on the way to United States. It is believed enemy will use Colén. This city 
threatened with immediate bombardment by land and sea unless it capitulates. 
Enemy has cut our aqueduct. 

I am told that, while we shall not be very short of provisions, we shall be of 
ammunition. Families are fleeing; city deserted. We are surrounded by land and 
sea. I think decisive events, serious and bloody, must soon follow. Joaquin Bus- 
tamante much better.! Twenty-four hostile ships. Total of crews squadron hitherto 
arrived, 153, among them Manuel Bustamante and José Caballero, only officers ; Mid- 
shipman Ramén Navia. Furor was sunk; the other ships ran ashore with fire on 
board, caused probably by hostile shell. Cable communication was interrupted— 
reason for my not sending more news. Shall communicate all information as I 
receive it. 


————————————— eee ee 


‘Capt. Joaquin Bustamante, chief of staff of the squadron, was in charge of the 
naval forces that went ashore to assist in the defense of Santiago de Cuba. In the 
battle of July 1 he was at the head of his forces, when his horse was killed under 
him; on foot he continued his command with a spirit and heroism extolled by all, 
until he was struck in the abdomen by a bullet. He died on July 19 at the Santiago 
hospital. His remains were buried in the Panteén de Marinos Ilustres at San 
Fernando. : 


123 


REPORT OF THE BATTLE. 
The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blance). 


Honorep Sir: In compliance with your excellency’s orders, aware of what had to 
happen, as I had so many times told you, I went out from Santiago Harbor with the 
whole squadron under my command on the morning of the 3d day of July. 

The instructions given for the sortie were as follows: The Infanta Maria Teresa, 
my flagship, was to go out first, followed by the Vizcaya, Colén, Oquendo, and 
destroyers, in the order named. The ships had all their fires spread and steam up. 
Upon going out the Teresa was to engage the nearest hostile ship and the vessels 
following were to take a westerly course at full speed, with the Vizcaya at their 
head. The torpedo-boat destroyers were to keep out of the fire as much as possible, 
watching for a favorable opportunity, acting if it presented itself, and try to escape 
at their highest speed if the battle was against us. The ships left the harbor in 
such perfect order as to surprise our enemy, from whom we have since received many 
enthusiastic compliments on this point. 

As soon as the Teresa went out, at 9.35, she opened fire on the nearest hostile ship, 
but shaping her course straight for the Brooklyn, which was to the southwest, for it 
was of the utmost importance to us to place this ship in a condition where she would 
not be able to make use of her superior speed. The rest of our ships engaged in 
battle with the other hostile ships, which at once came from the different points 
where they were stationed. The hostile squadron that day was composed of the 
following ships off Santiago Harbor: The New York, Admiral Sampson’s flagship; the 
Brooklyn, Commodore Schley’s flagship; the Zowa, Oregon, Indiana, Texas, and other 
smaller ships, or rather transatlantic steamers and converted yachts. 

Immediately after leaving the harbor entrance the squadron took the course pre- 
scribed and a general battle ensued, in which we were at a great disadvantage, not 
only owing to our inferior number, but to the condition of our armament and 5.5- 
inch ammunition, of which I notified your excellency in the telegram I sent you 
when placing myself under your orders. There was no doubt in my mind as to the 
outcome, although I did not think that our destruction would be so sudden. 

One of the first projectiles burst an auxiliary steam pipe on board the Maria 
Teresa. A great deal of steam escaped, which made us lose the speed on which we 
had counted. About the same time another shell burst one of the fire mains. The 
ship made a valiant defense against the galling hostile fire. Among the first 
wounded was our gallant commander, Capt. Victor M. Concas, who had to withdraw, 
and as we could not afford to lose a single moment, I myself took direct command 
of the ship, waiting for an opportunity when the executive officer could be called. 
But this opportunity never arrived, as the battle became more and more fierce and 
the dead and wounded fell all around us, and all we could think of was to fire as 
much as possible. 

In this critical situation fire broke out in my cabin, where some of the 2.24-inch 
projectiles stored there must have exploded. At the same time I was informed that 
the after deck and chart house were burning, while the fire that had commenced in 
my cabin was spreading with great rapidity to the center of the sbip, and, as we 
had no water, it made rapid headway, and we were powerless to fight it. I realized 
that the ship was doomed, and cast about for a place where I could run her aground 
without losing many lives and continue the battle as long as possible. 

Unfortunately the fire was gaining ground with great rapidity and voracity. I 
therefore sent one of my aides with instructions to flood the after magazines, but it 
was found impossible to penetrate into the passages owing to the dense clouds of 
smoke and on account of the steam escaping from the engine hatch, and it was 
impossible to breathe in that suffocating atmosphere. I therefore steered for a small 
beach west of Punta Cabrera, where we ran aground just as the engines stopped. 
It was impossible to get down the ammunition and other things below the armored 
deck, especially aft of the boilers, and under these circumstances all we could do was 


124 


to save as many as possible of thecrew. This was also the opinion of the offices whom 
I was able to convene, and who, when I asked them whether they thought the battle 
could be continued, answered no. 

In this painful situation, when explosions commenced to be heard in the ammu- 
nition rooms, I gave orders to lower the flag and flood all the magazines. The first 
order could not be carried out on account of the terrible conflagration on the poop, 
which was soon completely burned. The fire was gaining rapidly. When it had 
reached the forward deck we hardly had time to leave the burning ship, assisted by 
two United States boats, which arrived about three-quarters of an hour after we 
had run ashore. 

Among the wounded are Lieut. Antonio Lépez Cerén and Ensign Angel Carrasco. 
The following are missing: Higinio Rodriguez, captain of naval artillery, who is 
believed to have been killed by a projectile; Ensign Francisco Linares; Second Sur- 
geon Julio Diaz de Rio; Chief Machinist (first class) Juan Montero, and Machinist 
(second class) José Melgares, whose body has been washed up on the beach. The res- 
cue had been effected by those who could swim jumping into the water and trying 
three times to carry a line ashore, succeeding only at the last moment, assisted by 
the two United States boats above mentioned. 

We had lowered a boat that was apparently in good condition, but it sank at 
once. A steam launch was then lowered, but it was able to make only one trip; 
when it attempted to return to the ship a second time it sank, as the result of inju- 
ries received. Of the three or four men on board, one saved his life by swimming 
and the others were picked up by one of the United States boats. 

The captain of the Vizcaya, assisted by two good swimmers, had gone ashore. 
The executive and third officers were directing the rescue from on board ship, and 
as it was also necessary to direct it from the shore after the United States boats 
had arrived, I swam ashore with the assistance of two seamen, Juan Llorca and 
André Sequeiro, and my son and aide, Lieut. Angel Cervera. 

When all the men had been landed I was notified by the United States officer who 
was in command of the boats to follow him to his ship, which was the converted 
yacht Gloucester. I was accompanied by my flag captain, who was wounded, my son 
and aide,and the executive officer of the ship, who had been the last one to leave 
her. 

During this time the burning ship offered an awe-inspiring aspect. The explo- 
sions following each other in rapid succession were enough to appall even the calmest 
soul. I do not believe it will be possible to save a single thing from the ship. We 
have lost everything, the majority of us reaching the shore absolutely naked. A 
few minutes after the Teresa, the Oquendo ran aground on a beach about half a 
league farther west, with fire on board similar to that of the Teresa, and the Vizcaya 
and Colén disappeared from sight to the westward pursued by the hostile fleet. 
From the paymaster of the Oquendo, the only one of her officers on board the same 
ship with me, I have since learned the history of that ill-fated ship and her heroic 
crew. This history, which may perhaps be corrected as to some details but not as 
to the main facts, is as follows: 

The unequal and deadly battle sustained by the Oquendo became even more 
unequal when shortly after it had commenced a hostile projectile entered the for- 
ward turret, killing the whole personnel of the same with the exception of one gun- 
ner, who was badly wounded. The 5.5-inch battery, which had been swept by the 
hostile fire from the beginning, had only two serviceable guns left, with which the 
defense was continued with incomparable energy. The after turret also lost its cap- 
tain who was killed by a hostile shell that struck him as he opened the door of the 
turret, almost asphyxiated by the stifling air within. The paymaster does not know 
the history of the rapid-fire battery; he only knows that it kept firing the same as 
the rest of the valiant crew. There were two conflagations—the first, which was 
controlled, occurred in the forward hold; the other, which originated aft, could not 


125 


be controlled as the pumps were unable to furnish water, probably for the same 
reasons as on board the Teresa. 

The 5.5-inch ammunition hoists refused to work from the very beginning, but there 
was no lack of ammunition in the battery while the fight could be continued, as extra 
stores had been put on board all the ships as a precautionary measure. When the 
valiant captain of the Oquendo saw that he could not control the fire, and when he 
found that he did not have a single serviceable gun left, he decided to run aground, 
after first issuing orders to discharge all the torpedoes, except the two after ones, 
in case any hostile ship should approach before the last moment arrived. He also 
ordered the flag to be lowered a few minutes after the Teresa did, and after consul- 
tation with the officers who were present. The executive and third officers and three 
lieutenants had been killed. 

The rescue of the survivors was organized by her captain, who lost his life in 
saving those of his subordinates. They made a raft and lowered two launches, the 
only serviceable boats they had left, and were finally assisted by United States boats, 
and, according to the statement of an insurgent with whom I talked on the beach, 
also by an insurgent boat. It was asublime spectacle that these two ships presented. 
The explosions that followed each other incessantly did not frighten those valiant 
sailors, who defended their ship to such an extent that not even a single enemy has 
been able to set his foot on her. 

When I was asked by the United States officer to follow him, as stated above, I 
first gave instructions for the reembarkation to the third officer, Juan Aznar, whom 
I have not seen since. When the United States ship, the converted yacht Gloucester, 
arrived I found on board about 20 wounded men belonging mostly to the destroyers, 
the captains of the latter, three officers of the Teresa, and the paymaster of the 
Oquendo. There were in all 93 men belonging to the crews of the squadron. 

The captain and officers of the yacht received us with great courtesy, vying with 
each other in supplying our wants, which were manifold, for we arrived abso- 
lutely naked and half starved. The captain said to me that as his ship was so small 
he could not receive s0 many and he was going to look for a larger ship to take us. 
The insurgents with whom I had talked had told me that they had 200 men, among 
whom there were five or six wounded, and added, on the part of their captain, that 
if we wanted to go with them we should follow them and they would help us as 
best they could. I told them to thank their captain for us, and tell him that we had 
surrendered to the Americans; but if they had a surgeon I should be grateful to 
them if they would look after some of our wounded on the beach, some of whom 
were very seriously wounded. 

I told the captain of the yacht of this conversation with the insurgents and 
begged him to reclaim our men, which he promised to do, and he at once sent out a 
detachment with a flag. He also sent some provisions, of which those on the beach 
were so much in need. 

We then started westerly and met the nucleus of the squadron, from which the 
auxiliary cruiser Paris was detached, and our yacht proceeded until we were off 
Santiago, where we received instructions, according to which some were trans- 
shipped to the Jowa and the rest to other vessels, while the wounded were taken to 
the hospital ship. 

During my stay on board the yacht I inquired of the captains of the destroyers as 
to the fate of their ships, as I was anxious to hear of their sad end. The history of 
the Furor your excellency will learn in detail from the inclosed copy of her captain’s 
report. Capt. Fernando Villaamilmeta glorious death, and the number of casualties 
on board bear testimony to the valiant conduct of this little ship, whose captain also 
was slightly wounded. 

I likewise inclose to your excellency a copy of the report from the captain of the 
Pluton, who was also slightly wounded, and 5 Ed ship has as glorious a history as 
her companion, 


126 


When I reached the Jowa, where I was received with all manner of honors and 
marks of respect, I had the pleasure of seeing on the gangway the gallant captain 
of the Vizcaya, who came out and greeted me, wearing his sword, which the captain 
of the Jowa did not want him to give up, in testimony of his brilliant defense. A 
copy of his report is also inclosed, from which your excelleney will see that the his. 
tory of the Vizcaya is very similar to that of her sister ships, the Teresa and the 
Oquendo, which proves that the same defects had produced the same unfortunate 
results, and that it was all but a question of time. 

I remained on board the Jowa until 4 o’clock -p. m., when I was transferred to the 
St. Louis, where I met the second in command of the squadron and the captain of 
the Colén. 

While still on board the Jowa, Admiral Sampson came up, and I asked him for per- 
mission to telegraph to your excellency, which I did, as follows: 

‘In compliance with your excellency’s orders, I went out from Santiago yesterday 
morning with the whole squadron, and, after an unequal battle against forces more 
than three times as large as mine, my whole squadren was destroyed. Teresa, 
Oquendo, and Vizcaya, all with fire on board, ran ashore; Coldén, according to infor- 
mation from Americans, ran ashore and surrendered; the destroyers weresunk. Do 
not know as yet loss of men, but surely 600 killed and many wounded (proportion of 
latter not so large). The survivors are United States prisoners. Gallantry of all 
the crews has earned most enthusiastic congratulations of enemy. Captain of 
Viscaya was allowed to retain his sword. I feel very grateful for generosity and 
courtesy with which they treat us. Among dead is Villaamil and, I believe, 
Lazaga; Concas and Eulate wounded. We have lost everything, and I shall need 
funds. Cervera. July 4, 1898.” 

I wish to make a correction as to the fate of the Plutén, which was not sunk, but 
which, unable to maintain herself afloat, succeeded in running ashore, as your 
excellency will see from the report of her gallant captain. 


On board the St. Louis the second in command of the squadron and the captain of - 


the Colén told me of that ship’s sad fate, the former handing me a report, a copy of 
which is inclosed. I refrain from any comments on a report by this distinguished 
officer on events of which he was an eyewitness. 

In order to complete the outline of the history of this mournful day, there only 
remains for me to tell your excellency that our enemies have treated and are treat- 
ing us with the utmost chivalry and kindness. They have clothed us as best they 
could, giving us not only articles furnished by the Government, but their own per- 
sonal property. They have even suppressed almost entirely the usual hurrahs out 
of respect for our bitter grief. We have been and are still receiving enthusiastic 
congratulations upon our action, and all are vying in making our captivity as light 
as possible. 

I do not yet know our loss of men, being distributed to the different ships, but it 
is in the neighborhood of my estimates stated in the cablegram despatched te you. 

To sum up, the 3d of July has been an appalling disaster, as I had foreseen. The 
number of dead, however, is less than I feared. Our country has been defended 
with honor, and the satisfaction of duty well done leaves our consciences clear, 
though we bitterly mourn the loss of our beloved companions and the misfortunes 
of our country. 

On board this ship there are, besides the second in command of the squadron and 
myself, with our aides, 1 captain, 4 officers, and 32 men from the Infanta Maria 
Teresa; the paymaster and 35 men from the Oquendo; the 3 commanding officers, 14 
other officers, and 191 men from the Colén; the captain, chief engineer, amd 10 men 
from the Furor; the captain, 1 officer, and 19 men from the Plutén, and Lieut. 
Enrique Capriles, whom I took on board the Vizcaya asa passenger from Santiago. 

Of all of these I sead your excellency a list and shall send further lists as I receive 
news of ihe others. 


127 


I also send your excellency a list of the captains, officers, and midshipmen who 
were killed or wounded or who are missing, as also a list of all the wounded other 
than officers who are on board this ship. The majority of the wounded are on board 
the hospital ship Solace. 

As I realize that your excellency might have difficulties in forwarding this com- 
munication, I take the liberty of sending a copy of the same to his excellency the 
minister of marine. 

Of special facts worthy of mention which do not affect the general action I shall 
send separate reports as I learn of them. 

Yours, etc., PASCUAL CERVERA. 


ON THE SHA, ON BOARD THE ST. LOUIS, July 9, 1898. 





REPORT OF THE COLON. 
The Second in Command of the Squadron (Paredes) to the Admiral (Cervera). 


Honorep Sir: I have the honor of submitting to your excellency a report on the 
battle and the fate of the battle ship Coldén on the 3d instant, as communicated to 
me by her gallant captain, as follows: 

“In compliance with orders received, I went out of Santiago Harbor with the ship 
under my command, taking the position assigned to her. At 9.45 o’clock a. m., 
when abreast of the Morrillo, I opened fire on the Jowa, which was the nearest ship 
at the moment of the sortie. 

‘Five minutes later, wnen the Brooklyn was at the head of the hostile line, I gave 
orders to concentrate all the fire upon her and so far as possible upon the Oregon, 
which was on the port quarter, and to which we could not give special attention 
for lack of bow and stern guns. Our ship fired 184 rounds with 5.9-inch guns and 
117 rounds with the 4.7-inch battery, 10 per cent of which are believed to have hit 
the target. I saw at once that neither the Brooklyn nor the Oregon, which were 
chasing the Colén, could overtake us, the former falling behind more than the latter, 
and I proceeded, shaping my course for Cape Cruz, hugging the shore, 

‘‘At 1 o’clock p. m. the pressure in the boilers began to go down, decreasing the 
revolutions from 85 to 80, and the Oregon commenced to gain on us, and soon after 
opened fire with her heavy bow guns, which I could answer only with gun No. 2 of 
the battery, while the distance between us grew constantly shorter. In view of 
this fact, and the absolute certainty of being captured by the enemy, I acted with 
your excellency’s sanction, as it was not expedient to call any of the officers from 
their posts, which, in view of the structure and arrangement of the hatchways, 
would have meant a loss of very precious time. 

‘“‘Animated by the desire to take advantage to the last moment of any opportunity 
to fire that might present itself, and in order to obviate being captured, I decided to 
run ashore and lose the ship rather than sacrifice in vain the lives of all these men 
who, as your excellency is aware, had fought with brilliant heroism and great dis- 
cipline and coolness. I therefore shaped our course for the mouth of the Tarquino 
River and ran aground on the beach at 2 o’clock p. m., at a speed of 13 knots. After 
the ship had been beached I convened the officers, all of whom expressed themselves 
satisfied with the course taken, realizing thatif we had kept on even for a few minutes 
longer we should have been in the greatest danger of falling into the hands of the 
enemy and becoming a trophy of victory, which was to be avoided at any cost. 

‘Soon after we became prisoners of war on the Brooklyn, whose captain came on 
board shortly after. During the battle we had one man killed and twenty-five 
wounded. I herewith inclose a list of these casualties. Though a great many of 
the enemy’s projectiles struck us, they did not cause much damage in the protected 
part of the ship. 


128 


“The foregoing I have the honor of submitting to your excellency for your infor- 
mation, expressing at the same time my conviction that each and all did their duty 
under the difficult circumstances under which the sortie was effected and the disad- 
vantages of the battle, owing to the superiority of the enemy and the great defi- 
ciencies of our means of attack.” 

As a witness of what occurred, I wish to state to your excellency that, in the 
midst of our sorrow over the loss of the ship and the gallant and heroic men, I feel 
great satisfaction in knowing that all have done their sacred duty in the defense of 
their flag and their country, proving once more that the Spanish navy may be 
defeated, but never with dishonor. 

All on board the Colén have shown themselves worthy of their ancestors. It is 
hardly possible to recommend any one of her noble crew in particular, as all have 
distinguished themselves alike by their heroism. But I should be failing ina sacred 
duty if I did not tell your excellency that her valiant captain rose to a height which 
words can not express; I can only say that he is an honor to the corps in which he 
serves. 

JOSE DE PAREDES. 

ON THE SEA, ON BOARD THE ST. Louis, July 6, 1898. 





REPORT OF THE OQUENDO. 


Lieutenant Calandria to the Admiral (Cervera). 


HONORED Sir: The officer who has the honor of addressing your excellency is the 
_ senior officer of the battle ship Almirante Oquendo who survived the battle of July 3, 
and he therefore considers it his duty to give your excellency an account of what 
occurred on said ship during the battle. 

When the signal for battle was given, the undersigned officer went to occupy his 
post, which was the conning tower of the after deck, from where I observed the 
movements of the hostile fleet, which, as this ship came out of the harbor, was . 
steering in a westerly direction in line ahead, with the cruiser Brooklyn in the lead. 
As soon as we had cleared the channel we followed in the wake of the ship ahead of 
us and opened fire on the port side while constantly fired upon by the hostile ships, 
especially the battle ship Jowa and cruiser Brooklyn, and it was on these two that 
we mainly concentrated our fire; passing, in the opinion of the undersigned, at a 
distance of less than 3,826 yards from them. 

We continued to steam until we left the Jowa somewhat behind on the port quar- 
ter, but within range of her artillery, while the Brooklyn was on the bow of the same 
side and the other ships at a distance astern of the Jowa. This was the situation of 
the hostile fleet when I was notified through the speaking tube that fire had broken 
out in the after torpedo rooms, and as I came out I saw flames issuing forth from the 
officers’ hatchway in the poop. Realizing at once that it would be impossible to con- 
trol the fire, owing to the proportions it had assumed, I went to the forward deck to 
report to the captain, and found him preparing to beach the ship with the helm to 
starboard. 

As I was afraid that the bow torpedoes might explode when the ship ran aground 
in case there should be a violent shock, these torpedoes being all ready to be launched 
the same as the other torpedoes, I suggested to the captain the expediency of dis- 
charging them, and this was done in the forward torpedo room by Ensign Alfredo 
Nardiz and the personnel under his orders. 

At the moment when the ship ran ashore, enveloped in flames, her deck covered 
with dead and wounded, her guns disabled, the captain gave the undersigned the 
order to lower the flag, but owing partly to the listlessness with which the order 
was given and partly to the natural vacillation of those who were to fulfill it, the 


129 


distressing order was not carried out. The fire, which by this time had assumed 
gigantic proportions, caught the lanyard and the flag fell into the flames. 

The foregoing is all that the undersigned had a chance to witness of the battle, as 
he was isolated from the rest of the ship. The details which follow have been com- 
piled from information and data acquired subsequently. 

The orders given the two batteries and turrets were to set the sights for distances 
varying from 2,625 to 3,496 yards. At the fourth round of gun No. 6 (5.5-inch) the 
breech burst, killing and wounding the crew and blindin g the gunner. By this time 
there were so many casualties in the upper battery—among them the captain of the 
same, Lieutenant Enrique Marra-Lépez, and Ensign Juan Dfaz Escribano, both 
wounded—that there was only personnel enough left to serve guns Nos. 2 and 4, which 
continued to fire until both the ammunition hoists broke; and as it was impossible 
to bring up projectiles, owing to the fires that had broken out in the central ammu- 
nition rooms both forward and aft, the firing was continued with the projectiles 
that were on deck, which, for lack of other means, were carried to the guns by Lieu- 
tenant Enrique Marra-Lopez, Midshipman Quirino Gutiérrez, and Third Gunner 
Antonio Serrano Facio. 

The greater part of the rapid-fire battery had been destroyed, several guns having 
been dismounted, and nearly all the personnel killed or wounded, among them the 
executive and third officers. 

When the third round was about to be fired in the forward turret a projectile 
entered between the gun and gun port, tearing a piece from the upper edge of the 
latter and killing the captain of the turret, Eugenio Rodriguez Bircena, and Third 
Gunner Francisco Garcia Pueyo, and badly wounding First-class Gunner José Arenosa 
Sixto, also breaking the tubing and apparatus. In the after turret the captain of 
the same, Lieutenant Alfonso Polanco y Navarro, was also killed by a fragment. A 
shell which entered the after torpedo room put the whole personnel of the same out 
of action. A few moments later another shell, exploding in the central room aft, 
killed and wounded a number of men, among them Ensign Emilio Pascual del Pobil, 
who was wounded. 

When the captain gave instructions to flood the magazines on account of the 
fires, the order was transmitted by Lieut. Tomds Calvar to First Machinist Juan 
Pantin, who went to the central compartment forward for that purpose, where the 
men’s lockers were burning, and succeeded in flooding the forward compartment, but 
was unable, on account of the furious fire, to flood the after compartments; and the 
officers’ mess room and cabins and the pantries became a prey of the flames. The 
fire spread to the after deck as the result of burning wood from the officers’ mess 
room falling through the hatch of the ammunition hoist. This would have caused 
the explosion of the 5.5-inch ammunition room if Third Gunner Germ4én Montero and 
Sailor Luis Diaz had not stopped up the hatches, first with wooden gratings and 
then with wet bedding, and as, in spite of their efforts, they did not succeed in dis- 
mounting the hoist to lower the cover of the hatch, they left the deck when it be- 
came impossible for them to remain there, after first closing up the 11-inch ammu- 
nition rooms. | 

After beaching the ship, the engines were stopped by orders of the captain, the 
safety valves were opened, and the engines and boilers dismounted. The work of 
rescue was then commenced. We had to give up the large boats, as the fire made it 
impossible to lower them, and some of them were disabled. We succeeded in layer- 
ing the yawl, but it sank. The two launches were used successfully. Great acts of 
heroism were performed in the work of rescue as well as in the battle. Of these I 
give your excellency a separate account. 

When the undersigned jumped into the water there were left on the forecastle the 
captain, Ensign Alfredo Nardiz, several men, First Boatswain Luis Rodriguez, and 
First Machinist Juan Pantin. The latter told me that after I had gone the captain, 
who refused to leave, fell suddenly to the deck, raising his hands to his breast, taken 


107429 


130 


apparently with an attack of heart failure. They attended him, and when they 
knew that he was dead, covered his body with a flag. This I learned on board the 
Harvard. 
The ship was beached about 10 or 12 miles from the entrance of Santiago harbor. 
In the fulfillment of my duty, I submit the foregoing for your excellency’s infor- 
mation. 


| ADOLFO CALANDRIA. 
Camp LONG, PORTSMOUTH NAVY-YARD, July 20, 1898. 


THE REPORT OF THE VIZCAYA. 
The Captain (ulate) to the Admiral (Cervera). 


HONORED Sir: In compliance with the instructions received from your excellency, 
I got my ship ready on the morning of the 2d instant, to go out at4 p.m. Butas 
the reembarkation of the first company did not begin until that time, it was 6.30 
p. m. before the ship was ready to put tosea. At that moment the battle flag was 
hoisted by the officers, whom I addressed, reminding them of the obligations imposed 
upon them by the Ordinances, and the heroic deeds of our ancestors in our honorable 
career. After a prayer, we received, kneeling, the benediction of the chaplain. 

With the flag hoisted we were awaiting your excellency’s last orders, and at 9 
o’clock a. m. of the day following, July 3, the ship was ready to follow in the wake 
of the flagship. At 9 o’clock (true time) she started up, following the Teresa, and at 
9.30, after passing Punta Socapa, we went full speed ahead, steering in conformity 
with the instructions previously issued by your excellency. At the same moment 
we opened fire on the hostile ships, very heavy at first, but gradually decreasing in 
the 5.5-inch battery, owing to the defects of the guns and ammunition, of which your 
excellency is aware. 

In spite of these defects, the enthusiasm and intelligence of the officers in charge 
of the battery and the excellent discipline of their crews made it possible to fire 
during the battle, which lasted two hours and a half, 150 rounds with the port bat- 
tery, one of the guns alone firing 40 rounds, the others 25 and above, with the excep- 
tion of one, which only fired 8rounds. The deficiencies of these guns were numerous, 
chief among them, as you already know, the fact that the breech could not be closed, 
the projectiles jammed, and the firing pins failed to act. 

One of the guns had to try seven shells before a serviceable one could be found, 
another gun even eight, and it was only by dint of hard work that this latter gun 
could be brought into firing position. In the lower battery the firing was very 
heavy during the first two hours; after that the number of hostile shells striking 
and injuring the port guns was such as to disable every one of them and dismount 
the majority. 

In the high battery there were so many casualties that, although there was but 
one gun left that could be fired, there were not men enough to serve it. In the 
lower battery there were no men left either to serve the guns or to conduct the 
firing. It therefore became necessary to decrease the crew assigned to extinguish- 
ing the fires that were constantly breaking out everywhere, and as a result of this 
fact, in conjunction with the circumstance that the fire mains had become useless 
through hostile fire, the conflagration increased to such an extent that it was no 
longer possible to control it. It is safe to say that the number of victims in the two 
batteries two hours after the beginning of the battle was between 70 and 80, most 
of them killed, among them the captain of the lower battery, Lieut. Julian Ristory 
y Torres, who for his gallantry deserves a place of honor in the annals of the history 
of our navy. 

Owing to the valiant attack which the. flagship made on the enemy at the begin- 
ning of the battle, we did not at first have so much to suffer from hostile projectiles, 


131 


as only two battle ships were firing upon us. But during the second hour we were 
the target of four, the Brooklyn to port, the Oregon on the port quarter, the Jowa on 
the stern, and the New York on the starboard quarter, but the last two very close, so 
that only the after 11-inch gun could answer the fire of the Iowa and New York. 
The guns of the starboard turrets forward and aft were able to fire four or five 
rounds against the New York, but the fire was very uncertain because the latter ship, 
after firing from her port broadside, yawed at the stern. 

It was at 9.35 o’clock, after we had come out of the harbor and were shaping our 
course for Punta Cabrera, that we first received the enemy’s fire, and at 11.50, when 
we could no longer fire with a single gun, I wanted to try whether we could ram the 
Brooklyn, which was the ship that harassed us most on the port side and which was 
nearest t6 us. To that end I put to port, but the Brooklyn did the same, indicating 
that she was going to use only her guns. The undersigned, with his head and 
shoulder wounded, was obliged to withdraw to have his wounds dressed. Almost 
faint from the loss of blood, he resigned his command for the time being to the exec- 
utive officer, with clear and positive instructions not to surrender the ship, but 
rather beach or burn her. In the sick bay I met Ensign Luis Fajardo, who was hav- 
ing a very serious wound in one of his arms dressed. When I asked him what was 
the matter with him he answered that they had wounded him in one arm, but that 
he still had one left for his country. 

When the flow of blood of my wounds had been checked, I went back on deck 
and saw that the executive officer had issued orders to steer for the coast in order to 
run ashore, for we had no serviceable guns left and the fire at the stern had assumed 
such dimensions that it was utterly impossible to control it. This sad situation was 
still further complicated by a fire breaking out on the forward deck as the result of 
the bursting of a steam pipe and the explosion of one or more boilers of the for- 
ward group. Although the executive officer, Commander Manuel Rolddn y Torres, 
had acted in accordance with instructions, without exceeding them, I immediately 
convened the officers who were nearest, among them Lieut. Commander Enrique 
Capriles, and asked them whether there was anyone among them who thought we 
could do anything more in the defense of our country and our honor, and the unani- 
mous reply was that nothing more could be done. 

In order that the battle flag might not become a trophy of the enemy, I at once 
gave orders to Ensign Luis Castro to hoist another and lower the former and burn 
it, which order was promptly carried out. At 12.15, under the galling fire of the four 
battle ships mentioned above, the cruiser Vizcaya ran ashore on the shoals of Aserra- 
dero under circumstances which made it impossible to save the ship, not only on 
account of her position on the shoals and the nature of the latter, but also because I 
knew that all the magazines must necessarily explode, though there would be time 
for the rescue, and that was indeed what occurred. 

As soon as the ship had been beached, the executive officer gave instructions to 
make all arrangements for the immediate rescue of the crews. Attempts were at 
once made to lower the boats. When I found that only one was in serviceable con- 
dition, I ordered that it be used mainly for the transportation of the wounded, and 
I authorized all those who could swim or who had life-preservers or anything else 
sufficiently buoyant to keep them above water to jump in and try to gain the reefs 
of the shoal, which was about 98 yards from the bow. 

The rescue was effected in perfect order, in spite of the awe-inspiring aspétt of the 
ship on fire, with the ammunition rooms exploding, the flames rising above the fight- 
ing tops and smokestacks, and with the side armor red-hot. I was taken ashore by 
the officers in the last boat that carried wounded, and was subsequently picked 
up by a United States boat, which carried me to the Jowa. The executive officer 
told me afterwards that only the dead were left on board, as he had at the last 
moment directed the rescue of those who had taken refuge aft, and whom he had 
ordered to jump into the water and hold on to ropes which had previously been 
made fast, and there he and the others waited until they were picked up by our 


132 


boat. The conduct of the captain, officers, and crew of the Jowa, the ship to which 
the United States boats carried us, was extremely considerate. I was received with 
the guard drawn up. When I wanted to surrender my sword and revolver to the 
captain, he refused to receive them, saying that I had not surrendered to his ship, 
but to four battle ships, and that he had no right to accept them. 

The conduct of our officers and crew has been truly brilliant, and many deeds of 
heroism which have been recorded will in due season form the subject of a special 
recommendation, if your excellency should so order. 

Of the wounded taken to the Jowa five died soon after arriving there, and were 
buried with the same honors with which the Americans bury their own dead, with 
the guard drawn up and with the discharge of three volleys of musketry. All the 
prisoners were present at these ceremonies, which were conducted by the chaplain of 
the late Vizcaya. 

The foregoing is all I have the honor of reporting to your excellency upon the loss 
of my ship in a battle against four far superior ships without striking her colors nor 
permitting the enemy to set foot upon her deck, not even for the rescue. There are 
98 men missing of her crew. 

ANTONIO EULATE 
- (Prisoner of war). 
ON THE SEA, ON BOARD THE AUXILIARY CRUISER ST. LOUIS, 
July 6, 1898. 


REPORT OF THE FUROR. 
Lieut. Commander Carlier to the Admiral (Cervera). 


Honorep Sir: At half past 9 o’clock on the morning of July 3, upon orders 
received from the commander in chief of the torpedo boat flotilla, who came on 
board this ship, we sheered off from Las Cruces Pier, Santiago, and followed in the 
wake of the Oquendo. Before reaching Punta Gorda we commenced to hear the fire 
of the battle between the vanguard of our squadron and the enemy, and several 
shells struck near us. 

Soon after, in the harbor entrance, the commander gave orders to put to starboard 
and follow at full speed in the wake of the squadron in a westerly direction, open- 
ing fire upon the enemy. From the very first we received an enormous amount of — 
fire from the majority of the hostile ships and were struck by shells of every caliber. 

We soon commenced to have casualties from the galling fire and many injuries to 
the ship, which occurred in the following order: Bursting of the steam pipe of the 
engine; destruction of the starboard intermediate cylinder; flooding and submer- 
sion of the stern; bursting of a boiler; further injuries to the engine; destruction 
of the three remaining boilers; fires in different parts of the ship, one of great 
intensity in the engine room, below which was the shell room, and finally, breaking 
of the servomotor of the helm and tiller. All these accidents occurred one after 
another in a very short space of time, but we never ceased firing, although the deck 
was already strewn with a large number of wounded and some dead. 

About 10.45 the commander of the flotilla, in view of the foregoing facts, which 
he had either witnessed or which had been reported to him, gave orders to run 
ashore, which could not be carried out. Asthe ship was known to be doomed, hav- 
ing neither rudder nor engine left, the fire, no longer controllable, having invaded 
the stern and waist, and more than one-half of the crew having been put out of 
action, the commander ordered the flag and the boats to be lowered, and the men 
who could do so to get ashore in the boats or with the assistance of life-preservers. 
I transmitted this order to the executive officer. Several projectiles struck the men . 
who were swimming ashore. 

When the hostile fire had ceased, two United States boats came alongside, and 


133 


the few of us who still remained on board got in. The enemy did no more than just 
step on deck, and upon realizing the situation, returned hastily to the boats, fearing 
an explosion, which, indeed, occurred soon after we had sheered off from the ship, 
and she sank about a mile from the shore. 

Of the crew, which was composed of 75 men, 11 are unhurt; 8 of the dead have 
been identified; 10 of the wounded have been picked up; the remaining 45 figure in 
the list as missing, thdugh some of them were left on deck dead and could uot be 
identified; others were drowned, but I have hopes, which I trust I may see fulfilled, 
that some of these 45 men have gained the shore. 

It is with deep sorrow that I have to report to your excellency that among the 
dead who were identified is our worthy chief, the noble and brilliant Capt. Fernando 
Villaamil. 

All of the foregoing I report to your excellency for your information, in com- 
pliance with my duty. 

DIEGO CARLIER. 

On Board THE Sr. Louis, July 8, 1898. 


REPORT OF THE PLUTON. 
Tieutenant-Commander Vazquez to the Admiral (Cervera). 


HONORED Sir: In compliance with the orders received from the commander in 
chief of the torpedo-boat division, I sheered off from Las Cruces pier at 9.30 in the 
morning of the 3d instant and steered straight toward the entrance of Santiago 
Harbor. : 

I was off the little town of Cinco Reales when I commenced to notice the falling 
of shells, the natural result of the battle that was being fought between the van- 
guard of our squadron and the Americans. I followed closely in the wake of the 
furor, according to instructions received, and when about to leave the harbor 
entrance I opened fire upon the nearest hostile ship and went ahead at full speed. 
After I emerged from the harbor steering in a westerly direction I was greeted by a 
hail of projectiles. This was the beginning of the battle, and the fire increased as I 
advanced and got into the midst of the hostile fleet. 

About 10.45 a large caliber shell entered the orlop, which rapidly filled with water 
and the ship pitched forward. Almost at the same time other projectiles hit the for- 
ward boilers, which burst. Another entered the ammunition room of my cabin, and 
besides causing a leak, started a fire in that quarter. 

But we steamed on, though at a slower speed, and constantly fired upon by the 
Americans, whose fire we kept answering. But when I saw that the ship commenced 
to sink, owing to the water entering at the bow, in the boiler room, and my cabin, I 
concluded that she could not remain afloat much longer, and tried to run ashore ona 
small beach near by. I ordered the helm to be put to starboard (port?—O. N. T.) but 
the rudder no longer responded, the servomotor having been disabled, and one of the 
tiller ropes broken. The ship was still going ahead and struck on the rocks, com- 
pletely destroying her bow. Upon instructions from me part of the crew jumped 
to the ground, others into the water to starboard, some of them gaining the shore. 

I then left the deck, went to my cabin, took the package of confidential letters 
received from your excellency and the commander in chief of the torpedo-boat divi- 
sion, and threw it into the water, together with signal code No. 32 and the Perea 
signal code and key. I then lowered the flag. After that 1 went forward, but it 
was no longer possible to gain the shore from there, as the ship had changed hei 
position. I therefore hailed the boat which had gone ashore with some of the mer 
and, entering it, I was able to gain the rocks, Soon after I heard an explosion and 
the ship went down as far as the deck. 

The hostile fire having ceased, I had a white flag hoisted. A United States boat 
then came to pick us up and took us to one of their ships. 


134 
There were 21 of the crew left, among them 5 wounded; the rest are comprised in 
the list of dead and missing which I had the honor of handing to your excellency. 
The foregoing is all I have the honor of reporting to your excellency for your 


information, in compliance with my duty. 
PEDRO VAZQUEZ. 


ON THE SEA, ON BoarRD THE ST. LOUIS, 
July 6, 1898. : 


The Captain- General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera). 
[Received at Portsmouth, N.H., 1.52 p.m.,July 11, 1898. Dated Washington, D.C.) 


Admiral CERVERA, Portsmouth, N. H.: 
The following telegram has been received for you from the Captain- 
General of Cuba: 


Being very desirous of alleviating the lot of those heroic defenders of our country 
who so valiantly succumbed in unequal battle, and to whom, as to yourself, I offer 
a tribute of admiration, I beg that you will advise me of the amount you require 
and where you wish it placed. In order to gain time I also address the French con- 
sul at New York on this subject. 

The following is a copy of the first part of the manifesto in this connection which 
I addressed to the people of Cuba on the 4th day of July: ‘‘Inhabitants of the 
island of Cuba: Fortune does not always favor the brave. The Spanish squadron, 
under the command of Rear-Admiral Cervera, has just performed the greatest deed 
of heroism that is perhaps recorded in the annals of the navy in the present cen- 
tury, fighting American forces three times as large. It succumbed gloriously, just 
when we considered it safe from the peril threatening it within the harbor of San- 
tiago de Cuba. Itisa hard blow, but it would be unworthy of Spanish hearts to 
despair,” etc. BLANCO. 

Lone, Secretary of the Navy. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain- General (Blanco). 


PORTSMOUTH, N. H., July 11, 1898. 
Your excellency’s cable received, for which we are very grateful. 
The men will remain here where they were landed, having with them 5 
army officers, 2 surgeons, 2 chaplains, and 1 midshipman. We ofiicers 
are to go to Annapolis, where we shall all be together. As we have 
lost absolutely everything, we need about $70,000 gold for the present. 


The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Minister of Marine (Aunén). 


HAVANA, July 11, 1898. 

The consul of Jamaica says that your excellency is waiting for particulars of loss 
of squadron. In cablegram dated 3d instant I told your excellency and minister 
war of its sortie from Santiago in same terms in which it was reported to me by 
commander of navy and general of division. Subsequently, on the 5th, I forwarded 
to minister war communication from Rear-Admiral Cervera, of same date, reporting 
destruction squadron. Have received no further official information on this unfortu- 
nate event, which saddens the heart of every good Spaniard, and am therefore 


135 


unable to give your excellency the particulars you desire. I do not believe that the 
reports circulating through the American press are trustworthy. Everything indi- 
cates, however, that the disaster has not been as great as at first supposed as far as 
casualties are concerned, especially as to the number of killed. 


The Minister (Aufién) to the Commandant-General of Navy- Yard (Manterola). 


MADRID, July 11, 1898. 
To clear up doubts, examine and transmit literally first few words of telegram 
addressed by Admiral Cervera to Captain-General from Playa del Este. 


The Captain- General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera). 
{From Playa del Este to Admiral Cervera, care of commandant naval station, Portsmouth, N. H.) 


Fuacsuip NEw York, 
Off Santiago, July 12, 1898. 
The following telegram was received from General Blanco for you: 


> 


Am deeply impressed by your excellency’s telegram of yesterday and greatly 
admire conduct of commanders, officers, and crews. Perhaps if another time had 
been chosen for sortie result would have been different. Sampson states in his 
report he sustained only three casualties. Is that possible? Advise me how much 
money is required and where to place it, and I beg that you and all officers and men 
under your orders will believe in my deepest interest and a desire to better their 


situation as much as lies in my power. 
BLANCO. 
ADMIRAL SAMPSON. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain- General (Blanco). 


PorTSMOUTH, N. H., July 13, 1898. 

I am in receipt of telegram which your excellency sent me at Playa 
del Este, from where it was forwarded to me here. Am deeply grieved 
that all my actions meet with your excellency’s censure. Trust I may 
be able to justify them when time comes, as the facts have taken care 
of showing that there was no exaggeration in my opinions expressed 
to your excellency, which you also censured. The sortie at night would 
not have obviated loss of squadron, and surely the number of dead 
would have been tripled, provided the sortie could have been effected 
at all, which pilots doubted. Many thanks for your offers. In my for- 

mer telegram I have already asked for $70,000 gold. 





The Admiral (Cervera) tu the Minister (Aunién), 


ANNAPOLIS, MD., July 16, 1898. 
Have just arrived here, second in command of squadron and total of 43 captains, 
officers, and midshipmen. Petty officers and men, with 4 army officers, 2 surgeons, 
2 chaplains, and 1 midshipman, remain at Portsmouth. At the Norfolk hospital 
there are 48 wounded. 


a! 


1 This telegram was to have been sent from Havana on the 5th or 6th. 


136 


The Minister (Autén) to the Admiral (Cervera). 


MADRID, July 18, 1898. 
The minister of marine sends respectful greeting to Spanish prisoners. Money 
sent you from Havana. 


@e 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Auitén). 


ANNAPOLIS, MD., August 12, 1898.) 
Presume when peace protocol is signed we shall at once be restored to liberty. 
If we do not previously receive instructions I intend to contract for passage, draw- 
ing for necessary funds upon your excellency or London committee. 


The Commandant-General of Navy- Yard (Manterola) to the Minister (Auitén). — 


HAVANA, August 17, 1898. 
In compliance (with) orders (from) your excellency. » In reply to your cable (of July 
11).2 


The Minister (Aunén) to the Admiral (Cervera). 


MADRID, August 17, 1898. 
If prisoners are granted unconditional liberty you may contract for passage home, 
preferring, terms being equal, national flag. If possible one ship bound for Ferrol 
and one for Cadiz and Cartagena. Draw for necessary funds. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aufién). 


ANNAPOLIS, MD., August 18, 1898. 
Dias Moreu has obtained permission from United States Government and leaves 
for Madrid; also Surgeon Jurado, seriously ill, accompanied by Chaplain Riera. 


The United States Admiral (McNair) to the Admiral (Cervera). 


NAVAL ACADEMY, Annapolis, Md., August 20, 1898. 
Rear-Admiral PASCUAL CERVERA. 

Sir: I have the honor of advising you that the Governmeut of the United States 
will grant Admiral Cervera and the officers under his orders their liberty upon con- 
dition that they pledge their word of honor in the usualform. The admiral’s word 
will suffice as to the troops and crews. Liberty can be granted on this condition 
only. I call your excellency’s attention to the fact that upon pledging their word 
in the manner indicated about 20,000 men have been restored to liberty, some of 
whom have already returned to Spain. This was the mode of procedure followed 
by the commander in chief of the United States troops which operated in Santiago 
de Cuba. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the United States Admiral (McNair). 


HONORED Sir: The penal code of the Spanish navy defines as crime and provides 
penalties for the acceptance of liberty upon promise not to take up arms during the 








‘Received at Madrid the 16th. 2See telegram p. 121, 


~ 


137 


continuation of the war. We can, therefore, not accept, and I have the honor of so 
informing your excellency. 
I report the matter to my Government. 
PASCUAL CERVERA. 
ANNAPOLIS, August 20, 1898. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aundn). 


ANNAPOLIS, MD., August 20, 1898. 

I have been officially advised that the United States Government will grant us 
liberty if we pledge our word not to take up arms during the continuation of the 
war, as the 20,000 men of Santiago have done. Have replied that we can not do so, 
because our penal code considers such action criminal. I beg your excellency for 
instructions. , . 


Lieutenant-Commander Capriles to the Minister (Aunén). 


ANNAPOLIS, MD., August 20, 1898. 
I shall not accept liberty upon word of honor, even if authorized by your excel- 
lency. 


The Minister (Aundn) to the Admiral (Cervera). 
MADRID, August 23, 1898. 
I approve refusal of officers prisoners to accept liberty upon promise not to take 
up arms. Advise Lieutenant-Commander Capriles that although his intention may 
be different, it is considered disrespect on his part to admit possibility of Govern- 
ment authorizing what the penal code forbids. 


The Minister (Auinén) to the Admiral (Cervera). 


MADRID, August 28, 1898. 
Advise me on what terms Diaz Moreu, Jurado, and Riera are returning. 





The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aunén). 


ANNAPOLIS, MD., August 29, 1898. 
Jurado returns sick; Riera to take care of him. Particulars official letter 12th 
instant.! I did not mediate in Moreu’s liberty. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aunoén). 


ANNAPOLIS, Mp., August $1, 1898. 
United States Government grants us unconditional liberty. Shall at once look for 
transport in compliance with your excellency’s instructions, 


The Minister (Aundn) to the Admiral (Cervera). 


MADRID, September 1, 1898. 
You may contract for steamers necessary for return prisoners. But for sanitary 
reasons, if only one ship, to go to Santander; if two, one to Santander and one to 
Vigo. 
reer ee a ee Te 


1The sentence in italics is not in the pamphlet, 


138 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aunén). 


ANNAPOLIS, MD., September 8, 1898. 
Committee I sent to New York has contracted for transportation of men for 
£11,185, payable at sight in London, order Krajewski, Pesant & Co. Draft upon 
committee navy. Will notify of departure. 


The Minister (Auftén) to the Admiral (Cervera). 


MADRID, September 4, 1898. 
I approve of arrangements. There being only one ship, go to Santander and 
notify me of departure. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aunén). 


NEw YorRK, September 8, 1898. 
Wounded (from) Norfolk have arrived (in) City (of) Rome. ‘To-morrow officers 
from Annapolis will arrive. The day after steamer leaves for Portsmouth to embark 
nucleus of men. I leave now to arrange for embarkation. ! 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister (Aunén), 


PORTSMOUTH, September 12, 1898. 
We are about to leave. Probable arrival 21st. I beg that commandant navy be 
instructed to issue passports to captains and officers for respective homes, except 
those mentioned by me, in immediate charge of expedition. 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain- General (Blanco). 


PortsMouTH, N. H., September 12, 1898. 
We are about to leave for Spain. ; 


The Rear-Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine (Aunoén). 


Honorep Sir: As I tread once more the soil of our beloved country I deem it my 
duty to give you in the shortest possible form an account of events from the day 
of the disaster of July 3 to the present date. I will not weary your excellency with 
the many transfers we had to make during the first few days, and will confine myself 
to stating that all the prisoners were divided into three groups. The one to which 
I belonged was assigned to the auxiliary cruiser St. Louis; another, the most numer- 
ous, to the auxiliary cruiser Harvard, and a third, the least numerous, but composed 
of the most seriously wounded and sick, to the hospital ship Solace. 

In my report of the ill-fated battle of July 3, I had the honor of telling your 
excellency of the kindness and courtesy with which we were treated by the enemy, 
with the exception of one unfortunate incident which occurred on board the Har- 





1 Words in parentheses were not in the original, but appeared in the pamphlet; 
those in italics vice versa. 


139 


vard, and of which I shall speak in a separate letter,' and some friction at Ports- 
mouth, N. H., which does not deserve special mention. 

The United States Government had prepared on Seavey Island a camp composed 
of wooden barracks for the petty officers, crews, and troops; that is to say, for all 
except the active officers, who were assigned to the Naval Academy at Annapolis, 
Md., with the exception of the seriously wounded and sick, who were sent to the 
Naval Hospital at Norfolk, Va. The first expedition to arrive was that of the St. 
Louis, of which I formed part. We were landed at Portsmouth, N. H., on July 10, 
at which time I learned of the different points to which we had been assigned. 

I requested Captain Goodrich of the St. Louis that a few officers be permitted to 
remain with the men who were to camp at Seavey Island, and that we be allowed 
to take with us to Annapolis a few sailors in the capacity of servants, which was 
granted by the United States Government. I therefore appointed Lieuts. Antonio 
Magaz, formerly of the crew of the Vizcaya, Fernando Bruquetas, of the Teresa, 
Adolfo Calandria, of the Oquendo, and Antonio Cal, of the Colén; Ensign Carlos 
Boado, of the Plutén; and Midshipman Enrique Morris to serve as interpreter on 
account of his knowledge of English. AI these officers remained at Portsmouth 
with the exception of Calandria, who was not on the St. Louis, but on the Harvard. 
Surgs. Salvador Guinea and Alejandro Lallemand, Assistant Gabriel Montesinos, and 
Chaplains Matias Biesa and Antonio Granero also remained to attend to the many 
sick and to the spiritual welfare of all. 

During our stay at Portsmouth we received a visit from the bishop of Portland 
~ and the curate of Portsmouth. Words fail me to give an idea of their kindness, 
We remained at Portsmouth until the 14th, when we left for Annapolis, where we 
arrived on the 16th. The same day the Solace arrived at Norfolk and landed the sick 
and wounded, a list of whom I sent your excellency by cable. During the night of 
July 4, there occurred on board the Harvard the incident above referred to. This 
latter vessel reached Portsmouth on the 15th, landing Lieutenant Calandria, Surg. 
- Adolfo Nifiez and the men, and on the evening of the 20th she arrived at Annapolis, 
where the captains and officers were landed. 

At Annapolis I was received with the honors due my rank. I was given a well- 
furnished house, where I remained during the whole time of our captivity with Capt. 
José de Paredes and one of my aides and a sufficient number of servants to make us 
very comfortable. The captains and officers were also given comfortable quarters 
and were always treated with the greatest courtesy. The United States Government 
was kind enough to appoint Rear-Admiral McNair, superintendent of the Naval 
Academy, so that I might not be under the orders of an officer of inferior rank to 
mine. In a word, we were treated at Annapolis with a kindness and courtesy that 
have probably no equal in history in the treatment of prisoners. 

When we were settled and I had the necessary clothes, I wanted to visit our men 
at Norfolk. I asked the United States Government for permission to do so, which 
was granted, and left Annapolis on August 4, arriving at Norfolk on the morning of 
the 5th, where I was received with the greatest courtesy, by express orders, I believe, 
of the United States Government. I spent the day with the sick and wounded and 
went back at night, reaching Annapolis the next morning. At the hospital I found 
every one well treated and carefully attended, and had the pleasure of making the 
acquaintance of Mr. Arthur C. Humphreys, who was our vice-consul until the war 
broke out, and who has been a friend and comfort to our wounded. He has since 
rendered us great service in the transportation of the sick to New York, to embark 
them on the City of Rome, which was accomplished by his disinterested efforts in a 





1 The letter referred to is omitted, as I do not deem it necessary. It is contained 
in the pamphlet mentioned. The incident to which reference is had was the death 
of six sailors and the wounding of many others, some of whom have subsequently 
died, caused by the United States watch at daybreak of July 5. 


140 


more economical manner than I would have thought possible. I recommend him 
especially to your excellency. 

While yet at Annapolis I asked for permission to go to Portsmouth, and the Gov- 
ernment hastened to grant it and to issue instructions accordingly. I left Annapolis 
on August 12, arriving at Portsmouth at 11 o’clock a.m. of the 13th. I was met at 
the station by a naval lieutenant by orders of Mr. C. A. Carpenter, superintendent 
of the navy-yard, who invited me to his house, together with my aide, a paymaster 
whom I had taken along to distribute a month’s pay, and Ensign Narciso Diez, who 
had gone with me to relieve Carlos Boado, whose health was very delicate. 

I found conditions different here from what they were at Annapolis. There was 
not the same material comfort nor the same courtesy; on the contrary, it was notice- 
able at once that there was a lack of material welfare, and in the relations with our 
enemies I thought I could see friction, and on the part of some of them a desire to 
‘make especially the officers feel that they were prisoners, and make them suffer the 
bitterness of their sad lot. While it never came to open insults, there is no doubt 
that the people there did not act according to the desires and certainly not the spirit 
that prevailed in the higher Government spheres. 

As to the material careI will state that for lodging the men ten barracks had been 
built, each 100 feet long and 15 feet wide, so that the ground covered was 15,000 
square feet. As we had over 1,500 men, 150 had to be put into each barrack, which 
gave each man only 10 square feet of space. The officers had only one barrack, the 
dimensions of which I do not remember, but it had all along the walls miserable 
cots (I could not call them beds) and in the middle was a table lengthened by ~ 
boards and disreputable looking remnants of chairs. As politely as I knew how, I 
commented on this to Admiral Carpenter, and in honor to truth I must say that 
when I left Portsmouth two days later the officers had chairs and another barrack 
was being built for a dining room, and instructions had been issued to stop up every 
crack of the old barrack. 

I left Portsmouth on August 16, arriving at Annapolis on the evening of the next 
day. On August 20 Admiral McNair handed me the letter which I inclose to your 
excellency, marked No. 1, as also my reply thereto, marked No. 2. I notified you 
of the substance of these letters by telegram, and your excellency approved of my 
reply. In view of the decision of the United States Government that we should 
promise not again to take up arms and the fact that we could not do so under our 
laws, I deemed it necessary to write Admiral McNair letters Nos. 3 and 4,! of which 
I inclose a rough draft, referring respectively to the invalids and the firemen engaged 
in Cuba entitled to be sent back. 

Admiral McNair also advised’ me, in letter marked No. 5, that we were to be pre- 
pared to leave the academy. Aside from the above there were no further incidents, 
except the deaths which have occurred since we landed, of which I sent you a list, 
and the return to Spain of Capt. Emilio Diaz Moreu, Surg. Antonio Jurado, and 
Chaplain José Riera, of which I notified your excellency at the time. On August 
31 Admiral McNair wrote me a letter stating that the United States Government 
granted us unconditional liberty, and I at once appointed a committee, composed of 
Lieut. Commander Juan B. Aznar and Paymaster Eduardo Urdapilleta, to go to New 
York and make arrangements for passage, in accordance with your excellency’s 
instructions; and I also sent a surgeon to New York to purchase such medicines as 
the steamer did not carry and as might be needed, and I and my aides got ready to 
go at the last hour to settle minor difficulties that might present themselves. 

Before proceeding, I wish to state that wherever we went there were demonstrations 
of the greatest sympathy with our misfortune. I have received many visits and 
many kind services from prominent people, some of very high rank, and at Annapolis 
the whole population was very kind toward us. Admiral McNair and the whole 


1Some of the documents referred to have not been included in this collection 
because it was not deemed necessary, ‘ 


141 


personnel under his orders have distinguished themselves by their exquisite courtesy, 
for which I considered it my duty to thank him in a letter of which I inclose memo- 
randum. To take charge of the expedition I appointed Lieut. Commanders Juan B. 
Aznar and Carlos Gonzélez Llanos, Lieuts. José Butrén and Lorenzo Mild, Captain 
of Artillery Manuel Hermida, Ensign Enrique de la Cierva, and Midshipman Juan 
Munoz, and Raimundo Torres. I have granted permission to all the other captains 
and officers who have asked to be allowed to return to Spain, without giving them 
any further assistance. I inclose a list of these. 

When everything was in readiness at Annapolis, I thoughtit best to take a trip to 
Norfolk, New York, and Portsmouth, before the steamer was ready, and I am glad I 
did so, as I had a chance to settle several small difficulties which might perhaps 
have delayed the steamer, which would have increased the expense. Of the firemen 
engaged in Cuba, 20 asked for permission to go with us, and only the 19 mentioned in 
the inclosed list took passage for Havana, and I wrote to the commandant-general of 
the navy-yard, asking him to send them on to Santiago. 

We had with us 29 prisoners of the army, among them 8 officers. I asked the 
Captain-General for instructions relative to these, and in accordance with his orders ° 
six have gone to Havana, while the others have come with us. All of them have 
received some aid, of which they stood much in need. I was obliged to leave Seaman 
José Maria Vilar Toimil at Portsmouth, as the physicians stated that it would 
endanger his life to take him on board. I left with Commodore George C. Remey 
$50 for his expenses and a letter, of which I inclose memorandum. 

The committee appointed to charter the steamer did so on the terms stated in the 
contract, of which I forward a copy to your excellency. In accordance with the 
terms provided, with the etiicient assistance of the United States authorities, the 
whole embarkation was accomplished without trouble of any kind; no one was 
absent, and by noon of the 12th we were on our way home, and every face on board 
expressed the joy that filled every heart. The trip was made with the most beauti- 
ful weather and has benefited everyone, especially the sick. There were 300 when 
I went to Portsmouth, but their number has been reduced to 180, and even these are 
much improved, so that very few will have to be carried out on stretchers, and I am 
happy to say no death ocourred while we were on the sea; nor has there been any 
disaster, and it has not been necessary to admonish a single man. Four members of 
the Red Cross Society came with us, and their conduct has been of the very best. 
Their names are given in the inclosed report. 

I also inclose a list of all the personnel that came home with me, amounting in all 
to 2 flag officers, 8 captains, 70 officers and midshipmen, and 1,574 petty officers, 
sailors, and naval troops, and 2 officers and 21 men belonging to the army. 

Before closing this long history permit me to say that the officers who were at 
Portsmouth, with the men, have conducted themselves with the greatest tact, patience, 
and prudence. In my official letter of August 11 I have already told your excellency 
of the merits of the medical corps and chaplains, whichI hereby confirm. As tothe 
special merits of some of the others your éxcellency will be advised by the inclosed 
copy of the official letter from Lieut. Antonio Magaz, who was the oldest officer 
there. Lieut. Commander Juan B. Aznar and Paymaster. Eduardo Urdapilleta 
accomplished their mission of chartering the steamer in the best possible manner, 
taking into account the state of the market. Paymaster Urdapilleta has shown 
himself to be one of the best officers of the service, which I take great pleasure in 
stating. 

Yours, etc., PASCUAL CERVERA. 

SANTANDER, September 20, 1898, 


142 


The Oaptain- General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera).' 


ARMY OF OPERATIONS IN CUBA, STAFF. 

HONORED SiR: I am just in receipt of the report which you were 
kind enough to address to me, dated on the sea, July 9 last, on the bat- 
tle sustained by the squadron under your orders in the waters of San- 
tiago de Cuba, on July 3, against the United States naval forces. I 
transmit the report to-day to the minister of war for the information of 
the Government, accompanied by the following letter: 

‘HONORED Sir: I have to-day received from Admiral Pascual 
Cervera the official report, of which I inclose a copy to your excellency, 
on the battle he sustained in the waters of Santiago de Cuba on July 
3 last, said report being dated on the sea, July 9. If the accounts 
published as to this event should not be sufficient to make you appre- _ 
ciate the gallant conduct of our sailors on that day, the reading of 
this document will certainly suffice to make anyone realize the valor, 
presence of mind, and self-sacrifice shown in this fierce battle against 
far superior forces, not only by the flag-officers, captains, and officers, 
but also by the crews of the ships. Though victory has not crowned 
their gallant efforts, they have demonstrated once more the military 
virtues that grace the Spanish navy by giving the noblest example of 
heroism. In view of these facts, it is my opinion that ltear-Admiral 
Cervera, the captains of the ships composing the squadron, and all 
those who took part in the battle are entitled to signal rewards for 
their valiant conduct, and I beg your excellency to use your best 
endeavors with Her Majesty the Queen to grant them such reward.” 

I have nothing to add to the foregoing, except again to express my 
admiration for the gallant conduct of your excellency and the squadron 
under your command, and to lament with the army here and the whole 
nation the sacrifice of so many lives on the altar of the nation’s honor, 
But, as in the first paragraph of your report you expressed an idea 
upon which I can not help but comment, though only in a few words, I 
wish to state that, if it is intended thereby to make me responsible for 
the results of that ill-fated operation, I accept beforehand every responsi- 
bility that can be laid to me as the result of the orders which, guided 
by the most patriotic intentions, I deemed expedient to dictate to your 
excellency, since I had the honor of having the squadron under your 
worthy command placed under my orders. 

RAMON BLANCO. 

His Excellency Rear-Admiral PASCUAL CERVERA, 

HAVANA, August 7, 1898. 


one e 


The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain- General (Blanco). 


HONORED Sir: Not until this morning did I receive your excel- 
lency’s letter dated August 7, which, though not signed, I know to be 


1 This letter was received by me at Madrid shortly after my return from the United 
States. 


143 


genuine, as it came to me with your confidential letter of September 
15, in which you notify me that you sent it in case your former letter 
sent to the United States had been lost. 

I thank your excellency many times, not in my name alone, but in 
the name of those who were under my orders, for the kind words which 
you addressed to the minister of war in our behalf when you sent him 
my report of the ill-fated battle of July 3. 

Relative to the matter that concerns me alone, I wish to explain to 
your excellency the object and motives that impelled me to place at the 
beginning of my report the words that gave rise to your remarks. 
Permit me first of all to say that it was not my desire to incriminate 
anyone, nor to throw responsibility upon anyone, but simply to disclaim 
any responsibility which a priori might be laid to me and which does 
not belong to me. 

It is certain that we accepted a war with the United States for which 
we were not prepared, as we had no fleet such as would have been 
necessary to defend the colonies. This matter was the subject of an 
interesting correspondence, both official and confidential, which I had 
with the Government before the war became inevitable. 

It is also certain that when this war did become inevitable I wanted 
to formulate a plan of campaign and the Government refused me per- 
mission to go to Madrid with that end in view. 

My ideas on this subject were that we should have to lose Cuba in 

any event, and if my squadron, the only naval forces of any value that 
we possesseg, were destroyed, that a humiliating peace entailing many 
other losses was sure to follow the destruction of my squadron. Sub- 
sequent events have shown that I was right on this point. 
- In order to save the squadron it would have been necessary to draw 
the enemy away from their base of operations to some point where they 
would not be able to take all their forces. We should have had all of 
ours united where we had better resources. But I never could make 
these ideas clear, which explains why I was so energetically and obsti- 
nately opposed to the squadron going to the West Indies. 

It was this departure for the West Indies that was the signal for our 
loss, as I had the honor of telling your excellency ina telegram. After 
that nothing that happened could surprise me. Hence the introductory 
words of my report. 


Perhaps if I had not gone out Shafter would have reembarked his 
forces. I was told so in the United States, and I believed it then, 
although this would only have prolonged the agony of Santiago de 
Cuba for a few days; for I considered the city lost from the moment 
when I arrived there, and told the Government so in my telegram of 
May 21, two days after I entered. 

Having explained to you that it was not the object of the introduc- 
tion to my report to throw responsibilities upon anyone, but simply to 
disclaim such responsibility as does not belong to me, there only remains 


144 


for me to reiterate to your excellency my thanks for the kind words 
addressed to us all. 
Yours, etc., “ PASOUAL CERVERA. 
His excellency the CAPTAIN-GENERAL OF THE ARMY OF OPERA- 
TIONS IN CUBA, Havana. 
MADRID, October 8, 1898. 





The Captain-General of the Army of the Island of Cuba. 
{Private.] 
HAVANA, September 15, 1898. 
His Excellency PASCUAL CERVERA. 


My DEAR SiR AND HONORED ADMIRAL: As soon as I received 
your telegram advising me that you were about to leave Portsmouth, 
I replied, wishing you a safe voyage. But you had already embarked, 
as you will see from the inclosed dispatch,! and I, therefore, take the 
liberty of writing to you to fulfill that duty of courtesy. 

I do not know whether you will finally receive my communication 
dated August 7, in which I acknowledge the receipt of the report you 
were kind enough to address to me on the 9th of July. In case you 
should not receive it, I send you herewith a copy of the communication 
referred to. ; 

And while I hold the pen in my hand, permit me also to answer a 
remark which occurred in one of your telegrams and which I thought 
better not to answer by telegram, especially at that time. 

You said that your actions met with nothing but censure on my part. 
I have never censured you, my dear Admiral; on the contrary, I have 
always been lavish with praise, as you deserve, both before and after 
your arrivalin Santiago. You will remember that as soon as you arrived 
I congratulated you on your skillful seamanship. Since then there may 
have been differences of opinion between us, but never censure, at least 
not on my part, for I can not believe that you would so construe a 
phrase in one of my letters, written in a moment of the greatest bitter- 
ness I have ever experienced in my life, under the impression of that 
great national misfortune, and in which I only expressed doubt.? 

In any event, although you do not need my support, which moreover 
could not be of any help to you, as the blow has struck me harder than 
you, be sure that I shall always be on your side and on the side of the 
navy, whatever may be the vicissitudes of these unhappy times through 
which we are passing, and the attitude which you assume toward me. 

Wishing you sincerely all manner of happiness, I remain as ever, 


yours, ete., 
RAMON BLANCO. 


1THE INTERNATIONAL OCEAN TELEGRAPH COMPANY, 


Hon. GENERAL BLANCO: Septemnbart® odes 
We are advised from Portsmouth that your telegram of this date to Admiral 
Cervera could not be delivered, the person addressed having left for Europe on the 
steamer City of Rome before the receipt of the cable. : 
2The letter referred to never reached me. 


145 


MADRID, October 7, 1898. 
His Excellency RAMON BLANCO. 


My DEAR FRIEND AND RESPECTED GENERAL: Last evening I 
received your favor of September 15, together with the official letter of 
August 7, which, probably through an oversight, had not been submit- 
ted to your excellency for signature. To-day I answer both. 

It was not necessary for you to forward to me the note from the Inter- 
national Ocean Telegraph Company, for how could I ever doubt your 
exquisite courtesy? That would not be possible. 

I am not the only one who has seen censure in some of your telegrams, 
especially the one you sent to Santiago, and which I do not have before 
me, as I have not yet received the documents which, in anticipation of 
the disaster, I left in thatcity. In this telegram you said that you be- 
lieved I exaggerated, and other things which I do not wish to repeat 
from memory and in order not to make this letter too long; but I regret 
I shall not be able to make it short, though I do not wish to trouble you. 

You will remember that I answered that I had to respect your opin- 
ions and not discuss them, because to my mind that is all a subaltern 
should do, and if I subsequently pointed out to you in another tele- 
gram the impossibility of going out at night, it was only by way of 
information, which I must now give you more in full. 

As Santiago was short of artillery in the modern sense of the word 
(for, aside from the guns of the Mercedes, which were mounted at the 
Socapa and Punta Gorda, there were only two 3.54-inch Krupp guns, 
which were of no use against the ships, and some howitzers and abso- 
lutely useless guns), the enemy was not afraid to approach the harbor 
entrance, especially at night, when they remained in the immediate 
vicinity of the same. 

At night they always had one ship, relieved every three or tour 
hours, less than a mile from the harbor entrance, maintaining the latter 
constantly illuminated, and, as though this were not enough, they had 
other smaller vessels still nearer, and steamboats close to the headlands 
of the entrance. Once in a while these latter boats would exchange 
musketry fire with our forces. 

Under these circumstances it was absolutely impossible to go out at 
night, because in this narrow channel, illuminated by a dazzling light, 
we could not have followed the channel and would have lost the 
ships, some by running aground, others by colliding with their own 
companions. 

But even supposing that we had succeeded in going out, before the 
first ship was outside we should have been seen and covered from the 
very first with the concentrated fire of the whole squadron. Of the effi- 
ciency of that fire an idea may be gained from what happened to the 
Reina Mercedes during the night of July 3. 

In daytime, on the other hand, the hostile squadron was more 
scattered and some of the ships were usually absent, as was the case 
with the Massachusetts on July 3. 

10742——10 


146 


Feeling sure, as I did, that the disaster was inevitable, all I could do 
was to see that we had the least possible number of men killed and to 
prevent the ships from falling into the enemy’s hands, thereby com- 
plying, as we literally did comply, with an article of the Ordinances of 
the Navy which the minister of marine cited in a cablegram to me. 

If Santiago de Cuba had been even reasonably well armed, the hos- 
tile ships would always have kept at a distance of five or six miles at 
least, in which case they could not have lighted up the harbor entrance 
so effectively, and we could then have maneuvered with some remote ° 
prospect of success. 

In your letter you alluded to a phrase from another letter of yours 
which I never received, and my telegram from Portsmouth was only in 
answer to the one which you sent me in reply to mine of July 4. In 
this telegram you say about as follows: 

If the sortie had been made at another time, perhaps the result would have been 
different. 

I repeat that I do not have the telegram before me and shall correct 
such words as may not have been employed. 

I confess that I saw.in this sentence another censure, and I am glad 
to see from your letter that such was not your intention, although it 
was so construed by the very few persons whom I consulted. 

I thank you very much for the support you offer me and still more 
for the generous terms in which you couch the offer. Although my 
attitude has already been defined in an official letter, 1 believe it my 
duty to speak of it more fully. 

I never have held, nor do I hold now, any grudge against anyone, 
least of all against you. Hence it is not my intention to attack anyone, 
but I must defend myself from the many things that have been said 
against me here; and if in doing so I should indirectly attack anyone 
I shall feel very sorry. 

If I were the only one concerned I should make an end of it right 
here and ask for my retirement, as I have been wanting to do for some 
time. But when I returned to Spain I found part of the nation led 
astray in its judgment of these matters in their relations to the future, 
and the navy made the subject of unjust attacks, and looking upon 
me as embodying in my conduct its spotted honor; and I can not betray 
the navy, and still less my country. 

Therefore, aS soon aS judgment has been passed upon my conduct 
or the case dismissed, I shall publish my whole correspondence, and, 
unless my strength shall fail me, subject everything that has happened 
to a critical examination without going into personalities, inspired only 
by the interests of our country and the dangers which I see ahead for 
the Canaries, the Balearic Islands, and Ceuta. If anything personal 
should result from this (which I hope not), it will not be my fault. 

In closing this letter, permit me to assure you of my profound respect, 
and to remain as ever, yours, etc., 

PASCUAL CERVERA. 


APPENDIXES 
Which in Themselves Justify Many of the Statements Contained in the Text. 


L 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EXPEDITION OF THE SQUADRON OF RESERVE 
TO THE UNITED STATES COASTS (MAY 27). 


The Minister (Aunén) to the Admiral (Cémara). 


HONORED Sir: The equipment of the squadron under your excel- 
lency’s worthy command having been completed and the ships sup- 
plied with provisions and coal, you will arrahge for its immediate 
departure for the harbor of Las Palmas, where without loss of time 
you will replenish the coal consumed and take whatever quantity of 
provisions you may deem necessary, according to the respective pur- 
poses for which the different units are intended. At Las Palmas you 
will form three, divisions of the squadron. 

The first,’ composed of the battle ship Carlos V, cruisers Rdpido, 
Patriota, and Meteoro, and dispatch boat Giralda, will remain under 


1 Description of first division. 





Daily coal consump- 
tion— 
Cal ee 
capacity. At 11.22) At15 
knots. knots. 


Name of ship. 











Tons. Tons. Tons. 
OE oS ose add cls nt ou oxina'da eun~ ius sin's'adicaseian 6 Gadus 2, 000 70 169 
Son Gea A See ee eS ee eee ee oe ee oa 2, 362 66 158 
NE So ae cin oh cnlp'b nia: sae ech vinsin ecobinic eae eenaccedend: 2,749 (a) (a) 
EIDE Sch goede sk ot «avs va- ss cols cb seme aesaqcews ssancoedcccreds 1, 945 99 236 
te tee Me eet ee eae sales omeccele 436 23 48 





a Not known. 


your excellency’s immediate command. The second division, composed 
of the battle ships Pelayo and Vitoria, and destroyers Osado, Audaz, 
and Proserpina, will be placed under the orders of the oldest captain, 
being the commander of the Pelayo, Capt. José Ferrandiz y Nifo. 
The third division, of which the auxiliary cruisers Buenos Aires, 
Antonio Lopez, and Alfonso XII will form part, will be commanded by 
Capt. José Barrasa y Ferndndez de Castro. 

The squadron will leave the harbor mentioned united, and in order 
that its subsequent movements may not be surprised it will shape its 

147 


148 

course for the West Indies until at a sufficient distance from the 
Canaries and from the course most frequented by the ships crossing 
those waters; or the whole squadron will perform evolutions within 
sight of said islands, simulating tactical exercises while waiting for 
nightfall, when each of the divisions, upon previous orders to be issued 
by your excellency, will proceed in the proper direction for the purposes 
hereinafter set forth. 

The first division under the command of your excellency will shape 
its course for the Bermudas, and at a proper distance from those islands 
you will detach a fast vessel to acquire at Hamilton all possible infor- 
mation, besides such as the Government will communicate to you 
through our consul, José Garcia Acuna, a resident of said port, as to 
the location, number, and quality of the hostile forces distributed along 
the Altantic coast, it being understood that the communication with 
the Bermudas must be confined to the one vessel referred to and only 
for a length of time absolutely necessary for the purpose indicated, the 
rest of the division to pass out of sight of the islands, so that its pres- 
ence in said waters may not become known. 

Taking into account sthe information you may acquire, and eluding 
an encounter with superior forces, your excellency will choose such 
point on the United States coasts as you may deem best adapted— 
Charleston, if possible—to carry out in the direction from south to 
north a series of hostile acts, in the energy of which you will be guided 
by circumstances, against fortified positions as well as against such 
places as, owing to their industrial, military, or commercial importance, 
will justify the operation and make it worth while. I call your excel- 
lency’s attention to the expediency of your course along the coast being 
from south to north as indicated. Key West being the enemy’s prin- 
cipal base of operations, the forces detached to oppose your operations 
will follow you instead of going to meet you, as would otherwise be the 
case. 

Your excellency will determine to what point the hostilities should 
be carried, remembering that the object of these hostilities is not only 
to make reprisals for the enemy’s unjustified acts on our own coasts, 
but principally to call -his attention toward the north, dividing his 
forces and thus facilitating the movements of the third division and at 
the same time those of Admiral Cervera’s squadron. You might find 
it expedient (but this is not imposed upon you as a duty) to go up 
north as far as to permit you to detach a cruiser to Halifax, in order 
that Lieut. Ramon Carranza, who is assigned to Canada, may give you 
such information as he may have acquired beforehand. Having accom- 
plished on the United States coasts the object indicated, and following 
the route which offers the greatest security, you will try, unless reasons 
of greater importance should prevent, to pass north of the island of 
Mariguana, or Turks Island, and collect at the latter the information 
which the Government will take care to forward to you there, 


149 


From that favorable position you may proceed at your discretion to 
the southern coast of Cuba, around Cape Maysi, and enter Santiago 
Harbor; or, following said coast, enter Havana Harbor, or passing north 
of the Keys, enter the harbor of San Juan de Puerto Rico. Any prizes 
you may be able to capture during this expedition, if the conditions of 
the vessel or the nature of the cargo make it worth while, you will 
dispatch to the Peninsula, with a suitable prize crew on board, or incor- 
porate in your division, as the case may be. If the services such prizes 
can render do not compensate for the trouble they require, it will be 
better to get rid of them by sinking them or setting them on fire, after 
transshipping whatever you may deem serviceable, in any event the 
personnel and flags, the portable armament, and the ship’s papers. 

As to the second division, in order that its separation from the rest 
of the squadron may remain unknown as long as possible, and also in 
order that it may be in a position to reach speedily, if need be, any 
given point of the Peninsula or the Canaries, where its defensive action 
may be required, will cruise between parallels 30 and 36 north latitude, 
the ninth meridian west, and the coast of Africa, for ten or twelve 
days from the date when it begins to maneuver independently, which 
is probably the time it will take your excellency to reach the United 
States coast, after which the second division will proceed to Cadiz to 
receive further orders. 

The third division, upon leaving your excellency’s flagship, will pro- 
ceed to the latitude of Cape St. Roque, to cut off the route of the 
vessels plying between the eastern coast of the United States and 
South America or the Pacific. It will remain on this route, cruising as 
far as the tenth degree north latitude, as long as its radius of action 
(calculated by that of the ship having the smallest radius) will permit, 
including the return. The object of this expedition will be to capture 
the greatest possible number of prizes, concerning which the com- 
mauder of the division will observe what I have previously stated 
relative to the prizes which your excellency may take. 

In case of injury or any other unfortunate circumstance making it 
necessary for any of the ships of this division to seek a port, you will 
see, provided there is a possibility of choice, that preference be given 
to the French colonies. With the necessary prudence, the commander 
of these forces will detach one of his ships to Fort de France, Marti- 
nique, where it will receive orders from the Government and acquire 
such information as may be of importance to him. But if from unfore- 
Seen causes he should not find upon his arrival the orders referred to, 
it will be understood that the division is to return to the harbor of Las 
Palmas, following the shortest route and carefully eluding the hostile 
forces, if the power of the latter renders this necessary. 

It is the desire of the Government that your excellency, as well as the 
commanders of the second and third divisions, when navigating inde- 
pendently, will proceed within the scope of the general outline traced 


150 


above, but with all the liberty of action that may be necessary to 
insure the success of the plan, with the understanding that he who 
causes the greatest amount of damages to the enemy without endanger- 
ing his own forces will best fulfill his mission. If the vicissitudes of the 
voyage givé your excellency an opportunity to join Admiral Cervera’s 
squadron, you will do so at once, and the forces will remain united 
until the Government decides that it is expedient to separate them 
again, or until both commanders in chief, or in case of difference of 
opinion, the eldest commander, should deem such separation necessary. 

As to the ports that may be touched, the engagements that may be 
sustained, as ‘well as any visits, reconnoissances, and captures that may 
be made, your excellency, as well as your subordinates, will adhere to 
the terms of international law, seeking to obviate any motive for claims 
on the part of neutral powers. The Queen and the Government are 
confident that this expedition, intrusted to the zeal of your excellency 
and your subordinates, will be carried out in such manner as to earn 
the approval of the nation and serve as a brilliant example of what may 
be accompiished, in spite of the scarcity of resources, by energy, intel- 
ligence, and good will placed at the service of the King and the country. 

MADRID, May 27, 1898. 


it 


The Admiral (Cdmara) to the Minister (A ufién). 


CADIZ, June 15, 1898. 

I can assure your excellency that all are cooperating with me for 
immediate departure, and if we do not sail as speedily as desired it is 
owing to difficulties impossible to overcome, in spite of the most earnest 
desire. I repeat that the utmost coal capacity of the Rdpido and 
Patriota is only 3,000 tons. Carlos V will refill bunkers as far as pos- 
sible while the 3.94-inch armament is being completed, having until 
now been busy with speed trials. I shall confer with the Captain-Gen- 
eral of the Departamento, after inspecting the ships, in order to settle 
any difficulties that may present themselves, and to fulfill your wishes, 
which are my own as well. I hope to be ready next week. 


III. 
The minister of war (Correa) to the minister of marine (Aunén), Cadiz. 


MADRID (not dated—about middle of June). 
The military governor of Cadiz transmitted to the minister of marine 
the following telegram from the minister of war: 


(To be deciphered by your excellency personally.) Kindly advise minister marine, 
in strict confidence, that I have received very serious news from the Philippines and 
that the Government considers it necessary for the squadron fitted out, or part of 
same, to leave immediately in ordér to calm anxiety of public opinion and raise 
spirit of fighting forces through knowledge that reenforcements are coming. 


151 
ve 


» 


The minister of marine (Aufén) to the commander in chief of the squad- 
ron of reserve (Camara). 


JUNE 15, 1898. 

HONORED Sir: The equipment of the squadron under your excel- 
lency’s worthy command having been completed, the ships provisioned 
and coaled, the necessary papers issued, and the troops and supplies 
having been embarked in the transports mentioned in the inclosed mem- 
orandum, you will arrange for the immediate departure of the squadron 
in a southwesterly direction, timing yourself so that you will be near the 
Strait of Gibraltar by nightfall. After nightfall you will dismiss the 
trans-Atlantic steamers Alfonso XII and Antonio Lépez to carry out 
independently their respective orders from the ministry of war. With 
the remainder of the squadron and the convoy you will pass through 
the Strait of Gibraltar at the necessary speed, so that by daybreak you 
will be in the Mediterranean and out of sight of the lookouts of that 
place. 

When this has been accomplished you will dismiss those of the colliers 
whose rate of speed will not permit them to follow the speed of the 
squadron, and will shape your course for Suez, avoiding as much as 
possible passing within sight of land. The coal consumption of the 
deep-draft ships should be proportioned methodically, so that upon 
arrival at Suez they may be as nearly alike as possible, so as to facili- 
tate the passage through the canal under statutory conditions without 
the necessity, or with the least possible necessity, of transshipping or 
unshipping anything. 

Upon arrival at Port Said, and upon notifying this ministry by cable 
of the condition in which the expedition reaches that city, and the 
facilities or difficulties that may present themselves for passing through 
the canal and the means to be employed for overcoming such difficulties, 
if any there be, you will receive orders to continue or modify your course. 
In the former case, or in case you should not be able to communicate with 
the Government, you will replenish the destroyers with the necessary 
coal to enable them to return to Mahon, and will instruct them to pro- 
ceed to that place either directly or with such stops as you may consider 
necessary. 

Thereupon the remaining ships will pass through the Suez Oanal, and 
take on board pilots and such Arabic personnel as you may deem neces- 
sary to lighten the arduous work of the firemen in the Red Sea. You 
will choose a point on the Red Sea or on the Island of Socotra, or any 
other point you may deem suitable for the purpose, and there provision 
and coal the ships, taking the coal from the slow colliers, provided they 
have rejoined the squadron, leaving these vessels enough coal for the 
homeward voyage and dispatching them back to Cartagena. 

If the slow colliers have not rejoined the squadron and you have no 


152 


news of them, you may take coal from the colliers accompanying the 
squadron and continue the voyage, leaving behind for the former, if 
possible without endangering the necessary secrecy, instructions to 
rejoin the squadron, or stay at Suez, or return to Spain, as you may 
think best. From Socotra you will proceed to the Laccadive Islands, 
in one of which you may perhaps have a chance to complete the coaling 
of the squadron, and from there, unless it should be necessary for any 
of the ships to touch or be detached, to a port in Ceylon, you will 
continue your voyage in the manner hereinafter indicated. 

From any point where the colliers of the squadron may lighten their 
cargo you may dispatch them back to the Peninsula, or the nearest 
place where they can renew their cargo, giving them instructions in 
the latter case as to where to rejoin the squadron. From the Lacca- 
dives you may choose your route according to circumstances, either 
passing from the north through the Strait of Malacca and coaling again 
at some anchoring place on the northern coast of Sumatra; or, passing 
through the Strait of Sunda, touching at Singapore or Batavia if 
deemed necessary, and proceeding thence to Labuan, Borneo; or, finally, 
passing south of Sumatra and Java and through the Strait of Lombok, 
going thence directly to Mindanao, without stopping at Labuan. 

If either of the first two routes is adopted, you can communicate at 
Labuan with Madrid, stating the condition in which the ships arrive, 
and receive the confirmation or modification of these instructions, after 
which you may proceed with the united squadron, or detach ships, as 
in your judgment may be most effective, to Balabac, Jolo, Basilan, or 
Zamboanga, reenforce the detachments with the landing troops, or, if 
possible, enter into communication with the authorities at Manila for 
the purpose of cooperating in the future. 

As it is the main object of the expedition to assert our sovereignty 
in the Philippine Archipelago, and as it is impossible to tell what will 
be the condition of the islands at the comparatively remote date of 
your arrival at Mindanao, you will from that time on make your own 
plans and take such steps as will lead to the attainment of the total or 
partial success of this enterprise, according to circumstances, either 
assisting the Bisayas, or running along the eastern coast of the archi- 
pelago to effect a landing of the forces on the opposite coast of Luzon, 
provided the conditions of the territory in the part nearest the lagoon 
and Manila admit of doing so; or passing around the north of said 
island to operate upon Subig or Manila, if the information you may 
acquire as to the hostile forces will permit you to meet them without 
Signal inferiority on your side, and even detaching the convoy of 
troops, with more or less escort, or without it, if deemed expedient, in 
order to facilitate movements or conceal the true object. 

If you succeed in communicating with the Governor-General of the 
Philippines, you will consult with him and proceed, within the means 
at his disposal, to do anything that may lead to the defense or recon- 
quest of the archipelago, but always trying to operate carefully, as the 


153 


ordinance prescribes, so as to obviate all encounters that have no pros- 
pect of success, considering it an essential point to avoid the useless 
Sacrifice of the squadron, and under all circumstances to save the honor 
of arms. 

The Government, which realizes the difficulty of the mission in- 
trusted to you and the deficiency of means which it has been possible 
to furnish you, traces these general outlines to show the final object it 
seeks to attain; but at the same time you are fully authorized to depart 
therefrom whenever circumstances promise greater chance of success 
by following a different course. 

If in the course of your voyage you should find it necessary to enter 
any port on account of injuries or from other causes, you will remem- 
ber the expediency of preferring French colonies or the territory of 
the Kingdom of Siam. Any prizes which you may be able to capture 
during the expedition you will man properly, incorporate them in the 
Squadron, and send them to a Spanish port, or destroy them by fire or 
sink them, according to circumstances and the services they may ren- 
der or the impediment they may represent, first transshipping to the 
vessels of the squadron everything considered serviceable, in any event 
the personnel and flags, portable arms, and the Ship’s papers. 

It is the desire of the Government that your excellency, as well as the 
captains of the ships or groups of ships, who may on certain occasions 
operate independently, will proceed within the Scope of the general 
outlines traced above, but with all the liberty of action that may be 
necessary to insure the success of the plan, with the understanding that 
he who causes the greatest amount of damage to the enemy without 
endangering his own forces will best fulfill his mission, and that Her 
Majesty, the Government, the nation, and his own conscience, will be 
Satisfied if each one in his sphere follows in all of his actions the letter 
and spirit of our ordinances. 

As to the ports that may be touched, the engagements that may be 
sustained, as well as any visits, reconnoissances, and captures that 
may be made, your excellency, as well as your subordinates, will adhere 
to the terms of international law, seeking to obviate any motive for 
claims on the part of neutral powers. 

A few days after the departure of the squadron there will be dis- 
patched to join the squadron at Suez the trans-Atlantic steamer Isla 
de Luzon with provisions, coal, lubricating material, supplies, and 
the personnel that has remained behind on account of sickness or from 
other causes. To this vessel you can transship the troops on board the 
Buenos Ajres in order that the latter may be better adapted for any 
military operations with which she may be charged. 

The Queen and the Government are confident that this expedition 
intrusted to your excellency and your subordinates will be carried out 
in such a manner as to earn the approval of the nation and serve as a 
brilliant example of what may be accomplished, in Spite of the scarcity 


154 


of resources, by energy, intelligence, and good will placed at the serv- 
ice of the King and the country. 
The above is communicated to you by royal order for your action. 
RAMON AUNON. 
CADIZ, June 15, 1898. 


MEMORANDUM REFERRED TO. 


Group A.—Fighting ships which are to go to the destination of the expedition, 
Pelayo, Carlos V, Patriota, Rapido. 

Group B.—Fighting ships which are to return from the canal, Audaz, Osado, Pros- 
erpind. 

Group C.—Transports of troops, Buenos Atres, Panay. 

Group D.—Colliers, Colén, Covadénga, San Augustin, San Franctsco. 

Group E.—Ships destined for different purposes which are to sail with the squad- 
ron and separate from it, Alfonso XII, Antonio Lopez, Giralda, Piélago. 


ORDER OF SAILING. 


© Audaz. © Osado. 
© © © © 
2 4 3 1 
© © © © 
124111 46 5 1 
o ©) © © 
8 10 9 7 
© 0) 
Proserpina. a Giralda. 
Piélago. 


1, Pelayo; 2, Carlos V; 3, Patrtota; 4, Ripido; 5, Buenos Aires; 6, Panay; 7, Colén; 
8, Covadonga; 9, San Francisco; 10, San Agustin; 11, Alfonso XII; 12, Antonio Lopez. 


V2 
The Admiral (Camara) to the Minister (Aufién). 


PorRT SAID, June 30, 1898. 

After waiting four days for decision of Egyptian Government to 
transship coal to Pelayo, the transshipment has been prohibited, and we 
have been notified to leave at once all Egyptian ports. In view of 
critical aspect of question, and with assistance of Spanish minister at 
Port Said and consul, have succeeded in gaining time to receive full 
instructions from your excellency by telegraph. If I were to pass 
through canal at present without coaling here or at Suez, should have 
to tow Pelayo all through Red Sea, there being no port where transship- 
ment could be effected until reaching Bab-el-Mandeb. If to avoid 


155 


international conflict it should be impossible for me to remain here until 
I receive your excellency’s instructions, shall go out to Mediterranean 
and wait outside of territorial waters for your telegrams. 


Vi 


The Commander in Chief of the Squadron (Odmara) to the Minister 
(Awnon), 


CAPTAINGY-G'NERAL OF THE 
SQUADRON OF RESERVE, STAFF. 

HONORED Sir: From the 16th, the day of our departure from Cadiz, 
until that of our arrival in this harbor, the weather has been perfect and 
the health and spirit of the crews excellent, so that we have been able to 
practice military exercises every morning and evening. On the 17th 
the Patriota, Rapido, and Buenos Aires took the three destroyers in tow, 
but several times during the voyage the lines parted, and on the third 
day the Buenos Aires collided with the Proserpina so hard that the iron 
cable was lost, so that she could not again tow the Proserpina. I then 
ordered the Carlos V to take the latter in tow, which was done without 
difficulty. As I have already stated, the lines of all the ships parted 
several times as the result of the bad arrangement and lack of strength 
of the bridles which the destroyers carried. 

The towing ships furnished coal and provisions to the vessels towed. 
This operation was always carried out as rapidly as possible, and the 
only drawback was that the squadron had to reduce its speed. The 
destroyers sustained several injuries to their engines, which were 
remedied with the contrivances on board. The Audaz was the only 
one that had injuries of any importance, the piston of the air pump 
being broken, which is detaining the vessel in this port. The flagship 
sustained some minor injuries in the feed-water apparatus and the air 
pump of the port engine, which were remedied without trouble. On 
the morning of the 26th, when near Port Said, a dense fog compelled 
us to moderate our speed for an hour. When it was over we went 
ahead at full speed and entered the canal at 11.20 o’clock, casting 
anchor at noon. 

Yours, etc., MANUEL DE LA CAMARA, 

ON BOARD THE PELAYO, Port Said, July 1, 1898, 


VIL 
The Minister (Aurion) to the Admiral (Camara), Carthagena. 


MADRID, July 23, 1898. 
When the torpedo-boat destroyers have rejoined your squadron, start 
for Oadiz with the Pelayo, Carlos V, khdpido, Patriota, Buenos Aires, 
and the destroyers, keeping close to the shore, so as to be seen from 


156 


Spanish cities, exhibiting when near them the national flag, illuminated 
at night by searchlights, which are also to be thrown upon cities. If 
you meet any coast guard vessels, communicate with them. Advise me | 
in advance of hour of sailing. The colliers that have unloaded or trans- 
Shipped the good coal they carried may proceed to Cadiz, either with 
squadron or alone. 





HARVARD INCIDENT. 


Rear-Admiral Cervera to the United States Admiral (McNair), Superin- 
tendent of the Naval Academy. 


Most EXCELLENT SiR: Upon my arrival at Portsmouth, N. H.,I 
read in the papers of an event that occurred on board the Harvard, and 
which has cost the lives of six of my sailors and resulted in many others 
being wounded. As I know, on the one hand, the spirit of discipline 
among my men, whose conduct is of the very best, and see, on the other 
hand, for myself the generosity and extreme courtesy with which we 
are being treated by the American nation, which fact I have had the 
pleasure of expressing in writing to Admiral Sampson and Captain 
Goodrich and take pleasure in confirming here, I did not believe this 
piece of news, which I took to be one of the many inventions which 
may be seen in the press every day, but when the Harvard arrived 
yesterday I learned, to my surprise, that it was true. 

Any act which costs the lives of six innocent men 1s extremely seri- 
ous, and when to this is added the fact that they are defenseless pris- 
oners of war, the seriousness is increased, as your excellency is well 
aware. In view of the spirit of justice and generosity shown us by 
this nation, prisoners though we are, I must believe and do believe that 
a full andimpartial investigation has probably been made, for the pur- 
pose of clearing up the facts and in order that justice may be done to 
prevent the repetition of an act like the one in question. Ifthe gener- 
osity of the United States Government would go so far as to advise me 
of the result of the investigation that has probably taken place, and 
whether any of my men have been examined, or only their slayers, also 
as to the measures adopted, I should be extremely obliged for this new 
favor. If, furthermore, I may be authorized to communicate this infor- 
mation to my Government, with such remarks as the reading may sug- 
gest to me, the whole civilized world will recognize therein a gigantic 
progress in the rights of men. 

If the United States Government does not deem it expedient to grant 
my request, I shall not again speak of this matter while I remain a 
prisoner. 

. I beg that your excellency will pardon me for troubling you, although 
it is simply love of justice and of my subordinates which inspires these 
lines. 
PASCUAL CERVERA, 
ANNAPOLIS, MD., July 21, 1898, 


157 


The Rear-Admiral (Cervera) to the United States Admiral (McNair), 
Superintendent of the Naval Academy. 


Most EXCELLENT Sir: On the 21st of July last I had the honor of 
forwarding to your excellency a letter, in which I referred to the inci- 
dent that took place on board the Harvard which cost the lives of six 
of my sailors, and through which. others were wounded, some of whom 
have since died. Your excellency did me the kindness of sending me 
a letter from his excellency the Secretary of the Navy, which letter 
kindly informed me that as soon as steps could be taken to get wit- 
nesses together I should be notified of the fact. It is not impatience 
and far less doubt that puts the pen in my hand, for that would be an 
insult to this great nation, and God saye me from falling into such a 
grave error. It is simply the desire to contribute, so far as is in my 
power, toward establishing the truth in the interest of justice. LIinclose 
you at the same time a copy of the report made to me by Lieut. Com- 
mander Juan Aznar. Not wishing to hurt your excellency’s kind feel- 
ings, I refrained from sending it before, but seeing now -by the papers 
that the regiment whose members fired upon my men is returning from 
Cuba, I thought that the opportune moment had arrived. 

Yours, etc., PASCUAL CERVERA, 


ANNAPOLIS, MD., August 29, 1898. 


DOCUMENT REFERRED TO. 


Most EXCELLENT Sir: As the person most prominent among the 
prisoners taken on board the United States auxiliary cruiser Harvard, 
I have the honor to give you an account of all the happenin ¢s from the 
moment 1 became separated from your excellency on the Nimaniba 
beach. Once ashore, the balance of the crew of the Infanta Maria 
Teresa, including the wounded, marched toward the interior of the thick- 
wooded land, and finding a clearing in which we were safe from the 
explosions of the vessel, intended to camp there for the night. About 
3 o'clock in the afternoon there appeared a lieutenant of the United 
States Navy, accompanied by an armed squad of sailors, and with pro- 
visions sufficient to last more than one day, who announced to us, after 
inquiring insistently if we had been ill treated by the insurgents, that 
we were to remain there under the protection of the United States flag 
until the next day, when he would return to take us away in a large 
boat. The vessel, which happened to be the Harvard, came up that 
same night and seut boats ashore to take us away, when we embarked 
_ after some difficulty, owing to the sea breaking with some force. 

While in the act of embarking there came up 250 men of the Oquendo, 
who had been detained at the camp by the insurgent leader Cebrero, 
and they were also taken on board the Harvard. Having boarded the 
latter vessel at about 9 o’clock in the evening, each officer was provided 


158 


with a fatigue suit and a pair of shoes, and we were shown to our 
quarters in the first-class saloon, where we were ordered to remain from 
10 o’clock in the evening till 6 the next morning, and cautioned not to 
hold any communication during the day with the noncommissioned 
officers and men, who had been placed on the upper deck aft. The 
wounded were treated that same night on the deck of the ship by the 
two surgeons of said ship, aided by those of the Oquendo, Guinea and 
Parra, and transferred the next morning to the hospital ship Solace. 
In spite of all our efforts to separate the noncommissioned officers from 
the men, it could not be done, and they kept together, corralled, so to 
speak, in the after part of the ship, guarded by the Massachusetts 
volunteers. 

On the same day, the 4th, a list was made of all the prisoners, which, 
with the changes that occurred until the day of landing in Portsmouth, 
N. H., I have the honor to inclose to your excellency. At 2 o’clock in 
the morning of the 5th, while I was in my stateroom, I was summoned 
to the cabin of the commander of the vessel, Capt. 8. Cotton. This 
gentleman in the presence of the executive officer expressed to me his 
regrets for the events that had taken place on board the vessel an hour 
before, and which had resulted in the killing of several prisoners. 
According to the investigations made by the captain, which he com- 
municated to me, the incident happened as follows: 

One of the prisoners at 11.30 of that night went forward of the lines 
indicated by means of cables stretched from port to starboard. The 
sentry ordered him to go back, and as he showed resistance in obeying, 
the sentry fired. The firing woke up the 600 men who, I repeat, were 
crowded aft, and jumped up naturally excited. The watch, which was 
under arms, ordered them to sit down, and as they did not obey, fired a 
volley which resulted in the immediate death of five and the wounding 
of about fourteen, also causing several to jump overboard. The latter 
were picked up by the ship’s boats. 

When the captain had finished speaking, I stated to him how much I 
deplored the act; that I could assure him that our people were incapable 
of doing anything that would have made the firing necessary, and that 
the disregard of the order, first of the sentry and then of the watch, 
must have been due to their ignorance of the language, and that, had 
the watch been composed of members of the Regular Army instead of 
volunteers, the thing would certainly not have occurred. As we were 
not allowed to communicate with our people during our stay on board 
the Harvard, I was not able to obtain information as to what happened 
that night. I could have only a moment’s talk with the quartermaster 
of the Teresa, who told me that the men had jumped up, thinking that 
the ship was on fire. 

As all the witnesses are in Portsmouth, I don’t think it would be dif- 
ficult to find out exactly what occurred, which will, without doubt, lead 
to trouble, to judge by the expressions of regret for what occurred, on 


159 


the part of some of the ship’s officers. The wounded were cared for 
by our own surgeons, and transferred the next day to a hospital ship, 
except one who died that same night. 

On the 5th, at noon, the bodies of the unfortunates shot the previous 
night were slid overboard. The ship’s crews in line, with their officers 
at their head were present, as well as our people in line and also the 
military guard of the ship, who presented arms during the ceremony 
and fired three volleys at the moment the bodies fell to the water. The 
latter were wrapped in the Spanish flag and received the prayer and 
benediction of the chaplain of the Teresa before being committed to 
the deep. 

Before the 7th it had been impossible to separate the warrant and 
petty officers from the men, the former being placed in the third-class 
passenger cabins and the first-class seamen in the emigrant’s steerage, 
with the privilege of ascending to the deck aft. All were provided 
with a change of underclothes, soap, and a towel. From the night they 
picked us up until the 8th we stood off between Altares and Punta 
Cabrera. At noon of the 8th we anchored off Playa Bste, and the ship 
began coaling. In the afternoon they brought on board as prisoners 4 
officers and 200 men of the Cristébal Colén, and landed the Massachu- 
setts volunteers, who were replaced by 40 marines. 

At 4 o’clock in the afternoon of the 10th we sailed for Portsmouth, 
in which port we cast anchor at 7.30 on the morning of the 15th. Dur- 
ing the trip many cases of fever broke out among our people, with fatal 
results for some, their deaths occurring on the dates your excellency 
will find recorded in the list herewith inclosed. At9 of the morning 
of the 16th all the petty officers and men were sent to the navy-yard 
with Lieut. Adolfo Calandria, except 55 sick who remained on board 
for observation, and were landed on the 18th with Surgeons Guinea 
and Lallemand. | 

At 5.30 in the afternoon of the same day we went to sea, and anchored 
off Annapolis at 5 o’clock yesterday afternoon. Before terminating, I 
think it my duty to call your attention to the marks of consideration 
and respect shown to us by Captain Cotton, of the Harvard, who 
endeavored to make our stay on board his ship as pleasant as possible. 
This is all I have the honor to communicate to your excellency in the 
fulfillment of my duty. 

Yours, etc., JUAN B. AZNAR, 
Lieutenant-Commander. 
NAVAL ACADEMY, Annapolis, July 21, 1898. 


A true copy: CERVERA. 
The Secretary of the United States Navy Department to Admiral Cervera. 


Str: The Superintendent of the Naval Academy has placed before 
the Department translations of your letter of the 29th ultimo and the 
report of Lieutenant-Commander Juan Aznar, therein mentioned, with 


160 


respect to the unfortunate incident which occurred on board the U.S.S. 
Harvard on the night of July 4 last, resulting in the killing and wound- 
ing of certain Spanish sailors, prisoners of war on board that vessel. 
When your former communication, that of July 21, on this subject was 
received, this Department immediately, under date of the 23d, addressed 
a letter to the honorable the Secretary of War transmitting, with a 
copy of your letter, all the other papers relating to the matter which 
were in its possession. 

This action was taken because, while the incident occurred on board 
a vessel of the Navy, this Department recognized the fact that the 
firing was actually done by men belonging to the Army. At the same 
time the opinion of the Secretary of War was requested as to whether 
the subject was a proper one for joint investigation or whether the 
inquiry should be conducted by the War Department alone. No reply 
having been received, this Department subsequently, August 18 last, 
addressed to the Secretary of War a further communication on the 
subject. I deem it proper to add that copies of your letter of August 
29 and of Lieutenant-Commander Aznar’s report were on yesterday 
transmitted to the honorable the Secretary of War, inviting attention 
to the prior correspondence, and in view of the urgency which this 
matter presents, the Spanish prisoners under the control of this Depart- 
ment being soon to be released, and it being understood that the regi- 
ment to which the soldiers who did the shooting belong may be shortly 
disbanded, early consideration of the subject was earnestly requested. 

In this connection it is proper to add that at the time the affair 
under consideration occurred Capt. Charles 8. Cotton, the commanding 
officer of the Harvard, made an investigation of the circumstances, and 
the results of this investigation were communicated to Rear-Admiral 
Sampson, the commander in chief of the squadron, who, upon review 
of the matter, considered that no further inquiry was necessary. 

Renewing the expression of sincere regret conveyed to you in this 
Department’s letter of the 23d of July last that so unhappy an inci- 
dent should have occurred, and assuring you that such steps as may be 
practicable will be taken to promote any further investigation of the 
matter which may be necessary and proper, so far as this Department 
is concerned, 

I am, very respectfully, CHAS. H. ALLEN, 
Acting Secretary. 
WASHINGTON, September 1, 1898.) 


1After my return to Spain I received the result of an inquiry made by order of the 
ministry of war by Judge-Advocate-General of Volunteers Edgar Dudley on the 
subject of this bloody and disgraceful incident. The conclusion reached was that it 
was an accident for which no one was responsible. All these documents were 
forwarded by me to the minister of marine, ; 
4 


Jan. 


Feb. 


INDEX OF THE MOST IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS. 


DOCUMENTS PRIOR TO THE WAR. 


8, 1898.—Cablegram from General Blanco to the minister of colonies, 
concerning economic situation of the navy in Cuba.....--- 
30, 1898.—Letter from the admiral to Mr. Spottorno and certificate in 


which it is stated that the latter was preserving in his pos- 


session a collection of documents intrusted to him by the 

STATA ae Ee Na Sa ig xo 1 oe ty as ee gs Dione 

3, 1898.—Letter from the admiral to Minister Moret upon the necessity 
of providing for the pay of the men of the squadron. --.- oe 

6, 1898.—Official letter from the admiral to the minister setting forth the 
eR LHL Oar hie Be TOL ee oo Lee ae tes ou tole ode 

16, 1898.—Letter from the admiral to the minister of marine upon the 
aiuation of the naval forces of Spain. -../------222.4-2.--- 

25, 1898.—Oflficial letter from the admiral to the minister upon the com- 
parative strength of the naval forces of both countries ---.- - 

26, 1898.—Letter from the admiral to the minister emphasizing his former 
official letter and requesting that his opinion be made known 

to the Queen and to the council of ministers............--- 


Mar. 4 and 7, 1898.—Letters exchanged between the minister and the admiral 


Apr. 


Apr. 


*” 


Tis KIO Col DAT IeONs. Ola f08COS 0! oh ce aaetavieeeo ia! Oha Tan toe 

16, 1898.—Letter from the admiral to the minister expressing, among other 
things, the necessity of avoiding the war and of correcting 

the mistaken conception existing as to the naval forces. -.--- 

4, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to the minister asking permission 
to go to Madrid to form a plan of campaign, and reply from 
MUSESMITALIARTGRA a een sae ee serena (2 foe ALTE ONT Be See ee 

4 and 6, 1898.—Letters from the admiral and the minister relative to the 
Topedomenbeooratade ys. ae ly feat oe Sake ee se 

7, 1898.—Telegrams from the admiral to the minister insisting upon the 
necessity of forming a plan of campaign, and reply of the 

| 2a WSL margins a ted Slee ary cl A ga ey SE A IS ee TO Oe 


FROM CADIZ TO CAPE VERDE. 


8, 1898.—Instructions received at Cape Verde ......-....----.-.------ 
19, 1898.—Letter from the admiral to the minister upon the condition of 
the ships and the international situation ........---...---- 

20, 1898.—Proceedings setting forth the opinion of the admiral and his 
captains as to the ultimate destination of the squadron. ---- 

21, 1898.—Official letter commenting upon the foregoing proceedings - - - 
21, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to the minister persisting in the 
foregoing opinion, and reply of the minister -.........---- 

22, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to the minister disclaiming respon- 
Stotlisy OL. Wie Urder LO call tor FOrto RICO. eect ss. ~~~ - 

22, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to the minister asking whether 
war had been declared, and reply of the latter-.........--. 

22, 1898.—Interesting letter from the admiral to the minister ......-.--- 
22, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to the minister insisting upon the 
disastrous results of sailing for America, and requesting 

that all his official and confidential correspondence be made 

kfiown to the president of the council.........-..-------- 


10742——_11 161 


Page. 


it 


12 
14 
16 
24 


29 


30 


31-36 


38 


42 


42 


43 


45 
48 


50 
51 


54 


55, 56 
56 


162 


Apr. 23, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to the minister asking if war had 
been declared: -. 22.222. hese ee oon oe eee 

23, 1898.—Proceedings of meeting of general officers of the navy, held at 
> ®Madrid’ = Soles oc cel y-e s/s a ee 
24,1898.—Telegram from the minister to the admiral, relative to the 
meeting of general officers, and stating in addition that the 

United States flag was hostile _--.........- 23222. eee 

24, 1898.—Letter from the admiral to the minister, in answer to telegram 
ordering departure for West Indies ...--.. -. 2 ogee 

25, 26, 27, and 28, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to the minister rela- 
tive to the difficulties of coaling: - 5. --2.-.-202. Soe 


FROM CAPE VERDE TO CURACAO AND SANTIAGO DE CUBA. 


May 5, 1898.—Letter from the admiral to Mr. Spottorno, inclosing copy of a 
telegram from Villaamil to Sagasta.........-.------.-----. 

12, 1898.—Proceedings of the meeting of captains held off Martinique. -- 

14 and 15, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to the minister, announcing 
arrival at Curacao, and reply of the latter......-.......... 

15, 1898.—Report of voyage up to arrival at Curacao......------------- 


SANTIAGO DE CUBA. 


May 19 and 20, 1898.—Telegrams from the admiral to the minister announc- 
ing arrival at Santiago de Cuba, scarcity of coal, and difficult 

situation of the city -.2. 2.226 L222 2 ee a 

21, 1898.—Telegram from Admiral Manterola, stating the lamentable con- 
dition of naval forces of the navy-yard.-..-.....-.2..2 22222 

22, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral in answer to the foregoing. ....--- 
23, 1898.—Telegram from the minister to the admiral, informing him of 
sailing of hostile fleete..25s020 = 22.0522. = one e ee 

24, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to the minister, giving an account 
of the situation and opinion of the council of war_.....---- 

24, 1898.—Proceedings of the council of war on the situation ..........- 
24, 1898.—Letter from Rear-Admiral Rocha to the admiral congratulat- 
ing him upon his arrival at Santiago de Cuba, and reply 

thereto... s+ ewe eee aches ie fs oe woe eee oe 

25, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to the minister notifying him of 
blockade, and reply of the latter -....:.....-. 22. gee 

26, 1898.—Proceedings of the council of war, discussing possibility of 


28, 1898.—Telegram from the Captain-General to the minister of war 
relative to supplies sent to Santiago de Cuba --...-....---- 

June 3, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to the minister, advising him of 
operation of Merrimac 4.220 252.22 f0-<2 220 Se 

3 and 4, 1898.—Telegram from the minister of war to the Captain- 
General relative to operations of squadron, and reply of 


8, 1898.—Telegram from the minister to the admiral relative to the 
authority granted the latter_-.-...-2-.--. 5.022 

8, 1898.—Proceedings of the council of war, setting forth its opinion as 
to sortie of squadron®.....2-.5.22-- 225.2605 e oe 

11, 1898.—Official letter from the admiral to General Linares, requesting 
that the batteries at the mouth of the harbor keep the hos- 

tile fleet at a distance at night, and reply of the latter ....- 

22, 1898.—Telegram from Admiral Manterola, transmitting a telegram 
from the minister giving instructions how to ogder ammuni- 

tion, and reply thereto. .._...-.-.-< 2.2... 2 se 


Page. 


58 


58 


64 
65 


66, 67 


69 
73 


74 
75 


80, 81 


84 
86 


86 
88 
89 
89 
91 
95 


98 


163 


June 23, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to the minister, relative to progress ar 
made by the enemy, and his plans in view of the situation. 108 

24, 1898.—Proceedings of the council of war held relative to the possi- 
BROMO LNG Are cee Or Pee Oe Se aa 109 

24 and 25, 1898.—Telegram from the minister to the admiral, placing 
squadron under orders of General Blanco. Reply......-.- 110 


25, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to the Captain-General, placing 
himself at his orders and setting forth condition of squadron. 110 
25, 1898.—Letter from General Linares to the admiral, stating desire of 


General Blanco to know his opinion. Reply............-- 111 

25, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to the Captain-General, giving his 
HY ATE CUR OR, Gp ES AMIR aE ato MA ae MS: Meals, Yas 

26, 1898.—Interesting telegram from the Captain-General to the admiral 
Pease CR OTIC Me tn. oc ee is ett ee eae 113 

26 and 27, 1898.—Telegram from the minister to the admiral relative to 
Ser teem EUCIBCOD Lore eee rn Ae ne ee eee a eee ee 114 

27, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to General Blanco, replying to his 
telegram of the 26th relative to the first order to sail...___- 114 

28 and 29, 1898.—Telegram from the Captain-General to the admiral, 
giving him instructions as to sortie, and reply..........--- 115 

July 1, 1898.—Telegram from the minister of marine to the Captain-General, 
approving instructions for the sortie of the squadron...._-- ~ 116 


1, 1898.—Proceedings of the council of war relative to the order to goout 117 
1, 1898.—Urgent telegram from the Captain-General to the admiral giv- 


Me Lier ORaelerG: ut fo. Mesias 3 ott. ee al: er diury: 118 
1, 1898.—Urgent telegram from the same ordering departure to be 

OTT ROSS he. oh arly th ae ea pe 118 
2, 1898.—Urgent telegram from the Captain-General to the admiral 

ordermpm him to ¢o. out immediately... 2-2. 525. 2222... 119 


SORTIE FROM SANTIAGO DE CUBA. 


July 4, 1898.—Telegram from the admiral to the Captain-General giving an 
account of the battle sustained at the sortie...............- 121 
Snr OVOOl UNE: DSLLIG e. on ois a an tw eo ew om es we 'sdeb cca cee 123 
12 and 138, 1898.—Telegram from the Captain-General to the admiral in 
reply to his telegram relative to the battle. Reply of the 
LULL s Ustie s eardee ee ee ase a as OL aa) eee 135 


AT ANNAPOLIS. 


Aug. 20-23, 1898.—Communications relative to the granting of liberty on prom- 


Pe AAIL Lo eal) ALI0S 2... 22 eee 136, 137 
fee conditional libertyr2. 0-2-0. ot oe ee eet ee 137 
IN SPAIN. 

Sept. 20, 1898.—Report upon arrival at Santander..................---.----- 138 

Aug. 7,1898.—Official letter from the Captain-General to the admiral ac- 
knowledging receipt of report of the battle.............--- 142 

Oct. 8, 1898.—Official letter from the admiral to the Captain-General in an- 
USE EE TAL IO EOP OLN So oe oe ann a a IE ee ag 142 


Sept. 15, 1898.—Letter from General Blanco to the admiral, with which he 
accompanied his official letter acknowledging receipt of report 
PIM EMAC. ATS WEIt ets we co. ae eae ae ds os. Ss 144, 145 
Appendices, which in themselves justify many of the statements contained in 
(ae cay he a Se a aS es 147 


ADDENDUM. 


Letter from Admiral Cervera to Mr. Juan Spottorno y Biernet, cited in 
‘the letter and certificate on pages 12 and 13 of the text.' 


PUERTO REAL, March 14, 1898. 
DEAR JUAN: Three days ago I received your letter of the 9th.’ 


* * * 


The conflict with the United States seems to be averted or at least 
postponed, but it may revive when least expected, and each day. con- 
firms me in the belief that it would be a great national calamity. 

As we hardly have a squadron, wherever it may go it must be as a 
whole, because to divide it would, in my judgment, be the greatest of 
blunders, but the next greatest would perhaps be to send it to the 
West Indies, leaving our coasts and the Philippine Archipelago 
unprotected. For my part, I am not eager for the sad glory—if there 
can be any glory in going to certain defeat—of perishing at the head 
of the squadron. If this falls to my lot I shall be patient and fulfill 
my duty, but with the bitterness of knowing my sacrifice fruitless; and 
before I go Berénger and Cénovas must hear what I say to you. 

Still, if our small squadron were well equipped with everything 
necessary and, above all, well manned, something might be attempted; 
but you are right in saying that there is no ammunition but that on 
board, and I add that worse than this is the lack of organization in 
every respect, the result of many causes, conspicuous among which are 
the absurd economy in coal, the continual sending of the ships from 
place to place, and the local exigencies. 

What you say to me concerning myself does not surprise me, for 
Beranger believes me his enemy, but, in truth, I am not the enemy of 
him or of anyone. Yes, I am the enemy of the system which leads to 
this disorder and to this disorganization, and I instinctively call to 
mind Admiral Byng, hung at Plymouth for a similar reason; Persano, 
after the battle of Lissa; Mathews, exonerated after the battle of Cape 
Sicié; Bazaine, condemned to death after the battle of Metz, and now 








1 After the whole book had gone to print, Mr. Spottorno sent this letter, cited in 
the letter of January 30, 1898, which will be found on page 12 and in the certificate 
on page 13, It being impossible to include it in the book in its proper place, it has 
been added at the end. 

2 The stars represent family matters omitted.—O.N.I. 

164 


165 


Baratieri, who is just being tried by a council of war and already antie- 
ipates that he will be condemned to death or to imprisonment for life. 

And thus it is that when the people are disorganized their govern- 
ments (the products of such disorganization) are disorganized also, aad 
when some logical disaster takes place they do not seek the true causes, 
but always cry “treason” and look about for the poor victiin, who 
expiates the faults which were not his. For these reasons I was very 
vacillating before accepting the charge; but, having accepted it, I will 
fulfill it with the consequences which it may entail, and, as I said 
before, 1 will do my duty, but I shall recall the words of Jesus Christ 
and, not for myself as much as for poor Spain, say: ‘‘O, my Father, 
if it be possible, let this cup pass from me.” 

Butler seems to me a very good choice, but I pity him, as I would any- 
one upon whom the lot should fall. 

There is no occasion ever to divulge these things and less now, for 
which reason I enjoin upon you great secrecy as to what I say to you; 
but at the same time I beg you not to destroy this letter, but to preserve 
it, in case it should some day be expedient to make known my opinions 
at this time. 

Your cousin, PASCUAL. 


fa fos 


=o 





OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 
War Notss No. VIII. 


INFORMATION FROM ABROAD. 





ee ae eee 


TH E 


SQUADRON OF ADMIRAL CERVERA, 


BY 


CAPTAIN VICTOR M. CONCAS Y PALAU, 


Formerly Commander of the armored cruiser Infanta Maria Teresa, and Chief of 
Staff of said Squadron in the naval batile of Santiago de Cuba, 


Vice-President of the Geographical Society of Madrid. 


TRANSLATED FROM THE SPANISH. 





OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 


WASHINGTON: 
« | GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 
Oaeae 1900. 


INTRODUCTORY. 


This number will probably close the series of ‘‘ War Notes” on the 
Spanish-American war. The object in making and publishing these 
translations has been to give to history from reliable sources, where 
the writers were actual participants, a correct version of the Spanish 
side of the war. It has sometimes occurred that these writings con- 
tain unverified statements and harsh expressions, which at a later 
date, when the writers are better informed, and time has exercised its 
mollifying influence, would not be made, and it has been questioned 
by some whether it is not proper to omit such portions from the publi- 
cations of this office. The accepted view, however, has been that the 
series should be presented as written. In the case of Captain Concas’s 
book, it seems proper that reference should be made, as is done in the 
footnotes, to portions of Chapter XII, wherein he comments on his 
alleged loss of valuables on board the U.S. S. Gloucester, and criticises 
the surgeon of the Solace, the commander of the marines at the prison 
barracks near Portsmouth, N. H., and the personnel of the regiments 
that were on board the Harvard when the unfortunate affair of the 
prisoners occurred. It is to be borne in mind that in this chapter 
Captain Concas has recorded impressions formed by him at a time 
which was doubtless one of great mental depression and was certainly 
a period of severe physical suffering. Under such circumstances 
criticism is perhaps to be expected. In other parts of his work he is 
cordial in his praise and gratitude for kindness shown by our officers 
and men. He is a brave and able officer and was badly wounded at 
Santiago. His book is valuable both professionally and historically. 

RICHARDSON CLOVER, 
Commander, U. 8. N., Chief Intelligence Officer. 
Navy DEPARTMENT, January 24, 1900. 


Approved. 
Wm. 8S. Cowles, 
Acting Chief of Bureau of Navigation. 





TABLE OF CONTENTS. 


: Page. 
neem ae ee ts eee a BA Eee A Ne ) 
Why silence has been preserved until now—Estimates of public opinion— 
Difficulty of officers in active service to comment on such recent events— 
Opportunity to save the country lost—The Spanish press, and the press 
of the United States, England, France, and other countries, especially 
with reference to professional writers. 


I Re ors Goa lb ed Alas fa eas ween y hee eke kl 15 

Intention of the Spanish Government to avoid the war at any cost not 
carried out—Condition of our forces—Naval officers were prohibited by 
law from speaking publicly of the relative forcees—A second Trafalgar— 
Why the patriotism of the press was not resorted to—Lecture of Mr. 
Concas before the Geographical Society—Diplomats and naval men gave 
warnings in good season— Voyages of the Maine, Vizcaya, and Oquendo— 
Telegram to Manila to give the United States fleet a friendly reception— 
Scattering of our ships—Preparation of any kind prohibited—Situation 
in which the war was accepted—Influence of United States naval officers 
in Congress—Castelar and his ideas of the United States—Anglomaniacs— 
Without the support of public opinion military forces may gain victories 
but can not achieve success. . 

ee ene ans Gees ba i oe ance asks 23 

Villaamil’s flotilla and diplomatic exigencies—Voyage of Admiral Cer- 
vera’s squadron to St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands—Cruisers Oquendo 
and Vizcaya join the squadron—Arrival of instructions by the collier 
San Francisco—Coal at St. Vincent—Memorable council of war on April 
20, 1898—Discussion of plans—The Philippines in most urgent need— 
Plan to return to the Peninsula contrary to instructions—Telegram to 
the Government—Communications of the day following, which have 
disappeared from the archives—Telegrams to the Government calling 
upon it to save the country—Telegram from Mr. Moret: God _ bless 
you!—Council of admirals at Madrid—Unofficial exertions of some of 
them—Letter of Sefior Silvela against the departure of the squadron— 


Finis Hispaniz! 
EE ry re ne SS. FOUTS Se. se Sa ee ak 36 
Documents and comments thereon. 
a OE i et) I SS a Le ee le a i A oe A A Se 42 


Departure from Cape Verde and voyage to the West Indies—The squad- 
ron—Its arrival off Martinique—Lack of information; our consul— 
Steamer Alicante; information received from her captain. 

Ee Ge ee esos sacs caine dees aaa sseecae 46 

Council of war in West Indian waters—Habana, Cienfuegos, Santiago de 
Cuba, and San Juan de Puerto Rico—Curagao—The telegraph—Coal in 
time of war—The Oregon—At Curacao; no news—The run to Santiago— 

At Santiago—Instructions for the squadron to return to Spain—Remon- 


strances of the Governors-General of Cuba and Puerto Rico. 
5 


Craprar VI o.oo nn Sak Seats cen 'on cocUcub ee one ek eee 
Military and political situation of Santiago—Toast of the archbishop— 
Starvation—Condition of the army—Defenses at the harbor entrance— 
Coal and engines—Fraternal relations between the army and navyy—Gen- 
eral Linares and Admiral Cervera—Councils of war on board the Maria 
Teresa—Study of possible operations—The blockade—Council of war of 
May 26—Opinions relative to the sortie; belief that the Government 
wished the prompt destruction of the squadron so as to obtain peace— 
Attacks upon Santiago—The Merrimac—Situation after the landing of 
Shafter—The blockade at night—1,000 sailors of our squadron disem- 
barked—Our valiant Captain Bustamante, chief of staff of the squadron, 
mortally wounded—Telegrams and comments thereon—The squadron 
pressed to go out—Instructions, ‘‘Go out at once’’—Remarks on the 
departure from Cape Verde. 
CHAPTER (VIG Too. coc ns cb anol oe whee een aie eee tie eee ee ee 
Situation of the squadron—Important data and defects of the matériel— 
Comprehensive comparison with the hostile fleet. 
Crapran: PXe to 05 Sere. 20s po LOOT AG Sa 
Embarkation of the landing companies—Conditions of the harbor entrance 
unfavorable from a tactical point of view, which circumstance deter- 
mined the character of the battle. 

CHAPTER OXGn wits. fick Preaiulat lw ae lee eee lide 
The 3d of July, 1898—Poor Spain!—Detailed description of the battle. 
GHAPTER : Xi Vie.s, oj ca horcre'a 3 ae Jue Gapiehe St be ete apt ie aes et ee 

Technical chapter—Cruisers and battleships—Disparity of casualties in 
all naval battles—Our firemen—“‘ Fighting .bunkers’’—Coal bunkers— 
Liquid fuel—How coal consumption should be designated to be intelli- 
gible to the general public—Ventilators; ashes—Pipe joints and steam 
cocks—Steam piping of auxiliary engines—The temperature below the 
protective decks—Electric motors and central station—Fire mains— 
Empty cartridge cases—Auxiliary artillery parks—Broadside firing— 
Temporary parapets—Torpedoes—Lifeboats—Turrets—Transmission of 
commands—Clothing and effects of crews—Coaling and its effect on the 
armament—Extra meals—The battle hospital and its horrors—Torpedo- 
boat destroyers and their crews—Dualism of command as the result of 
the telegraph, and how it might be solved in China—Portable arma- 
ment—The wounded. 

CHAPrER eX TTP 2s. SUIS Ee BS A 

The shipwrecked on the beach—Camp of insurgent leader Cebreco—Crews 
of the Oquendo and Maria Teresa—Care of the wounded and burial of the 
dead—Assistance lent by the Americans—The crews of their boats plun- 
der our sailors—The Gloucester—Hospital ships Olivette and Solace—Inci- 
dents, both good and bad—The hospital at Norfolk and admirable con- 
duct of Drs. Cleborne and Kite—Reporters kept out—Mr. Arthur C. 
Humphreys, who had been our consular agent—The Harvard and its 
horrors; dead, wounded, and dying men on board upon her arrival at 
Portsmouth—Portsmouth; unkind treatment of prisoners—Noble con- 
duct of Admiral McNair toward our prisoners at Annapolis—Instructions 
from United States Government to treat the prisoners with every possible 
consideration—Correspondence inspected—Things were well generally, 
but not as well as they say—Secret information—According to the Gov- 
ernment at Washington, it was the Spanish Government that placed 
difficulties in the way of our liberty—Our steamer not permitted to pro- 
ceed to a maritime departamento—Our dear comrades go to Santander 
to receive us. 

CuaPTrer XIII 

Résumé. 


ere wreefc es 2 2 8 622 82 8 62 OO 2 688 6 6 2 © 8 8 6 6 6.6) S 6.6 6 we & hee ela alte aaa 


64 


68 


71 


85 


101 


Vee 1 Rei) Spe shag Nes Oa Oye 


Mherscd.of July, Leos: 


‘‘Alas for the vanquished!” is an old saying, but we should now add: 
‘Alas for those who are sent out to be vanquished!” For no matter 
how many may fall in the struggle, there can never be enough to cover 
the mistakes of others and the treason to the country; for it certainly 
is treason to lead the country to ruin and to the loss of ten million 
inhabitants, while invoking romanticism and legends. Political men 
should know that these are not the reality; that they do not now and 
never did constitute war, and that the nations which have had recourse 
to them have ended by disappearing from the map of the world.— 
(Defense of Admiral Montojo, of the Squadron of the Philippines, 
before the Supreme Council of the War and Navy.—Concas. ) 





CHAPTER I. 


It is some time since peace has been concluded and diplomatic rela- 
tions with the United States renewed. The Spanish Government 1s 
no longer composed of those political elements that have been the 
cause of our disaster, that enforced silence upon us, calling it disci- 
pline, while we had to listen to insults, and that purposely kept the 
people in ignorance of the facts of which they alone bear the respon- 
sibility. The supreme council of war and navy, after slow and 
minute proceedings, has rendered its judgment of complete exonera- 
tion relative to the great disaster of Santiago de Cuba, and in view of 
the easily impressed character of the Spanish people we may almost say 
that it has already become a matter of past history, though surely not 
for those families who are still weeping for their lost friends, nor for 
us who have covered with our blood the decks of the Spanish ships, 
and who, to fill the bitter cup to overflowing, have since had to suffer 
the terrible torment of having to keep silent before those who have 
torn our country and its flag to pieces, and before whom we, who are 
among the few Spaniards that can boast of having left nothing undone 
that their duty required of them, proudly raise our heads, con- 
scious that we have been loyal in council, soldiers in danger, and 
slaves to our duty. 

Has the hour arrived when matters will be cleared up? According 
to foreigners nothing has been said in Spain in explanation of matters 
of such gravity, with the honorable exception of the letters of 
Admiral Cervera which were published in La Epoca, of Madrid, and 
those foreigners are right in asking that everything pertaining to the 
matter should be made public. The Spanish people, also, ask why 
we do not defend ourselves. Many of them are not honest in asking 
this question, for they know perfectly well that the law relating to 
courts-martial and the exigencies of discipline have tied our tongues, 
for reasons erroneously called considerations of state, though no con- 
sideration, either in that sense nor in a purely military sense, has 
been shown any of us. 

Captain Mahan, of the United States Navy, one of the men who have 


had the greatest influence on the war, in speaking of the manceuvres 
9 


10 


of our squadron in his famous articles entitled The War on the Sea 
and its Lessons, says on this point: 

What Cervera’s actual reasonings were is unknown to the writer, and probably will 
remain unknown until he sees fit to publish them, or until he has appeared before 
the court-martial which, by the almost universal practice of naval nations, awaits a 
commander who has lost a ship or incurred a considerable disaster, a practice merci- 
ful as well a just, bringing to light a man’s merits as well as his faults, if such there 
be, and confronting idle gossip with an authoritative expert judgment. The course, 
being usual, implies no antecedent implication of blame, and therefore is never invid- 
ious as regards an individual. Until it is decided whether such a court shall be con- 
vened, it is not to be expected that the Spanish admiral will reveal the line of his 
defense, or lay himself open to attack by the statement of inferences and decisions, 
which at the time of their formation may have been sound and yet in the event 
have proved unfortunate. 

In the absence of certain knowledge, conjectural opinions, such as the writer has 
here educed, * * *, 


While a man of the profound knowledge of Captain Mahan told the 
whole world that he spoke only from conjectures, there are few men 
in Spain who have not constituted themselves infallible judges over 
us, reminding us at the same time, first, of our military duties, then 
of our duties as being under court-martial, and finally exacting silence 
from us for political reasons, since in the opinions of some our declara- 
tions might be of international significance. Sad it is that we who 
have had a share in the bloody tragedy of July 3, 1898, in the waters 
of Santiago de Cuba, can not make such explanations as we deem best 
for the interests of our country. But as no one prohibits us from 
arranging the data which are already known to the whole world, and 
which, when confirmed by one of us, assume a guaranty of reliability 
which they might not otherwise have, future generations will at least 
be able to judge whether that sad battle was a natural encounter of 
the war, or whether it was brought about by politicians, designated 
by the misnomer of statesmen, who in cowardly fear of an uprising 
did not hesitate to sacrifice the whole country, on the extremely orig- 
inal theory that the disaster, imposed by the law of necessity, would 
compel the people to resignation. As though disasters, on the con- 
trary, had not always been the true reason for great social disturbances 
and the cause of cruel and exorbitant demands on the part of the 
enemy. And on this occasion the tranquillity and good sense of the 
Spanish people when brought face to face with misfortune is the best 
proof that there was neither rhyme nor reason in the exaggerated 
fear of our statesmen. 

For all these reasons\we shall abstain from expressing opinions 
wherever the rocks and reefs of discipline do not permit us to go 
ahead, and let the reader find between the lines what it is not now pos- 
sible for us to discuss. For instance, in referring to a telegram of July 
3, 1898, from our Government to the Captain-General of Cuba, which 
was published in large capitals in the New York Journal, in which 


11 


telegram the Captain-General was consulted as to whether the block- 
aded squadron could go to the Philippines and return to Cuba without 
loss of time, we shall not add any of the considerations which such a 
consultation would suggest to us, though the telegram is not sufficient 
in itself to explain the fatal policy of the campaign. We shall only 
quote it such as it has circulated through the press of the whole world, 
without even putting it in large letters; for if we were to adopt that 
type of letters to quote similar matters, there would be very little left 
to be printed in ordinary type, and this book would look like one of 
those devotional books which are printed with a view to being read 
almost in the dark. 

The naval battle of Santiago will surely not be forgotten for many 
a year. And if God should work a wonder so that the Spanish peo- 
ple will some time know a little more of what is going on in the world 
than they do now, it is possible that the pros and cons will then be dis- 
cussed in this country as something new. Therefore, when we who 
have had a share in this disaster have been called home by the Lord, 
we want to impress upon those who shall then wear the uniform of the 
Spanish navy to keep alive the defense of the memory of those who 
were not afraid, upon their return to Spain, of the stones and insults 
thrown at them by the Spanish rabble for having insisted on the 
opinion that we ought not to go to war nor the squadron to the West 
Indies, always invoking the salvation of the country; of the country 
abandoned, insulted, and trampled upon by the enemy, as Admiral 
Cervera said literally in his official letter of April 21, in which he 
reported on the council of war convened at Cape Verde Islands. At 
that council we were sad prophets of coming disasters which it was 
still time to reduce to reasonable, though bitter, terms that would not 
involve the whole country in the catastrophe. And if duty and dis- 
cipline carried the squadron to the disaster predicted (‘Sand so 
Cervera went forth with his four gallant ships, foredoomed to his 
fate by folly or by national false pride, exhibited in the form of polit- 
ical pressure disregarding sound professional judgment and military 
experience ”—these are the words of Captain Mahan, of the United 
States Navy, who is known the world over as the foremost naval writer) 
and to its total ruin, we knew at least how to fight and how to die, even 
though under circumstances of the greatest strategic absurdity known 
to military history, and for which we, the admiral and his captains, 
jointly and separately, disclaim positively before history, before our 
country, and before every Spaniard without exception, all manner of 
responsibility, in whole and in part. 

We do not claim that these pages are an official history of the events. 
That history will be furnished by the admiral by publishing the docu. 
ments themselves. Moreover, it would confine us to too narrow limits. 
Our intention is simply to furnish a chronicle in regular order, 


12 


derived from authentic sources, which no one would dare deny me, 
as I was not only in command of Admiral Cervera’s flagship, but also 
his chief of staff on the memorable day of the battle when my 
beloved comrade, Bustamante, who held that important post, lay 
ashore mortally wounded. This chronicle is designed to set the peo- 
ple right; for public opinion is formed from the daily press, which is 
more intent on reporting events rapidly than on reporting them well, 
and the historical information furnished by it often requires rectifica- 
tion and explanation from beginning to end. 

We do not mean to open up a discussion with the entire press, for 
so many and such different opinions have been put forward all over 
the world that it is quite impossible for one work to embrace them 
all, nor would it be within human power to read them all. We shall 
confine ourselves to making certain statements, in which everyone 
who does us the honor of reading these pages will find the solution of 
the doubts which have been raised against the navy, treating with 
proper disdain the writings of some foreigners, probably youthful 
officers of no experience whatever and of great presumption, whose 
writings do not deserve the honor of criticism nor any attention 
except that of their own insignificance. 

In taking notice of the press, which is the more necessary as no one 
else has hitherto spoken freely of the events of the war, we must 
observe that it is characterized by different nationalities rather than 
different criterions. 

Strange to say, it is the United States press that has treated the 
battle of Santiago de Cuba and the causes that brought it about with 
the greatest accuracy, fairness, and charity. Aside from the facts 
that everyone is prone to praise his own people, wherein the Anglo- 
Saxon race excels particularly; that the Americans have concealed or 
misrepresented more than one defeat which their flotilla experienced 
in the West Indies, which, however, did not affect the outcome of the 
war; and their evident desire to conceal the decided advantages which 
they have derived from the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines, 
the statements of the Americans have been on the whole very fair; 
and the writings of such men as Mahan and others we may consider as 
a defense of ourselves and at the same time as a judgment against the 
inefficiency of our politicians. Translations of these writings, though 
abbreviated—but not in those parts in which the navy is criticised— 
have been published in our newspapers and hardly anyone had read 
them. 

The publications of the United States Navy Department also are 
very noteworthy and of great value in the study of the war, for sel- 
dom has the public been furnished a collection of such truthful data. 
But while recognizing this circumstance, we believe that these publi- 
cations lack one requisite which, according to Balmes, is indispensable 
in telling the truth, and that is that the whole truth should be told; 


13 


and in this respect the report of the United States Bureau of Naviga- 
tion, in the original as well as in the translation, has omitted matters 
which may have seemed inconvenient, or which do not redound to the 
credit of the Americans. This must not be forgotten when we have 
recourse to that source of information. 

The English scientific press has treated the matter with that decorum 
which a not overconscientious miss might employ to save appearances. 
That is the tone adopted by all the English constructors who had a 
share in the building of our cruisers and were responsible for some of 
their defects, for which no one, however, has blamed them, and which, 
moreover, are not of importance, for such defects might be found in 
_ any other ships, no matter how great the reputation of their building 
yards. We will mention, for instance, that one of the constructors, 
who was a very skillful engineer, forgot the 5.5-inch ammunition 
hoists, which he subsequently built himself by an installation of his 
own invention, which turned out to be pretty bad, as would naturally 
be the case with anything in the construction of our modern ships not 
provided for from the beginning. But as the constructor and those 
associated with him knew very well that these hoists were among the 
things that mustnecessarily function badly in the first serious encounter 
of the cruisers, he hastened to publish in Engineering a series of 
explanations which absolutely lacked truthfulness. And there were 
many similar instances on which we shall not waste time. In the daily 
press the tenor has been much lower, for even over the signature of 
people of high standing articles have appeared of such shameful ser- 
vility for anyone who has any regard for his professional dignity 
that they have been ridiculed by the whole world, especially by their 
cousins on the other side of the Atlantic. Some of their admirals, 
afraid of losing the prestige which they have so well earned in the 
maritime world, have changed their opinions; and it is curious to watch 
the acrobatic feats they execute when they give free reins to their 
opinions and judge the facts, and when, as though in obedience to an 
order from the foreign office, they plan campaigns and perform other 
skillful acts which seem hardly possible in men of such practical minds. 
Really, it seems impossible, absolutely impossible, that in a country of 
such naval intelligence as England so many high officers should have 
written so many utterly ridiculous opinions without superior orders 
to praise the Americans at any cost. Nothing else could be expected 
of the only nation in Europe which, with the same object in view, 
has seriously sustained the tale of the blowing up of the Maine from 
the outside by means of a torpedo. While I was in America, many 
Americans in talking to me of this tale made fun of it—that is to say, 
of these English articles; however, business is business; but in the end 
everything must be paid for, as Spain has paid for the great political 
mistake she made when she aided the British colonies in achieving 
their independence. 


14 


From the point of view of criticism we will speak of one note- 
worthy article, which is important on account of its great circulation, 
having appeared in Brassey’s Naval Annual for 1899, written by Col. 
Sir George Clarke with a freedom of criticism that truly honors him, 
especially as he has heard only one side, which serves to demonstrate 
what we have said before; for in conclusion of his article, on page 
174, he states explicitly that he has obtained his information from 
different officers of the United States Navy, which, as already stated, 
with the exception of concealing some minor defeats, has furnished 
the most correct report of the events. 

The press of France, Italy, and Germany has treated Spain with 
more moderation and its navy with greater fairness. But in its evi- 
dent desire to be generous, for which we are truly grateful, it 1s often 
led aside from the path of truth, and what should be justice has come 
to be charity. 

There finally remains the Spanish press. We forgive it from the 
bottom of our hearts, though before God and before history it is prin- 
cipally responsible for the disasters of our country. It is a severe, 
moral lesson that public opinion in Spain, except in the case of a few 
sound-minded men who were not led astray, has returned to the right 
channel without the aid of the press—even in spite of the press—com- 
pelling even the most hostile to recognize that the mistakes and respon- 
sibility rest with the Government factors and not with those who, after 
insisting that we should not go to Cuba, counted neither enemies. nor 
obstacles when they received the order to go out to meet death for 
their country, though they were convinced, not only of the futility of 
the enterprise, but also of the fact that the order meant the delivering 
up of all Spain to the mercy of the enemy. 

In our country everything goes to extremes; soldiers must all be 
heroes, martyrs, or traitors; the just medium is completely lacking; 
but it is precisely in the just medium that common sense prevails, 
which in war, as in everything else, is needful at the decisive moment. 
In our country we would have qualified as a monstrosity the order 
given Sampson, as appears from several telegrams published in the 
Appendix to the Annual Report of the Secretary of the United States 
Navy for 1898, not to go near the heavy guns of our coast defenses in 
order not to expose his ships to being injured. We should have con- 
sidered that cowardice, and preferred a squadron crippled and ren- 
dered useless by a glorious battle without any objective, to a squadron 
that has remained intact and is ready to give the whole benefit of its 
unbroken forces. If the Spanish press had so understood the best 
interests of our country, it would not have defended what it did 
defend, nor accused those whom it did accuse, and who, covered with 
blood, might have asked the press when they learned that Watson was 
threatening the coasts of the Peninsula, ‘‘ What have you done with 
our squadron?” 


CHAPTER II. 


One of the most. unfortunate circumstances of this period of the war 
was the firm resolution on the part of the Spanish Government to 
obviate the war at any cost. This was not only the resolution of the 
administration then in power, but of all the preceding ones without 
distinction. But the relinquishment of the island of Cuba, which was 
the only means of obviating it, never entered into this resolution, 
although that, and that alone, could ward off the conflict which could 
have no other outcome than the total ruin of Spain. Thus it was that 
not the least preparation was made, either on land or on the sea, and 
while the whole world was under the impression that we were fran- 
tically getting ready for a struggle to the bitter end, the navy remained 
entirely on a peace footing. The armored crusier Cristébal Colon did 
not have her heavy guns. The firm of Armstrong, anxious to take 
advantage of the opportunity, offered us two old guns, which the 
admiral of the Mediterranean Squadron begged for with insistence, 
as they were better than none atall; but this solution was not adopted 
because it was not believed that the case was very urgent. The Pelayo, 
Numancia, and Vitoria, which were in foreign building yards, would 
not be ready nor have their new armament until September—that is, if 
the constructors fulfilled their contracts—and the Carlos V was having 
her heavy guns installed at Havre, with great activity, it is true, but 
she also lacked part of her secondary battery. 

The Pelayo had 203 men on board, including the commander, which 
number is absolutely necessary to take care of her machinery and 
armament; the Carlos V had in all 282 men, and the cruisers Vwman-’ 
cia and Vitoria had 51 men each, while a crew of over 500 men was 
provided for each one of these ships on a war footing. Moreover, it 
takes a very long time to organize a modern warship, for even after 
months had been spent in fitting them out they were not in condition 
to render the best service that could be expected of their machinery 
and armament. The figures given above show better than anything 
else could, even to people not versed in these matters, that we were 
on a complete peace footing. 

On this subject our daily papers have published the semioflicial cor- 
respondence of Admiral Cervera with the Government, in which the 


former insisted time and time again on the danger that was threatening 
15 


16 


us, on the unfinished condition of our ships that were being fitted out 
abroad, on the impossibility of going to war, and on the probable 
results. When this correspondence has been published in full it will 
be given a place in the opinions of the whole world, with sorry reflec- 
tions upon our statesmen who maintained a wholly untenable optimism. 

On land nota single gun had been mounted on our coasts. The field 
artillery in Cuba had not been increased by modern guns, although it 
was evident that they would be needed against an Anglo-Saxon army, 
better equipped with matériel than with personnel, and the only pre- 
caution taken was that of sending to the Canaries and Balearic Islands 
some troops that would have been of little avail if the hostile squadron 
had made its appearance on our coasts, and if, as would have been the 
natural result, it had brought its pressure to bear on our coast cities. 

On the other hand, it is positively certain that several good ships 
were offered to us, although this is not apparent from the letters of the 
minister of marine, who was desirous of protecting his colleagues in 
the cabinet. And it is also certain that this same minister, Mr. Ber- 
mejo, made superhuman efforts to acquire these ships, but met with 
no support—because there would be no war. 

Although it is going back to the same subject, we shall call attention 
a hundred times to the fact—moral rather than material—that the 
cruiser Cristobal Colén did not have her heavy guns, for when the 
Government was not willing to accept those that were offered it, that 
is tosay, when it was decided that the Colén was not to have any heavy 
guns, it must have been because it was positively convinced that 
she would not require them, although the whole universe thought 
differently. 

While this was the spirit prevailing in the Government, strength- 
ened by the belief that this, the most unjust war recorded in history, 
would never be undertaken against us, the press embarked on an entirely 
different campaign. For, aside from the natural protest caused by the 
aggression of the United States, it lost no opportunity to misrepresent 
that country’s resources and elements of power, undervaluing its squad- 
ron and making comparisons devoid of all common sense. Moreover, 
it is well known that a nation like ours, whose coasts are not only acces- 
» sible, but where the repression of contraband is confined by law almost 
entirely to capture when caught in the act, requires two complete belts 
of surveillance, on land and on the sea, and the latter requires numer- 
ous flotillas of fast vessels. The same was also needed for the coasts 
of Cuba and the Philippines for active coast patrol. But such flotillas 
do not represent any power in an international conflict, and to call 
them a squadron would be the same as though we were to designate 
under the name of regular army the police force, gamekeepers, and civil 
guards, whose forces in every country, and especially in ours, repre- 
sent many thousands of men, But every vessel has a name, and that 


17 


of a 40-ton launch is frequently twice as long and more high sounding 
than that of a battleship; and so the press, believing it its duty to be 
inspired by patriotic views, and without noticing whether the ship 
whose name was mentioned was in Europe or in the West Indies, or 
perhaps in the lagoons of Mindanao, in the Philippine Islands, hun- 
dreds of feet above the level of the sea, simply counted the names and 
figured up the total, and with the assistance of illustrations numerous 
squadrons were conjured up, for when ships are taken out of the sea 
and transferred to paper it is all a matter of different scales. 

About this time there occurred a split in the navy, which we men- 
tion especially because Mahan lays it to Vice-Admiral Beranger, former 
minister, referring to an interview published in the Heraldo of April 
8, 1898, in which said admiral made some statements which he had also 
made in public while minister, to the effect that we had the necessary 
means and elements to face the conflict. 

While this was going on our navy followed step by step the devel- 
opments in our relations with the United States, and when it found 
that it would have to bear the brunt of the conflict, and would even 
be charged with the mistakes of others, it tried by every possible 
means to induce the ministry to compel the press to speak the truth. 
The alarm of the navy was justified, for while it was recognized at 
Madrid that we should have to lose the island of Cuba, it was said 
that this could not take place without a second Trafalgar to justify so 
painful a loss. This phrase, @ second Trafalgar, was attributed to no 
less a personage than Antonio Canovas del Castillo; but we who have 
had occasion to become intimately acquainted with this eminent states- 
man believe this report utterly devoid of any foundation, for we feel 
certain that he never would have gone to war for fear of the internal 
disturbances which have dragged us into so mad a conflict. 

This dissension in the navy increased when Admiral Cervera’s 
letters became known; but we do not believe that either party was 
entirely in the right, for while we do not deny that there was great 
lack of discretion in the ministry, which was always controlled by the 
idea that there would be no war, we must also recognize that a minister 
interviewed by a newspaper correspondent could not possibly say that 
we were irremediably lost. Hence the testimony cited from the 
Heraldo is of no more value than interviews of that kind usually are; 
they can easily be invented and, as a matter of fact, frequently are 
invented by reporters who are acquainted with the political opinions 
and the position of the person interviewed. 

Admiral Cervera’s letters were confidential, even as regards the 
officers under his immediate orders, and although the situation has 
materially changed since then, in writing of these events to-day we 
are confronted with the same difficulties that he was. If the accounts 
are not signed by some one who has had an actual share in the events 

14232—No. VIII 2 





18 


they lack value in the eyes of the public, and if attested by the signa- 
ture of one of us, how are we to write them and how comment on 
them ? 

All the officers of the navy are constantly being asked by many 
people why they did not tell the country the truth. But that is 
unjust, for the truth has been told in every tone of voice and from 
every quarter, only it was not signed with the names of the persons 
telling it; and they did well in not signing it, for it might have been 
said that they were seeking a way to be sent to prison in order to 
escape the necessity of going out to meet the enemy. 

This is the dilemma which military writers belonging to the service 
have had to solve; and there is but one way of solving it, namely, to 
leave the active service. There can be no other solution, when the 
penal code provides severe penalties for any military person who 
speaks highly of the enemy’s forces. But unfortunately in Spain, 
when men have left the service, it has not always been in order to 
work for their country and its armed forces. And that is why we 
were restricted; for those among us who might have signed their 
writings lacked the necessary prestige, and those who would have 
been listened to could not sign them. But it will ever remain a severe 
charge against the Government that it did not use its powerful influ- 
ence to call upon the patriotism of the press, which would surely have 
responded at once and abandoned an ill-advised campaign in favor of the 
- war, when the Government not only did not desire it, but had not 
taken the least precaution to prepare for it in case events should be 
precipitated. 

While on our part not the least preparations were being made, the 
United States was not neglecting the smallest details, as though the 
war they were anticipating was to be fought against the most power- 
ful nation. A captain of the United States Navy came to Spain and 
imprudently we opened our navy-yards to him, so that he might inform 
himself to his heart’s content of the calm prevailing there and of the 
backward condition of our ships under construction. Whenever it 
was desired to send torpedoes to Cuba, the declaration of war was 
threatened and hence those many orders and revocations which the 
public could not understand. Objections were made to the construc- 
tion of the torpedo-boat destroyers as well as to the purchase of the 
Cristobal Colén, and it is the general belief in naval circles that some 
of the work we were having done in England was interfered with, for 
that is the only explanation of the delays and the many fines consequent 
thereon, which finally amounted to £75,000. 

The vigilance, even in the smallest details, went so far as to make 
a lecture I delivered before the Geographic Society of Madrid, of 
which I have the honor of being vice-president, the subject of violent 
remonstrances; and I take pleasure in stating that I said very compli- 


19 


mentary things about the United States, which I should have liked to 
hear said about Spain. But I was a sad prophet of what was to hap- 
pen, which, however, I do not believe could have been news to anyone 
who was well acquainted with the situation. And although the Geo- 
graphic Society is of a purely scientific nature, the Government had to 
interfere, and the president, Antonio C4énovas de Castillo, had to 
request me to sign a letter written by himself, which I did, saying that 
the defense rested with him.! 

In speaking of the preparations made by the United States, I do 
not have reference to those which are known to the whole world—for 
the Americans stated themselves that months before the war they had 
128 auxiliary vessels fitted out and in readiness—but to the work done 
in our country by their agents, who were powerfully aided by the 
insurgent committee which the Cubans were maintaining at Madrid, 
and relative to which we abstain from all comment, because, in the 
first place, these are matters which are difficult to prove, and, in the 
second place, because, after all, they only demonstrate that, as already 
stated, we had overstepped the limits of the most ridiculous senti- 
mental policy. 

All this did not alarm the Spanish people, nor even the Govern- 
ment, which treated the communications of the delegates of the 
ministries of state and marine as exaggerations. For, though it may 
seem strange, Spanish diplomats and naval men have for the last ten 
years sounded the note of alarm, with what result we all know.? While 
the storm over our heads was thus gathering in intensity, people used 
to engage in discussions as to whether the resolutions of the United 
States Congress would be joint resolutions or not, with a lack of 
political understanding and instinct of preservation which has no equal 
in modern history. 








‘As it is not easy wholly to lay aside the personal part one has taken in these 
events, I will state that, for fear I might enter upon some other course, as it was an 
entirely personal matter, the minister of state, José Elduayen, wanted to smooth my 
ruffled spirits with a splendid breakfast, and at the dessert he presented to me the 
letter referred to, dictated by the president of the council, asking me, in the name of 
the interests of the country, to sign it. As stated above, I did so, though not with- 
out remarking that this document would probably be misused by the persons to 
whom it was to be delivered, saying that I did not havea very high opinion of them, 
and I was not wrong, for it was soon after published in the New York papers. 

On that occasion I filled no particular office of any kind; therefore my statements 
could have only a literary value. It was the insurgent committee at Madrid that 
had promoted this incident. > 

* Among the documents of this class which are known to me are the noteworthy 
communications of the Naval Officer Gutiérrez Sobral in 1896, in which he states 
that the attack upon our Philippines was sure to come, and that the United States, 
before declaring war, would take possession of the Hawaiian Islands, to be used as 
an intermediate base of operations. He also calls attention to the sending of a num- 
ber of newspaper men to Japan to embark upon a campaign of defamation, on the 
order of the campaign which the Cubans were carrying on in the United States and 
Europe, thus using artless Japan in the interests of others, while apparently working 
for what the Empire of the Rising Sun considered its legitimate spoils in the future. 


20 


The Government believed at that time that the granting of autonomy 
would solve the Cuban problem. While the Cubans aspired to inde- 
pendence, there is no doubt that they would have accepted autonomy 
as a means for achieving more easily complete separation, without los- 
ing the Spanish emigration, for without it—and this in spite of the 
United States, or perhaps because of the United States—the island of 
Cuba is fatally doomed to fall into the hands of the colored races. 
Moreover, the discouragement of the insurgents was great; they saw 
no hope of immediate victory, and there was no lack of sound-minded 
Cubans and true patriots who gave their support in good faith to the 
policy of autonomy as a transitional stage. Insurgent parties also 
commenced to flock to it, and peace would have been reestablished 
within a short time. It was then that the U.S. cruiser J/aine was 
sent to Habana to promote disturbances, and that the United States 
squadron took up its position at Dry Tortugas, so as to be ready at a 
moment’s notice. Our Government answered by sending the armored 
cruiser Oquendo to Habana and the Vezcaya to New York—to return 
the call. This movement of ships deserves a place in the annals of 
the continued policy of artlessness. 

The letters of Admiral Cervera, published in La Epoca, and from 
which we shall hereafter copy a few paragraphs, show that the com- 
mander in chief of the squadron clearly foresaw what would and must 
necessarily happen, and also demonstrates the incredible optimism of 
the Government, with Sefior Moret, minister of colonies, in the lead.' 

The armored cruiser Vizcaya was about to be docked, had the 
admiral on board, and was the least ready of all the ships of the 
squadron, while the Zeresa, which was under my command, was the 
only one that was in a condition to render immediate service. But on 
account of the lecture referred to it was feared that I might not be 
persona grata, and so the Vizcaya started without having her bottom 
cleaned, and the result was that when the war broke out she had not 
been in dock for a year and had lost considerable speed. 


‘The report submitted to the Senate by the Governor-General of the Philippines, 
Fernando Primo de Rivera, says on page 191: ‘‘ The meddling of Sefior Moret in mili- 
tary matters, his demands for data, his estimates of battles, his opinions as to whether 
or not they were expedient to attain what was desired, etc., * * * his wanting 
to handle everything, occupying himself with matters wholly foreign to his ministry, 
were truly laughable. He did nothing to carry out the compromise I had worked 
for, and, as no investigation was made of these sacred interests, I found myself under 
the necessity of quafting the bitter cup which he held out to me with that simplicity 
which Sefior Moret, in his good faith or his innocence, always assumed. While such 
was his conduct in political matters generally, in personal matters there are no words 
to qualify the lack of respect for the sacred interests of Spain and for its representa- 
tives in those countries.”’ 

General Marqués de Estalla himself has authorized us to publish the following tele- 
gram of March 5: ‘‘The minister of colonies to the Governor-General of the Phil- 
ippines: As our relations with the United States are very cordial, your excellency 

will receive its squadron in the same manner as other foreign squadrons have been 
received in that harbor.’’ 


21 


While our cruiser was on her way to New York the Mame was 
blown up (February 15, 1898), and one can easily imagine the anxiety 
of all, including the Government, for the safe arrival of the Vezcaya in 
the United States, with her bunkers almost empty. 

In addition to the scattering of the ships at Habana, New York, 
Cartagena, Toulon, and Havre, and to spread further anxiety among 
the squadron, letters that were being received from Madrid repeated, as 
common property, the idea expressed by the phrase of @ second Trafal- 
gar to justify the loss of the island of Cuba, and a letter circulated 
from hand to hand, in which D. M. B., a surgeon of the armada, 
stated that upon the advice of Sefior Moret it was destined to go to the 
Philippines in place of the squadron, because the latter would prob- 
ably be destroyed. Then the admiral, who was closely following 
everything that happened and forming his opinions with that clear 
judgment which characterizes him, asked with insistence for permis- 
sion to go to Madrid in order to formulate a plan of campaign, repeat- 
ing again and again that if the war broke out the West Indies and the 
Philippines would be lost, and that it would mean the total ruin of 
Spain. The answer he received was that in moments of international 
crisis no definite plans can be fornvulated. 

Consequently nothing, absolutely nothing, was done; no thought 
even was given to what was to be done if the war should become a fact." 

So the supreme moment arrived, and the Government, which had not 
enlightened the people and had made no preparations whatever, found 
itself completely disarmed before the tremendous wave which threat- 
ened to change all existing conditions in Spain. The Government 
being afraid to do anything but accept the war to hide its own blun- 
ders, the war was accepted, still in the simple belief that the disaster 
would be confined to the island of Cuba, and that it would not mean 
the total ruin of Spain, as Admiral Cervera had said, and as everyone 
must have said who knew anything of elementary history. 

We shall never weary repeating the fact—moral rather than mate- 
rial—which is apparent in everything we have hitherto stated, namely, 
that the war was not desired by the Government nor by the people, 
nor even by the press, which believed it impossible. An eminent 
man, of the greatest influence in Spain, Emilio Castelar, to whom 








1The United States Army and Navy desired the war. But when it is learned, if it 
is ever learned, what efforts were made at Paris up to the last moment before the war 
broke out, in which efforts our ambassador and the Spanish minister who had been 
at Washington took part, it may possibly appear that the United States Govern- 
ment did not desire the war, and that, with the exception of Cuba, we might have 
saved everything, including even the recognition of the debt. 

The United States Navy had considerable influence in the Senate, and, supported 
by public opinion, it pushed matters with great success, as may be seen from a com- 
parison of the incidents of that period. How many things will be written, or could 
be written, within the next fifty years! 


22 


monuments are being erected for having reestablished the discipline 
of the army, in emulation of Juan de Robres, author of the peace 
proposition and bard of universal love, but who spoke of the build- 
ing of new ships as of throwing millions into the Nervién, had in his 
writings spoken in such extravagant language of the United States of 
North America as the purest expression of democracy, equality, and 
progress, that there was hardly anyone in Spain, from the most uned- 
ucated to the most learned, who did not feel the marvelous charm of 
the harmonious prose of perhaps the most eminent writer that ever 
lived. But we who remembered the history of Florida and of Louisi- 
ana, the unjust campaign against Mexico, and how the Latin race has 
been robbed of the best territories of the world, which throws the lie 
in the face of the whole universe against that so-called just and humani- 
tarian policy, and the active part which the United States had taken 
against our dominion in Cuba long before the first expedition of Nar- 
ciso Lopez, and above all we who had lived among them were called 
sectarians, impassioned men, little short of partisans of the inquisition. 
This went so far that the writer, about fifteen years before the events 
herein recorded, felt himself isolated in the Geographic Congress of 
Madrid, the Geographic Society and the Atheneum of Madrid, the 
center of the intellectual culture of all Spain, and was politely rebuked 
because his opinion differed from the mad Anglomania of 99 per cent 
of his colleagues. These bitter disenchantments had to come ‘in 
order to make the Geographic Society think it necessary tacitly to 
beg my pardon, leaving in the heart of the citizen and the patriot the 
sad satisfaction of having been right. We cite this case as one of the 
thousand instances of such great moral deterioration relative to every- 
thing English or American that, without this chastisement sent by God, 
the time might have come when, in order to be considered as belonging 
to high life, our women would have been required to debase themselves 
by drinking whisky and brandy, or to send their fathers and husbands 
to hospitals, as the people of pur sang do in that model country of 
Moret’s and Castelar’s. 

It was impossible for us, who plainly saw the storm approaching, to 
make ourselves heard by those who considered us mad. And if at this 
moment all of Europe were to descend upon Spain with all her forces 
on land and sea, although we are ruined, shattered, and in one of the 
most critical periods this noble country has ever passed through, still, 
if the whole country were to unite with us in one grand effort, morally 
as well as materially, and with the powerful assistance of the will of a 
nation, we should be in better condition than the navy was in the war 
into which it was forced, and in which it had no more chance than a 
detachment of the civil guard would have if sent out against a power- 
ful party of highwaymen, simply as a matter of form, and as though 
the hostility of the United States were merely the fancy of some idler. 


CHAPTER III. 


While the situation was shaping itself, as described in the previous 
chapter, there had been prepared at Cadiz a flotilla of three torpedo 
boats and three torpedo-boat destroyers, and after overcoming a thou- 
sand difficulties, apparently of a naval nature, but in reality of a diplo- 
matic character, it had put to sea and was at St. Vincent, Cape Verde, 
awaiting the order to start for the West Indies. Its departure was 
delayed in the vain hope of a peaceful solution, in view of the repeated 
threat that its departure would be considered a casus belli. 

On April 8 Rear-Admiral Cervera left Cadiz to join this division, 
with the armored cruiser /nfanta Maria Teresa, his flagship, and the 
Cristébal Colon, the latter without her heavy guns, as previously stated. 
The admiral did not carry with him any instructions from the Govern- 
ment, but was to receive them at his destination by a collier which was 
to follow him. This proceeding is the more incomprehensible, as the 
collier left almost at the same time as the squadron. 

To send instructions to a modern squadron by means of a steamer 
of 8 knots speed, which was to stop at the Canaries for the purpose of 
coaling, in place of giving them to the admiral himself, is a proceed- 
ing which before the tribunal of history will stand as one of the 
gravest charges of this period. But that is not all. It would have 
been the most natural thing for Admiral Cervera’s squadron, if it was 
irrevocably to go to the West Indies, to stop at the Canaries, where 
it could have refitted in a few hours, not only because the navy had 
contracts there, but also because the necessary appliances were to be 
found there for shipping all needed supplies, in addition to the very 
important circumstance that the telegraph was at the disposal of 
the Government and the cable was moored at Cadiz, so that it could 
not be interfered with. All this led the admiral to believe that he 
was sent to Cape Verde to get the torpedo-boat flotilla and convoy it 
back to the Peninsula; for when war had once been declared it would 
be impossible for said torpedo boats to cross the Atlantic. 

Upon our arrival at St. Vincent, on April 14, we learned that the 
armored cruisers Oguendo and Vizcaya were coming from Puerto Rico 
to meet at the former harbor, as they did with mathematical pre- 
cision. But two large ships more considerably aggravated the prob- 

23 


24 


lem of coal, which has been the foundation of our disasters, those in 
power having forgotten that modern tactics are the tactics of fuel. 

The United States consul had bought all the available coal at Cape 
Verde, and only after a thousand difficulties and by paying twice the 
regular price did we succeed in obtaining 700 tons, which were sold 
us upon orders from England, probably in the firm belief that the 10 
vessels we had there, counting both large and small ones, would not 
be able to do snails with that quantity. 

In the meantime the collier San Francisco arrived with the fatal 
instructions. 

We immediately proceeded to unload her and recoal all the ships, 
which is a very difficult operation at St. Vincent, because the sea 
coming from the island of San Antonio and striking ships headed 
toward the breeze on the broadside renders it impossible in that harbor 
for one ship to go alongside of another, so that we had to do the coal- 
ing by means of a few small coal lighters which the English company 
let us have, though very unwillingly. It was a slow and arduous task, 
and even with the coal brought by the San Francisco and Cadiz there 
was not enough to refill the bunkers. 

Owing to the instructions, of which we shall speak hereafter, the 
three torpedo boats did not return to the Peninsula with the steamer 
Cadiz, which had convoyed them. This steamer, which was originally 
a passenger steamer, had on board the main armament of the destroy- 
ers, as well as the ammunition, torpedoes, and many other articles 
which it is very difficult to transship when the order in which they are 
arranged in the storerooms is changed, making it necessary at times 
to take out things which have a whole cargo on top of them. And 
worst of all, the squadron was so much in need of coal that it was 
necessary to take it even from the bunkers of the Cadiz, which, as 
above stated, was not a freight steamer, and how difficult Rie is can 
hardly be Panlited except by those who have a knowledge of nautical 
matters. The latter need not be told how slow and arduous a task is 
transshipment under such circumstances. 

The admiral opened the instructions with veritable anxiety, for 
although he was in a measure ‘prepar ed they must have affected him 
deeply. 

The instructions provided that the squadron was to go to Puerto 
Rico, as its principal mission was to be to defend that island. The 
admiral was authorized to go to Cuba. He was also given authority— 
and the politicians qualified this as great liberty of action—to choose 
his own route and accept or refuse battle with the United States 
squadron, as he might deem best. This authorization meant nothing, 
for in the first case it was self-understood, and in the second case he 
had to do the best he could. 

The admiral convened a council of war, consisting of Captain 


25 


Paredes, second in command of the squadron; Capts. Diaz Moreu, 
Lazaga, and Eulate, commanders of the cruisers Crzstdbal Colon, 
Oquendo, and Vizcaya, respectively; Bustamante, chief of staff; 
Villaamil, chief of the torpedo-boat flotilla; and myself, commander 
of the Maria Teresa, flagship of the squadron. This memorable 
council was held on the 20th of April on board the Cristdbal Colon, 
whose commander was sick at that time. 

It is impossible to describe the impression which the reading of the 
instructions made upon us. For the squadron to go to the West 
Indies meant, as Captain Mahan says, the foredooming of the four 
gallant ships; it meant the carrying of the war to Puerto Rico, for 
wherever the squadron went there war must follow it; and it meant 
the adding of one more to Spain’s tribulations, since Puerto Rico was 
as yet quiet. The harbor of San Juan, the only one the squadron 
could enter, offered no military protection for ships, nor any coast 
defenses to speak ef; and it was no wonder that Admiral Sampson, 
after the bombardment of May 12, said in his official report—and he 
spoke the truth—that he decided not to continue the attack, although 
he was satisfied and certain of the possibility of attaining the surrender 
of the city, which he had not done because he did not have landing 
forces to occupy it. We mention this in order to destroy the illusion, 
which is still being clung to by some, that the United States squadron 
was repulsed at San Juan. 

In case the squadron went to Cuba it would be impossible for it to 
reach Habana Harbor, which was the only military harbor, properly 
speaking; for the enemy, who had several months ago established 
their base of operationsat Key West and Dry Tortugas, only five or six 
hours distant from the capital of the Greater Antilla, would be sure to 
watch very closely the only harbor possessing powerful artillery, 
especially as the approaches of said harbor were very easy to control. 
It was not known whether Cienfuegos was fortified; all we knew was 
that it had some torpedoes, and the natural assumption was that this 
harbor would be watched the most closely next to Habana, because it 
was connected by rail with the latter. Cienfuegos, moreover, could 
without difficulty be blockaded by the enemy, as the United States 
squadron could lie at anchor at the neighboring reefs, and by means 
of scouts at Cape Cruz could be informed in good season of the 
approach of our ships and receive them with forces four times as 
large. 

The enemy at that time had in the Atlantic Ocean the battleships 
Indiana, Towa, and Massachusetts, which were invulnerable as far as 
we were concerned, and each one of which represented greater power 
than our whole squadron together, so that it was only in the highly 
improbable case of meeting one of them alone that we had the slightest 
chance of defeating her by ramming, and even then probably not until 
we had lost half of our ships. 


26 


Besides these battleships they had the Teas (a cruiser of the type 
of our Vizcaya), the Brooklyn and New York, each far superior to any 
one of our ships, two ships of the Columbia type, powerful auxiliaries, 
besides a number of other cruisers and monitors, and over 120 vessels 
armed for war purposes, which, while not strong individually, repre- 
sented, when supported by a powerful nucleus of armor clads, a tre- 
mendous force which it would have been madness for us to want to 
oppose. 

This whole force, even before the arrival of the Oregon, could have 
formed four groups or squadrons, each overwhelmingly stronger 
than ours. For us there was no solution within human power but to 
go to Habana, Cienfuegos, or Santiago de Cuba, or even San Juan de 
Puerto Rico (although to go there would have meant to go in search 
of destruction), and if each one of those four divisions had taken up 
its position in front of one of the harbors which we had to enter, such 
division could have compelled us to battle, with absolute certainty of 
destroying our squadron. Even granting that such had not been the 
case and that we had had the rare good fortune of forcing our way 
through, it would have been with such injuries and losses that our 
squadron would have been rendered useless for the rest of the cam- 
paign, which would have ended the war for Spain, for the war was 
the squadron, and nothing but the squadron. To suppose, as it was 
supposed at that time, that the hostilities could be continued after the 
loss of the ships shows a sad lack of knowledge of our military situ- 
uation and of the meaning of modern squadrons." 

The Americans, on the other hand, did have such knowledge. 
Taking into account injuries and accidents to machinery, the necessity 
of renewing the coal supply and other difficulties from which no ship 
is exempt, they formed only two squadrons in place of four, so that even 
if two or more of the most powerful ships were temporarily absent, 
the remaining forces would still be such as to exclude any doubt as to 
the result. This is an admirable military precaution, even in case of 
overwhelming superiority. If we had done such a thing it would 
have given rise more than once to the question whether we were 
afraid. 

The object of military operations is final success and not proofs of 
valor. But it is useless to discuss this point, for it will never be 
understood in Spain. 

On the other hand, the enemy had made all manner of preparations 
months before the J/ame went to Habana. ‘They occupied the sea of 
operations, made sure of the powerful cooperation of the Cuban 








1 “Admiral Cervera’s squadron having been destroyed,’’ said the London Times of 
August 16, with good reason, ‘‘the war was practically at an end, unless Spain 
wanted to continue the struggle solely for the sake of honor, for there was nothing 
else she could save.”’ 


27 


insurgents, through whom they received information, not only as to 
Cuba, but as to all the Lesser Antilles, through which were scattered 
many emigrants and sympathizers, and finally, they used for their 
final preparations all those days which were occupied by the voyage 
of our squadron. 

On our part, leaving aside the defects of the ships, of which I shall 
speak in connection with the battle, we would arrive with our engines 
in the condition which is the natural result of a squadron crossing the 
Atlantic, especially if it is remembered that the Oquendo and Vizcaya 
had to make that voyage twice, without even a collier that would per- 
mit us upon arrival partly to replenish the coal consumed and to 
manceuvre untrammeled without having to think of our bunkers. 
Spain had at that time twelve heavy naval euns, and to divide this 
already scant force by sending six to the West Indies and leaving the 
other half in the Peninsula was so great a strategic mistake that it 
alone would have been sufficient to make a name for the hostile 
admiral who accomplished this by virtue of his manceuvres. 

In view of these considerations, which are rigorously exact and which 
have since been repeated by all naval writers of the world, with the 
exception of a few English publications in bad taste, we all agreed 
that it would be mad, criminal, and absurd to go out to surrender the 
country to the mercy of the enemy, for there was no doubt that the 
less difficulties the campaign presented to them the more exorbitant 
would be their demands. 

It was the unanimous opinion of all that the Philippine Archipelago 
was in the greatest danger, as appears from the official report of 
which we give a copy hereafter, for we felt sure that the insurrection 
would again arise there and support the attack from the outside. But 
this was no time to go to the Philippines when the mother country 
was in urgent need of us, for there was no doubt in our minds that if 
the Americans, counting on the Cuban insurrection, first directed their 
efforts against that island in order to facilitate the campaign, the war, 
as 1s the case with all naval wars, must necessarily end on the coasts of 
the unsuccessful nation. Therefore, the war would have to be con- 
sidered terminated when the United States squadron threatened to go 
to Spain, as would no doubt happen one way or another. And in this 
connection we deny the combinations relative to sending reenforce- 
ments to the United States squadron in the Philippines, which the 
eminent writer Mahan describes in detail at the conclusion of his 
articles, explaining the wherefore of the movements of the forces 
referred to; for if the United States squadron did not cross the 
Atlantic when no one could prevent it from doing so, it was because 
it did not please England, their ally, who did not want to see her 
cousins spread alarm on the Continent, which, without exception, was 
pained to see our ruin, or because England realized that her friends 


28 


had gone a great deal farther than she had counted upon. While we 
did not at that time clearly understand the part Great Britain played, 
though we had our suspicions, it was not so as to the outcome of the 
war which we saw as clearly then—that is, while we were at the Cape 
Verde Islands—as we do now. 

It was therefore evident that the only possible solution was to return 
to the coasts of Spain. That is what all military writers of the world 
now say, and the English Admiral Colomb goes so far as to say that 
Cervera should have done so, disobeying orders, even at the risk of 
being shot, for he would thereby have saved Puerto Rico and the 
Philippines for Spain, and there can be no doubt as to this. Thus we 
were of unanimous opinion that the squadron should return to the 
Peninsula. We therefore assembled all the fighting ships. We hada 
nucleus of torpedo boats which, though small in number, were good 
and adapted, even by themselves alone, to render permanent operations 
on our coasts difficult for an enemy whose harbors were so far distant. 
The enemy, in order to go to Spain, would have to divide their forces, 
as we had had to divide ours to go to their country. Our fortifica- 
tions, though not very powerful, were yet sufficient to keep at bay a 
squadron which had no harbor near as a refuge for its injured ships, 
and even if they should take from us some abandoned island and use 
it as a base of operations, they would still be compelled, in order to 
repair their ships thoroughly, to take them across the Atlantic, and 
hence an injury to one of their principal ships would make a general 
retreat necessary. Finally, all of Europe, including even England, 
must have realized more clearly than it was realized in Cuba, where 
the sympathy of the whole world had been estranged from us as the 
result of calumny, that for the first time in history the guns of the 
new continent were to knock at the harbors of old Europe, beginning - 
with the oldest of her nations; but the turn of the others was sure to 
come and then it would be too late for the latter to repent of having 
abandoned us in the hour of need. 

True that our return might have carried the war to the Peninsula, 
but under such different circumstances that surely not one of our 
seaboard cities would have had to suffer; and when peace was con- 
cluded, instead of our sorrowfully pleading for mercy, we might have 
threatened to renew the war, especially as the invasion of Cuba by the 
United States Army, while our squadron was intact at the Peninsula, 
would probably not have taken place. This is the opinion of the 
Americans themselves, and it has since been corroborated by the pru- 
dence they observed, which, we state again, we do not censure, but 
which, on the contrary, we consider worthy of professional and 
political admiration. 

At that council of war, which we compared at the time with the 
council held on the eve of the battle of Trafalgar, expression was 


29 


given to the greatest energy and patriotism, and a vehement telegram 
was drawn up addressed to the Government, in which we set forth our 
opinions. 

But one thing happened at this meeting which, we trust, will acquire 
importance from the candor with which we relate it. The circum- 
stances were known to all; each one had formed his own opinion con- 
cerning them, as became evident from the statements made at the 
meeting; but none of us knew anything of the exertions made by the 
admiral, who had not spoken of them even to his chief of staff nor to 
myself, his flag captain, although we were very intimate, for I had 
been his executive officer on board several ships and his lifelong 
friend, and this was the fourth ship which I commanded under his 
flagas admiral. Thus, froma wonderful devotion to discipline, he had 
preserved the most absolute secrecy and had carried on personally, 
with the assistance of a son of his, who acted as his amanuensis, the 
whole official and semiofficial correspondence, so that there had been 
no interchange of ideas between us, and we knew nothing of the Goy- 
ernment’s strange proceedings, which was necessary if we were to 
discuss matters of such vital importance with proper intelligence. 

The telegram first drawn up in which we opposed the Government 
appeared so vehement, although it would seem quite just and mild at 
this time, that all of us, without exception, agreed to change it, and it 
was thus that the following telegram, which, owing to the natural reac- 
tion, was deficient in the opposite extreme, was approved and for- 
warded on the evening of April 20: 

In agreement with the second in command and the commanders of the vessels, I 
suggest going to the Canaries. Ariefe has boilers in bad condition; boiler of Azor is 
very old. Vizcaya must be docked and have her bottom painted if she is to preserve 
her speed. Canaries would be protected from a rapid descent of the enemy, and all 


the forces would be in a position, if necessary, to hasten to the defense of the mother 


country. 


The proceedings of the meeting were signed by the commanders in 
chief, Cervera and Paredes, and by Captains Lazaga, Diaz Moreu, 
Eulate, Concas, Bustamante, and Villaamil, the latter, being the 
youngest, signing as secretary. 

At the conclusion of the council of war I returned to my ship 
together with the admiral, to whom I privately stated my belief that 
the telegram hardly expressed what had occurred at the meeting, and 
I insisted on my opinion set forth at said meeting that each one ought 
to have given his views in writing and signed them with his name, as 
these proceedings would pass into history and might constitute the 
military testament of each one of us, the only thing, perhaps, that 
would defend our memory, the honor of the navy, and the name which 
was to be our legacy to our children, whom we should probably never 
see again. 


30 


The admiral thought a moment, placed his right hand on his fore- 
head, closing his eyes for an instant, then laying his hand on my shoul- 
der, he turned to Bustamante, who was writing, but listening at the 
same time, and said to him: ‘‘ Victor is right!” and shaking me affec- 
tionately, as I was still absorbed in profound meditation, he added: 
‘* You write it out, then.” I told my beloved admiral that I could not do 
so, because it would seem like disloyalty toward my comrades, as it 
would appear to be my own personal views, when with slight differ- 
ences the opinions of all had been the same. ‘‘ Precisely because all 
were of the same opinion, you write it out as the expression of the 
views of all the captains of the squadron; and now I command you to 
do so,” the admiral added kindly. 

I did so, and Admiral Cervera accompanied the document with the 
noteworthy communication which I copy below, together with my 
views, as taken from the Madrid newspaper La Epoca, and which are 
therefore public property, the same as all other documents which we 
quote herein, regretting that we can not do the same with many others: 


The Minister oF MARINE: 

For lack of time I could not tell you yesterday about the council which met on 
board the Colén, and only sent you a copy of the proceedings. The council lasted 
nearly four hours. The prevailing spirit was that of purest discipline, characterized 
by the high spirit which animates the whole fleet, and especially the distinguished 
commanders, who are an honor to Spain and the navy, and whom it is my good for- 
tune to have for companions in these critical and solemn circumstances. The first 
and natural desire expressed by all was to go resolutely in quest of the enemy and 
surrender their lives on the altar of the mother country; but the vision of the same 
mother country abandoned, insulted, and trod upon by the enemy, proud of our 
defeat—for nothing else could be expected by going to meet them on their own 
ground with our inferior forces—compelled them to see that such sacrifice would not 
only be useless but harmful, since it would place Spain in the hands of an insolent 
and proud enemy, and God only knows what the consequences might be. 

I could see the struggle in their minds between these conflicting considerations. 
All of them loathe the idea of not going immediately in search of the enemy and 

» 
finishing once for all. But, as I said before, the vision of the country trampled upon 
by the enemy rose above all other considerations, and inspired with that courage 
which consists in braving criticism and perhaps the sarcasm and accusations of the 
ignorant masses, which know nothing about war in general and naval warfare in 
particular and believe that the Alfonso XII or the Cristina can be pitted against the 
Lowa or Massachusetts, they expressly and energetically declare that the interests of 
the mother country demanded this sacrifice from us. One of the captains had cer- 
tain scruples about expressing his opinion, saying that he would do what the 
Government of His Majesty should be pleased to order; but as all of us, absolutely 
all, shared these sentiments, it is hardly necessary to say his scruples were soon over- 
come. My only reason for mentioning this is to give you an exact report of every- 
thing that happened. 

Another of the captains, certainly not the most enthusiastic, but who may be said 
to have represented the average opinion prevailing in the council, has, by my order, 
written down his ideas and I send you a copy of his statement, which reflects better 
than I could express them the opinions of all. This document represents exactly the 
sentiment which prevailed in the meeting. 


31 


Believing that I have fulfilled my duty in giving your excellency an accurate account 
of all that happened, I reiterate the assurance of the excellent spirit of all. 
Yours, ete. 


PascuaL CERVERA. 
APRIL 21, 1898. 


Views of Capt. Victor M. Concas, commander of the battleship 
Infanta Maria Teresa: 


Concerning the subjects presented for discussion by the admiral of the fleet at the 
council of war held on board the battleship Cristébal Colén, my opinion is as follows: 

(1) The naval forces of the United States are so immensely superior to our own in 
number and class of vessels, armor, and armament, and in preparations made, besides 
the advantage given the enemy by the insurrection in Cuba, the possible one in 
Puerto Rico, and the latent insurrection in the east, that they have sufficient forces 
to attack us in the West Indies, in the Peninsula and adjacent islands, and in the 
Philippines. 

Since no attention has been paid to that archipelago, where it was, perhaps, most 
urgent to reduce our vulnerable points, which could have been done with a single 
battleship, any division of our limited forces at this time and any separation from 
European waters would involve a strategic mistake which would carry the war to 
the Peninsula, and that would mean frightful disaster to our coasts, the payment of 
large ransoms, and, perhaps, the loss of some island. 

As soon as this fleet leaves for the West Indies it is evident that the American 
flying squadron will sail for Europe, and even if its purpose were only to make a 
raid or a demonstration against our coasts the just alarm of all Spain would cause the 
enforced return of this fleet, although too late to prevent the enemy from reaping 
the fruits of an easy victory. 

The only three vessels of war remaining for the defense of the peninsula—the Car- 
los V, the Pelayo, whose repairs are not yet finished, and the Alfonso XII, of very 
little speed, and even that not certain—are not sufficient for the defense of the Spanish 
coasts, and in no manner for that of the Canaries. The yacht Giralda and the steam- 
ers Germania and Normania, of the acquisition of which official notice has been 
received, are not vessels of fighting qualities and add no strength to our navy. 

(2) The plan of defending the island of Puerto Rico, abandoning Cuba to its fate, 
is absolutely impracticable, because, if the American fleet purposely destroys a city 
of the last-named island, in spite of all the plans of the Government on the subject, 
and even though it would be the maddest thing in the world, the Government itself 
would be forced by public opinion to send this fleet against the Americans, under 
the conditions and at the point which the latter might choose. 

(3) Even deciding upon the defense of Puerto Rico alone, the trip across at this 
time, after the practical declaration of war, without a military port where the fleet 
might refit on its arrival, and without an auxiliary fleet to keep the enemy busy— 
who, I suppose, will make St. Thomas his base of operations—is a strategic error, 
the more deplorable because there have been months and even years in which to 
accumulate the necessary forcesin the West Indies. It seems probable, judging from 
the information acquired, that the supplies accumulated at St. Thomas are intended 
by the enemy to establish a base of operations in the vicinity of our unprotected 
Vieques (Crab Island). For all these reasons the responsibility of the voyage must 
remain entirely with the Government. 

(4) Adding these three battleships and the Cristébal Colén, without her big guns, 
to the two remaining in the Peninsula, and to the few old torpedo boats which we 
have left, it is possible to defend our coasts from the Guadiana to Cape Creus, includ- 
ing the Balearic Islands and the Canaries, thanks to the distance of the enemy from 
his base of operations. This defense, however, will have to be a very energetic one 


32 


if the enemy brings his best ships to bear on us, and it will not be possible to save 
the coasts of Galicia and of the north of Spain from suffering more or less if the 
enemy should bring along a fast division, nor even the protected coasts, from an 
attack here and there, as our ships are too few in number to be divided. 

(5) It is very regrettable that there are not enough vessels to cover all points at 
one time; but duty and patriotism compel us to present clearly the resources which 
the country gave us and the needs which present circumstances bring on the country 
in danger. 

(6) Lastly, I believe, with due respect, that the military situation should be laid 
before the minister of marine, while I reiterate our profoundest subordination to his 
orders and our firm purpose most energetically to carry out the plans of operations 
he may communicate to these forces. But, after pointing out the probable conse- 
quences, the responsibility must remain with the Government. 

Victor M. Concas.! 


St. VINCENT, CAPE VERDE, April 20, 1898. 

These significant communications we suppose reached Spain on May 
5. I say we suppose, because, although duly acknowledged by the 
then minister of marine, they do not appear in the archives, and 
probably went astray at the council of ministers, since the latter was 
the cause of the highly important order to the squadron to return to 
Spain, issued on May 12, and of which we shall speak later. But, 
treating this matter with due loyalty, as everything else’herein set 
forth, we must say that the Government had on that day no further 
information than the telegram of April 20, above referred to, giving 
an account of the meeting. 

The answer was another telegram, ordering the departure to be 
delayed and stating that a council of admirals was to be convened at 
Madrid. 

In the meantime the telegraphic correspondence with Madrid was 
continued, as the result of the fact that we all went more deeply into 
the question. 

On April 21 Admiral Cervera addressed to the Government the fol- 
lowing significant telegram: 

The more I think about it the more I am convinced that to continue voyage to 


Puerto Rico would be disastrous. The captains of the ships are of same opinion 
as I, some more emphatically. 


On April 22 the admiral had to ask whether war had been declared. 
On the same day the admiral telegraphed as follows: 


I beg your excellency to permit me to insist that the result of our voyage to America 
must be disastrous for the future of our country. That is the opinion of all men of 








1As it is always gratifying to present testimony in support of an opinion sustained 
under very unusual circumstances, I beg to be permitted to state in support of the 
foregoing views that it appears from Admiral Sampson’s telegram dated May 12 that 
he sent the auxiliary cruiser Yale to St. Thomas in search of information; and from 
his telegram of May 8 that he told his Government, among other things, that ‘‘if 
the auxiliary vessels he had asked for were sent to him he would proceed to San 
Juan, probably destroying fortifications, establishing a temporary base at Culebra 
Island, to the east of Puerto Rico,’’ ete. 


33 


honor. I beg your excellency to read this telegram and my whole official and con- 
fidential correspondence to the president of the council, in order to ease my 
‘conscience. 

In the meantime two telegrams had been received to the effect that 
the mission of the squadron was the defense of Puerto Rico, and finally, 
on the 24th, another telegram in which the minister said that the Govy- 
ernment, in conjunction with the council of admirals, ordered the 
departure, adding that the United States flag was hostile. These tele- 
grams will in due time be published in full, so that each one of them 
will stand before history for the part it played therein. 

Villaamil, taking advantage of the circumstance that he was a 
deputy, telegraphed on April 22 to Préxedes Mateo Sagasta, premier 
of the Government, stating that he considered the sacrifice of the 
squadron as certain as it was useless and disastrous. And as the sub- 
lime and the ridiculous are often closely connected, this telegram was 
answered by Sefior Moret, minister of colonies, by an English tele- 
gram saying, ‘* God bless you.” 

The telegram ordering the departure of the squadron and the one 
containing Sefior Moret’s blessing, which each one of us honestly 
appropriated to himself, were answered by the admiral in a letter 
dated the 24th and closed on the 27th, in which he said, among other 
things: 

As the act has been consummated, I will not insist upon my opinion concerning 
it. May God grant that I be mistaken! You see I was right when I told you 
that by the end of April the Pelayo, Carlos V, Vitoria, and Numancia would not be 
finished; that the Colén would not have her big guns unless we took the defective 
ones; that we should not have the 5.5 inch ammunition for the new guns, etc. With 
a clear conscience I go to the sacrifice, but I can not understand the unanimous 
decision of the general officers of the navy indicating disapprobation and censure of 
my opinions, which implies that some one of them should have relieved me. 

There was, therefore, no way out of the dilemma. The idea of 
returning to Spain contrary to instructions, which was fermenting 
in the minds of all, was sustained with energy by Capt. Diaz Moreu 
as the only salvation of the country. But the opinion of the others, 
though this point was not discussed at the council of war, was that the 
ignorance prevailing in Spain as to the true situation was so great, 
even among the most highly educated classes, that we should not only 
be punished, but also ridiculed, and no one would ever understand that 
it was a heroic resolution and a sublime sacrifice. And hence we had 
no choice but obedience, which for Spain was equivalent to the loss 
of those of her colonies which she still had a chance of preserving. 
Moreover, there was the council of admirals. 

It was with profound sorrow that we realized that discipline forbade 
our discussing that council, not to censure it for the decision it had 
arrived at, but, on the contrary, to defend it from the charges which 
history will bring against it, if at the time when it is written and when 

14232—No. VIII 


9 
a 





34 


these matters can be talked about with entire freedom the admirals 
composing said council should no longer be among the living to add to 
their respective decisions a full account of everything that led up to 
them, as they, and they alone, can do. Below we give in full a letter 
written by Sefior Francisco Silvela, now president of the council of 
ministers, who quotes the words of Sefior Guillermo Chacon, late 
admiral, who was one of those who voted for the squadron going to 
the West Indies. These words say more in favor of the said meeting 
and of the above statements than anything I could add. 

To this meeting were convened all the admirals residing at Madrid, 
including those on the retired list, who are never called to such coun- 
cils, because on account of het advanced age or invalidism, they 
are not able to keep themselves posted as to the marvelous transfor- 
mations of the matériel. The majority of them, however, were pol- 
iticians, and it was from the standpoint of politics that the question 
was laid before them, as the uprising of the very stones in the street 
in Cuba as well as in Spain had to be represented to them. So one 
of two things had to happen; either the politicians or the purely naval 
men had to prevail at said meeting. And while we know and esteem 
all the officers present and have no doubt that all maintained their 
Opinions with the independence that characterizes each one of them, 
there will nevertheless always remain a question as to one of the opin- 
ions, the one which carried the others along with it; for he who pro 
nounced it, a politician par excellence, was only twenty-seven days 
later called to the ministry of marine as though as a reward. 

Four admirals voted against the departure of the squadron, though 
their opinions varied in form, and favored rather concentration of all 
the ships. Since then many a voice has been raised in favor of that 
opinion; for the same thing that happened at our council of war at 
Cape Verde occurred also at this meeting, namely, those present were 
taken by surprise; and we know positively that, if in either case there 
had been twenty-four hours’ time between the convening of the coun- 
cil and the all-important decision, the vehemence of our telegram 
would have been such that it would have made even the blind see, and 
the decision of the council of admirals would no doubt have been 
unanimously to the effect that our fighting ships ought never to have 
left the coasts of the Peninsula, neither united nor separately. 

Those who voted against the departure were Admirals Lazaga, 
Gémez-Imaz, Mozo, and Butler; but the former two, believing that 
they had not done enough and fully convinced that a national catastro- 
phe was hanging over us, carried their efforts by common consent out- 
side of the council, using every possible endeavor, for they believed— 
and they were right—that there was still time to save our country. 

We regret that Rear-Admiral José Gémez-Imaz has not been able 
to authorize us to speak of the many efforts he made in certain quar- 


35 


ters, as they would redound in the highest degree to his patriotism 
and the consciousness of his duty as a good Spaniard, and would also 
honor those to whom he applied and who did all in their power. But 
fortunately Joaquin M. Lazaga has authorized us to publish the share 
he took in these last efforts to save the country and for which we feel 
deeply grateful, because if he had not done so it might seem like an 
argument in favor of our theory. 

Admiral Lazaga went to see Sefior Francisco Silvela, leader of the 
Conservative party, who was deeply impressed and became convinced 
of the disaster threatening us. He at once went to interview the 
president of the council of ministers, in order to induce him to use 
every endeavor against the departure of the squadron, and the letter 
we give below, and which we have been authorized to publish, tells 
better than anything we might say what was the result of the patri- 
otic efforts of Sefior Silvela and Admiral Lazaga, and shows at the 
same time that there were men in Madrid who shared our opinion and 
who realized how statesmen should understand their duties. 

The letter referred to is as follows: 


Francisco Silvela, 1 Serrano, Madrid, to His Excellency Joaquin M. Lazaga. 


My Dear Frienp: I have spoken to the president, as I told you I would, but 
without any practical result. He said that the instructions to Cervera give him 
absolute freedom as to his route; that the superior speed of his ships will permit him 
to elude an encounter if he is not in condition to fight; that he can go to Cuba, 
Puerto Rico, or United States harbors, and can await, for a decisive battle, the ships 
that will be sent from here to join him. This seems to me neither practical nor 
possible. Admiral Chacén has told Villaverde that he too deems the concentration 
of the squadron absolutely necessary, and that it would be a great thing if Sagasta 
could be made to see this. I have tried hard to convince him; but it is too late. 
God protect our brave sailors! Tt is with them that rests our only hope of salvation, 
at least the salvation of honor. I shall try to see you soon and give you further 
details; but as I realize how anxious you must be I tell you this much, feeling sure 
that it is safe in your hands. 

Very aifectionately, your friend, F. SILVELA. 

(Wednesday. ) 


But in spite of all, the telegram ordering the departure was con- 
firmed. God had withdrawn his hand from Spain! The die had been 
cast, and the Moret-Sagasta administration had written upon our 
history the words: /inis Hispanie! 


CHAPTER IV, 


Spanish statesmen, it is to be supposed, thought that the 
honor of their country was better served by exposing to 
the world its incomprehensible incapacity than by making 
terms with the United States, and parting with Cuba for 
a consideration, before this incapacity was exhibited to 
the world.—(The Lessons of the Spanish-American War.— 
CoLom. ) 


If we could have given the above lines to the public at the time of 
the events to which they refer, they would surely have passed from 
hand to hand, not with a view to seeking our justification, nor that of 
the disaster, but to put in practice Talleyrand’s profound maxim that, 
‘* Whatever you may say and write will be repeated and turned against 
you.” But not even that can we hope for, we who are anxious to be — 
discussed even though unfairly, since the facts speak so loudly for 
themselves that we need fear no controversy. But it would be in vain 
for us to aspire to the interest of past times, when those who have the 
greatest interest in hiding their responsibility, of which they have not, 
like ourselves, been exonerated by any tribunal, have succeeded in 
throwing upon this period of history the great remedy of politicians, 
time, and with it, public indifference. | 

This being the case, we claim the protection of history and of our 
comrades in the navy, Spanish as well as foreigners, in conjunction 
with fair-minded men who make a study of the development of this 
drama, to constitute an honest, intelligent, and absolutely independent 
jury to whom we do not hesitate to submit our cause, since circum- 
stances have taken from us universal suffrage. 

In order to complete the necessary data to strengthen the conviction 
of what we have stated in the previous chapter, it is necessary to make 
the reader acquainted with part of the official documents which have 
been published in full abroad, and some of which have been copied 
by La Epoca, and others by El Correo Gallego, of Ferrol, in its sup- 
plement of February 17, 1899, as also by several other papers. 
We repeat again that we make mention only of those documents 
which have been published, and not of those which should have been 
published. 

36 


37 


Before proceeding we will speak of a matter which will surely find 
many imitators in future. Admiral Cervera, foreseeing not only acci- 
dents to his flagship, but also the struggle of opposed interests which — 
always accompanies great historical events, especially when success 
can not reasonably be hoped for, and considering the necessity of leay- 
ing a testament of his military history, forwarded all his documents to 
a safe person, who, in conjunction with two other men, likewise highly 
respectable, drew up a certificate in which he acknowledged the receipt 
of said documents. In the same manner, during the night of July 2, 
the admiral placed in the care of the archbishop of Santiago de Cuba 
all his other official and semiofficial documents up to said date, so that 
these extremely important papers were not destroyed the next day by 
the flames which devoured the flagship of the squadron. 

We do not copy these documents, since they have already been pub- 
lished in full and circulated through the whole world, and we shall com- 
ment on them only briefly. It is sufficient for our object to give a few 
precise extracts in defense of the theory which we have set forth rela- 
tive to the preparations made in Spain prior to the war, leaving out 
details which distract the attention from the principal facts, and at the 
same time reducing the length which has kept many persons from 
reading these documents. 

Although the admiral commenced his important correspondence on 
December 3, 1897, it was not until February, 1898, when the events 
became precipitated and the voyage of the cruisers Vizcaya and Oquendo 
had been determined upon, that the admiral made his observations 
with increased energy, as shown by an official letter dated February 
6, 1898. 

In his letter of the 7th he said, among other things : 

I feel sure that absolute secrecy will be maintained, even as to my flag captain.”’ 

And this, as stated in connection with the council of war at Cape 
Verde, is strictly true. 

On February 9, in speaking of the guns of the Colon, he said: 

And if we have no other guns, and these can fire even twenty-five or thirty 
shots, we should take them anyhow, even though they are expensive and inefficient, 
and we should lose no time about it in order that the vessel may be armed and sup- 
plied with ammunition as soon as possible. 

It is clear that this indicates a profound conviction that the declara- 
tion of war was inevitable. 

In his letter of February 11 the admiral said to the minister: 

I always bear in mind what the press is in this country, and you will have noticed 
that I avoid in my telegrams the use of phrases which might cause alarm or stir up 
passion. With these private letters and confidential communications it is quite dif- 
ferent, and I believe that I owe you my frank opinion, without beating about the 
bush. 

We wish to impress this remark on all fair-minded people, for the 
press, the world over, wants everything discussed on the street, and 


38 


a hundred times have we heard the question asked in connection with 
these matters, why we had not said so, as though we should and could 
have consulted each Spaniard separately. 
On February 12 the admiral asked what was to be the plan of 
rampaign in the prospective war with the United States. 
On February 16, after showing the enormous disparity of the rela- 
tive forces, the admiral said, among other things: 


I dread to think of the results of a naval battle, even if it should be a successful 
one for us. 


By these words the admiral expressed what countless writers have 
said since, namely, that damages to our ships would have rendered 
them useless for the remainder of the war, while the enemy’s forces 
were such as not to be much affected by injuries that some of the ships 
might sustain, and their resources for repairing damages, in case they 
should be material, were inexhaustible. 

On February 25 he stated that none of the ships undergoing repairs 
would be ready by the time the war would probably break out, and 
he doubted whether the Colén would be ready, and he was right. 

In several letters he spoke of the vital question of the metal car- 
tridge cases for the 5.5 inch guns. We shall refer to this matter in 
connection with the sortie from Santiago. 

His letter of February 26 contains the following memorable words, 
which should forever remain engraved upon the hearts of all good 
patriots: 

I send to-day the official letter which I announced yesterday. Its conclusions are 
indeed conflicting; but can we afford to cherish illusions? Do we not owe to our 
country not only our lives, if necessary, but the exposition of our beliefs? I am very 
uneasy about this. I ask myself if it is right for me to keep silent, and thereby 
make myself an accomplice in adventures which will surely cause the total ruin of Spain. 
And for what purpose? To defend an island which was ours, but belongs to us no 
more, because, even if we should not lose it by right in the war, we have lost it in 


fact, and with it all our wealth and an enormous number of young men, victims of 
the climate and bullets, in the defense of what is now no more than a romantic ideal. 


It was perhaps believed that the admiral saw matters in too dark a 
light, while in other quarters all was optimism, for on March 3 he said 
to the minister: 


I have deemed it my duty to express my opinion to the proper authorities—that is, 
to you and to the whole Gcvernment through you—clearly and without beating 
around the bush. Now, let orders be given to me; I will carry them out with energy 
and decision. 


As events followed each other in rapid succession, the admiral wrote 
on March 7: 


Whatever may be the direction given to the conflict—whether war, negotiations 
direct or through a third party, an arbitrator, or otherwise—the longer the decision 
is delayed the worse it will be for us. If it is war, the longer it takes to come the 
more exhausted we will be. If it is negotiation of any kind, the longer it is post- 


39 


poned the greater will be the demands, each time more irritating, which will be 
presented by the United States, and to which we will have to yield in order to gain 
time in the vain hope of improving our military position. And as our position can 
not be improved, let us see what we can expect from a war under such conditions. 

It would be foolish to deny that what we may reasonably expect is defeat, which 
may be glorious, but all the same defeat, which would cause us to lose the island in 
the worst possible manner. 


In the same letter _he says further on: 


I have never thought of the forces which the United States have in the Pacific and 
Asia in connection with the development of events in the West Indies; but I have 
always considered these forces a great danger for the Philippines, which have not 
even a shadow of a resistance to oppose them. And as regards the American coasts 
of the Pacific, the United States has no anxiety about them on our account. 


On March 16 the admiral begged again and again to be permitted 
to go to Madrid in order to formulate a plan of campaign and to 
explain the terrible danger of the situation. His words are not any 
too strong when he says: 

We can not go to war without meeting with a certain and frightful disaster. 


* * * The war will surely lead us to a terrible disaster, followed by a humiliating 
peace and the most frightful ruin. : 


In conclusion, he asks to be allowed to go to Madrid to inform the 
Government verbally. This request was reiterated with vehemence 
in his telegram of April 7, in reply to which he yas told that he 
would receive the instructions at Cape Verde. 

We have purposely omitted to mention any of the answers which 
these patriotic remonstrances received; but we must mention one 
letter from the minister to the admiral, dated April 7, which has 
already been published and the character of which impels us to speak 
of it. It says, among other things: 

But the President of the United States is surrounded by the waves which he him- 
self has raised and which he is now trying to appease. * * * In the instructions 
which you will receive a general idea is outlined which you will work out with your 
captains, etc. 

This phrase of the waves was repeated a great deal in Madrid, the 
same as that of a second Trafalgar, and serves as an apology for the 
policy which Admiral Colomb censures with as much justice as severity. 

The second sentence quoted from the letter referred to indicates that 
the instructions had been written out. The admiral might therefore 
have received them at Cadiz on the 8th before he left, either by the 
same mail, or by a special engine or tender, or by telegram, which 
would have been well worth while, but never by a collier. 

We shall not comment on the remainder of this letter nor on any of 
the others, out of affection, respect, and sympathy for the minister 
who had the ill-fortune of holding the portfolio on that occasion. But 
there is in connection with this particular matter something much 
more serious which affects the whole Government, namely, while on 


40 

April 7 the departure of the squadron for Cuba had already been 
determined upon and the instructions written out, a telegram was sent 
to the Philippines on the 12th ordering the immediate return to the 
Peninsula of the captain-general of the army, Fernando Primo de 
Rivera, who had recently surrendered the governorship-general of the 
archipelago, and who, considering that the man who had relieved him 
was new in the Philippines and that the circumstances were extremely 
grave, urged the expediency of his remaining there under the orders 
of the new captain-general, on account of his prestige in the country, 
and also to take command of some of the army forces if the war should 
break out. Thus, when the squadron, on April 11, had already passed 
the Canaries on its way to Cuba, in accordance with the instructions 
brought by the collier, Sefior Moret, minister of colonies, on the 12th 
ordered the return of a general whose services had unquestionably 
been of the greatest value in the far east, especially as it was on the 
part of the latter a tremendous sacrifice to remain there, since no 
success could be expected. This is indeed a serious matter, which 
reflects upon the statesmen of the Sagasta ministry, and while our 
defective organization can not call them to account for it, God and 
history will treat them more severely. 

We should not have found fault if an order to start for Habana at 
full speed had been received by telegram on April 7, as the concen- 
tration could have been effected there with great ease some days before 
the declaration of war, which in that case would have taken a very 
different turn. 

It is reported that about this time very urgent telegrams were 
received from the Philippines, Habana, and Puerto Rico, all asking 
for the squadron. We are not acquainted with these telegrams, but 
it seems to us they were very natural and not at all reprehensible, for 
it is clear that each one was pleading for his own church, which was 
right. But these telegrams, which the Government is trying to use 
as an excuse for having sent the squadron to the West Indies, can in 
no manner exculpate it from its responsibility, for it was the part of 
the Government to combine common interests, and what it did at the 
last hour, when it invoked the salvation of the mother country, it should 
have doneat this time instead of procrastinating for several days, which, 
by gaining a few hours, resulted in the total ruin of Spain. We have 
already said that to take the squadron to Puerto Rico would have meant 
its loss as well as the loss of theisland. This is what Mahan and Samp- 
son have said, and even the United States Navy Department, and we 
should hardly have believed it possible that Puerto Rico asked for the 
squadron had we not seen it confirmed by telegrams of April 20 and 
May 18, which we regret not to be able to insert here. 

The request for the squadron by the Philippines was quite reason- 
able, as there was time to improvise a port of refuge prior to the 


41 


arrival of larger forces. In Cuba, while the petition was not reason- 
able, it would have been rational at least for the squadron to go there 
as long as it was still possible to enter Habana Harbor without previ- 
ous battle. But by the time the squadron started from Cape Verde its 
voyage was equivalent to certain defeat, since it could no longer enter 
Habana Harbor. 

Our voice was not listened to; but we are nevertheess grateful for 
having been considered men of honor and valor, as we unquestionably 
were, for in spite of everything, those ships, the only ones which Spain 
possessed, were left intrusted to our hands. 


CHAPTER V. 


And so Cervera went forth with his four gallant ships, 
foredoomed to his fate by folly, or by national false pride, 
exhibited in the form of political pressure disregarding 
sound professional judgment and military experience.— 
MAHAN. 


On April 29, at 10 o’clock a. m., we lost the Portuguese islands 
from view to the eastward. 

The squadron was composed, first, of the armored cruiser /nfanta 
Maria Teresa, under my command, bearing the flag of Rear-Admiral 
Pascual Cervera and having on board as chief of staff the learned Capt. 
Joaquin Bustamante. 

The /nfanta Maria Teresa had a displacement of 7,000 tons, a pro- 
tection of 11.8 inch compound steel armor, and a protective deck 
extending over the whole lower part of the hull. This cruiser had two 
11 inch Gonzalez-Hontoria guns mounted in two armored barbettes, 
constituting the strong part of the ship. The main battery consisted of 
ten 5.5 inch guns of the same type, mounted on deck and having no other 
protection than vulnerable shields. These were rapid-fire guns, but 
somewhat antiquated, having been remodeled. The lower battery con- 
sisted of eight 2.24 inch Nordenfelt and eight 1.45 inch Hotchkiss guns, 
with no protection whatever. On trial her speed had been 204 knots. 

Then followed the Oguendo, under the command of Capt. Juan 
Lazaga, and the Vizcaya, under that of Capt. Antonio Eulate, both of 
which were sister ships of the Zeresa. 

Finally the Cristébal Coldn, recently built at Genoa, under the com- 
mand of Capt. Emilio Diaz Moreu, having on board the second in 
command of the squadron, first-class Captain (Commodore) José de 
Paredes. This ship, as previously stated, did not have her heavy guns, 
that is to say, the two 30 ton guns. Her armament consisted of ten 
6 inch Armstrong guns, six 4.7 inch, ten 2.24 inch and 1.45 inch guns, 
all protected by a 6 inch nickel-steel belt and armored redoubt. 

To complete the squadron there was a division of torpedo-boat 
destroyers under the command of Fernando Villaamil, composed of 
the Zerror and Furor, of 380 tons each, under the command of Lieu- 
tenant-Commanders Juan de la Rocha and Diego Carliez, respectively, 

42 


43 


and the Plutén, of 420 tons, in command of Lieutenant-Commander 
Pedro Vazquez. 

There were no auxiliary vessels and no fast cruisers, and worst of 
all, no colliers. 

The order of sailing was in two columns, with a flagship at the head 
of each, navigating in such manner as to permit the ships greater free- 
dom of movement, while they were at the same time in a position to 
form almost instantaneously in line ahead. 

The admiral permitted the destroyers to be towed, in order that it 
might not be necessary to have them coal on the sea and that the deli- 
cate machinery of these ships might be in good condition for service 
upon arrival in America. But this contingency had not been taken 
into consideration when we left Cadiz, and even if it had been the 
destroyers could not have been properly equipped, as they require spe- 
cial bridles for that purpose, which were to be found neither at the 
arsenal nor on the market, and other appliances which involve little 
expense, but which can not be improvised with the resources on board 
ship, and the result was that it became extremely difficult to tow the 
destroyers, especially as their small size and their large screws caused 
them to yaw considerably, so that the towlines parted frequently and 
much valuable time was lost. 

Still, this was better than coaling them at sea, which, owing to the 
swell caused by a fresh breeze in which we lost the torpedo boats from 
view a few yards from the ships, would have been very difficult and 
dangerous, as anyone familiar with nautical matters will readily 
understand. 

The Vizcaya, whose bottom had not been cleaned for almost a year, 
was the only ship which did not take any of the destroyers in tow, 
especially as her coal consumption, even with the moderate speed of 7 
knots, to which we were reduced while towing, was so much greater 
than that of any of the other ships that we were all alarmed about it. 

Two days before our arrival in the West Indies the towing was dis- 
- continued. The larger ships formed in line ahead, with the flagship 
at their head and the destroyers alongside of them, ready to receive 
orders. All the fires were lighted, and the speed was regulated at 11 
knots. The destroyers were the first to cause delay, on account of 
injuries to their engines. The machinery of the larger ships was not 
wholly free from injuries either, but these were of a less serious 
nature. 

On May 10, the admiral detached the destroyers Zerror and Luror 
to Martinique, under the command of Villaamil, with instructions to 
try to obtain coal, and especially news. 

The operation had been calculated at a speed of 20 knots, but a few 
hours after the destroyers had left the squadron the boilers‘of the 
Terror became unserviceable, and there she was on the open sea noth- 


44 
ing but a buoy. With no small difficulty one of the boilers was 
repaired; Villaamil then left her to her fate, knowing that we should 
meet her on our course, and went on with the Luror. 

Our exact destination was not known to any one outside of the 
Squadron, as the admiral, fearing some indiscretion, had not even 
notified the Government of it. But as Admiral Cervera had tele- 
graphed the minister of marine from Cape Verde on April 22: ‘‘At 
principal ports West Indies, where these ships are likely to touch, 
we should have confidential agents to give me authentic informa- 
tion.” He had reason to expect that he would find such information 
at Martinique, not only as to what had occurred in the meantime, but 
also as to the manner in which the enemy was carrying on the cam- 
paign and, if possible, the distribution of his ships. It was therefore 
natural to suppose that our consuls would be on the alert, and one can 
easily imagine the disappointment of Villaamil when, upon his arrival 
at Fort de France, he found that our representative was in the country. 
The fact of his being a Frenchman and only a consular agent had noth- 
ing to do with it, for he subsequently showed so much interest and 
zeal in the discharge of his duties that, if he had had the least intima- 
tion, he would unquestionably have been in the city to lend his coop- 
eration in favor of Spain. ° 

Not being accompanied by our consul, Villaamil was received ungTa- 
ciously by the governor, and would have obtained no information 
whatever had it not been for the hospital steamer Alicante, of the 
Transatlantic Company, which was in port at Fort de France, and 
whose captain, Antonio Genis, kepta diary of everything that occurred; 
but as his source of information was the daily press it was not wholly 
reliable. However, it was all Villaamil could obtain, in addition to the 
statement on the part of the governor that we could not get any coal, 
and that the ship carrying fuel which the Government had promised 
was not there; also, that we were prohibited from going out, as he 
said that the United States auxiliary cruiser Harvard had just put to 
sea from a neighboring port. 

One can easily appreciate the situation of Villaamil, who knew that 
the admiral was rapidly advancing and would wait for him on the open 
sea. Therefore, before the detention of his ship could be carried into 
effect, he weighed anchor at midnight, and, assisted by some of the 
boats of the A/ccante, in which her captain himself illuminated the 
buoys of the harbor entrance, he escaped at full speed, running at 
the rate of 20 knots an hour, and went in search of the squadron. 

Something occurred in this connection which can easily happen in 
war, and which caused a misapprehension on either side. 

The commander of the Harvard, as may be seen from documents 
since published by the United States Government, believed that he 
was blockaded by one of our torpedo boats; which was not the case, 


"45 


since the /wror had gone to Fort de France, not only without knowing 
whether there were any hostile ships in eee waters, but also with 
positive instructions to elude ¢ any encounter that might linveten: with 
the principal object of her mission. 

On the other hand, as the governor had told Villaamil that the 
flarvard had gone out, the latter believed that she had about six 
hours’ start of him, and when he saw a large steamer on the coast, he 
believed himself discovered and even pursued, which, as since ascer- 
tained, was likewise incorrect. 

Incidents like these, which are so common in war, furnish a plausi- 
ble explanatior for three alleged engagements, two in the West Indies 
and one in the Philippines, in which the Americans, perhaps mis- 
taking some wreckage for torpedo boats, imagine that they have 
destroyed three of our torpedo boats. This is wholly inaccurate, for 
they could hardly have fought or destroyed any when there was not a 
shadow of a torpedo boat in either place. 

A question arises here, which has since been discussed, but which 
at that time seemed very clear to us, namely, that it would be the 
telegraph rather than hostile scouts that would betray us, and as a 
matter of fact that is what happened. Without it the squadron 
would have passed at night between two islands, and once in West 
Indian waters it could have gone, without previous notice, to what- 
ever harbor it deemed most expedient. But it was absolutely neces- 
sary to obtain information and coal, as anyone will realize (for it will 
be remembered that the admiral did not even know positively whether 
war had been declared), and so there was no choice but to proceed to 
some coast in search of news and coal. 

The hour agreed upon had passed and there was great anxiety. 
Silence was imposed upon the ships which were advancing with all 
lights extinguished, except a screened light at the stern to guide the 
next cruiser. All the men were stationed for general quarters, ready 
for any emergency, until shortly after 2 o’clock a. m., when we saw 
the signal agreed upon thrown upon the clouds by the searchlights of 
the Furor, and we answered; and so we were once more in communi- 
cation with our valiant destroyer and her plucky commander. 

By 8 o’clock a. m. Villaamil was alongside of the flagship, and 
from him we heard of the disaster at Manila on May 1; we further 
learned that a powerful squadron was off San Juan; he also had some 
information as to the blockade established by the enemy and as to the 
movements of the hostile squadrons, though guaranteed only by news- 
paper reports. In view of this information we felt sure that the tele- 
graph had already announced our arrival; that the trans-Atlantic 
steamers Harvard and St. Louis had sighted us; that we were right on 
the scene of war, and that the enemy had gained control of it, without 
any opposition whatever, having preceded us there by a number of 
days. 


CHAPTER VI. 


On May 12 we approached the western coast of Martinique for the 
purpose of leaving the destroyer Terror in territorial] waters, with 
instructions to proceed to Fort de France to repair her boilers, since 
in her present condition she was an impediment to the fleet. 

A few miles to the westward the squadron stopped and the admiral 
convened the commanders while the other two destroyers were being 
coaled. At this meeting it was decided to proceed to Curacao, which 
resulted afterwards in our going to Santiago de Cuba. These manceu- 
vres have since been discussed by all naval experts the world over, and 
we will therefore speak at length of the considerations and reasons 
which led to these operations. 

In the first place it had been reported for some time that the United 
States was negotiating for the purchase of the island.of St. Thomas. 
We had therefore good reasons to suppose that the enemy would have 
a station there, if only a merchant vessel, so that the squadron, which 
we had been told was at San Juan, would be notified of our arrival 
that very same day, and as said squadron could have no other object 
in view but to await us, it was highly probable—almost certain—that, 
knowing us to be to the southward, the hostile fleet would cut off our 
passage at Cape Maysi and Mole St. Nicolas, or at Gibara, from which 
points the hostile squadron was 450 and 600 miles distant, respectively ; 
while we, passing to the southward of Santo Domingo, since to the 
northward an encounter was certain, were 950 miles from Cape Maysi, 
and still further from Gibara, without being able to elude an encounter 
with much superior forces, if we wanted to go to Habana through the 
old Bahama channel, which encounter would probably have taken place 
at a distance of not less than 400 miles from Habana. In that case, 
the hostile forces being overwhelmingly superior, our ships, if even 
slightly injured, were hopelessly lost, for under such circumstances, 
and when harassed by the enemy, ships can not run hundreds of miles. 

The only harbors which, as stated, we could enter were: First. San 
Juan, which we had to discard altogether, because, asthe United States 
admiral has said with good reason, he could have taken it whenever 
he pleased. Second. Habana, which we had to suppose to be well 
guarded, and it was indeed, since the Americans themselves haye since 


sald that vt was considered highly improbable that we should attenypt to 
46 


47 


enter Habana; and it must be understood that it was better guarded 
by the squadrons at a distance than those near by, because, in spite of 
the blockade, it would have been difficult to prevent ships, whether 
injured or not, from placing themselves under the protection of the 
batteries of the city, while an encounter at a distance from Habana 
meant the total destruction of our squadron. Third. Cienfuegos, which 
we also supposed guarded, especially since, our squadron having been 
sighted to the southward, it was from here that our passage to Habana 
could be most effectually cut off; moreover, this harbor, situated at 
the head of Cazones Bay, is a veritable rat trap, very easy to blockade, 
and from which escape is more difficult than from any other harbor of 
the island. We knew there were torpedoes there, but no fortifica- 
tions to amount to anything, and, moreover, the entrance is very diffi- 
cult to defend against a serious attack from the sea. 

On the other hand, we were 1,250 miles distant from the latter harbor, 
while from Habana, or Dry Tortugas and Key West, the enemy’s base 
of operations, they had to make a run of only 500 miles to cut us off. 
For these reasons Cienfuegos Harbor was not seriously considered by 
us at that time. Later, when starvation stared us in the face at San- 
tiago de Cuba, the former harbor was thought of asa possible solution, 
but not on the day of our arrival at Martinique. 

There remained as the only solution going to Santiago de Cuba, 
the second capital of the island, which we had to suppose, and did 
suppose, well supplied with provisions and artillery in view of the 
favorable conditions of the harbor entrance. Moreover, the southern 
coast of the island offered chances of sortie on stormy days and an open 
sea for operations, after we had refitted and made repairs. But as we 
also supposed that the fortifications there were not sufficient to afford 
us much support in the sortie, it was not at that time decided to go to 
said harbor in the hopes of a solution which would permit us to force 
our way into Habana Harbor. Thedistance from Martinique to Santiago 
is about 950 miles, so that the hostile squadron, which was at San Juan, 
could easily have arrived there ahead of us. But we never believed 
that it would do so, thinking that Admiral Sampson, though it has since 
come to light that he did not know of our arrival, would do what he 
actually did do, namely, cover the remotest possibility, the entrance 
to the only fortified point, Habana. 

Moreover, the Government had notified us that we should find a 
collier at the island of Curacao; and as we were not more than 480 
miles from said island, and by going there should lose only about 200 
miles on our way to Cuba, it was decided to proceed to Curacao, 
because, if we had a collier with us, we could have disappeared in the 
Caribbean Sea and, though at great risk, reached Habana, and our 
entering the harbor, though we might have to suffer more or less in 
the attempt, would not have been prevented by anyone, provided 
always that the battle had taken place within sight of the forts. 


48 


There are such strange ideas prevailing as to naval matters, espe- 
cially in Spain, that it is perhaps not superfluous to say that, after 
hostilities have broken out, warships cannot, as in time of peace, nor 
as passenger steamers can, proceed to a port with empty bunkers; for 
if their course should be intercepted it is absolutely necessary for them 
to have coal in order to be able to manceuvre and not be compelled to 
remain on the open sea without the possibility of moving. Hence, 
while the squadron had coal enough to go from Martinique to Cien- 
fuegos under conditions of peace, it would have been highly imprudent 
to proceed to any distant harbor of Cuba, as is shown in the case of 
the Oquendo which reached Santiago de Cuba with hardly 100 tons of 
coal. Therefore, as we had good reason to believe that we should 
find at Curagao the coal which the Government had promised in its 
telegram of April 26, and,also news which we needed more than any- 
thing else, it was decided to go to Curacao as the best solution. 

In this connection Mahan says: 

It may very well be, also, that Cervera, not caring to meet Sampson, whose force, 
counting the monitors, was superior to his own, thought best to disappear once 
again from our knowledge. He did, indeed, prolong his journey to Santiago, if that 
were his original destination, by nearly 200 miles, through going to Curacao, not to 
speak of the delay in coaling. But, if the Dutch allowed him to take all that he 
wanted, he would in his final start be much nearer to Cuba than at Martinique, and 
he would be able, as far as fuel went, to reach either Santiago, Cienfuegos, or Puerto 


Rico, or even Habana itself—all which possibilities would tend to perplex us. Jt is 
scarcely probable, however, that he would have attempted the last named port. 


Mahan thinks it would have been of advantage to him if Admiral 
Cervera’s squadron had gone into Habana Harbor, because, being 
near the United States base of operations, it would have made the war 
easier and he would at the same time have covered our naval base. As 
to this point, it was as a matter of fact covered from the moment that 
the squadron was blockaded, and it seems to us it is very difficult to 
say what would have happened. 

On the one hand the landing of troops, which was so easy at Santi- 
ago, would have presented insurmountable difficulties here, but on the 
other hand the bombardment of Habana, which is always possible to 
effect with impunity from a great distance at night, or even in day- 
time, in spite of the forts, was a problem which we were inclined to 
consider very much against us; for among the inhabitants of the 
island, including the Spaniards who had accumulated wealth and 
gained a firm foothold in these cities, there was no one disposed to 
remember the example of Cadiz except in popular songs, and we 
believe it quite possible that a wholesale uprising in the country, until 
then apparently quiet, would have left the Captain-General with only 
an insignificant contingent of his forces for fighting a battle. We 
therefore deem it very risky to venture an opinion as to what would 
have been the course of events, for even though American writers 


49 


pretend to deny it, the insurrection in Cuba would have ended the 
war, and the island, as Admiral Cervera said in his letter of February 
26, 1898, which we have previously quoted, was no longer ours 
anyway. 

For all these reasons there was among us no doubt as to the choice; 
for though the city of Habana, terrified by the bombardment, would 
have delivered us to the enemy without hesitation, still the burning 
ships could have returned to the harbor under the protection of the 
forts and the greater part of them would have been saved as well as 
their crews. These considerations must have presented themselves 
from the moment that the mistake was made to send an inadequate 
squadron to the West Indies. 

Having concluded this digression, which was suggested by the many 
discussions on this subject, in which we have always found the best 
and most fair-minded support in the opinions of those who were our 
enemies, we will now return to our squadron, which was proceeding to 
Curagao in line ahead, with the flagship in the lead and the destroyers 
on the beam, to facilitate our manceuvres in accordance with the cir- 
cumstances. The speed of the ships was regulated so as to time our 
arrival at a convenient hour, and it is almost superfluous to say that 
the fires were lighted under all the boilers and that the ships were 
ready for any emergency. 

It was about this time, namely, on May 18, that the Oregon cast 
anchor at Barbados. The United States Government was under the 
impression that it might be the object of the manceuvres of our squad- 
ron to go in search of that ship, which we, however, supposed to be 
in the Pacific. This illustrates how the commander in chief of our 
squadron was supplied with information. 

Upon reaching Curagao on the morning of May 14 the squadron was 
detained at the harbor entrance. After lengthy and unpleasant nego- 
tiations, the governor stated that the conditions of neutrality permitted 
him to allow only two ships to enter and that these could not remain 
more than forty-eight hours; also, that we could ship only a limited 
quantity of coal. It was about 2 o’clock p. m. by the time the armored 
cruisers Infanta Maria Teresa and Vizcaya entered the harbor, while 
the Colon, Oquendo, and the destroyers, Furor and Plutén, remained 
outside. 

It was with difficulty that we acquired the coal available, which, if 
I remember right, amounted to only 400 tons, and we proceeded to 
get it on board, working frantically, shipping also such provisions as 
we could obtain. Nothing can give an idea of the anxiety of that 
night of May 14, when we interpreted every noise we heard as an 
attack upon our comrades, and we could not even go to their assist- 
ance, for the harbor of Curagao, which is closed by a bridge, is com- 
pletely cut off from the outside at sunset. 

14232—No. VIII——4 


50 


In the meantime we had ascertained the sad fact that the anxiously 
looked-for collier was not there, nor was there any news for us; and 
as though ill luck were pursuing us even in the least details, one of 
those two days was a holiday and everything was strictly closed up, 
so that we could not even buy postage stamps for our letters, which 
we had to intrust to the consul to be mailed the next day. 

On the evening of the 15th, as daylight was fading, the two cruisers 
went out, having to leave in the harbor launches with coal and provi- . 
sions, but did not rejoin the other ships until it was quite dark, owing 
to the fact that a man of the crew of the Plutén had fallen overboard, 
but fortunately he had been rescued. 

When the line had been formed again with every precaution made 
necessary by the grave situation, we proceeded at an economical speed 
on account of the Oguendo and Colén, which were short of coal, and 
timing ourselves so as to reach Santiago de Cuba at daybreak, the 
squadron shaped its course for that harbor, which the admiral indi- 
cated by signals to be our destination. All the ships were in complete 
readiness to open fire. 

During the night of May 18, off Jamaica, we crossed two trans-Atlantic 
steamers which left us in doubt as to whether they were auxiliary 
cruisers or not. But soon one of these vessels passed within sight of 
us, making signals with the Morse alphabet and with a search light in 
operation. But she did not discover us, as we were proceeding with- 
out lights, with the exception of a small screened lamp at the stern, of 
such feeble light that it could not be discerned beyond a distance of 
three cables, which was the distance maintained between our ships. 

We paid no attention to these cruisers or merchant vessels, for as 
their presence seemed to indicate that there were hostile forces at San- 
tiago it was necessary for us to reach that harbor before daylight, 
whether to fight at the entrance, or whether to force our way through 
before being defeated in case the enemy was superior. The admiral 
did not have the least information as to whether there were hostile 
forces there, and if so, what they consisted of. 

At dawn of May 19 the squadron was off Santiago, without having 
seen a hostile ship. The destroyers therefore made a reconnoissance 
of the coast, while the large ships entered the harbor, where they cast 
anchor in complete security at 8 o’clock a. m. of that day. This was 
very fortunate, as the Oguendo and Colén, which had not been able to 
~ enter Curacao, had very little coal left, especially the former, which 
had hardly 100 tons. 

In the meantime the Government and the authorities in the West 
Indies had exchanged some telegrams and orders, which we regret not 
being able to transcribe here, but which we have no doubt will be pub- 
lished in full in due season. 


51 


One thing is certain, namely, that the Government, on May 12, 
ordered the return of the squadron to the Peninsula, having no doubt 
changed its opinion on account of the disaster at Manila, as also of 
the communications from Cape Verde, which must have reached Mad- 
rid on May 5, and the bombardment of San Juan, which took place 
that same day, the 12th, and demonstrated that the defense of that 
island was a mistaken idea. 

To this telegram vehement remonstrances were made by the gov- 
ernors general of Cuba and Puerto Rico, as we have since learned, who 
predicted revolution if the squadron should withdraw. These blessed 
fears of revolution, the cause of our disasters in the Old World as well 
as the New! and yet experience has shown that there was no founda- 
tion for such fears in either continent. 

It is also reported that one of these governors advanced the astound- 
ing theory that the defeat of the squadron would increase the enthu- 
siasm, on which we abstain from commenting. But while all this was 
going on without coming to the knowledge of Admiral Cervera, who 
had not received the telegram of the 12th, he could conjecture it from 
another telegram dated May 19, from which, though some words were 
ambiguous, it was plainly to be seen that the Government canceled the 
telegram relative to the return to Spain. 

It was too late. Even if we had received the order we lacked the 
necessary colliers, without which it is madness in time of war to send 
a squadron out to sea, as it would be madness to send an army corps 
into a°campaign without provisions and cartridges except such as the 
soldiers might carry in their knapsacks. 

The squadron was at Santiago. By a miracle it had arrived there 
intact, and there was nothing to be done but to suffer the consequences 
of its departure from Cape Verde. 


CHAPTER VII. 


Nothing can be compared with the disastrous condition of Santiago 
the day of our arrival, and the stupendous ignorance of the Spanish 
residing there must be counted among the most disastrous features, 
for they had no conception whatever of the true condition of things. 

Without pretending to describe the location of Santiago, except as 
to what relates strictly to the situation of the squadron, we will give 
a few particulars for the benefit of those who are not familiar with 
that locality. 

Santiago de Cuba, although it is the second capital of the island, 
had no other communications than those within its zone of cultivation, 
and a country road leading to Manzanillo, another to Holguin, and a 
third to the neighboring port of Guantanamo. These roads could very 
easily be cut off by felling heavy trees across them and by flanking 
them from the impenetrable underbrush on either side, so that it 
would be a serious enterprise to conduct any force over them. ° On the 
other hand, the south front of the island is a virgin and impenetrable 
forest, communication with which had always been by sea. 

Although the city was in reality besieged by the insurgents, it was 
still able to obtain some vegetables for its own maintenance owing to 
the field being occupied by military detachments which were defended 
in small blockhouses. But the city, which like all those of Cuba 
depended upon imports for its principal supplies, was feeling the 
effects of being closed in and the poorer classes that of hunger a 
month before any hostile ship had appeared off the entrance of the 
harbor. 

The merchants, all of whom were Spanish, had ceased ordering goods, 
as they anticipated the country’s defeat, and no one was willing to 
endanger interests, the fate of which was very uncertain, or to furnish 
goods on credit not knowing who would pay in the end. Even the 
Spanish Bank had only 4,000 silver dollars on hand, for the sake of 
appearances. ‘This ridiculous sum is the best picture we could draw 
of the difference which existed between what everyone thought and 
the falsehoods which fell from their lips. 

Notwithstanding all this, there was a great deal of foolish talk, and 


as this might seem exaggerated we will relate that at a banquet given 
52 


53 


in honor of the squadron, while the officers of the army and navy were 
continually talking of duty, which ought to have opened the eyes of 
even the most blind, the archbishop himself proposed a toast to our 
assault upon the Capitol of Washington. This toast was received with 
feverish enthusiasm by some and with profound sorrow by us who 
knew that our fate was already decided and that we were irredeemably 
lost. But this did not prevent the Spanish themselves from taking 
advantage of the occasion, as was shown during the latter half of June, 
when, in order to do peer to Admiral Cervera, who had not sen 
br on for two weeks, I bought for him from a eerie a small barrel 
containing 50 rounds of flour and had to pay for it $42 in gold. And 
while this is not considered anything in particular, and the : same thing 
happens everywhere, what is unpardonable is the fact that itis 
clutching their money they still pretended to be ardent patriots. 

We have purposely left until the last the consideration of the mili- 
tary side of the question in regard to which the commander in chief, 
Arsenio Linares, lieutenant-general of the army, had no illusions. 

The troops of the army at Santiago were completely exhausted by 
three years of warfare in that horrible climate, with arrears in pay 
amounting to thirteen months, and impossible food, the result of this 
jack of pay. They were much more like specters than soldiers, and 
nothing but the steadfastness of the Spanish people could keep them at 
their posts. And when we say people we do not mean to refer only to 
the private soldiers, for an infantry officer whom Admiral Cervera 
invited one day to ie very modest table was unable to eat, such being 
the condition to which the stress of circumstances had Peon nee 
honorable defenders of Spain; a condition which affected all the mili- 
tary forces from the general down, while the Spanish in general and 
the commissary department in particular lived in a very different 
manner. 

In regard to the defenses, those of the city consisted of anumber of 
bronze guns of the earliest models, which came from France after the 
war with Italy, and the effects of which could not be other than to 
cause the needless death of some of the gunners at their sides, and this 
fact, so little understood and still less appreciated, is called military 
honor by those responsible for it in order to clear themselves. 

At the harbor entrance, and this is the most interesting, five 6-inch 
bronze guns had just been mounted which bore the date 1724. It is 
true these pieces had been rifled to improve their appearance, but in 
view of the height of the hill upon which they were placed, it was evi- 
dent that the enemy could always station themselves beyond their 
range. 

The navy had furnished four Gonzdlez-Hontoria guns of the 1883 
model by removing them from the Reina Mercedes, two of which had 
been placed on the Socapa by the army engineers in charge of mount- 


54 


ing them, and two at Punta Gorda for the defense of the channel, and 
at the time of our arrival, almost a month after the declaration of war, 
they had finished mounting only one. In conclusion, the fortress of 
the Morro had a few mortars, but inasmuch as the fortress was in 
ruins they could not be fired and were entirely abandoned. 

Surely nothing was wanting in these circumstances to induce the 
admiral to leave the harbor as early as possible, but the Oguwendo and 
Vizcaya had just been twice across the Atlantic, their engines having 
been in operation for many days, and it was absolutely necessary to 
put out the fires. Those of the other ships had also been in operation 
since the 29th of March, and they needed a general cleaning. The 
boilers especially needed to have their water renewed if they were to 
maintain their efficiency, as naturally they had not been able to change 
their water on account of movements, alarms, and orders from Spain 
without the admiral being able to interfere, since for six months we 
had held ourselves in constant readiness, without being able to stop 
the engines for more than twenty-four hours, and always lighting and 
putting out our fires; circumstances which are so well known to every 
officer of the navy that we mention them solely for the benefit of those 
who wrongly believe that engines are like the old sails, always ready to 
render their most eflicient’service, without knowing that those of the 
trans-Atlantic steamers undergo a thorough repair every two weeks 
and are handled with incredible care. 

So the fires were put out and the question of renewing the water of 
the boilers was discussed.. Almost 600 tons of water, without count- 
ing the reserve! A work which was impossible from lack of appli- 
ances, for there was nothing but our boats, which at the most were 
only partially adequate for this work. The water lighters of the har- 
bor carried at the most but 6 tons, and moreover there were only 
three or four of them, and they made but two trips a day. 

The coal supply of the six ships also had to be renewed, and this 
work was undertaken with frenzy. What coal there was belonged to 
the State and was on a cay belonging to the naval station, where it was 
difficult for the lighters to come alongside, and where with all the 
means at our command, and with all that we could hire for their weight 
in gold, and in spite of the energetic aid of the army, we were not 
able to ship more than 150 tons of coal daily, an insignificant amount 
for six ships which even before relighting the fires of the engines, 
which was almost immediately, consumed 4 to 5 tons of coal per day 
solely for lighting, winches, cooking, and steam launches. Every- 
thing which was required for rapid coaling—lighters, tugs, and even 
baskets—was lacking, and we had to use the sacks which we had 
bought at Cape Verde for use on the destroyers, but which were 
insufficient for the larger vessels. 

In this work, as in all that occurred at Santiago, there was the most 


55 


admirable accord: between the army and navy, the two vying with 
each other in harmony and disinterestedness, and furnishing a most 
patriotic example, beginning with the two commanders in chief, Lieu- 
tenant-General Linares and Admiral Cervera, who were in constant 
communication and who did all they could to assist each other. The 
artillery of the cruiser J/ercedes had been disembarked, and being the 
only one which merited the name, had, together with its officers, been 
placed under the orders of the artillery officers of the army. Later, 
the landing companies were added to the defense of the city, and 
always in the first line, as they were the only.men well fed, and thus 
far had not’ been exposed to the evils of the climate. We never hag- 
gled about our services, and the general in chief of that district, 
Arsenio Linares, mobilized his forces in order to furnish us with 
water and coal from Daiquiri and whatever else he could get out of 
his limited resources. 

While this work was in progress the admiral convened a council of 
war, in view of the probability of our being blockaded, the difficulty 
of defending the city from a serious attack by land, and the fact that 
the squadron could not wait for the season of hurricanes, for before 
that time hunger would compel them to capitulate the city, as the 
latter could not be effectively aided from Habana. The presence of 
the squadron at Santiago de Cuba would carry the war to that city, 
just as it would have carried it to San Juan, or wherever it might have 
gone, and neither the city nor the harbor was in a position to sustain 
it. As to the advisability of going to Cienfuegos, which has since 
been so much discussed, we repeat what has already been said, namely, 
that that harbor was a veritable rat trap, and that the defense of tor- 
pedoes could have been destroyed from the sea with the greatest ease, 
after which the American squadron could have forced the harbor with 
no possibility of being prevented from land. Moreover, Schley was 
stationed off Cienfuegos with the Brooklyn, Texas, Massachusetts, and 
lowa, and it was impossible to enter that port or the Yucatan Channel, 
for forces so important could not be simply for the blockade of Cien- 
fuegos. Sampson was at Habana with the rest of the forces, and con- 
sequently there was no other course but to remain where we were or 
go to San Juan. And why to San Juan? Certainly not to remain in 
the harbor, for the disaster would have happened the sooner. Hence 
the object in going to San Juan could only be to coal more rapidly 
and put to sea before the arrival of the enemy, in order to make an 
attempt to go to Habana or to return to Europe. 

These observations, which we make here once for all, will serve 
better than anything else to describe the circumstances prevailing at 
that time. 

Urged on by the dark future of Santiago, our ships were working 
frantically at coaling when, on the 25th of May, there appeared at the 


56 


mouth of the harbor several of the enemy’s fast vessels which we 
supposed were scouts belonging to Schley’s squadron, which had left 
Cienfuegos, apparently because of the bad weather prevailing for the 
first time since our arrival. 

The English steamer Restormel was captured on that day off the 
Morro, on her way from Curagao with coal, and it could not be pre- 
vented, for even if'the Colén had gone out, the only ship which could 
get up steam quickly in consequence of her Niclausse boilers, the collier 
would have been sunk and nothing would have resulted but the loss 
of the coal which we so much needed. 

On the morning of the 26th Schley’s squadron appeared off Santiago 
and at night withdrew to the southwest to take shelter under the lee 
of the island of Jamaica from the storm prevailing. 

On that day the Infanta Maria Teresa had 300 tons of coal in her 
bunkers, the Oguendo and Vizcaya 500 each, and the Colén 700. The 
ships all had steam up and were ready to go out, for Admiral Cervera, 
realizing that the blockade would begin the following day, which in 
reality had been inaugurated the day before, had called a council of 
war of his captains to determine what was best to be done. 

The situation was as we have described it, being obliged to suppose 
that the hostile squadron was closely guarding the channel at Cape 
Cruz, that Sampson was coming down by way of the Old Channel 
with the Vew York and the Oregon, according to information from the 
Government itself, and that Habana was sufficiently blockaded against 
an attempt by our half-dismantled ships. There was, therefore, no 
alternative but to go toSan Juan. And to what end? Tocoal. And 
could we coal at San Juan in twenty-four or thirty-six hours, which 
was the latest that we could suppose the enemy would arrive, and in 
this space of time stow away as much as 1,000 tons in each of our 
cruisers? Before answering this question, and referring to certain 
American writings which speak of the colliers at San Juan, we ought 
to say that the following steamers of the Transatlantic Company had 
already been officially offered to the squadron: First, at Cape Verde, 
the steamer Cadiz, which was a passenger steamer, whose storerooms 
were filled with the equipment of the torpedo boats; later, at Marti- 
nique, the steamer Alicante, which was a completely equipped hospital 
ship, the storerooms and hold of which were fitted up for this pur- 
pose; and, finally, the Adfonso XTTT, at San Juan, the most luxurious 
steamer of the Transatlantic Company, adapted for first-class pas- 
senger traflic, and whose storerooms were reported to have a capacity 
of little more than 1,000 tons burden. These vessels were conse- 
quently not colliers, and could only be an impediment to the squadron. 

These facts being evident, all agreed that it would be impossible to 
coal at that place in the short space of time which the circumstances 
demanded. The problem was further complicated by there being a 


57 


heavy swell at the mouth of the harbor, and the Colén, whose draft 
aft was excessive, would be sure to touch bottom in going out. 

Opinions were divided. Some thought we should go out in any 
event, directing our course toward San Juan, and if we should perish 
there it would be by the will of the Government, and if we succeeded in 
getting to sea with all or part of the squadron it would be safe. Others 
thought that, as it was quite possible and even probable that the 
Colén would be lost at the mouth of the harbor, for which reason she 
must be the last to make the sortie, the squadron would be reduced to 
nothing. Public and official opinion which we thought so exaggerated, 
and as a matter of fact it was so in Spain, would not have considered 
the loss of the Colén justified, and as we certainly could not have gone 
out from San Juan either, it was better to remain at Santiago and 
await events there. Two of those who had voted for the sortie 
declared on their honor and conscience that they were convinced that 
the Government at Madrid was determined that the squadron should 
be destroyed as early as possible in order to discover some means of 
attaining peace at an early date, and that they had therefore voted for 
the sortie, not because it was logical, but because we would receive the 
definite and military order to do so under still worse conditions. 

Confronted by these terrible dilemmas, the admiral ordered the 
mouth of the harbor to be sounded, and having ascertained that 
there would be but 8 feet of water under the keel of the Co/dn in pass- 
ing over the rocks of the bar, and as the swell presupposed serious 
injuries if not her total loss in going out, notwithstanding that I had 
been one of those who voted for the sortie, believing that our destruc- 
tion was what the Government desired, I think that Admiral Cervera 
was very wise in deciding to have the fires extinguished under eight 
boilers of each ship and remain at Santiago in expectation of whatever 
opportunity fortune might offer us. But such opportunity never pre- 
sented itself, as it never does when the disproportion of forces is so 
great and when all the fundamental principles of naval strategy have 
been disregarded. 

At dawn of May 26 the cruiser I/inneapolis appeared at the en- 
trance of the harbor, and at 11 o’clock in the morning the blockade was 
established, but the manceuvres of the hostile squadron up to the 29th 
were incomprehensible to us. 

It would not explain matters if we were to describe the coming and 
going of the hostile ships, but we do want to mention their good for- 
tune, for the sea, in general so rough to the south of Cuba, was so 
smooth in this instance that the cruisers were able to coal, sometimes 
having a steamer on each side, which could not be done even in the 
majority of the harbors. As for the rest, the communication with 
Jamaica, the real base of operations, was so manifest and barefaced 
that if any doubt as to the complicity of England had existed, an 


58 


ascent to the Morro would have been sufficient to convince anyone of 
the contrary. 

A series of bombardments at the entrance of the harbor followed the 
blockade and it is to be regretted that these have not been described 
by foreigners, for it must be difficult to believe that a single 6.3 inch 
gun was the sum total of the artillery which opposed the powerful 
American squadron. In the attack upon the so-called fortifications of 
the entrance, made by the squadron on the 6th of June, we had on our 
side five rifled bronze guns of 6.3 inch, which, as has already been sald, 
showed by their date that they had been cast in 1724, and whose maxi- 
mum range was 3,281 yards, within which the enemy never came. A 
few iron howitzers of 8.27 inch, the maximum range of which was 
4,373 yards, had not even been mounted, as the majority of them could 
not be fired, and those which could were not able to reach the enemy, 
who, either from precaution or because of the high position of our 
batteries, always kept at more than 7,587 yards distance. The second 
6.3 inch gun of the cruiser Reina Mercedes was not yet mounted, hence 
there was but one of them which answered without being silenced by 
the tremendous fire of the whole American squadron, which lasted a 
little over four hours and, according to the New York papers, repre- 
sented an expenditure of $2,000,000, while causing us only an insignifi- 
cant number of casualties. They destroyed four huts belonging to the 
families of the light house tenders without dismounting a single gun, 
and the great tales related by the American press about the Morro are 
absolutely incorrect, for that ancient fortress had but one mortar, 
which was never fired, and was in such a state of ruin that orders had 
been given to abandon it except for a few caverns in the living rock 
back of the hill which served as a shelter for the troops. It is incom- 
prehensible that so little damage was done considering how many shells 
were directed against it, including a dynamite projectile thrown one 
night by the Veswwywus. 

Nevertheless this prodigality could not fail to be very profitable to 
the blockading squadron, as it was a veritable battle drill without any 
battle, properly speaking, a drill which has no precedent in the 
world. From the military point of view it is a model of prudence 
without parallel, for if the enemy had shortened the distance, although 
they might not have been able to dismount the scant and antiquated 
artillery defending the entrance, as the parapets would have concealed 
the guns, they might, on the other hand, have been able to reach the 
ships of the squadron, which of course was their object. But the 
American vessels kept themselves at such a distance that not a single 
projectile could have had any decided effect. In one of these bom- 
bardments (on May 31) the adntiral stationed the Coldn at the head of 
the channel with her broadside bearing on the harbor entrance; but 
that ship had only 6 inch guns, and although these were primed, the 


59 


fact that the hostile ships remained at a distance (7,000 yards accord- 
ing to Schley’s official report) at which heavy artillery only could be 
effective, which was entirely lacking from our only protected ship, 
made it advisable to recall her within the harbor, and Admiral Cervera 
did so in order not to expose her to no purpose. 

During these days Admiral Sampson resolved to prevent the sortie 
by sending the English steamer Merrimac, half full of coal and under 
the command of Naval Constructor Hobson, to be sunk in the curve at 
Diamante bank. The steamer, skillfully handled, was duly received 
by the batteries of the Morro and Socapa. Hobson must have thought 
that by hugging the shore they would not be able to fire at him, since, 
being located on the heights at either side of the entrance, the hills 
themselves would cover him, and this was the case. But hardly had 
he entered the mouth of the harbor when all the rapid-fire batteries of 
the submarine defenses, those of the two destroyers which were on 
guard, and the battery of Punta Gorda opened fire upon the J/errimace. 
It seemed that the crew must surely become demoralized under this 
fire and throw themselves with all haste upon a raft which they car- 
ried alongside, but, on the contrary, it is inexplicable that no one was 
even wounded under this downpour of iron at pistol range, and above 
all that they did not drop the anchor or anchors which they had ready, 
and whether across the channel or not, the boat would have been sunk 
at the desired locality and the channel obstructed for ships as large as 
ours. Along the outside of the Merrimac was a line of powder 
charges for 8 inch guns so arranged as to immediately sink the vessel 
upon being fired. Some of these I afterwards opened in company 
with our ill-fated comrade Bustamante, and the powder in them was 
thoroughly wet. Evidently this was an impromptu device constructed 
from the elements on board and it seems very probable that none of 
them functioned. The hostile collier was struck by two Whitehead 
torpedoes, one submarine mine, and a deluge of projectiles, and it is 
clear that it took several minutes to sink her, which were sufficient 
for her to be carried past the narrowest part of the channel and thus 
not to obstruct it. 

Constructor Hobson, whose heroism on this occasion was admirable 
and merits the hearty congratulations of all, has written an account 
of this enterprise which reads like a novel, which, however; does not 
detract from the merit of his unquestionable bravery. 

The blockade constantly grew more strict, the ships coming so close 
at night that sometimes the cries of the watch could be heard, and 
Admiral Sampson says they could not understand why we never fired 
at their searchlights. This, nevertheless, was clearly explained by 
the resistance which had been made to the bombardment, similar to ° 
that at Strasburg, with which he had honored the empty hills at the 
entrance of the harbor; for since we had only two modern guns with 


60 


a caliber of 6.3 inch, and only a hundred rounds each for the whole 
period since the beginning of the war, every engagement was an occa- 
sion for showing our lack of forces and even for exhausting our scant 
supply of ammunition, while what was inexplicable to us was that the 
squadron had not long before reduced our archaic batteries to per- 
petual silence and made a more serious attack upon the entrance of 
the harbor. 

This explains why the dynamite cruiser Veswoius was able to dis- 
charge a number of her peculiar projectiles, but the only injury they 
inflicted was to kill a poor gunner who was sleeping in the open air, 
and upon whom one of them fell; but even a poor searchlight at the 
entrance of the harbor and a few more guns to keep the enemy at a 
distance would have made her fire at very short range impossible. 

A rigorous blockade followed the landing of the army, as was to be 
expected, and the weather gave us no hope whatever that the hostile 
squadron would be forced to abandon its position. The situation on 
land had grown much worse, for in spite of the fact that the Ameri- 
cans are not willing to acknowledge the assistance which they received 
from the insurgents, this was so decided that without them they would 
certainly not have been able to attain their object. In fact, the same 
day the troops were landed Santiago was left without any of the 
resources which she had received from her zone of cultivation and the 
sufferings from hunger increased. All communications were cut off, 
forests, roads, and mountains. Everything was infested by the Cubans, 
and even the west coast of the harbor itself was unsafe, the American 
Army being relieved of this painful service. The final yielding from 
starvation was plainly foreseen—starvation which was decimating our 
wretched troops, and which the inhabitants of the city, Cubans as well 
as the majority of the Spanish, were not disposed to endure. And 
thus the decisive moment was drawing near, and there was no other 
course but to go out to unavailing death at the entrance of the harbor, 
or to blow up our ships at the last moment, disembarking the rapid- 
fire guns and all our forces for the defense of the city. 

The American Army was advancing, being aware of our lack of 
modern artillery, for two 3.54 inch Krupp guns and two 6 inch Mata 
howitzers, the only guns of this class which the city had, were at the 
mouth of the harbor, and although Escario’s brigade, which was on 
its way from Manzanillo, was expected and arrived the day following 
our sortie, still the greatest aid which could have been given to the 
city would have been the landing of the rapid-fire guns; but this could 
not be done, because the idea of the sortie of the squadron dominated 
all else in Habana and Madrid. 

As many as 1,000 men were disembarked from the squadron for the 
aid of the city, under the command of the chief of staff of the former, 


61 


Capt. Joaquin de Bustamante. About 400 of these men fought in the 
battle of July 1, in which El Caney was taken by the enemy, also in 
consequence of our having no guns. The valiant defender of this 
place, Gen. Vara de Rey, was killed while sustaining the action under 
conditions so agonizing that General Linares found it necessary to take 
the convalescents from the hospital to send them to the trenches. 
That general having been seriously wounded, as well as nearly all the 
commanders and officers of the army, who themselves, rifle in hand, 
took a share in the actual fighting, it was the naval column which, 
with its valiant commander at its head, repelled the attack, illustrating 
once more that what is needed for war are sound and well-fed men 
such as our robust sailors, who, as yet unaffected by the climate, were 
in a condition to sustain the battle. 

In this battle fell wounded, never to rise again, our learned and 
valiant Capt. Joaquin de Bustamante, an eminent electrician and the 
inventor of the torpedoes which bear his name, and whose writings 
will insure to him a place among the most illustrious of the service. 

On the night of this day the situation of the city was desperate 
and would become more so if we were to withdraw our sailors, as the 
Captain-General had telegraphed to Gen. José Toral, upon whom the 
command had fallen. But the idea of our sortie prevailed over all 
else in Habana and Madrid, which, nevertheless, was not so urgent 
since the capitulation did not take place until two weeks later. 
Escario’s brigade arrived the following day, and as the climate could 
not fail to have its effect upon the encamped forces of the enemy, each 
day gained was a victory for us. On the other hand, we regarded 
with anxiety the heights on which were located the defenses for the 
harbor entrance, against which General Shafter did not direct his 
forces, more regardful of his own interest certainly than that of his 
country, for if he had done this, following the natural and sound 
councils of the Admiral of the squadron, as appears from what they 
themselves have since published, there would not have been so great 
a loss of life, nor would the outcome of his expedition have been so 
uncertain, in spite of the terrible condition in which they found our 
troops as well as the defenses of the city. 

During this interval a veritable correspondence by telegraph was 
held between Admiral Cervera, General Linares, Captain-General 
Blanco, and the Government, which we hope to see published in full, 
for that hitherto published in our newspapers is only a portion of it. 
We will, therefore, give here only as short an account of it as possi- 
ble, in order that this narrative may not be incomplete. 

On the 20th of May General Blanco, who had requested the coming 
of the squadron, asked for reenforcements for it, when he surely must 
have known that there were none, and announced. that we were going 
to be blockaded, which was also well known before we left Spain. 


62 


A multitude of telegrams from Spain and Habana showed the anxiety 
over a situation which seemed to them a new state of things, while it 
was only what had been foreseen and foretold by Admiral Cervera. 

The New York Journal published the following telegram in very 


large type: ; 
Manprip, June 3, 1898. 
Captain-General BLuanco, Habana: 


Very serious situation in Philippines compels us to send there ships and reenforce- 
ments of troops as early as possible. To be able to cope with hostile squadron at 
Manila it will be indispensable to send an equally strong fleet there. At present 
only two war ships there, and one of them I believe can not pass through canal. The 
only thing we can do is to send all the ships of Cervera’s squadron that can get 
out of Santiago. But before deciding the Government wishes to know your opinion 
as to effect the withdrawal of Cervera’s fleet might produce in Cuba. This move- 
ment would be only temporary, and as soon as object is attained in Philippines the 
squadron would return to Cuba without loss of time and strongly reenforced. 

CorrEA, Minister of War. 


On June 3 General Blanco announced the possibility of a revolu- 
tion, that the army might rebel, and that the salvation of Spain and 
the dynasty rested in Cuba. These telegrams, like the foregoing, we 
are not permitted to comment upon. 

On the 21st of June General Blanco asked to be given authority over 
Cervera’s squadron. In this connection we must call attention to the 
injustice shown by this request, for the squadron was, in fact, not only 
already under the orders of the Captain-General, but even of General 
Linares, commander in chief of the army at Santiago de Cuba. 

As we have already said, history will make all these telegrams 
known in full, and we will speak of only the last three. On July 1 
Admiral Cervera received a telegram in which, among other things, 
was the following: 

In conformity with the opinion of the Government, you will reembark those of 
your crews which were landed, taking advantage of the first opportunity to go out 
of the harbor with all your ships. 

He convened a council of war on that day, and while the battle was 
raging on land, by unanimous consent, he telegraphed to General 
Blanco, stating that if his landing forces were reembarked the city 
would surely be lost. On the 2d the answer to this was received, 
expressed in the following unequivocal terms: 


Reembark landing troops of squadron as fast as possible and go out immediately. 


The following telegram was published with the foregoing when it 
appeared in the newspapers of Spain: 


Captain-General BLanco, Habana: 
The instructions given by your excellency to Admiral Cervera are approved. 
; CoRREA. 
These telegrams were translated from Spanish into English and 
from this language again into Spanish by our newspapers, so that they 


~ 


/ 


63 


differed slightly from the originals, but these differences were not 
essential either as to form or substance. By publishing the transla- 
tions instead of the originals we keep within the law. 

The hour forseen at Cape Verde had arrived, and the departure of 
the squadron from that place for Cuba was the source and cause of the 
inevitable disaster which was not even lessened by giving to the squad- 
ron a small convoy with which we would at least have been able to come 
off with more military honor by attempting some enterprise upon our 
arrival at the West Indies. But this would not have prevented the 
disaster, for once the error had been committed, it only remained to 
determine the place of our defeat. As for the time when this occurred, 
it was not in reality the 3d of July, but in April, when, anticipating 
seditious movements in Spain and the West Indies, even going’so far 
as to make the absurd mistake of supposing that the volunteers could 
be placed side by side with the regular army, the most elementary 
principles of strategy and the interests of the country were forgotten, 
even by the members of the Government who were not willing to rec- 
ognize that, just as military men must give’ their lives in a holocaust 
for the country, political men should also make some sacrifice for it, 
and take at least a little risk before they permit the Crown of Spain to 
lose 10,000,000 of its subjects. 


CHAPTER VIII. 


Although we have spoken of this in an earlier chapter, we will state 
again the condition of both squadrons, giving the details more in full. 

The armored cruisers nfanta Maria Teresa, Vizcaya, and Oquendo 
were protected at the water line by a compound steel belt 11.8 inches 
thick, which extended over two-thirds of their length. Theoretically, 
this protection was vulnerable to 8, 12, and 13 inch guns, but practi- 
cally we had to suppose it vulnerable only to the fourteen 12 and 13 
inch guns with which we would be confronted. 

These ships each had two 11 inch guns mounted in strong, perfectly — 
protected barbettes, practically invulnerable save to the fourteen guns 
referred to above, except in case of a casualty such as occurred in 
the forward barbette of the Oquendo, in which a projectile entered 
between the gun and the gun port. 

These ships had in addition—and this should have constituted their 
principal strength—a battery of ten 5.5 inch R. F. guns with their 
shields, but with no other protection of any kind, and exposed to all 
the splinters of the boats and their equipment. The ammunition hoists 
for these guns were entirely unprotected, and their construction and 
installation left much to be desired. 

The rapid-fire armament, in addition to being not very nomergua 
had also no protection of any kind. 

These ships were overloaded with wood, both in their decks and in 
the quarters and installations, although the tables and benches for the 
crews, the small boats, and whatever object it was possible to dispense 
with, had been disembarked at Cadiz in order to clear the ships and 
avoid conflagrations. 

To sum up, these ships were protected in their so-called vital parts, 
as if anything could be more vital than the tives of the crews, and even 
as regards their being sunk they had to fear at the most not more than 
18, or, if you will, 64 guns (of course we are speaking of the 3d of 
July), while the upper works of these ships were vulnerable to 265 
guns, in addition to all those of the auxiliary boats. 

The cruiser Cristdbal Colén, protected by a 6 inch armor of nickel 
steel, had the ten 6 inch Armstrong guns of the main battery protected, 
and six 4.7 inch and ten 2.24 inch Nordenfelt guns unprotected although 

64 


65 


well installed. This ship, as was stated at the beginning, did not have 
her big guns mounted. 

In reference to the protection of this cruiser, we will say that her 
water line was more exposed to the 8 inch guns; hence she could be 
considered vulnerable to 64 guns, but invulnerable to the others. 

As regards the enemy, the armorclads Jndiana, Oregon, Iowa, and 
Massachusetts were practically invulnerable to us. Their vertical armor 
of harveyized steel 14 to 18 inches thick could have been pierced by 
our 11 inch guns only with difficulty and at the muzzle of the gun and 
on the proving ground, but under the conditions of war, they were 
practically invulnerable and we could only have partially injured them 
in the small turrets of the 6 and 8 inch guns. The remainder of our 
guns in firing upon these ships had the same effect as barking at the 
moon. Any one of these four ships alone would have been able to 
oppose our whole united squadron, and all of them together, support- 
ing each other, represented a force so colossal in comparison with 
ours, that an officer who was certainly very competent estimated it 
from a purely scientific point of view as the relation of 40 to 1. 

The armored cruisers Brooklyn and New York were each superior 
to ours, above all in having all the armament protected, and, being 
more recently constructed, everything had been avoided in them 
which could furnish food for flames. 

The Texas, although better armed, was very similar to our ships of 
the Vizcaya class, having been constructed at the same period, and, in 
conjunction with the others, was a very powerful ship, as ours would 
have been had they had the support of some large armorclads. 

We may not and should not depreciate the armament of the auxil- 
lary vessels, which was very large; and these vessels are especially 
useful because in the heat of battle they can fire with impunity, for, 
as has been seen in many naval battles, nofone pays any attention to 
them. 

In regard to gunnery, the enemy had hada great deal of practice, for 
they had spent two years preparing for the war, spending fabulous 
sums in target practice, as shown in all the annuals of the world. In 
addition to this, the great experience gained in the bombardments of 
Puerto Rico, Santiago, and Daiquiri had served not only to train their 
men, but to overcome the numerous difficulties arising from the com- 
plicated mechanism of the mounts and breeches of modern cuns, 
which were also experienced by Dewey’s squadron at Cavite on May 1, 
and by Sampson’s at San Juan, as appears from the United States 
official reports. 

As for us, we had fired in practice but two shots with each of our 
11 inch guns—which were of the very best—and therefore we had no 
opportunity to acquire the skill so necessary to prevent what hap- 
pened on board the Vizcaya in practice and on the Teresa in combat, 

14932—No. VIII 5 





66 


namely, that after the first discharge of the stern guns we had no 
means of closing the breech of either gun. 

But the awful thing was what happened with the 5.5 inch guns. 
These pieces, which constituted the real strength of the ships, were 
fired, as every expert knows, with their charges inclosed in metal 
cartridge cases like the charges for revolvers (we mention this for the 
benefit of the uninitiated), and these cartridge cases, manufactured by 
Armstrong at Newcastle, disastrously recalled by whatever artillery 
material they furnished us, had given very bad results, as in discharg- 
ing them gases escaped through the breech. Part of the breech- 
block of a gun on the Maria Teresa had been blown off from this cause, 
injuring several of the gunners and threatening a greater disaster. 
As these cartridge cases are not manufactured in our country, others 
were ordered abroad to replace the defective ones, and it is painful to 
confess that owing to the formalities of contract and trials, which 
occupied the time from the middle of 1896 to March, 1898, when their 
manufacture was begun, almost two year's had elapsed after negotia- 
tion was begun before we received the first cartridge cases; circum- 
stances which indicate once more how little the needs of the country 
are recognized and how dearly these formalities cost in extreme 
circumstances. 

At the breaking out of the war there were only 300 rounds of the 
new cartridge cases of this type, and these we distributed among the 
three cruisers, I will not say willingly, for I, who had them on board 
the Teresa, gave them up very reluctantly, until the admiral, half 
serious and half smiling, gave me definite orders to divide them up. 
The others were assorted, and those which seemed best were tried on 
board the Vizcaya, and although no accident occurred, when these 
cartridge cases were examined it was found that some of them were 
without caps, and they might, therefore, easily have blown out the 
breechblock of the guns, killing all the gunners. In consequence of 
all this the following dilemma presented itself, either not to fire a shot 
from these guns until the moment of battle, in which case, whatever 
the injury, it would pass unregarded and fire would be kept up in any 
event, or to fire with them and give the gunners the training which 
was so necessary; but as it was possible for grave accidents to occur 
all the batteries would, in that event, become demoralized in the most 
dreadful manner. 

It was necessary to choose and we chose the first alternative; that is 
to say, we went into the battle under the fearful condition @f not hav- 
ing fired a single shot from the 5.5 inch guns until we fired against the 
enemy, and the inevitable occurred, for a gun on the Oguendo blew out 
the breechblock, killing the whole gun crew, and I myself sawa splin- 
ter of ebony removed from the head of one of the gunners of the V2z- 
caya, which showed that another breechblock had been blown out 


67 


either in whole or in part. This much at least is known, but it is 
possible that there may have been many other accidents. 

Nothing, therefore, was wanting to make our situation a gloomy 
one, and as for the disaster, officially foretold by the admiral at differ- 
ent times and for which he was censured, especially by those who were 
in a measure responsible, it was obvious and inevitable. Nothing but 
disaster could result, as all foreigners reiterated, saying that if the 
squadron went out it would be annihilated, as nothing less could follow. 

Nevertheless we do not desire that what we have just set forth should 
give rise to an opinion similar to that deduced from the correspondence 
of Admiral Cervera, leading to the supposition that the ships were in 
an impossible condition. This is not the case. The correspondence 
which has been published is not solely and exclusively upon the war. 
It is a correspondence covering a period of many months, and has 
reference to the wants and necessities which are experienced by all 
the squadrons of the world. Admiral Cervera desired to publish the 
documents as a whole solely in order that no one could think he had 
mutilated the communications. 

And thus it is that we never weary of repeating that the ships were 
magnificent, that in the training of the personnel they were not sec- 
ond to the best ships of any navy of the world, and that, except for 
the cartridge cases for the 5.5 inch guns and the necessity of consum- 
ing a great deal of coal in the training of our firemen, they had no 
essential defect. The mistake consisted in sending them against 
immensely superior forces at the last moment and without auxiliary 
elements. It was the same as if a few squads of cavalry should be 
sent against inaccessible intrenchments after having given the enemy 
time to fortify himself, to choose his position, and to assemble large 
forces with which to annihilate them. This does not mean that the 
squads were to be despised because this or that detail was lacking in 
their service. The really detestable thing would be the command for 
them to go out to certain death in order that their dead bodies might 
offer an argument to the Spanish people which would justify the 
necessity of asking for peace. 


CHAPTER IX. 


July 2, 1898. 


At daybreak the admiral convened his captains and brought to our 
notice the contents of the telegram, the original text of which, and 
not the translation we have given, says at the end: ‘*‘ Your excellency 
will go out immediately.” He stated to us that the time for discussion 
had passed, that we had done all that was within human power to avoid 
the catastrophe, and that nothing was left now but to obey, to which 
weallagreed. The learned and beloved Bustamante, who fell wounded 
in the battle of the previous day never to rise again, was absent, in con- 
sequence of which I performed the duties of chief of staff from the day 
of his landing. 

We unanimously agreed to make the sortie precipitately, because, as 
the insurrectionists were in constant communication with the city, and 
as it was not easy to conceal the sortie, we felt certain that Admiral 
Sampson would know of it in a few hours, and that we would thus lose 
the only hope which remained to us, that of engaging them before their 
engines were entirely ready. | 

The admiral immediately proceeded to give us instructions for the 
battle. These were based on the knowledge which he had of the usual 
maneuvers of the enemy observed during the time of the blockade. 
The enemy’s ships, resting against Daiquiri on the east, and very close 
to the shore, were in the habit of forming a great arc, with the /ndiana 
on the east, followed in a westerly direction by the WVew York, Oregon, 
Towa, Massachusetts, and Texas, which latter remained approximately 
to the south of the mouth of the harbor. Close inshore, toward the 
west, there was a yacht which we supposed to be in constant communi- 
cation with the insurrectionists, and supporting the yacht was the 
Brooklyn in the center of the interval and far away from the other 
ships, consequently leaving a large space open to the southwest between 
the Zexas and the coast. 

Supposing, therefore, that the Brooklyn was at her usual station when 
we came out, the Maria Teresa was to engage her in battle, endeavor- 
ing to ram her, and while the rest of the enemy’s squadron were grap- 
pling with our flagship the other ships, headed by the Vizcaya, without 
delaying to succor the Teresa, were to pass in column between her and 


the coast and endeavor to escape. The destroyers were to place them- 
68 


69 


selves under the protection of the larger ships, and as soon as possible, 
under forced draft, endeavor to steam away and to take no part in the 
battle except in case a good opportunity should present itself. Upon 
encountering any single ship, however, they were to improve the oppor- 
tunity to attack her. Those of the ships which succeeded in escaping 
were to gain Habana or Cienfuegos. 

The words of the admiral were received with enthusiasm, and we 
all clasped each other’s hands fervently, as soldiers who knew how to 
meet death and destruction, from which no power could save us. 
There were harsh and well-merited denunciations of many statesmen 
who remain as calm as if they owed nothing either to God or their 
country, and we swore that if anyone of us should survive he would 
defend the memory of those who perished in the encounter. 

Four o’clock in the afternoon was set as the hour for the sortie, 
if by that time the reembarkation of the forces of the squadron had 
taken place; if not, the following morning. 

Every captain now returned to his ship. I, as chief of staff, went 
to see the general of division, José Toral, who, as has been stated, 
was commander in chief at Santiago, and whom I met at 7 o’clock in 
the morning under fire in the trenches before El Caney, and asked 
him to order the reembarkation of the 1,000 men whom we had sent 
ashore. An aid of the admiral left, at the same time, in the hands of 
the archbishop all the original documents of the tragedy, which docu- 
ments fortunately have now been recovered; and to this admirable 
forethought of Admiral Cervera we who were fortunate enough to 
serve under him, and the whole navy, owe the salvation of our honor 
against interested imputations. 

In connection with the sortie we have studied particularly one fea- 
ture, which constituted the most essential point and which was to 
determine the character of the battle. We find no explanation of the 
fact that this point, which was the most decisive, has been passed 
over unnoticed by all the professional writers who have occupied 
themselves with this subject. 

The entrance to the harbor of Santiago is a narrow channel anon 
1,100 yards in length, which is made still narrower near its outlet by 
the location of Diamond Bank, which reduces its width to about 76 
yards. ‘These narrows take a slight turn, which makes it necessary in 
coming out to steam at a moderate speed, in order not to run upon 
the rocks on the opposite shore, and therefore it is impossible, when 
several ships are going out, for more than one to be in the channel at 
a time, otherwise there is danger of collision, if by chance some damage 
should be done to the ship which goes out first or if it should run 
aground, which would not be strange in view of the difficult character 
of the maneuver. ‘The situation would be the same as that of a regi- 
ment of artillery passing through the gate of a fortress if one of its 


70 


pieces should get caught and the others crowd upon it in case they 
were not able to draw back nor turn within the walls of the passage. 

To this natural difficulty of the harbor must be added the obstruc- 
tion of part of the channel near Cay Smith caused by the sunken 
Merrimac, against which we would not only scrape, but the ships would 
have to turn before clearing it, for which reason the port screws would 
pass within 3 or 4 yards of the hull of the wreck, with great risk of 
being entangled in it or its rigging. 

It was necessary, therefore, that the ships go out a considerable 
distance apart, and although this circumstance in itself would not be- 
prejudicial to our fire, it had, on the other hand, the serious drawback 
that the ship which went out ahead, as well as each successive ship, 
would have to suffer alone the fire of all the enemy’s vessels, result- 
ing in a battle of only two available guns against more than two 
hundred. 

This was the problem which presented itself to us and which we 
were unable to avoid, and this is the tactical reason for the way the battle 
unfolded itself; and I again call attention to the fact that foreign critics 
have laid much stress upon the distance of one ship from another, but 
have not considered the time, which was the most important factor. 

The embarkation of the seamen who had goneashore took place rapidly, 
except those of the Vizcaya, who were farther away on the road to 
El Cobre and who arrived at 4 p. m. completely exhausted. For this 
reason the admiral decided to suspend the sortie for this day, and allow 
everybody to rest, since everything was in readiness and no further 
preparations were necessary. 

We will not conclude the narrative of this day without stating that 
on land the firing continued very lively, so that at certain moments we 
watched with new anxiety the heights at the entrance of the harbor. 
At 2 o’clock in the morning, by order of the admiral, I went ashore 
and for the last time communicated with Villaamil, who, with his 
destroyers, was below the piers of the iron mines, where the firing 
sounded so near that it seemed as if the enemy had surrounded that 
position. However, nothing extraordinary occurred, and all the cap- 
tains saw that their crews enjoyed a refreshing rest to prepare them 
for the action of the following day. 


CHAPTER X. 


July 3, 1898. 

Poor Spain! 

A foggy day dawned; the ships had all their fires spread; the guns 
were loaded; the use of torpedoes was left to the discretion of each 
commander, and the anchors were ready to be weighed. The men had 
been given an extra ration. At 7 o’clock I went, by order of the 
admiral, with the gunboat Alwarado to the entrance to reconnoiter the 
position of the enemy, who could not be seen from inside the harbor. 

The enemy’s ships were in the following order, beginning in the 
east: The Jndiana, New. York, Oregon, lowa, Texas, and Brooklyn, 
and a number of auxiliaries, which I did not mention before. The 
Massachusetts was absent; the /ndiana was closer inshore than usual, 
and the Brooklyn, contrary to her position of the preceding days, per- 
haps because it was Sunday and she could not communicate with the 
land, was close to the Zexas, and in the intermediate space which she 
before occupied there was a small yacht. The enemy, then, was pre- 
senting an array of 14 guns of 12 and 13 inches; 38 of 8 inch, and 191 
of smaller caliber, all rapid-firing guns, in addition to machine guns 
and torpedoes. Of these guns 96 of larger caliber were perfectly 
protected. 

On our side we had only six 11 inch guns protected, and the others, 
114 in number, were completely unprotected, and 30 out of the 40, 
which constituted the mainstay of our armament, had their ammuni- 
tion in the condition we have described. 

The relative strength of the armament changed somewhat, because at 
half past 8 in the morning the Vew York, with Admiral Sampson on 
board, had gone to Siboney to confer with General Shafter, and by 
the absence of that ship from the enemy’s line there were temporarily 
withdrawn 6 guns of 8 inch and 20 of less caliber. 

In regard to distances, with a stadimeter which I carried I deter- 
mined that of the Brooklyn to be more than 7,656 yards, which was the 
maximum range of my instrument. I calculated that the distance was 
nearer 9,848 than 7,656 yards, since from an elevation of about 40 feet 
above sea level her water line could scarcely be seen. Concerning this 
matter of distances Admiral Sampson’s report is not exact, and one 


need only look at the official plan published in the United States to 
rae 


72 


understand this. It shows the Brooklyn about 5,468 yards from the 
harbor entrance, which would have obliged the Zeresa to pass about 
328 yards from the flagship of Admiral Schley, which is what we 
should have desired for our torpedoes and main battery; the Gloucester, 
875 yards from the Morro, from which place the Mausers of the 
garrison would have driven her away; the Vixen, 1,640 yards distant 
from the only good gun of the Socapa, which would instantly have 
made its presence felt; and, finally, the Zndiana, about 3,826 yards from 
the entrance of the harbor, and it is sufficient to remember that the last 
of our ships to go out did so about thirty minutes after the first in 
order to understand that if the Zndzana had been stationed 3,826 yards 
from the mouth and close to shore she would have awaited the Oguendo 
at the sortie, which she could have done with impunity, since a speed 
of 4 knots per hour would have been sufficient to get abreast of the 
Morro before the Oguendo came out; that is, on the supposition that 
the /ndiana occupied the place which her admiral assigns to her. It is 
true that the position of the /ndzana was near the coast, but probably not 
less than 2.5 miles from it, and about 8,746 yards from the mouth of 
the harbor. It is very easy to reconstruct the position of the ships at 
the moment of the sortie, because from the Zeresa, in doubling Cay 
Smith, only the Zevas could be seen, and soon afterwards the Jowa, 
forming an arc of about 9,848 yards radius stretching to eastward of 
the harbor. The captain of the Jowa himself states that he fired at 6,000 
yards, which, added to our advance toward the enemy’s line, coincides 
with what we have stated respecting distances, contrary to what Admiral 
Sampson says. Moreover, if what he himself affirms were true, it 
would have been his duty to court-martial all of his captains for not 
having sunk our squadron at the very entrance of the harbor. 

Neither does the official plan of battle as given by Admiral Samp- 
son conform to the reports of his commanders, for the captain of the 
Texas says that he was 1,500 yards off the Morro, which, according to 
Sampson’s report, could not have been the case. The captain of the 
Lowa, which was by her side, states that he was between 3 and 4 miles 
from Morro Castle. However, in other particulars it is compara- 
tively acceptable, the documents published by the Navy Department, 
_as already acknowledged, being usually quite impartial, and excepting 
that they always suppress everything disagreeable, they are, as stated, 
models of fairness which we believe have few precedents. 

Returning to the question of the plan of battle, we note that, on 
the other hand, the one in Brassey’s Naval Annual of this year, which 
evidently originated with one of the American captains, is on the 
whole, correct, except that the positions of the Zewas and Brooklyn are 
shown too far forward; for, if they had been so situated, the Jowa and 
Texas could not have interfered with the Zéresa as they did. Neither 
is position No. 2 of the Brooklyn correct, which makes her appear 


73 


to advance toward us. What she did do was to make a turn which 
brought us astern, as described by the chief engineer of the Oregon, 
on pages 544 and 545 of the Engineering Magazine for January of this 
year, and whose plans are perfectly correct as to the position of the 
American squadron. 

We ought, however, to acknowledge the sincerity of all, since the 
differences acquire importance only through the difficult circumstances 
under which the battle took place. 

Having returned to the flagship, I reported to the admiral the result 
of my reconnoissance, and thata battle ship of the type of the /ndiana 
was absent from the enemy’s line. | 

Immediately the admiral gave orders for hoisting the signal to 
weigh anchor, and when all the ships answered that the anchors were 
secured the signal for the sortie, ‘‘ Viva Espafia!” was given, which 
was answered with enthusiasm by all the crews and the troops of the 
army, who, entirely ready to help us, stood on the high banks which 
form the shores of the harbor of Santiago.’ 

With the battle flag hoisted the /Infanta Maria Teresa advanced 
ahead of the other cruisers, which for the last time gave the honors 
due their admiral, saluting him with hurrahs that manifested the 
spirit of the crews, worthy of a better fate. The Maria Teresa con- 
tinued to advance rapidly without being detected until she was abreast 
of the battery of the Estrella, whose evidently hurried signals and 
an alarm gun from the /owa showed that the hostile ships were taking 
positions for battle. 

We had just finished making the turn at Diamond Bank, amidst death- 
like silence, everybody awed by the magnificent spectacle of the ships 
issuing from the narrow passage between the Morro and Socapa. It 
was a solemn moment, capable of making the calmest heart beat faster, 
From outside the conning tower, which I did not want to enter, in 
order, if I should fall, to set an example to my defenseless crew, I asked 
leave of the admiral to open fire, and, that received, I gave the order. 
The bugle gave the signal for the commencement of the battle, an 
order which was repeated by those of the other batteries and followed 
by a murmur of approbation from all those poor sailors and marines 
who were anxious to fight; for they did not know that those warlike 
echoes were the signal which hurled their country at the feet of the 
victor, since they were to deprive Spain of the only power still of value 
to her, without which a million soldiers could be of no service; of the 
only power which could have weight in the treaty of peace; a power the 
destruction of which would place Spain at the mercy of her enemy— 








1]t is not worth while to discuss the reports that the anchors were not ready 
and the guns not loaded, which interested Spanish writers in search of popularity 
haye dared to surmise or invent. 


74 


the old Spain of Europe, not Cuba alone, as many ignorant persons 
believed. 

The sound of my bugles was the last echo of those which history tells 
us were sounded at the capture of Granada. It was the signal that the 
history of four centuries of grandeur was at an end and that Spain 
was becoming a nation of the fourth class. 

‘‘Poor Spain!” I said to my noble and beloved admiral, and he 
answered by an expressive motion, as though to say that he had done 
everything possible to avoid it, and that his conscience was clear. And 
this was true. As to civil duties, no one could have done more than he 
did; for as concerns military duties they were so easy that they are > 
not worth the trouble of discussing them. 

As for me, what a strange coincidence! A few years ago I had the 
honor to represent in the caravel Santa Maria, which is an exact copy of 
that of Columbus, the glories of the fifteenth century, and on the 3d 
of July it fell to my lot to give the signal for the end of this great- 
ness. But the first was only a representation, while this was a frightful 
reality. 

The second gun of the deck battery was the first to open fire and 
brought us back to this reality, too dreadful to allow us to think of 
other things. Giving the cruiser all her speed, we poured out a 
frantic fire with our whole battery, except the forward gun, which 
we reserved to fire at close quarters. In compliance with the order 
received, I put our bow toward the armored cruiser brooklyn, which, 
putting to starboard,* presented her stern to us and fired her two after 
turret guns; moving to southward. In the account of the battle given 
by the engineer of the Oregon he confirms the fact that the Brooklyn, 
seeing the intention of the Zeresa to attack her, made the maneuver 
which we have indicated. The position of the Brooklyn, and the fact 
of her being close to the others, which advanced as she receded, caused 
the Zewas and the /owa to come between the Zeresa and the Brooklyn; 
for this reason, as to keep on this course would have been to run the 
danger of being rammed by these two ships, the admiral consulted 
me, and we agreed that it was impossible to continue, so he ordered 

‘me to put her prow toward the.coast. At that time the Brooklyn was 
about 5,416 yards and the Zevas and /owa about 3,250 yards from us. 

Behind the Zeresa came the Vizcaya, followed by the Colén, and then 
the Oquendo; but after the Zeresa came out of the harbor she was 
entirely alone for about ten minutes, during which time she had to 
suffer the fire of all the batteries of the enemy. This formed, as we 
have said, the peculiar nature of that battle; that is to say, the Ameri- 
can squadron was exposed to two guns of the Zeresa, but she to all 
the guns of the enemy. 


'The turn was to starboard, although it would seem reasonable for it to have been 
made to port. 


15 


The Vizcaya and the Colén came out quite close to each other, 
increasing, consequently, the distance between them and the Oquendo; 
and as the enemy’s ships continued to pick out the admiral’s ship for 
their fire, and especially as our other ships had orders to follow inside, 
they were beyond the range of the 6 pounder rapid fire guns, so that in 
the beginning they suffered but little; and if their engines had been in 
good condition and the Vizcaya’s bottom clean, they would have been 
able to make a much longer resistance. 

In the meantime, continuing with the Maria Teresa in order not to 
lose the thread of the narrative, she was torun ashore. The Lrooklyn 
ran parallel with her, without any manifest intention toapproach. The 
Texas, after the first attack, had followed in the wake of her flagship, 
maneuvering apparently with indecision, but the /owa, which forged 
ahead and consequently gained the distance she was obliged to run, 
which was for her less than half of that the Zeresa had to make, was 
now about 2,166 yards from the stern of the Spanish flagship, when she 
lodged in us two 12 inch shells, which, exploding on the poop, burst 
the steam pipe of the main pump and broke some pipes of the engines, 
which was the decisive cause of the loss of that ship. 

In the descriptions which the chief engineer of the Oregon has pub- 
lished he credits the Oregon with these shots, and while it is true that 
in the end it was she that decided the destruction of the Vizcaya and 
the Colén, nevertheless at the beginning of the battle there must have 
been much indecision, because, if she and the /ndiana had advanced, 
the Oguendo would not have come out of the harbor. Be that as it 
may, we still believe that the hostile ship which dealt the deathblow to 
our cruiser Maria Teresa was the Jowa, as thecaptain of the Oregon 
himself speaks of the rapid advance of the latter battle ship. 

What the captain of the /ndéana says about the bursting of one of 
his shells on the Maria Teresa, I believe, can not be sustained, since 
the same captain states that he fired on the destroyers from a distance 
of 4,500 to 3,000 yards, and as these had come out of the harbor more 
than one-half hour after the flagship of Admiral Cervera the latter 
could not have been at a distance where the injuries inflicted by the last 
ship in the enemy’s line could be seen. The distances as given by the 
commander of the /ndiana himself indicate that he was at even a 
greater distance from the mouth of the harbor than we ourselves sup- 
posed, or that he did not make great haste to shorten it. 

Every one knows how difficult it is to give a description of a naval 
battle, which consists of a number of rapid individual movements, and 
for that reason, before we proceed, we repeat that we do not propose 
to furnish a literary description, but an absolutely professional mili- 
tary study, which it is impossible to endow with the life to which a nar- 
rative of another kind lends itself. 

It was at the moment the Marta Teresa received her deathblow that 


76 


the Oquendo came out of the harbor. But we will proceed with the 
former, in order not to lose the trend of the battle. | 

When the decks were strewn with dead and wounded and the gun 
crews had been relieved repeatedly; when various fires had broken out, 
some of which had been extinguished; when it seemed apparent that 
the Brooklyn alone would be able to keep up with us, as we could 
easily keep ahead of the battle ships, the distance from which we had 
had to shorten on account of the configuration of the coast, it was then 
that the two 12 or 18 inch shells which burst on the poop, or some 
other projectile, breaking one of our big steam pipes, caused our speed 
to be diminished immediately and visibly, and we knew that we were 
hopelessly lost. The steam permeated the poop, cutting it off com- 
pletely, and invaded the turret, rendering it untenable. The fires 
increased, as we could not reach them. The crew of one of the small- 
caliber ammunition hoists were suffocated; a number of brave men who 
attempted to pass through the after gangways, led by a valiant officer, 
perished in the fire. 

At this moment, while, from the bridge, I was addressing the men 
who were fighting furiously amidst the frightful chaos which the deck 
of the cruiser presented, and was trying to ascertain what had occur- 
red on the poop, because from the bridge it was impossible to see 
what had happened, which seemed to me like the explosion of a maga- 
zine or a torpedo, I fell severely wounded, and with me the two officers 
of the squadron staff, we three being the only ones left standing of 
the many who had been stationed defenseless on the bridge. 

During that furious struggle there was no time nor opportunity to 
call the executive officer, and therefore the admiral himself took com- 
mand of the ship, while I was carried to the sick bay. 

The fire on the after deck of the Maria Teresa grew more and more 
formidable, her speed diminishing every moment, and the havoc was 
constantly increasing, as we were within range of the rapid firers. The 
admiral therefore called the second and third officers and the lieuten- 
ants who were in his immediate vicinity, and it was agreed that there 
was no other recourse than to. beach the ship, in order to prevent her 
from falling into the hands of the enemy and to save the crew, for 
which reason, putting her to starboard,-the ship was run ashore about 
5 miles from the mouth of the harbor. 

We left the Oquendo coming out of the harbor; but at this juncture 
the /ndiana, the Oregon, and the Jowa, having advanced with their 
unerring line of fire, our cruiser received the concentrated fire of the 
three powerful battle ships, which could fire at her with impunity, as 
if shooting at a target, so that she was completely destroyed before 
she came out. 

The sortie of the Oguendo under these circumstances, coolly maneu- 
vering to make the turn at Diamond Bank, is one of the grandest feats, 


LH 


if not the grandest, performed in any navy, and the unfortunate cap- 
tain, Juan Lazaga, who was killed in the battle, leaves behind him a 
record of honor and glory which coming generations should remember 
with respect. When the Oquendo came out of the harbor, she was already 
completely lost, and it is strange that the American battle ships, which 
ought to have surrounded her, did not capture or sink her then and 
there, because with the superiority they had they ought to Nee accom- 
plished more than they did. 

The Oquendo proceeded under full steam, passing very close to the 
Teresa as the latter ran toward the shore, and with her whole port side 
burning she was beached about a mile from the flagship, running 
ashore at full speed, harassed throughout her course by the whole 
American squadron, which was discharging but few guns at the Viz- 
caya and the Colén and no longer firing at the Zeresa, and once more 
there was a battle of a// the American guns against a single one of the 
Oquendo, for a shell from an 8 inch gun had burst under the gun of 
the forward turret, rendering it useless and killing an officer and the 
whole gun crew. 

Before we follow the other cruisers which remained afloat we will 
occupy ourselves with the destroyers, /uror and Plutén, which came 
out after the Oguendo. These ships had orders to come out with the 
bigger ones and to put themselves under their protection until, by vir- 
tue of their speed, they were able to get out of the range of the fire, 
as we have stated in discussing the plan of battle. We are ignorant of 
the reasons which their brave commander, Captain Villaamil, may have 
had for issuing forth at such a great interval after the other ships. 
Perhaps he thought that all the battle ships would engage in the pur- 
suit, not taking into account that there were many auxiliary ships 
which, for the destroyers, were more to be feared than the battle 
ships themselves. It was these auxiliaries which, at very short range, 
destroyed them, aided by the rapid-fire battery of the Jndiana, which, 
as we have seen, was behind the others“ These ships, so frail that 
they can not be struck by a shell without receiving their deathblow, 
were destroyed immediately at the sortie, the /wror going to the bot- 
tom and the P/uton dashing against the coast almost submerged, each 
of the boats having lost one-third of its crew, most of whom were 
killed. 

We left the Vizcaya and the Colén steaming westward, after forc- 
ing the hostile line, followed closely by the Brooklyn, the Texas, the 
Towa, and the Oregon, which last, forcing her draft, proved on that 
day to be the ship whose engines were the best managed. To add to 
her bad luck the Vizcaya was left behind by her companion; there- 
fore, being nearer, she was instinctively attacked by all the ships of 
the enemy; the same circumstance of two of our guns pitted against 
all those of the enemy occurring again as before; and hardly had the 


78 


hostile ships gained in distance when fire broke out on the beautiful 
cruiser, which all the heroic courage of her defenders could not con- 
trol, and at about half past 11 she ran ashore at Aserraderos, her flag 
consumed by the flames, like those of her two companions, so that 
not one flag was lowered. 

In this chase, and about half past 10, the Vizcaya made for the 
Brooklyn, with the object in view of shortening the distance and attack- 
ing her, but the Oregon and the Jowa interfered in the same manner as 
the Jowa and Texas interfered with the Maria Teresa at the beginning 
of the battle, so that the Vézcaya had to put again to westward and to 
go on fighting with them all. 

The Vezcaya carried a beautiful silk flag, the gift of the historical 
society of the ancient province of the same name, and knowing the ship 
lost Eulate had it lowered and burned, hoisting another one to the 
main truck, and this one was never lowered until the fire caused the 
whole mast to fall into the flames devouring the poop, their pointed 
tongues seeming to wait for the flag of our country to fall into them, 
that it might never serve the enemy as a trophy. 

The crews of the three ships had to jump into the water and the 
wounded of the Maria Teresa and Oquendo were carried ashore by 
those who could swim. The Vizcaya, however, was fortunate enough 
to save a boat; but she had run aground quite a distance from shore 
and had there not been a reef close by the whole crew would have per- 
ished by being burned or drowned. 

The Vizcaya being lost, the /ndiana returned to her post off San- 
tiago, the Colén being closely pursued by the Brooklyn and the Oregon 
and also by the Zexas and the Vew York, which latter, upon hearing 
the cannonade, had forced her draft in order to take part in the engage- 
ment, and thus had a share in the destruction of the destroyers. 

The Cristébal Colén was about 6 miles ahead of the other ships, 
hoping to save herself. One may therefore imagine the despair of her 
captain when the chief engineer came up to report that the good coal 
had been almost consumed and that with what yet remained the revo- 
lutions would be considerably reduced and, consequently, her speed 
also after a further run of about 3 miles. Everything was done to 
stimulate the enthusiasm and interest of the firemen; but the battle ship 
Oregon, which forged ahead with a speed of 16 knots, according to the 
official reports, gained rapidly on our cruiser, and she was irredeem- 
ably lost. 

The situation of the Cristébal Colén could not possibly have been 
more critical. She was closely pursued by the Oregon, which could 
sink her without herself receiving the least injury, and the Brooklyn, 
an armored cruiser of more speed and better armament, and the Vew 
York and the Texas steadily gaining on her—a powerful combination, 
from which it was impossible to escape; and to make the situation still 


79 


more difficult, the Oregon was located in the dead angle of the guns on 
the upper deck. As already stated the Coldén did not have her 30 ton 
guns. ‘Thus she could not fire without lying to, thereby losing her only 
chance of safety. 

If the defense had been continued, there would have been more casual- 
ties, which appeals to that class of people who judge the actions in a 
war by the number of victims, while these very often represent only 
the incapability of the one who is in command. But the ship (Colén) 
would certainly have fallen into the hands of the enemy, and that is what 
the captain of the Oregon was trying to accomplish when he managed to 
put himself between the shore and our cruiser. One recourse, how- 
ever, was left, and that was to sink the Colén before the arrival of the 
enemy; but that would have caused the whole crew to be drowned. 
Though this is so monstrous a proceeding that it does not deserve to be 
discussed, it is well to remind the Spaniards of the fact that it is pro- 
hibited by law, for, as the commandant of a fortress at the surrender 
has no power to order the whole garrison over the powder magazine and 
blow it up with all of its defenders, likewise a commander can not in 
cold blood give an order which will send 500 men to their death, though 
this may be considered a very natural act by the great admirals around 
the tables of the café; and, above all, this should not be done when it 
is of no advantage to the country. 

The ship being lost beyond human help, just as Admiral Sampson 
states in his official report, Commodore Paredes and the captain of the 
Colon, inspired by a high sense of duty, and before the enemy was 
able to prevent it, ran the cruiser at full speed against the shore, 
ordered the valves to be opened, and prepared for the bitter task of 
lowering the flag—the last brave act in that bloody but fruitless 
drama. 

The beaching of the ships took place under decidedly favorable 
conditions, because the coast is sandy, alternating with large groups 
of rock. 

The most fortunate ones were the Vizcaya and the Oguendo, both of 
which ran upon rocks, so that, with their bottoms stove in, it was im- 
possible for the enemy to pull off their hulls. The Warta Teresa struck 
only one rock on the starbeard side, in consequence of which, and 
because she had but little speed, she did not receive all the damage 
that the admiral had intended. Moreover, I had arranged with the 
two principal engineers everything necessary for sinking the ship, feel- 
ing sure that it would be carried out. But as these worthy men were 
killed and I severely wounded, that which was a secret among us three 
could not be put into effect, nor could it be made public without 
jeopardizing the moral courage of the whole crew; and when, after 
beaching the ship, I was carried to the deck it was impossible to 


80 


go to the engine rooms, as the escaping steam and the conflagra- 
tion in the battery made any attempt fruitless. 

The Cristdbal Colén was less fortunate than any of the others, 
for, although going at aspeed of 13 knots, she ran ashore on sand; and 
if Admiral Sampson, with a more seamanlike spirit, had ordered the 
divers to close the valves, he could most certainly have saved the 
cruiser, but with feverish impatience he towed her off with his own 
flagship, the Vew York. Hardly had the ship been floated when she 
began to list, at which moment, with great dexterity, he pushed the 
Colon back again with the ram of his own ship toward the sandy shoal; 
but it was too late, and, turning over, that noble and ill-fated 
cruiser went to the bottom of the sea forever. ‘The few Americans 
and Spaniards who were still on board hastily saved themselves. 

Admiral Sampson states in his official report that the valves had 
been opened ¢reacherously, supposing that it was done after the flag 
was lowered; but this is not correct, not only because neither the dis- 
tance nor the condition of the ship made any precipitation necessary, 
but also because the ship did not surrender until she was thought to 
be a total loss. And it is certainly a strange pretension on the part of 
the American people, not only in this but in other things, to attempt 
to give lessons in morality when that which they profess is of a 
peculiar kind, as the whole world knows. 

Since, as we have said, we do not undertake to give a description 
having literary merit, but simply a serious and entirely impartial 
study, we will continue with the discussion of the battle before relat- 
ing the incidents which followed thereafter, which discussion, added 
to the chapter which we will exclusively devote to professional obser- 
vations, will complete a study in which we hope that at least the officers 
of the navies throughout the whole world will appreciate the spirit of 
loyalty in which it is written. 

The first subject which presents itself is the question of armament, 
which in turn may be divided into three parts—training, distances, al 
vulnerability. 

In regard to training, ours had the disadvantage that, as we defiled 
before the enemy, he passed rapidly from bow to stern before the 
muzzles of our guns, and this explains why the Brooklyn, which was 
the ship that virtually ran parallel with the Zeresa and the Vizcaya, 
received 41 shells, certainly from these two ships, for she was never 
within range of the fire of the Oquendo and only for a short time of 
that of the best guns of the Colén. 

As for the enemy, while his ships advanced toward ours, he kept 
his guns trained on us; so that, as regards the training, properly 
speaking, he was in a much more advantageous position than the 
Spanish squadron, as long as it did not leave the circle in which all 
the firing of the enemy converged. The superiority of the Ameri- 


81 


cans was due to the large amount of firing they had done, and even 
the extremely prudent bombardments of the Morro and Socapa, at San- 
tiago de Cuba, had given them great practice in firing at long range. 
Sites 5.5 inch guns were fired for the first time on this ecchsiond 

In the Becur iptions which have been made @ posterior? of the effects 
of the fire on our lost ships, they have even gone so far as to say to 
which hostile ship each one of the projectiles belonged; and from this, 
which seems to us ridiculous when we consider how difficult it is to be 
able to fix even the position of the ships themselves, the conclusion 
has been drawn that the Americans made 38 per cent of hits, which, 
although an acceptable percentage under these circumstances and 
when firing in actual war, we roundly deny, because the casualties 
were enormous in the upper batteries, where projectiles scarcely show, 
and it is certain that the number of hits made is perhaps more than 
double. But, in any case, this goes to demonstrate that we could not 
lessen the distances as we wished, especially as regards the ships in 
the extreme west of the enemy’s line, since the great secret of good 
firing is to fire at short range, and the small number of hits in propor- 
tion to the number of shots fired goes to support what we have said 
about the distances in discussing the plan of battle. 

On our part, we feel secure in asserting that the 41 hits in the 
Brooklyn were made principally by the Teresa and the Vizcaya; and 
if we take into consideration that at the end of fifteen minutes the 
Teresa was practically hors de combat, and soon afterwards the Oquendo, 
while the enemy during the whole of the action had ad/ his guns in 
service, we see that the proportion is not so unfavorable as it appears, 
and perhaps superior to that of the American artillery. 

During the whole battle, except at the sortie of the Oguendo and 
the destroyers, we were at too long range for our Nordenfelt 6 pound- 
ers, while the American batteries, situated in the high superstructures, 
were much better than ours, which were located on the lower deck for 
the sole purpose of defense against torpedo boats; and in order to give 
a convincing proof that the number of hits found on our ships is very 
much less than those which we actually sustained, we will state that 
on the bridge of the Marta Teresa all who were anette of the con- 
ning tower were killed or wounded, and I personally saw seven pro- 
jectiles strike there, one of which, no doubt of large caliber, cut one 
of my orderlies in two, and another put me and the whole staff out of 
action. 

The question of vuinerability was discussed when we compared the 
ships, and aside from our deficient armament.the distance augmented 
the protection of the Americans, while our ships, neither at close 
nor at long range, had any protection whatever in the upper works. 
It appears from the American notes that there were found 27 hits in 
the Zeresa and 26 in the Vizcaya, both of which ships were rapidly 

14232—V IlI——6 


82 


consumed by fire, and the Brooklyn, which received 41 shells, though 
of smaller caliber, did not suffer much, owing to her protection. The 
cruiser Almirante Oquendo received, in all, 16 big projectiles and 46 
6 pounders, and this is an additional proof of the absolute necessity 
for protecting the upper works, so that the accumulated damage 
may form no obstruction. 

We repeat again and again that the shots which our ships received 
were much more numerous, because, if only those had hit which 
showed their marks, it would have been impossible for the conflagra- 
tion to attain the proportions and rapidity that it did. 

More than the casualties and damages—as the 7Zeresa alone was 
injured by the bursting of a pipe in connection with the engines—it 
was the conflagration that determined the rapid destruction of the 
squadron; for it was impossible to remain any longer on board ship 
with the two upper decks converted into one immense blaze. The 
three cruisers were overburdened with timber, and the living spaces 
constituted the greatest danger. Furthermore, with fires under all 
the boilers ships attain a temperature so excessive that any com- 
bustible material will ignite with the greatest facility; and for. this 
reason the greatest danger to these ships, and every one of their date, 
lay in conflagrations from the moment when the battle became so fierce 
that there was no time to extinguish them when they occurred. 

In order not to interrupt our narrative we will reserve these details 
for another chapter of a purely professional nature, the contents of 
which will explain everything relating to the battle. 

That which had been foreseen and which could not fail to happen had 
come to pass; the hour of the disaster had arrived to which the squad- 
ron had been doomed by the instructions of the 7th of April and of the 
29th, the day of our departure, from Cape Verde; as for the rest, it 
was only a question of the time and place when and where it was to 
occur. In this disaster were lost the four beautiful sbips on which 
we founded the hopes-of a powerful navy. Of their crews, some 
were on board the enemy’s ships and others ashore, naked, starving, 
wounded, and dying under the cruel, tropical sun, while their com- 


rades, drinking the unwholesome water of a near-by brook out of . 


improvised cups made of the leaves of trees, were trying to quench 
the thirst of burning fever. And how terrible were the wounds! We 
still remember with horror the frightful havoc caused by the large 
fragments of the modern shells. A boatswain of the Adaria Teresa 
had fourteen wounds; no one struck by American projectiles had less 
than two, and of such size and capricious frightfulness that not even 
the most hardened could view without pity. 

Among the missing was the brave commander of the Oguendo, my 
beloved life-long companion, Juan Lazaga, who will ever leave as 
an example to all the seamen of the world the glorious memory of 


83 


his sally out of the harbor of Santiago and the turn at Diamond Bank, 
made as though it were an everyday occurrence, his ship already 
totally destroyed and after an 8 inch shell had exploded in the forward 
turret. Under these conditions he kindly dismissed the pilot and 
with great composure took out his ship himself. We consider this 
act one of the most admirable of the whole battle. } 

There were also missing his executive officer, Sola, who was cut in 
two by a shell; the third officer, Matos, the three lieutenants next in 
rank, and 121 men of that heroic crew, all’ killed. 

There was missing the excellent Villaamil, the commander of the 
destroyers, killed by a shell on the bridge of the Furor, also five of 
the officers of the Marta Teresa, and four of the Vizcaya, whose sur- 
vivors related how the poor gunner, Francisco Zaragoza, with gaping 
wounds, asked for a piece of the silk flag which the flames were 
devouring, and, wrapping it about him, gave up his soul to the 
Creator; and with tears in their eyes they told how the midshipman, 
Enrique Cheriguini, with both legs shot off close to the trunk, after 
making preparations to die like a Christian, wrote a letter to his 
parents, to whom he gave his last thoughts, knowing that God receives 
in His arms all good children, and that his soul would be united with 
Him, and with his last breath he wrote the last letter of his name. 
There was also missing the second surgeon of the Maria Teresa, who 
bravely and calmly had been attending all in that frightful sick bay, 
the awful aspect of which exceeded any horrors which man could 
invent in his imagination; also my two poor engineers, and Higinio 
Rodriguez, the captain of marines, all of whom had paid the frightful 
tribute to the errors of others, only to give an easy victory to the 
enemy and leave to him Cuba, the Philippines, and all Spain to do 
with as he pleased. Still, if this sacrifice had been for the good of our 
country, we should not have considered it too much if all had died for 
its greatness and prosperity. 

The revised lists of casualties, made some months later, not counting 
those who had saved themselves *through the woods and reached 
Santiago de Cuba, show a total of 323 killed and 151 severely wounded, 
for there were few slightly wounded; that is to say, 22 per cent of 
all the crews, an enormous number, especially taking into account the 
proportion of dead to the number wounded, which is quite different 
from what it usually is in a land battle; yet, though this number is 
large, we were convinced before the battle that it would be much 
greater, and that would have been the case if the fire had not hastened 
the destruction of the cruisers. 

The fact that we were often fighting just within the limit of the range 
of the small-caliber guns caused many unexploded shells to fall upon 
the decks of our ships, and there were many and repeated acts of valor 
shown in throwing them into the water. 


84 


We could never complete this chapter if we were to undertake to 
relate the innumerable acts of bravery, generosity, and courage; but 
I can not do less than to mention one which I saw with my own eyes. 
The Maria Teresa had already been abandoned, the flames mounting 
up to the height of the funnels, and projectiles exploding on all sides— 
a spectacle capable of awing the stoutest heart—and when everybody 
thought that no living soul was left on the ship suddenly a man 
appeared there calling for help. Instantly, without being incited by 
anyone, the third boatswain, José Casado, cried out in a loud voice, 
““T will not let that man die!” and threw himself into the water. He 
climbed up the blood-stained sides of the ship with utter disregard of 
the danger to his life, seized the man in distress, carried him down on 
his shoulders, and, swimming with him to the shore, laid his precious 
burden on the beach. It was hardly possible to believe that that 
shapeless form was a man with fourteen wounds, who must have been 
left aboard as dead. 

We have no doubt that the country will know how to reward this 
act of bravery, but if not, God, who sees and hears everything, 
undoubtedly heard the tribute of admiration of 500 men, who forgot 
their misfortune in order to admire the noble deed of one who shook 
off the water on the beach as if he had done nothing unusual. 

Fortunately, and perhaps on account of the number of projectiles 
which passed through the water, we did not have to suffer from the 
attacks of sharks. The account written on this subject by one of the 
captains of the American battle ships is not correct, and when we after- 
wards exchanged our impressions it was found—strange, perhaps, but 
nevertheless true—that none of us remembered any such danger. 

Thus ends this fatal expedition for Spain, and if the men who sent 
us on it could have seen on the shores of Santiago de Cuba the crews 
of the Oquendo and the Maria Teresa at the borders of the woods, and 
the crew of the Vizcaya abandoned on a reef, everyone almost naked, 
covered with blood, some breathing their last, looking over the sea 
with awful silence, as though looking for the road to Spain and inquir- 
ing, ‘‘ Why has this happened?”—if those to whom the question was 
directed had been there, and who perhaps may dare to argue the sub- 
ject before some assembly, being accustomed to have rhetoric serve 
them like the waters of the Jordan, I am sure that they would not 
have answered. 


CHAPTER XI. 





This chapter, of a purely professional character, should 
not be misunderstood by those who read it and who are 
not sailors experienced in matters of war. 


Before concluding, we believe that all that has been written would 
be incomplete if we did not add a purely professional chapter, because 
up to date all the narratives which have been given of the battle of 
Santiago are based on conjectures, and hardly anybody has been bold 
enough to venture upon any further conclusions than those already 
deduced from the Chino-Japanese war, so that, as navy oflicers, we 
can not let the opportunity go by to give expression to the observa- 
tions which the campaign in which we have taken part has suggested 
tous. Moreover, for those who study this book seriously, the obser- 

vations which follow will complete the analysis of the naval battle of 
July 3. 

We will leave aside the fact that ships should not contain wooden 
fittings, and that cruisers ought not to engage in battle with battle- 
ships, against which their guns are powerless, for nobody will do us 
the injustice to suppose that we did not know that. Moreover, we 
have proved that it was not Admiral Cervera who committed the error 
of going to the Antilles of his own free will. 

We are convinced that in all battles of the future there is bound to 
occur what happened in this; that is to say, that for one of the com- 
batants the casualties will be enormous and the destruction complete, 
while for the other it will result almost without harm. In fact, two 
ships equally protected can fight each other at long range, but from 
the moment when, on account of some damage or under certain con- 
ditions, an advantage be gained by one over the other, the repeated 
pounding of the rapid-fire guns increasing the damages without giving 
time for their repair, and securing the safety of the victor while the 
antagonist loses the means of recovery, it will happen that the battles 
will always present characteristics of inequality in regard to damages 
sustained which could not be explained in a land battle. 

The weakest point in our squadron was undoubtedly the machinery, 
and especially its personnel. We remember having been impressed 
some time ago by an article written by Admiral Freemantle, who said 

85 


86 


that on the day of battle neither the engines nor the firemen would 
give the results expected of them, a theory which was confirmed later 
by one of the chiefs of staff of the English squadron which bombarded 
Alexandria, who told me that in some of their ships it was necessary 
to put guards of marines at the hatchways in order to make the firemen 
stay below by force, where there was really no danger. 

Not one of our firemen, fortunately, deserted his post; but with 
fires under the ten boilers the ships made less speed than they would 
ordinarily with only part of the generators in use. This involves 
great problems relating to the engine personnel, to whom the respon- 
sibility belongs, especially as there was a considerable number of 
them in each boiler room; therefore it becomes necessary to solve 
the problem of strengthening the morale without unduly increasing 
the number of officers, since the two engineer officers are indispen- 
sable for the principal engines; and though we recognize the fact that 
there is nothing which is more awe-inspiring than the boiler room, 
even including the ammunition rooms, and though there is nobody 
who needs more courage than a fireman, placed as he is in a coal 
bunker dark and silent as a tomb, we feel sure that if there is no solu- 
tion found for this problem, many disillusions will result, less, how- 
ever, in cases of such immense superiority as the American ships 
undoubtedly had, under the protective decks of which there was no 
other danger to the life of a man than that of dying of oldage. From 
this point of view, and others of which we will speak further on, it is 
indispensable that the ships should have certain coal bunkers so 
arranged that they can be kept as a reserve, so that, during battle, it 
would not be necessary to have anybody in them. In the report of the 
chief engineer of the Oregon, which we consider very sensible, he 
speaks of fighting bunkers; and if these existed, and, as he says, had 
a capacity of 700 tons of coal, the fact alone of having a reserve of 
coal within easy reach, so that it is not necessary to place anyone in 
the coal bunkers, and thus have all the firemen vigilant and available 
for the boilers, is so noteworthy an advantage that the constructors, 
for that circumstance alone, may lay claim to a principal part of the 
success of that ship. We, therefore, state our opinion on this subject. 

In our war ships, as in all those of the world, the coal bunkers are 
sacrificed to theories of defense rather than to the service of the engine. 
There is no other way of taking out coal except at the rate at which it 
comes out of the bunker holes, and if it is necessary to reserve any it 
must be kept in sacks, because the coal bunkers above the protective 
deck usually have their opening below; moreover, as soon as the first 
fuel is consumed which is close to the outlet, it becomes necessary to 
earry it through sinuous coal bunkers, full of joists and angle irons, 
so that there are very few war ships, if any, which can sustain their 
maximum speed for twenty-four hours, because there is no arrange- 


87 


ment for taking out the necessary coal from the bunkers and putting 
it in sufficient quantity at the furnace doors. 

Though we have had but little practical knowledge of the use of 
liquid fuel, it seems to us that it may offer a solution of the question 
of fuel during battle, which will do away with the labor of many hands 
and avoid the problem of ashes, with which we will occupy ourselves 
presently. 

The naval constructors, whose companies usually exercise consider- 
able influence over the parliaments and press of their respective coun- 
tries, lay great stress upon the question of coal consumption, dis- 
coursing very opportunely about what is consumed per horsepower 
per hour. But this is a figure that to the public mind means noth- 
ing; therefore, we believe that from an instinct of self-preservation 
all navies should dispense with a classification so scientific, and simply 
say: For the development of 10,000 horsepower there are necessary, 
in theory about 220 tons of coal, and in practice at least 240, in order 
to maintain a given speed, and it will be more clearly seen that a ship 
whose bunker capacity is 600 to 700 tons can not sustain that speed more 
than a very few hours, for as soon as the coal recedes from the outlets 
to the fire room there is no way of keeping up the necessary supply. 
And we are not speaking of forced draft, because then the consump- 
tion in many cases is almost doubled. In a battle, therefore, the coal 
bunkers impose an additional difficulty to the many with which the 
unfortunate naval constructor already has to contend. 

On account of their relation to the coal, we will now discuss the ven- 
tilators, which in practice have a very arduous duty to perform, for 
the fine coal and the ashes with which the air is impregnated make life 
in the boiler room impossible. The selected coal which is employed 
at trials is split into perfectly regular pieces which look as if made ina 
mold, and is not the ordinary coal which has to undergo two or three 
transshipments and which is afterwards thrown, trampled upon, and 
shifted from place to place before it reaches the fire room. There a 
good part of it becomes a mass of powder which the ventilators throw 
in the air, making life unbearable. When, moreover, the red-hot ashes 
have been drawn out, the ventilating system must be stopped or it 
becomes impossible to live in an almost solid atmosphere, a large part 
of which is on fire. 

It is necessary, therefore, in the first place, that the ventilators should 
lead directly to the furnaces and that there should be automatic appa- 
ratus for drawing out the ashes, since coal inevitably contains dust and 
must be piled up in front of the furnaces before they are charged. 

We shall be asked, as we have been asked different times before, 
‘Did not the same thing happenon the Oregon ?” We will reply sim- 
ply that for the Oregon the battle was nothing more than an exercise; 
that the engines of the other big American armor clads behaved badly; 


88 


that the Brooklyn, whose speed should have been 22 knots, did not 
exceed 13.06 knots, and the Vew York, with a recorded speed of 21 
knots, made only 11.06. Thus there was an enormous difference in the 
situation of both combatants; for on our part we could not draw out 
the ashes while the ships were in one immense blaze, to which we were 
also unable to attend. One of the chief defects of our ships was the 
joints of the pipes which wasted steam as soon as the pressure reached 
about 125 pounds. In order to go at full speed it was necessary to 
increase the pressure considerably beyond that point, and as a conse- 
quence cause damages and thus provoke a scandal (for as soon as a 
ship goes into dock public opinion immediately pronounces it a serious 
injury); therefore there wasa circle of iron around us beyond which we 
could never pass and yet out of which it was necessary to go under 
the penalty when in front of the enemy of having to face the horrible 
alternative either of not forcing the draft or of exposing the ship to 
injuries which would render her useless. By this we mean to say only 
that it is necessary to force the draft and cause such injuries as are 
unavoidable. We should state, for the instruction of all, that the only 
ship of both hostile squadrons which did so was the Oregon, whose 
speed proved so fatal to us. 

And even at the risk of appearing trivial it will do no harm to say 
that we were surprised in an extraordinary manner by the effect of a 
small escape of steam from a joint which for some little time rendered 
it impossible to see and to breathe under the protective deck, the steam 
being the dry steam of the modern boiler, which burns the lungs as if 
they were breathing flames, and is an enemy whose importance in many 
cases 1s not sufficiently recognized. For this reason said joints should 
all be elastic, or in order to avoid the danger referred to something 
better than anything we know of to-day should be invented. 

Like many other ships which navigate the ocean, our cruisers had 
their auxiliary steam pipes so connected as to be without any other 
stop valve than that at the outlet from the boiler, so that if, for 
instance, the steam whistle should be damaged it became necessary to 
stop the turrets, the ammunition hoists, the capstans, the electric light, 
in fact everything except the steering gear, which had a special and 
independent pipe system. The only one of these pipes which had a 
stop valve was the steam pipe of the bilge pump; but instead of this 
valve being placed under the protective deck it was located a meter 
above it. 

During our Stay at Santiago blind covers were put on all the steam 
pipes which projected above the protective deck, so that we could not 
use the winch for the ashes, the whistles, the siren, nor even the cap- 
stans, and were without means of operating the searchlight, so that 
every time it was used it involved a great deal of labor not free from 
danger in uncovering its steam pipe. The result was that these ele- 


89 


ments were lacking when they were most needed, burdening the men 
with additional labor when it was most necessary for them to have 
some rest. 

Consequently the main steam pipe of the big bilge pump remained 
as it was; but as it burst during the battle, it was undoubtedly the 
deciding factor in the loss of the J/aria Teresa, since the escape of 
steam decreased her speed to such an extent that it was equal to an 
abandonment of our hope of safety. It is difficult to be able to explain 
the cause of the bursting of that steam pipe, for, according to the 
investigation which I caused to be made after the battle, it appears 
that it was from the effect of a shell; but this nobody could confirm, 
since all who were at the place at the time were killed by the two 
13 inch shells which exploded there, or asphyxiated by steam. I was 
inclined to believe that the bursting of the pipe was due to the con- 
cussion following the explosion of these two shell, but from the 
above-mentioned investigation it rather appears that such was not the 
case and that the concussion, which from the bridge sounded like the 
explosion of a magazine, must have fractured some pipe of the star- 
board engine, because the steam issued directly from the engine room 
before the bursting of the steam pipe of the bilge pump so often men- 
tioned, which may, perhaps, likewise explain the death of Chief 
Engineer Juan Montero, who was among the missing, and who must 
have perished by the steam from the pipes in the starboard eudtir t- 
ment in which he was stationed. 

There are many ships which are in the same condition, and it is 
indispensable that all men-of-war on which electric motors can not be 
used should have stop valves on all steam pipes, and that these valves 
should be under the protective deck, and also in each water-tight bulk- 
head, and in all connections of the various compartments, since it 
should not be forgotten that the mission of men-of-war is to destroy, 
and that, consequently, if this contingency is not provided for, the 
auxiliary engines become disabled just when they are most needed. 

In connection with what we have said about steam and of the result- 
ing accidents, the excessive temperature which exists within men-of- 
war when all the machinery is in operation is such that we believe that 
one of the most urgent problems to be solved is that of ventilation, 
because without it life is made impossible in many parts of the ship, 
and the life of the men should always be the first consideration every- 
where. For this reason we believe that electromotors should be more 
generally used wherever it is possible to apply them. A central station 
could be placed below the protective deck, and here, the same as where 
there are steam pipes, means for lowering the temperature at any cost 
should be provided. | 

In this high temperature is to be found the first and great danger of 
fire; and since the diminution of combustible material has its limits, 


90 


as we shall see further below, we persist in what has been said about 
the dangers incident to:this excessive heat. 

Aboard our three cruisers and during the battle all the pipes for 
extinguishing fire were open, and the pumps made to work so that the 
decks could be completely inundated, until on the Varia Teresa and 
on the Oguendo and Vizcaya the fire main burst and a huge stream of 
water fell upon the boilers, causing alarm instead of extinguishing the 
fire raging above. 

The investigation showed that it was a projectile which cut the pipe 
on the Maria Teresa in two, but we are inclined to believe, rather, that it 
was due to the lack of escape valves properly located and to an increase 
of the pressure caused by some incident, either the closing of the out- 
lets or the flattening of various pipes through some accident. As to 
the Maria Teresa, it could also have been the concussion of the shells 
which burst on her deck; but we are rather inclined to believe that. 
the lack of good and sufficient escape valves in the pipes was respon- 
sible, resulting in an excess of pressure. 

The piping of ships presents to day a most difficult problem which 
requires the entire time of persons not occupied with other things, if 
only to ascertain where all the valves and registers are located. In our 
judgment, it is necessary once for all to do away with such complica- 
tions, and although each thing serves only one purpose, it should have 
the simplicity required of everything destined to render service in the 
midst of destruction and death. 

One of the first things to be disabled on the three cruisers were the 
5.5 inch ammunition hoists, each of which could carry five projectiles 
at a time with their complete charges. These were very heavy appa- 
ratus and connected with each other in such a manner that, if one 
was rendered useless, its companion was also put hors de combat. On 
the Zeresa every one of them was rendered unserviceable by the 
enemy’s fire, and one fell while ascending loaded, which caused the 
bursting of one of our own shells, setting the place on fire; fortu- 
nately, however, without blowing up the magazine; and the miracle was 
repeated a few moments afterwards, when a 6 pound shell of the enemy 
fell in the same shell magazine where it exploded without doing any 
harm. The combination of the ammunition hoists, their ascent to the 
guns, and the passage from the magazines is such that, in an unpro- 
tected cruiser they can not be disabled by a projectile without render- 
ing the guns unservicable. A subdivision of the apparatus is 
therefore absolutely necessary, even at the cost of carrying less guns; 
if not, the ships will be powerless to fire after a single shell has struck. 
Furthermore, we are of the opinion that the hoists should not be com- 
bined, but rather that each one should have a counterweight if neces- 
sary, in order to localize the damage. 

There remains also without solution a practical method of handling 


91 


the metallic cartridge cases which come out hot from the guns. These, 
if they are allowed to remain on the deck, are a material which, com- 
ing in contact with a shell, could cause it to explode and thus become 
auxiliaries of the enemy. 

On board our ships were placed wet bags with which the gunners 
could pick up these metallic cases; those of the 5.5 inch guns were 
thrown within the rails and some into the water, and on the Coldn 
in the cofferdams, which were well located for that purpose; in the 
lower batteries they formed much of an obstruction, notwithstanding 
that many fell into the water. The disposal of these cartridge cases 
is a problem which, so far as we know, has not been solved on any 
man-of-war, but which, nevertheless, it is necessary to solve. 

As it is not easy for the rapid-fire guns of small caliber of 2.9 to 2.2 
inches (12 and 6 pounders) to be placed in casemates, nor to have hoists 
leading directly to the guns, nor to have the rounds of ammunition 
brought one by one instead of in boxes, we believe that it is necessary 
to have in a convenient place a kind of steel box of sufficient thick- 
ness in which to put the wooden boxes in which these projectiles come, 
and by so doing avoid the imminent danger of their bursting upon 
being struck by a fragment of shell. Perhaps one of the interior 
walls could be made thinner in order to direct the explosion toward 
the more suitable place, which it should not be difficult to ascertain 
by experiments, with the end in view, above all, to increase the morale 
of all persons whose place is in said batteries. 

Likewise, it seems to us that in naval battles, when the enemy is 
more than 1,000 yards distant, the question of distances makes it nec- 
essary to return to broadside fire. It is not sufficient that the number 
of officers be increased, nor that, the enemy being seen, each one should 
have a small range finder to measure the distance of the enemy, for the 
quick movements in a naval battle, and the fact that there can not be 
an officer to each gun, renders necessary an organization of this sery- 
ice very different from that which exists to-day, for the situation in 
which a Barr and Stroud range-finder would have to be placed would 
allow it only a few seconds of life, as happened to the one on board the 
Vizcaya, the only one of the kind in the squadron. 

Speaking of the batteries, we will state further that in ours all the 
men’s mattresses were suspended so as to form a kind of parapet 
between each two guns, which, in our opinion, must have saved us 
many casualties. 

One of the things that technical men will particularly look for in 
this chapter is probably the manner in which the torpedo problem was 
solved. : 

The admiral allowed each commander to solve the question accord- 
ing to his own judgment. ‘With the exception of the Colén, whose 
torpedoes were protected by armor, and which we will not here con- 


92 


sider, each of the other three cruisers acted differently in this matter. 
One carried the torpedoes completely ready in the tubes with the war 
noses in position. Another carried the war heads of wet gun cotton 
and the torpedoes in the tubes, but without the igniters. The third 
had the war heads and noses, which can be put on in two minutes, 
in complete readiness outside of the torpedo rooms, but under the pro- 
tective deck, while carrying the torpedoes themselves on the charging 
platforms. 

This diversity of opinion in a matter of such vital importance is an 
additional proof of the fact that the question has many pros and cons, 
and as it has already been solved in every navy of the world by taking 
a decided stand in favor of under-water tubes, we will only say that 
for those ships which still carry torpedoes without proper protection 
for the launching tubes it would be advisable to reduce the number of 
tubes and utilize the weight gained thereby for strengthening the 
armor, especially as in our opinion torpedoes are suitable for torpedo 
boats, and for nothing else. 

One question which requires urgent solution in connection with 
war ships is that of lifeboats in battle. It seems hardly possible that 
a large battleship full of men, many of them probably mutilated 
after an action, should have no other means of rescue except for the 
men to Jump into the sea, which in some cases means seeking an even 
worse death. We believe that boats with substantial bottoms, either 
of cork or of light wood, which would continue to float even {HOuen 
the sides are torn open, ad so placed that they can be let into the sea 
without the necessity of lowering them, would be an aid that every ship 
should have, as not a single one can be sure that it will not be placed 
under the most critical circumstances. These boats should be placed 
from port to starboard, so that by being raised at one end they can be 
rapidly thrown into the sea, in the literal meaning of the word. 

Boats, like many other things, are not equipped with a view to war, 
and our ships do not have a single boat carrying ropes to enable the 
crews to reach the shore in a seaway, in spite of the example of our 
whole coasting trade, forgetting that as soon as war is declared ports 
and piers are but a myth for the ships of the navy. 

At Santiago the Vizcaya kept one boat from being disabled by the 
enemy, which saved the poor wounded and many others who could not 
swim great hardships. The Oguendo saved two of the side cleaners’ 
stages, by means of which it was possible to get a line to the shore, and 
thus rescue many men. I made the serious mistake of throwing our 
stages overboard when we went out, and, as the boats were literally 
nothing but splinters, no line could be run until a United States boat 
arrived, and in the meantime there was much suffering and anguish; 
for a steam launch which was apparently in good condition and was 
lowered into the water capsized and was the cause of further victims. 


93 


The boats mentioned above, though they were of little use, are 
nevertheless necessary, if only to keep up the moral courage of the 
crews, and we will add, in conclusion, that those of our boats which 
were located on the gallows frames do not appear to have been the 
cause of any special damage, although that is what we had feared. 

Battle conning towers as now constructed are an admirable protec- 
tion for attacking a city when it has no torpedo boats nor movable 
defenses of any kind, but in order to manceuvre a ship of large 
dimensions, followed by several others, with the prospect of being 
attacked by torpedo boats, and when one is in the habit of managing 
her from very high bridges, it is almost impossible to remain inside. 
When it is considered that the helmsman, two men for engine orders, 
officers for the speaking tubes and torpedo tubes, and the navigating 
officer are all inside it will be realized that with this mass of humanity 
it is impossible to move and that one is almost smothered, so that the 
commander, in view of the immense responsibility weighing upon 
him, has no recourse but to command the tower while walking up and 
down the bridge in order to be able to direct the battle. 

This entails the serious danger and the almost certain destruction 
of the commander, when he should be protected as much as possible, 
for in the solemn moments of a battle a relief in itself is a disaster. 
It is therefore our opinion that, as has been done with the ships, 
the thickness of the armor of the turrets. should be decreased and 
the turrets themselves increased in size, or at least armored para- 
pets should be placed by the sides of the conning bridge. If the 
battle tower is made more habitable it will become a great deal more 
useful. 

In any event, it is necessary to make it possible to observe the bin- 
nacle from the tower and to spread out charts, and especially should 
the towers be given sufficient dimensions so that the smokestacks and 
superstructures will not totally obstruct the view aft. We have seen 
in very modern ships a few towers that were larger than usual, but in 
our opinion even these are far from adequate. 

In passing we will state that the superstructures require very essen- 
tial modification, because they interfere more than anything else on 
board ship with military operations. 

Speaking tubes and other devices for transmitting orders should be 
tested on days when target practice is held and when all the ships fire 
at the same time. Itis on such occasions that it will become apparent 
of how little use they are. 

For the batteries the bugle signals proved more useful than other 
means, but as to the engines we had to stop all communication for fear 
of orders being misunderstood. 

In our opinion, even though all the tubes had to be sacrificed to one 
tube leading to the engine, it would be well worth while to have tubes 


94 


of larger diameter than those now in use, surrounded by some insu- 
lating substance which insures safe communication. 

Great sacrifices are being made nowadays to remove all combustible 
material from on board ships; but the effects of the crews, which from 
the standpoint of inflammabilty represent an immense amount of danger, 
can not be dispensed with. - 

It should be remembered that the effects of a sailor are of greater 
bulk than those of any army general in a campaign, and those of the 
officers and petty officers, which are of course larger in proportion, 
constitute a mass of combustible material that is positively dangerous. 

There are men who carry the argument so far as to want to dispense 
with cabins, berths, lockers, ete., under the impression that these are 
simply a luxury for the convenience of the crews, while as a matter 
of fact they are absolutely indispensable. The result of crowding 
together so large a personnel in one small space is the same as it 
would be ina store where it was necessary to keep thousands of differ- 
ent bottles without having the shelves required to put each one in its 
proper place; it would mean chaos, which is worse than anything else. 
Without entering into details that would lead us too far in this con- 
nection, we will mention that on a certain occasion when I was given 
command of a ship and the minister of marine, who honored me with 
his friendship, wanted to try an experiment of that kind—fortunately 
making an exception in my case and giving me a small cabin—the 
disorder created on board was such that, if we were to relate all that. 
happened, it would seem like a farce unworthy of the good intention 
which had inspired the measure, especially when the object had been 
to make things easier for everybody. I will only add that cireum- 
stances made it possible for me to relinquish the command of the 
ship, and I did so until a place should once more be assigned to each 
man; for the disorder which resulted was such that not only the disci- 
pline but the safety of all was endangered. 

We therefore deem berths absolutely necessary. But when a war 
is anticipated an order should be given to lighten the effects. Com- 
manders and officers should keep only their undress uniform, with the 
exception of perhaps one or two staff officers, who may keep a second 
uniform. The necessary books and instruments should be retained. 
All citizens’ clothing should be absolutely prohibited. In a word, the 
effects should be confined to a chest and a blanket. The same thing 
should be done in the case of all petty officers and, if possible, of the 
men. ‘This should be made practicable by having at each naval arsenal 
a warehouse, in charge of a commissary or boatswain of the respective 
ship, if possible, where, simply by means of cards and ‘without the 
formality of official papers, each man could dispose of his extra effects. 

A measure of this kind is the more imperative as it frequently 
becomes necessary during operations to transship officers, sailors. 


95 


wounded and sick, and even the effects of the dead, and the result is 
much confusion, especially as the crews of torpedo boats have to keep 
most of their effects in the larger ships since their own do not have 
room for anything. 

Such a measure should be obligatory and subject to strict regula- 
tions; otherwise it might seem as though each man wanted to save his 
‘own, and there would be no lack of evil tongues to make fun of it in 
the press and everywhere else. It might even seem like a herald of 
ruin, when, as a matter of fact, it is a strictly military measure to get 
rid of everything superfluous in anticipation of an engagement, for 
on board of modern ships there is absolutely no room for anything 
below the protective deck. We want to emphasize this for the bene- 
fit of those who have never seen war ships except in illustrated papers. 

We will now speak of the question of coaling, which we omitted in 
connection with the engines, because in our opinion it has a different 
significance from a military point of view. 

We already know that in other and more fortunate navies this matter 
has been more closely studied than in ours, although the ships which 
we purchased abroad have not brought us anything new, and the 
experiments hitherto made have borne mainly on the mode of shipping 
coal speedily. For our part we believe that it is imperative at any 
cost to take on coal through the ship’s sides, even if it should thereby 
become necessary to modify the armor plates. For when the coaling 
is effected through the decks, as it now is, the armament has to be 
protected, the guns and all delicate apparatus must be carefully cov- 
ered up—that is to say, the batteries are rendered unserviceable for 
the time being and everything becomes impregnated with coal dust, 
so that many things do not function properly. And since in an active 
campaign ships have to be coated every day, there results a constant 
fatigue and confusion which are opposed to all military principles. 

While coaling is going on and immediately after it is finished the 
batteries are in poor condition for an immediate battle, and if they are 
to be washed after nightfall the men do not get the necessary rest. 
We therefore insist on what we have stated, believing that all naval 
officers will agree with us. 

Moreover, modern ships do not have a sufficient number of cranes 
properly installed, not only to enable them to take coal rapidly trom 
lighters, but also to obviate the disorder inside of the ship and keep 
the batteries clean and free from all obstruction. 

In passing we will say that on board our ships we adopted the sys- 
tem of having one half of the mattresses serve as a parapet and the 
other half, without being unrolled, were used as pillows by the men 
off duty. In a cold climate this could not have been done without 
prejudice to the health of the crews. 

On a former occasion we have already expressed the opinion 


96 


officially that it is necessary in time of war to give the men a meal. 
at midnight. This is absolutely imperative for all firemen and for the 
crews of torpedo boats and destroyers, whose strength must be kept 
up by means of an extra amount of food. 

During the late campaign the admiral obtained from the Govern- 
ment a small extra allowance for the firemen and they were given a 
meal at midnight. 

This question can be easily solved, as there is no reason why the 
navy should not be given the same extra allowance during a campaign 
that the army enjoys; and it is our opinion that the whole crew should 
be included in this midnight mess, not excepting the officers. Boat- 
swains and others of similar rok owing to their small pay, are 
especially badly off in time of war. 

In connection with this question we will say further that the experi- 
ence acquired at Santiago when the food supply had become scant, 
especially in view of our arbitrary way of organizing the messes of 
the lower classes, so that each man provides his food, so to speak, on 
his own account, leads us to advocate that the commander of a ship 
be given authority by naval ordinance to send anyone to the mess 
kettle as he may deem expedient—in extreme cases and when abso- 
lutely necessary, even officers. As it is now, the messes are very 
numerous, and as the men when their supplies are exhausted resort 
to the pantry, it is impossible to make any calculations as to the pro- 
visions on hand. 

The only solution is to send them peremptorily to the mess kettle, 
for boatswains, for instance, could not possibly pay 20 or 25 pesos 
gold for a barrel of flour, mich was the price to which it soon went 
up at Santiago, and they peices for help just when the struggle was at 
its worst, and made it still harder. Although they were preached to 
and told that we should die of hunger, still as we could not get away 
from there, and they had to be fed, the result was that the provisions 
in store represented hardly one-half the number of days they would 
have if they had been used only for the men for whom they had been 
calculated. 

Other navies, we know, are differently organized in this respect. 

The operating room! There is nothing more awe-inspiring and hor- 
rible than the operating room on board ship on the day of a battle. 
It required the whole extent of my authority, when I was carried down 
to it, to impose the order and silence which the valiant Ensign Ramon 
Rodriguez Navarro, who was down there in charge of the ammunition 
hoists, was trying in vain to enjoin. The wounded in all the ships 
refused to be taken to the operating room because of its being so diffi- 
cult to get out of, they feared the most horrible death. On the Vizcaya 
some of the wounded had to be installed in the battery with no other 
protection than that afforded by the turret; they did not suffer much in 


97 


this spot, thanks to the fact that the bow remained comparatively free 
from injury. On the Oguendo they were installed on the orlop deck, 
and some of the dying men were left there when the ship filled with 
smoke. On the Zeresa they were installed on the forward platform 
under the protective deck, but near the pumps ‘and ammunition hoists, 
thanks to which circumstance and to the valor of the surgeons and the 
officer above referred to, only dead bodies were left below. In any 
event it is imperative to consider a question which has so much influ- 
ence on the morale of the crew. The operating room should have a 
large hatch with a good ladder through which the wounded can be 
lowered without difficulty, which would at least inspire them with a 
hope of safety. If the operating room could be located on the pro- 
tective deck of protected ships, even though the space is intended for 
other purposes and can be easily converted, the measure would no 
doubt be of great moral influence; for it is certain that, except during 
bombardments and cases which can not be designated as naval battles 
proper, the wounded will rather incur the risk of new wounds than to 
be buried without being able to move in that place where even those 
who are accustomed to live in those holes feel ill at ease in time of 
peace and'in the full enjoyment of their health. 

The Cristobal Colén had her operating room well installed in what 
constituted the machinists’ workshop in the battery,-and that is about 
where it should be on board all our ships. 

We will not conclude this chapter without expressing our opinion 
as to torpedo-boat destroyers; it is true that we have not been on board 
of them during a battle, but as these ships formed part of the squadron, 
we are sufficiently familiar with them to find the opinions we held 
concerning these vessels fully confirmed. 

In the first place, torpedo-boat destroyers are what their name indi- 
cates and should not be employed for any other purpose, although the 
probability is that they will continue to be used for everything; for 
in time of war anything is used that is handy. 

It should be taken into account that these vessels are in the same 
condition that a man would be whose whole body were heart and to 
whom any wound, therefore, would be mortal. And as these vessels 
present a large target, it is our opinion that torpedo-boat destroyers, 
whose unstable platforms render their fire very uncertain, will not 
often succeed in approaching larger ships; and even in the case of tor- 
pedo boats themselves we consider it doubtful whether they can do so 
if the gunners of the ship to be attacked have any presence of mind. 

In any event, we are sorry to say it is our opinion that these vessels 
will not be good for. anything unless for three months previous they 
have gone out of the harbor every single day, in all kinds of weather, 
until ne crews, from the commander down to the last fireman, fre 
become emanate familiar with their ship; and if in that space of 

14232—No. VIII T 





98 


time her engines should be injured, it is better for an injured ship to 
be in a dockyard than to go to the bottom or fall into the hands of the 
enemy., 

We do not share the opinion of those who believe that the crews of 
destroyers should be relieved by those of the larger ships, for the 
sailors of large ships are not fit to serve on board of torpedo boats 
until they have been navigating in them for some time; and those of 
torpedo boats, even if they were to sleep four days in succession, 
would consider that an injury was being done them; they would want 
to do nothing and only be in the way wherever they went. 

Each one must fill the post where accident has placed him, and. the 
crews of the destroyers and torpedo boats must not hope that, by 
means of a relief or feigned exhaustion, they can evade their destiny. 
Probably what occurs in our navy happens in others also, namely, as 
the torpedo boats in time of peace are stationed at navy-yards, a num- 
ber of sailors, gunners, and firemen live in them year after year, taking 
part in all the exercises and becoming thoroughly familiar with them; 
but when it comes to going out to war and leaving their families, there 
is not a single one to be found, as though the earth had swallowed 
them up. It is our opinion that these vessels should in daytime be sta- 
tioned at a distance from the firing and should be guarded, so that the 
crews may sleep quietly; but as for reliefs, we are of opinion that to 
substitute new men for the dead is all that is necessary. 

We further believe, as experience has taught us, that the men sery- 
ing on board of these vessels should not be more than 35 or, at most, 
40 years old. It is sufficient for their commanders to have attained 
the rank of lieutenants, as long as promotion continues to be as slow as 
it unfortunately is in nearly all the navies of the world. Their crews 
should undergo an examination in swimming—we hardly dare say in 
gymnastics, although gymnastics, in connection with the study of war, 
geography, and military strategy and tactics, are more needful than 
the endless mass of useless mathematics required -by our extensive 
programs. But in any event the personnel of these ships should be 
subjected to a rigorous physical examination and at all the navy-yards 
they should have a gymnasium for their exclusive use. | 

Relative to the subsistence in time of war we repeat what we have 
already said, namely, that the whole personnel, with the exception 
only of the officers, should be included in a single mess, so that there 
would not be more than two messes on board. } 

As for the hulls of these ships we will only state that they should 
be equipped with appliances both for towing and being towed, as it 
becomes frequently necessary for them to navigate in that manner. 
The fine lines of the bow make it very difficult to handle the towline, 
and it is therefore very necessary that it should be passed over a 

roller, so that it can be easily detached. Villaamil put a copper 


99 


sprocket wheel on his towlines to bear the strain, and while the ves- 
sels did not suffer, as the line terminated in a sprocket wheel 5 feet 
from the bow, it was at times impossible even to cut the stream cable 
in order to set the destroyers free. 

It may also be well to consider the arrangement of which Yarrow 
made use in order to conduct the steam as much as possible outside of 
the space where the men are at work in case of an injury to the boiler; 
for in two of our ships the whole personnel in the engine rooms was 
killed. ‘This is a sad experience which we should not forget, knowing 
that war is conducted with men and not with automata, as supposed 
in the romantic literature of those who know that they will never be 
shut in during a battle with a boiler under 200 or 300 pounds pres- 
sure. Nor can this experience ever be forgotten by an admiral who 
knows the danger which may arise when during operations in war al 
the firemen and machinists are killed. 

In our opinion, one of the compartments should also have a hatch 
sufficiently large to make it possible to lower a wounded man through 
it, which is impossible with the hatches they now have and which are 
unnecessarily small and elaborate. Our torpedo boats built by 
Thornycroft did have such a hatch, which shows that it is by no means 
an impossibility and that we are not asking for anything new, espe- 
cially as the elaborate construction has no other object than to impress 
the public and make the vessels more expensive, while the constructors 
do not trouble themselves about the manner in which those who will 
be called upon to handle them in battle are to manage them. 

There is another matter we wish to mention, although not relating 
directly to the battle, and that is the absence af the cruiser and scout- 
ing service in the United States Navy. Although the latter had an 
incredible number of auxiliary vessels and almost fabulous means at 
its disposal and no enemy, properly speaking, since at the time the 
war broke out the island of Cuba was already lost to Spain, the 
scouting service was really effected by telegraph, and hence the inter- 
vention of the Secretary of the Navy at Washington and the minister 
at Madrid, although the latter from different motives. It appears 
from the Appendix to the Report of the United States Navy Depart- 
ment, page 33, that there was created a naval war board, which 
acted as an advisory board to the Secretary, and although in view of 
the immense disparity of forces and circumstances the Americans 
could not fail to succeed, they did what they wanted. It would be 
very desirable if some writer of another nation, who could not be 
accused of being prejudiced, would examine closely whether or not 
the United States, considering its situation at the time of the war, 
could not have done more than it did. 

What we wish to point out by the foregoing lines is the danger 
with which in future all admirals will have to contend in time of war, 


100 


if the main operations are to be directed from a distance by factors 
and boards who will attribute to themselves the glory if such opera- 
tions are successful, but who will not be placed before a court-martial 
if they are failures. Such boards do not have to contend with a 
thousand and one difficulties which arise everywhere when it comes to 
a practical execution of plans, especially in war when this must be 
done on the battlefield and not on paper. Even naval officers fre- 
quently forget these difficulties twenty-four hours after they have left 
the command of a ship. 

This method of directing thé war is nowadays inevitable; but it is 
our opinion that it can succeed only in a country like China, where, 
judging from the ideas we have of that nation, we presume a decree 
could be issued ordering that, if an admiral is rewarded for successful 
operations, the advisory board is to be rewarded likewise, but if, on 
the contrary, he deserves to be hanged, then those in charge of direct- 
ing the war, telegraph in hand, should without further ceremony be 
hanged with him. And perhaps results will show that those whom 
we consider extremely barbarous do not reason so very badly. 

Not as a question of policy, but as a military question, we believe 
that there is on board our ships an excess of portable armament for 
some of the personnel. Firemen, for instance, of whom there are 100 
on board of each of our cruisers, do not need any armament, nor do 
some of the other contingents. By doing away with portable arms to 
a certain extent a great saving could be effected, and it would, moreover, 
remove one source of danger where there are so many. 

If I had not been seriously wounded myself, I should add some 
observations on the question of wounded, which I deem of great 
importance; but under the circumstances they would appear too per- 
sonal, and for that reason I leave them for some future occasion. 

We will here terminate this chapter, which, in connection with the 
description of the fight, will help naval officers who may read it to 
form an idea of the battle. For those who do not belong to the pro- 
fession we consider it of little interest; and we do not have much hope 
that it will be of service to our navy, which the country, with incom- 
prehensible misinterpretation of the true situation, looks upon with a 
manifestly hostilespirit. But we hope, nevertheless, that our colleagues 
the world over will appreciate a few observations made on the battle- 
field and set forth in a simple manner by a man who knows that he ts 
saying nothing new, but is confirming ideas which have everywhere 
been the subject of much discussion. 

We will now return to our ill-fated crews, who, on the beaches and 
reefs of the southern coast of Cuba, with the burning ships before their 
eyes, were quietly waiting, in the consciousness of having done their 
duty, for whatever fate might have in store for them. 


CHAPTER XII. 





Although the treatment of the crews and the incidents which occurred 
while they were prisoners of war are a question of secondary impor- 
tance in the drama in which Spain lost her colonial power, we shall 
speak of it briefly, not only as a matter of curiosity, but also because 
the fate of these valiant men who fought against impossibilities can not 
be indifferent to any good Spaniard. 

The crew of the Colon was transshipped without difficulty to the 
United States ships. That of the Vizcaya, which, as stated, was on the 
reefs at Aserraderos, was promptly rescued by the Jowa and some 
auxiliary vessels before the tide had time to endanger the lives of all 
those men cut off from the shore. 

It was reserved to the crews of the Oguendo and Maria Teresa to 
further taste the bitter cup of that fatal day. 

About a hundred men from these two ships, guided by the pilot of 
the Maria Teresa, fled through the woods until they reached Santiago; 
and during the march these men, naked and without weapons, fearful 
all the time of falling into the hands of some ferocious insurgent party, 
suffered the most terrible hardships, especially some of them who lost 
their way and spent three days in the woods without food, and having 
to climb trees to find out where they were, until they finally arrived 
at the Socapa. 

The men of the Oguendo were, moreover, divided into two groups. 
One of them fell into the hands of a party of Cuban insurgents, who 
fired on them, killing two men, until they discovered that the fugitives 
had no weapons, when they conducted them to the camp of their leader, 
Cebreco. The other group, guided by officers, followed a path along 
the coast and joined the men from the Zeresa about half a league from 
the place where they were shipwrecked. 

The crew of the 7eresa was grouped around the admiral on the beach. 
An attempt was being made to organize that camp of horror when a 
United States boat appeared with orders to pick up Admiral Cervera. 
To that end the admiral had once more to jump into the water with 
his aids, taking with him also Commander Mac-Crohon, executive 
officer of the Zeresa, who was very ill, and myself, who, having been 

101 


102 


placed on an improvised stretcher, unable to make the least motion 
except with my left arm, was thrown into the sea, which was breaking 
furiously on the beach, and I underwent the most excruciating suffer- 
ing which it is within human power to endure. 

The admiral left ashore the third officer of the Teresa, Lieutenant- 
Commander Juan B. Aznar, near that mass of wreckage of what only 
a short time before formed two handsome cruisers. This distinguished 
officer, who is an honor to the navy, had an opportunity to display 
his gifts under the most difficult circumstances imaginable. With 
large fragments of the masts stretchers were improvised for the 
wounded, who were placed under awnings of leaves made- by the men 
without any tools but their hands. The surgeons and their assistants 
took the clothing from those who had any left and made bandages out 
of it to alleviate the suffering as much as possible. The men were 
organized in groups of 50, each with an officer at its head, and it 
must have been a deeply affecting spectacle to see them, without any 
tools, simply with dry branches, dig graves for the burial of the dead 
bodies that were thrown up on the beach, and to hear our priests pray 
to God to receive the souls of these martyrs to duty. 

Among the dead bodies those of Chief Machinist José Melgares and 
Third-Class Gunner Francisco Martinez Canovas were identified. 

While this work was going on an insurgent appeared on the beach 
and invited Aznar to go with him and join the men who were at his 
camp in order not to become prisoners of the Americans. But Aznar, 
to whom the prospect of falling into the hands of the ferocious Calixto 
Garcia was by no means pleasing, instead of consenting succeeded in 
getting the men from the camp who belonged to the crew of the 
Oquendo to come to the beach, which was facilitated by the fact that 
at 3 o’clock in the afternoon a United States lieutenant had landed 
with twelve armed men, no doubt at the suggestion of Admiral 
Cervera, in order to prevent any intervention on the part of the 
insurgents. 

This officer brought with him large quantities of biscuit and cans of 
meat, which seemed like a blessing from heaven to our half-starved 
men. The embarkation was not commenced until nightfall, beginning 
with the wounded, who had to be thrown into the sea and picked up 
by the boats under the same frightful conditions as their commander 
had been, with the exception of a few who were placed in a boat which 
was run up on the beach for that purpose and which had then to be 
floated again by being pushed off by officers, both Spanishand Ameri- 
can, who, the same as all the men, worked with the utmost zeal and 
energy. The work was continued until late at night, when all had 
been installed on board the auxiliary steamer //arvard. It is to be 
regretted that the men in charge of the boats of these auxiliary steam- 


©1038 


ers plundered the sailors, filching from these unfortunates whatever 
articles of value they had about them.’ 

The boat carrying the admiral went alongside the yacht Gloucester, 
where we were received with full honors and great respect, passing 
almost naked in front of the guard which presented arms. When we 
had all been well fed and attended to as far as possible on that small 
yacht, the admiral was transferred to the /owa, and the seriously 


When I entered the boat with Admiral Cervera my servant handed me in a hand- 
kerchief 300 pesos gold and my watch, which he had taken care of, saying that it 
was safer with me than with him, as they would take it away from him. When I 
went on board the Gloucester I left my jacket in the boat, and the handkerchief with 
all it contained was stolen from it. While I was lying on a stretcher and attended 
with unparalleled kindness by Mr. George Lynn, a steward, to whom I shall ever 
remain grateful, I asked him to look for my jacket, telling him that there was money 
in it, which they might have eventually if they would only leave me what I needed 
to telegraph to my family. But not until night was the jacket found, and it was 
then in an officer’s cabin. To recover it (for I had been taken on board entirely 
naked, wrapped in a sheet) I had to say that they might cut off a sleeve because it 
was in my way, as I understood that they wantedasouvenir. And asalready stated, 
neither the money nor anything else was left in the pockets. 

I mention this incident because, in connection with another of a more serious 
nature, which also occurred on board the Gloucester, it was reported to the superin- 
tendent of the hospital at Norfolk. Wholly against my wishes and in spite of my 
entreaties, the estimable superintendent reported it to his Government and an investi- 
gation was instituted, a report of which has since been transmitted to me through 
diplomatic channels. From this it appears that nothing was found out, although 
Mr. Lynn’s statement says that I had been looking for certain papers to telegraph 
to my family, as though I had forgotten the address of the house where my wife and 
children were languishing in the most cruel anxiety. 

There is nothing of importance in this incident; it is simply one of those occur- 
rences which are inevitable in any campaign, and it would not deserve the time 
devoted to it were it not for the pretense of an investigation of even such details, 
which is far from the actual facts. 





Nore sy O. N. I.—The matter of the alleged loss by Captain Concas of 300 pesos on 
the board Gloucester was investigated by a board ordered by Lieut. Commander 
Wainwright, consisting of Chief Engineer G. W. McElroy, Lieut. G. H. Norman, 
and Asst. Engineer A. M. Procter, who reported: 

“We do not find from an examination of the evidence adduced that Captain 
Concas could have sustained any loss aboard the Gloucester, aside from the letters, 
which he stated were not important and which in all probability never came aboard 
the ship.”’ ; 

It will be noticed that Captain Concas connects the incident referred to ‘‘ with 
another of a more serious nature which also occurred on board the Gloucester,’’ but 
does not mention what it is. The incident referred to was the loss of a ring given by 
Lieutenant Ardurius to one of the officers of the Gloucester for safe-keeping. On the 
arrival of the Gloucester north this ring was promptly expressed to Lieutenant 
Ardurius at the naval hospital at Norfolk. It failed to reach him, due to his 
departure for Spain and delays in communication. The matter was investigated by 
the Navy Department, and the ring was subsequently forwarded through official 
channels to Lieutenant Ardurius in Spain. 


104 — 


wounded to the Olwette, an army hospital ship, where we were 
attended with admirable care by the surgeon, the captain, and the 
supercargo of that steamer. Personally I owe thanks for many kind 
attentions to Commander Gustaf Gade, of the Norwegian navy, attaché 
to the Norwegian legation in the United States, who was at that time 
discharging the duties of his office in the United States squadron. 

‘Two or three days later we were transferred to the Solace, a hospital 
ship of the Navy, which was under the command of my old friend Mr. 
Dunlap, who greeted me like an old comrade. Unfortunately the hos- 
pital part was in the exclusive charge of Dr. Streets, of whom I regret 
not to be able to speak in such terms as I should desire, especially as 
he too was an old acquaintance. He did not show me any of the con- 
sideration due to my age, rank, and condition, and if I received the 
most careful medical attendance, it was due to one of the assistant 
surgeons, Dr. Stokes. The men were poorly installed, still more 
poorly fed, ill treated, and even robbed by the nurses, in spite of 
courteous remonstrances which I made about this matter, in conjunc- 
tion with the captain of the ship himcelf. The unfortunate sailors, 
some of whom died for lack of care, arvived at their destination in 
a pitiful condition, although I must say that they were given clean 
clothes the last day before they were landed at the hospital in Nor- 
folk." 

To be just, however, it should be stated that there was not much 
preference shown, for it seems to me that the wounded Americans did 
not receive much better care than our men, nor was the extra time 
devoted to them which the circumstances required and which so much 
suffering made necessary. This must appear especially strange, as the 
number of wounded on both sides was not excessive, and there was on 
board an abundance of everything, which does honor to those who had 
organized this service and to the generosity of the country toward 
those who were to be victims of the war. 

Upon our arrival at Norfolk, Va., on July 16, we were taken to the 
naval hospital, At my request, the commander of the Solace accom- 
panied me ashore, in order to obviate the annoyances caused by curi- 
osity. The reception accorded us at the hospital by the medical 
director, Dr. Cleborne, and his assistant, Dr. Kite, will always consti- 
tute one of the pleasantest remembrances of my life. 





* Lieut. H. W. Harrison, who was a patient on board the Solace during the whole 
period that Captain Concas was on board that vessel, and who is now astaff intelli- 
gence officer in the Office of Naval Intelligence, states that Captain Concas and the 
Spanish officers and sailors were treated with the greatest consideration and afforded 
every luxury that could be expected under the circumstances; that they repeatedly 
so expressed themselves to him. He further states that on one occasion Captain 
Concas took offense at Dr. Streets’ reply, when he made a request that the Spanish 
officers on board be furnished with electric fans. Dr. Street’s reply was, ‘‘ No, there 
are not enough to go around, and our own people must be supplied first.””—O. N. I. 


105 


These gentlemen did all in their power to alleviate our physical and 
mental suffering. They treated us with the greatest kindness, showing 
us every attention and consideration, keeping from us with great deli- 
cacy everything unpleasant, saving us from importunate visitors, admit- 
ting those whom they thought we should. be pleased to see, and sending 
at once without our request for a body of Catholic Sisters of Charity. 
All these attentions were not for me alone, whose rank might have jus- 
tified some exception, nor for the officers, but for all; every sailor, as 
well as the captain, found kind brothers in these gentlemen from the 
first day to the last. 

The medical care, the excellent diet, the avoidance of all conversa- 
tion on the war, and the fact that the doors were closed to reporters 
were sufficient to further the rapid convalescence of all, especially the 
men whom the Solace had brought in such pitiful condition. 

My first interview with Dr. Cleborne is worthy of mention, for no 
doubt there was between us a bond of sympathy, due to the fact that 
we had many ideas in common. When he had installed me in magnifi- 
cent quarters he asked me whether there was anything he could do for 
me; I answered that he would do me a great favor if he would deliver 
me from the reporters, and the good doctor almost embraced me in 
his enthusiasm. I repeat once more, these worthy men of the United 
States Medical Corps, as physicians, gentlemen, and officers, left abso- 
lutely nothing undone. Their families also showed us the most affee: 
tionate hospitality and attention. We speak at length on this subject 
because it isa pleasure to express our gratitude for the favors received. 

Unfortunately, the military part at Norfolk was not at the same 
standard, but affected an indifference which caused some slight trouble 
and compelled the admiral to go there at the last hour. If he had not 
done so, there would have been delay in the return of the wounded to 
the Peninsula. | 

We do not wish to leave Norfolk without mentioning Mr. Arthur C. 
Humphreys, who had been our consular agent there and who conducted 
himself toward us with great chivalry, stating when he came to see 
us that he had been our consul and that, while he knew his duties as an 
American, there was nothing to prevent him from being our friend; 
and such he proved himself indeed, not without some annoyance to 
himself, which was due to the attitude assumed by the commodore who 
was in command of that naval station. 

We will leave this group of prisoners in the hot climate of Virginia 
and return to the larger group, which on the night of the 3d was 
embarked on board the Harvard and St. Louis. 

The officers were well installed and treated kindly by the commander 
of the former of these two ships, Captain Cotton; but the petty officers 
and men were crowded together on the deck aft, with nothing to pro- 
tect them from the burning rays of the sun in daytime and the damp- 


106 


ness at night except a thin awning. Owing to the inevitable disorder 
incident upon eating under these circumstances and the scarcity of 
water in such a climate the sight was a truly pitiful one, and at the 
end of a week malaria broke out among those sound and robust men 
and spread in an alarming degree, causing a number of deaths. 

Unfortunately the garrison of this ship did not consist of regular 
troops, but of semisavage volunteers from the State of Massachusetts, 
without discipline or training and with all the drawbacks and dangers 
of new troops of that nature, who have an idea that to be soldiers 
means to commit brutalities, especially when they can do so without 
danger, and it was these troops that gave rise to the terrible incident 
which we are about to relate, and which occurred at 11 o’clock on the 
night of July 4. 

It seems that one of our sailors, suffering from the suffocating heat 
in that place, rose from the deck and got on top of one of the boxes 
which were inside of the limit of the space in which they were con- 
fined. ‘The sentinel told him in English to go back to his place, which 
the sailor, of course, did not understand, and without further ceremony 
the soldier raised his rifle and shot him dead. At the sound of the 
discharge that mass of wholly defenseless men became excited, the 
watch came running and, without motive or cause, commenced to fire 
into that limited space filled with defenseless men, and their officers 
did nothing to calm the insane terror of those Massachusetts volun- 
teers until the officers of the navy arrived, who were able to put 
down those cowards carried away by their fear. 

Many of the unfortunates jumped into the water, others were 
wounded and killed—how many it has been impossible to ascertain. 
A fireman who had jumped overboard and was trying to regain the 
steamer by mounting the ladder on the side was assassinated by one of 
the officers of the volunteers, who killed him from the gangway with 
his revolver. There were 5 dead and 14 wounded on the deck, a 
comparatively insignificant number in comparison with this horrible 
incident. 

Our officers, who were forward at the opposite end of this large 
ship, knew nothing of what had occurred until 2 o’clock a. m., when 
the commander called the senior officer among us and told him 
about it. By way of reparation the dead were buried with full military 
honors, as though this were sufficient to make amends for the crime. 

The admiral made two energetic complaints about this matter, with- 
out any further result than a statement that an investigation would be 
instituted.’ 

The wounded and sick received poor care, not only because their 











‘A day or two after the battle of Santiago the Harvard, formerly the American liner 
New York, arrived at Siboney with 1,500 men for the army, who disembarked, 
excepting two squads from the Thirty-fourth Michigan and the Ninth Massachusetts 
Volunteers which were left on board under charge of the regimentai quartermaster to 


107 


number was very large, but also on account of the professional zeal of 
the United States surgeon, who would not permit any help on our 
part, though well aware that he and his assistant could not possibly 
attend to everything. The Harvard arrived at Portsmouth, N. H., 
on July 16 with a large number of sick, among them 51 seriously ill 
with fever. 

The contingent from the S¢. Zow/s had arrived there on the 11th. 
I copy below a paragraph from a letter which Lieut. Fernando 
Bruquetas, formerly of the Zeresa, wrote to me, telling me about my 
poor crew: 

Two or three days after our arrival came the expedition of the Harvard, com- 
prising almost the whole of the surviving crew of the Teresa. It was about 2 o’clock 
p- m. when they arrived under a scorching sun, half dead from hunger and thirst. 
There were not enough of us—officers, surgeons, attendants, and sailors—to carry those 
who could positively not move to a spot where there was a little shade to give them 
the first necessary aid. ‘‘ Water! Water!’’ was the cry of anguish heard everywhere; 
but, following medical directions, we gave them only a little water and that hot, 
according to the condition of each. The majority of these unfortunates remained 
sick during the whole time, and 31 of them died, though this is due particularly to 
the ill-treatment they experienced subsequently, as you are aware. 


The above is what my worthy officer said. We will now take up 
again the account of what occurred. 

The prisoners were installed onan island in the center of the harbor 
of Portsmouth, N. H., where a few miserable wooden barracks had 
been erected and were guarded with great military display, as though 
the prisoners could have escaped by swimming to Europe. 

The immediate chief of the prisoners was a low-born colonel of 
marine infantry who allowed himself all kinds of indignities toward 
the officers as well as the men, which was made possible through the 
weakness of a retired admiral who was in command. ‘The result was 
that some of the unfortunate sailors, devoured by fever and not even 
permitted to go to the hospital, died without being given the necessary 





look out for stores. On the night of July 3, 637 prisoners from the destroyed ves- 
sels of the Spanish fleet were placed on board, under guard of a few marines and the 
squads of the Michigan and Massachusetts regiments, the two regimental quarter- 
masters and a young marine officer standing watch. About midnight of the 4th, the 
quartermaster of the Michigan regiment being officer of the day, it appears that there 
was trouble in keeping the prisoners within the prescribed lines. One of the prison- 
ers climbed on top of a small deck house, where ammunition was stored, and when 
one of the sentries passed through the prisoners to make him get down they crowded 
around the sentry with menaces which made him think they were in open attack and 
he cried for help. The prisoners surged and forced their.way past the sentries, knock- 
ing some of them down. The guard coming on deck, supposing this was a mutiny, 
opened fire with the sentries. The sad result has been much deplored by our Goy- 
ernment and people, but in view of the circumstances all must see that the action of 
the guard is one for regret and not for condemnation. A special investigation was 
made by the War Department and a copy of the report and proceedings were fur- 
nished to the Navy Department, and on October 26, 1898, they were forwarded through 
the proper diplomatic channels to Admiral Cervera.—O., N. I. 


108 


assistance. Fortunately, all this came to the knowledge of Admiral 
Cervera, who obtained permission to visit the prisoners in that locality 
and at whose instance some of this was reported to the Government at 
Washington, which immediately relieved the admiral as well as the 
colonel.’ Even then the proper conditions of peace were never fully 








‘Captain Concas seems to have been incorrectly informed. The following corre- 
spondence refers to the subject here mentioned.—O. N. I. 


DEPARTMENT OF THE Navy, BurEAU oF NAVIGATION, 
Washington, D. C., August 12, 1898. 

Str: Your attention is invited to the following quotation from a letter addressed to 
Admiral Cervera by Lieut. Don Antonio Magaz: 

“The regulations have been complied with and are being complied with serupu- 
lously, notwithstanding the fact that on two occasions American sergeants have 
notoriously abused their authority by raising their hands against our sailors, one of 
the former being on one of the occasions completely intoxicated. I reported these 
occasions to the officer of the guard, and the latter I also made known to the colonel, 
who offered to make a proper report, although I am unacquainted with the result; 
all I know is that said sergeant continues to perform his duties. If justice has not 
been done, I regret it, for the Americans have conducted themselves so correctly 
with respect to us.”’ 

The Department requests that you make immediately a complete report concerning 
this matter. 

Very respectfully, _ A. §. CROWNINSHIELD, 


Chief of Bureau. 
The ComMAnbAnt, Navy-Yarp, Portsmouth, N. H. 


MarInE BARRACKS, 
Navy- Yard, Portsmouth, N. H., August 15, 1898. 

Str: 1. In obedience to the Bureau of Navigation’s letter of August 12, 1898 
(131968), concerning the striking of certain Spanish prisoners by noncommissioned 
officers of the Marine Corps, I have to report as follows: 

2. The only cases reported to me of the kind referred to in the Bureau of Naviga- 
tion’s letter were: 

First. That of Corpl: James Barrett, who did not strike a man, but caught him by 
the neck and shoved him along rather roughly. In his defense Corporal Barrett 
claims that the prisoner was sullen, insubordinate, and used a threatening manner 
toward him. I reprimanded Corporal Barrett severely at the time, and afterwards 
sent him out of the camp and put him on duty at the marine barracks. No report 
was made to me that Corporal Barrett was under the influence of liquor. At this 
time Corporal Barrett was acting police sergeant within the stockade. 

Second. The case of Private Patterson, who struck a prisoner with a musket while 
two prisoners were fighting. It was his only means of separating them, as the eyi- 
dence upon investigation showed. The men were not hurt in any way. 

3. I issued an order at that time that no one should strike a prisoner, and that any 
trouble should be reported to me at once and I would attend to it personally. 

4. Almost all the reports made against Spanish prisoners in the camp have been 
made by the Spanish officers themselves. 

5. Lieut. Antonio Magaz some time since objected to my mode of investigation’ 
He said that in Spain when an officer reported a man that ended it. I told him that 
with us it was different, and that not only were witnesses summoned, but that the 
accused himself had a right to make a statement. 

Very respectfully, . JAMES FoRNEY, 
Colonel, U. S. M. C., Commanding. 
The CommManpant, Navy-Yarp, Portsmouth, N. H. 


109 


reestablished, but at least our physicians and priests were allowed to 
minister to the men, and Lieut. Antonio Magaz, of the navy, who was 
the senior officer there, was given proper authority, of which he made 
use with a tact, skill, and gift of command which many a diplomat 
might envy. 

This is the more to be regretted as we know positively that the 
orders from the Administration at Washington were very different, 
and that neither pains nor expense was spared to make us comfortable 
so that upon our return we might be able to praise the American 
people. And thus it happened that while the unworthy colonel and 
some of his subordinates tried in every possible way to inflict hard- 
ships on the prisoners, the Administration furnished complete outfits 
of clothing to all the sailors and subaltern classes. The colonel 
referred to threw these articles of clothing, or had them thrown, one 
by one at the prisoners, and where they were hard articles, such as 
brushes for instance, they were thrown by the men as though firing at 
targets. They villainously disobeyed, in whole or in part, not only 
the instructions from the Government, but also the true wish of the 
American people. 

Not wishing to dwell longer -xpon petty annoyances, although at the 
time they may be the ca .. of great suffering, we will now speak of 
the admiral, commanders, and officers who were taken to Annapolis 
and installed in the Naval Academy, all the pupils of which were on 
vacation. They were very well lodged at this place, as nothing had to 
be improvised and they had only to take possession of the apartments 
of the absent pupils. Admiral McNair,a very polished gentleman, 
who, fortunately for us, had been placed at the head of this establish- 
ment,pursued—in conformity with the orders of the Government, and 
furnishing an example to all—a proper and highly commendable course, 
which was equaled by that of the no less praiseworthy Dr. Cleborne, 
of Norfolk. The whole personnel, from the Admiral down to the last 
midshipman, deserve the highest praise. 

‘In different ways, and sooner or later, all of our captains and oflicers 
were permitted to go out on parole from 8 o'clock in the morning 
until sunset, and it is a pity that the Government of the United States 
detracted from the merit of its conduct, to no purpose whatever, by 
establishing an inspection of our private correspondence, which could 
reveal no greater secrets than those furnished by the newspapers; and 
this was the more ridiculous and futile because, from the moment we 
went out and were able to post our own letters, all those of us whose 
correspondence might have contained something of importance wrote 
without the least interference, by way of England or France, where 
we had plenty of friends to whom such letters could be sent. 

Thus the treatment we received in the United States was on the 
whole as humanitarian as possible, with the exception of the unworthy 


110 


colonel to whom we have referred, who is the only one of whom the 
Appendix to the Report of the Navy Department for 1898 makes men- 
tion in terms which are entirely incorrect. The treatment was espe- 
cially kind on the part of the Government, whose orders, we repeat, 
we are sure were decisive to the effect that we should be well cared 
for, and it furthered this end with true generosity. But as to the 
dithyrambics on this subject in which the Americans themselves 
indulged, that old Europe might learn how prisoners were treated in 
civilized countries, there is much to be said; for comparing the treat- 
ment we received with that of Spain’s Chilean prisoners in 1866-67, 
when the whole Peninsula was given to the officers for a prison, and 
allowances assigned to them that they might live as they desired; when 
those who asked to go to the Paris Exposition were permitted to do so 
on parole, while no one troubled himself as to whether they wrote to 
their children or to their grandmothers, we find that there is a differ- 
ence between the treatment of prisoners by the civilizations of the 
Old World and that which we received in the United States, and that 
it is the latter who still have much to learn. 

We are not complaining, far from it. We only wish to correct their 
exaggerated self-praise, which if it were not ridiculous would be insup- 
portable on the part of the United States, where it never occurs to any 
one to ask if one likes a thing or not, but the classic ‘*‘ What do you 
admire more?” These exaggerations were the more insupportable since 
in this case they went so far as to take for history Zola’s Débacle, in 
which, although there is doubtless much that is true, for the great mass ~ 
of prisoners makes the best intentions impossible, the innuendoes were 
against Germany, whose sympathy for us stirred up all the j/ngoes as 
well as those who were not. 

The people in general could not have treated us better, and a great 
many persons showed us minor attentions; for instance, in accordance 
with the habit of that country, all the commanders received hundreds 
of letters from all classes of society, including the ladies, the greater 
part of which contained expressions of sympathy and disapprobation 
of the war, even those from many Protestant clergymen, while Admiral 
Cervera received not hundreds but thousands of letters and telegrams 
sent with the same object. These attentions were naturally accom- 
panied by visits, during which expressions of courtesy were exchanged. 
Distorted versions of these appeared in the papers afterwards, attrib- 
uting to both sides opinions they had never expressed, but which 
sounded fine to the American people, who constitute, as it were, a 
great mutual admiration society. But those civilities, which had no 
special significance in that country, and which all Americans under- 
stand, gave rise in Spain to very unfavorable comments against the 
admiral, for here also there are masters in the art of distorting facts, 
especially when there is something to be gained by so doing. 


111 


Fortunately it has come to the notice of no one, and we mention Zt 
to-day with the greatest reserve, that in consequence of my having one 
day remarked that I liked flowers a number of the ladies of Norfolk, 
who had already taken upon themselves the charitable mission of pro- 
viding me with books, added that of making my room a veritable 
garden, without my thinking at the time that in consequence of this I 
was guilty of an act of high treason, or that my servant was when, 
to my great regret, he ate the ices which usually accompanied the 
flowers, as my serious condition did not permit me to relieve him of 
this task. 

It seems impossible that serious-minded men in Spain should have 
given value and support to such newspaper stories from America, but, 
rightly regarded, this circumstance does have value, inasmuch as it 
shows the insignificance of those who talk thus, without, however, 
depriving themselves of the pleasure of being present at the opera on 
the very days of our two great naval disasters. 

The hour of peace arrived, and the consequent return to Spain, and, 
although the three groups of prisoners were now suffering no hardship 
except the moral effect of their position, our eagerness to see ourselves 
once more free made the hours which separated us from liberty seem 
very long. Tomy amazement, and while various contested points were 
still under discussion, I saw with my own eyes, in the hands of the 
highest authority at Portsmouth, a telegram from the Secretary of the 
Navy, in which it was stated that the difficulties in the way of our 
liberty proceeded from Sagasta’s cabinet. 

Finally, after the unavoidable formalities had been disposed of, the 
arrangements for our return were completed, anda committee, appointed 
by Admiral Cervera and presided over by Lieut. Commander Juan B. 
Aznar, chartered the steamer (ity of Rome, which, after picking up at 
New York the prisoners from Annapolis and Norfolk, went to Ports- 
mouth for the crews, and on the 13th of September the shores of the 
continent which Columbus had discovered, in an evil hour for Spain, 
faded from our view. 

Where was the (ity of Rome to go? The admiral requested that 
we be permitted to go to some maritime departamento, and this is 
what all would have desired, as there were hospitals there in which 
immediate attention could be given to the many sick we had with us, 
and especially to the wounded, many of whom were not yet able to 
move. Moreover, at a departamento at least a third of the men could 
have been furloughed to go home, and almost all the officers, even if 
they had no families, would at least have friends and places where they 
could find a home. The steamer could have gone to Cadiz and Feriol 
without increase of expense, but, as the Sagasta cabinet feared an ova- 
tion in each of the said departamentos, the ship was sent to Santander, 
whose hospitals were crowded with sick soldiers, and from where the 


ie 


men had to be sent to the departamentos in military trains, at enormous 
expense and with the prolongation of the sufferings of the unfortu- 
nate sick and wounded, who did not want to be separated from their 
companions. 

We arrived at Santander on the 21st of September, and one of the 
pleasantest experiences of our lives awaited us there. The first aux- 
iliary steamer which arrived alongside brought a committee presided 
over by two admirals and consisting of 43 commanders and officers 
from all the corps of the navy, who came to express to us approbation 
of our conduct, of which they, better than anyone else,‘were able to 
judge. Their presence, their patriotic words of comradeship and coun- 
sel, and the messages sent by all the officers of the Armada were the 
most perfect balm to the aching hearts of all, from the admiral to the 
last sailor. And I must state for their honor and our own satisfaction 
that the Government did all it could to prevent this manifestation, and 
while it did not go so far as to oppose it openly it at least sueceeded 
in depriving it of all significance. 

This was the last public act in connection with our imprisonment, 
and it is not expedient for any one of us who know the details to state 
at this time how much was done to prevent these things being spoken 
or written about when the Spanish people were actually thirsting to 
know the truth, and not even to-day, perhaps, would it be possible to 
make the account any more complete than we have done because a 
number of proceedings and documents are not public property. And 
therefore, since ‘* If a person does not find consolation it is because he 
does not seek it” (Spanish proverb), we are confident that if some day 
it occurs to someone to reply to this book these documents so care- 
fully hidden away will become a magnificent theme for a patriotic 
panegyric. 


CHAPTER XITI. 


If Spain were as well served by her statesmen and public 
officials as she is by her sailors she might yet bea great 
country.— The Spanish-American War, Engineering, July 21, 
1899, p. 68. 


Wewill here close the description of the events in which we have taken 
an active part, which description we have given with the restrictions 
imposed by the recency of these occurrences, but also with the right 
to legitimate defense, which the country itself demands of us, and 
against the interested silence which those who have been the cause of 
all our misfortunes would like to impose upon us with an injustice 
for which we can only find compensation in the above lines of a Euro- 
pean review of great weight, which, in commenting upon the opinions 
sustained on the subject of the disaster, makes outside of Spain a 
statement which history will make in our own country perhaps long 
before we dare hope for it. 

The war was accepted by Spain when the island of Cuba was virtu- 
ally lost, when in the Peninsula the sending out of one more man 
threatened an uprising more serious than any previous one, when our 
troops lacked the most indispensable necessaries, when the arrears of 
pay were the principal cause of the inadequate nourishment and con- 
sequent deterioration, and when the greater part of the Spanish resi- 
dents of Cuba, under the designation of reformers, autonomists, 
etc., made common cause with the insurgents while deriving fabulous 
profits from contracts for supplies and transports. 

Under these circumstances it was madness on our part to accept a 
conflict with an immensely wealthy nation, having a population four 
times as large as ours and situated at a gunshot’s distance from the 
future battlefield of its military aspirations, possessing an army anda 
navy anxious for easy victories to raise themselves in estimation and 
importance and acquire a place which they had not hitherto occupied 
in their country, and, in order to attain this, promoting that preemi- 
nently American spirit of hostility against Europe; a country in 
which every white man is the descendant of an immigrant and where 
every immigrant looks with grim envy upon the history of his native 
land, from which he believes himself excluded by privileges, by lack 
of prestige, or by fancies derived from novels, perhaps, which do not 

14232-—-No. VIII——8 113 


114 


acknowledge the all too prosaic truth that when a man emigrates it is 
simply because he does not have a dollar. Among the people of the 
United States the desire to make history stands above every other 
consideration, and we have been incredibly stupid when we offered it 
to them gratis and at our own expense. 

When the war commenced the outcome was, as a matter of fact, 
already decided, even if a less powerful nation than the United States 
had taken part against us. Subsequent results only would have been 
different; we should probably not have suffered the loss, for the pres- 
ent at least, of the Philippines. That the island of Cuba was lost and 
would have to be conquered back and that it was impossible for us to 
do so was well known in Spain from the very beginning. 

When nations go along without a political objective it does not make 
much difference whether their generals win battles or lose them; the 
latter is perhaps even preferable, because the solution is thus arrived 
at more promptly. It was because we had a political objective, even 
though we went from one defeat to another, that we succeeded in eject- 
ing the invader from Spain at the beginning of the present century. 
It is thanks to her political objective that Italy has become a great 
nation, in spite of her lack of success in the battlefield. A nation only 
need show its determination to make an energetic resistance in order 
to weaken the tenacity of the aggressor, whose political ideal can never 
be as firm as that represented by a people with its army and statesmen 
who know how to fulfill their exalted missions. Sometimes a military 
genius, supported by revolutionary ideas like those which marked the 
last years of the previous century, may temporarily rule over all 
Europe; but when the armies and the people unite in a political ideal, 
all they need, even after a hundred defeats, is one successful encounter 
to send the victor to St. Helena. 

Did Spain have a political objective, a policy, during the historical 
moments of which we are speaking ¢ 

Future generations will hardly believe it possible that the recent 
events actually occurred. The war was not desired, and yet nothing 
was done to ward it off. Peace was desired, but nothing was done to 
preserve it. With a loud voice our statesmen declared that they 
wanted peace at any cost, and yet they wanted it to cost nothing. 
They were well aware that the lack of men in the field had commenced 
to be felt, that the people complained of the redemption from service 
by purchase, and that it would be impossible to send any considerable 
contingent of troops to Cuba; but no thought was taken of what was 
to'be done when it should become necessary to send such a contingent. 
Yellow fever, typhoid, and anemia were rapidly decimating the con- 
tingent of our forces in Cuba, and nobody thought of who was to carry 
the guns when they were dropped by the soldiers who were taken -to 
the hospital or the cemetery. The debt increased fabulously. Medieval 


115 


means were resorted to and fraudulent money was coined, for silver 
money deserves no other name. And still the pay of the troops was 
over a year in arrears, and the poverty of the country increased the 
privations of all classes of people, and no solution was sought, except 
by criminal procrastination, of the problem as to what our forces on 
land and sea were to live on the following month. ‘The conflict had 
become inevitable, and the country was assured that our relations were 
cordial and that there was no cause for alarm. It was well known that 
our proud enemy was making’ preparations, and we were not even 
permitted to think of what was to be done when the aggression should 
become a fact. Long before the beginning of the war it was decided 
to send the squadron to the West Indies, but only to recall it when 
the war broke out. There was some thought of concluding peace, and 
the only point on which any energy was shown was that the squadron 
should go out to certain destruction, and thus leave Spain wholly at the 
mercy of the enemy. When the squadron had been destroyed and 
when the whole world knew that there was no help for us, valuable 
time was lost, and Santiago and Manila fell, while absolutely nothing 
was done in the meantime. 

Instead of making terms while the squadron was yet intact at San- 
tiago, and when that city and Manila could keep up the defense for 
some time, they waited until all was lost, although they knew before- 
hand that all must thus be lost. 

In this whole period may be seen the ‘*to-morrow” which never 
arrives, for there is no to-morrow for him who loses his life to-day. 
Miracles do not descend from heaven to change the face of the earth 
upon the wish of an impossibility. 

The political idea which ruled our destinies was one fearful denial, 
and by denials nothing can be attained. Was the object of our policy 
war!‘—No. Was it peace?—No. Resistance/—No. The relinquish- 
ment of Cuba?—No. Was it determination to defend ourselves ¢’— 
Not either. To allow ourselves to be killed?—Still less. Was it 
believed that Cervera would be victorious in the West Indies/—No. 
Was it believed that he would be defeated?—No. Would he be 
relieved from his command on account of his opposition to every- 
thing that was being done?—No. Finally, did we want battles /—No, 
and a thousand times no. For we have been assured, though we have 
not been able to ascertain the source of the statement, that it was 
believed true in Madrid that Sefor Moret, minister of colonies, had 
said that the war would not be of any importance, because as soon as 
the Americans had sunk three or four of our ships peace would be 
concluded. We recommend Sefor Moret’s theory to the statesmen of 
the great nations of Europe as something truly novel. 

The only thing that comforts us is the fact that our brothers, the 
Cubans, and let us also call the Filipinos by that name, do not give 


116 


the lie to their race nor their education; for both believed that the 
United States was working solely for love, as subsequent events have 
demonstrated. 

It may be said that all this is already a matter of history, although 
the wounds of all who feel themselves Spanish are still shedding blood, 
and their eyes tears; and if-history teaches, will this history teach the 
Spanish? We do not dare hope so. The historically hostile attitude 
of the country toward the navy, the situation of our capital, the 
Mohammedan indifference of the nation regarding its international 
relations, due perhaps to the disenchantment of the policies of the 
houses of Austria and Bourbon, and the necessity, brought about by 
our disturbances, of withdrawing within ourselves—all these cause the 
ministries of state and navy, which in all civilized countries form the 
axis upon which rests their prosperity, to be in our country like two 
islands lost in the mist of indifference, of which public opinion takes no 
thought and which never excite the enthusiasm of the people except to 
destroy them. 

It is, therefore, useless for us to think of alliances, of relations with 
other nations, of mutual guarantees which at least would render the 
ambitions of the powerful dangerous. 

It is likewise useless to think of battleships, cruisers, and torpedo 
boats if, when the crisis comes, we are not permitted to make the 
least preparation for war, and if our ships are to be scattered over the 
whole world, as though the policy of the country sought in its own 
destruction the prompt solution of conflicts, which must always come 
in the nature of surprises in a country that has no international policy, 
and as the result our nationality goes to pieces. 

It is useless also for us to have diplomats if they are not to be 
listened to and if, when they announce a storm threatening the coun- 
try, they are to be treated with disdain as though they were making 
an unnecessary fuss about nothing. It is useless to send to these dip- 
lomats high-sounding documents, which in our country are the remedy 
for everything, instead of sending them battleships, which is the medi- 
cine employed by other nations, especially the most advanced, which 
by such arguments open markets for their products and take posses- 
sion of archipelagoes owned by others, for no other reason than that 
they have in a Christian and generous manner civilized the Indian tribes 
of their country. 

It was in vain that the navy in 1884 predicted the double cyclone 
that menaced Spain, in the Gulf of Mexico on the one hand, and in 
the Empire of the Rising Sun on the other, and that it urged the ~ 
necessity of completing the fleet inside of four years. If that had 
been done the war would have been obviated, as our naval forces 
obviated it in 1870:at Habana, where they were efliciently represented. 
by General Caballero de Rodas, Governor-General of the island of 


117 


Cuba, on the occasion of a visit similar to that of the Maine. It was 
in vain also that day after day, and step by step, the navy pointed 
out the recent danger, in every tone of voice, from every quarter, 
even as late as the eve of the disaster, July 2, 1898. And when the 
catastrophe came, the rdles were changed by the brutal law of the 
majority, and those who had refused to read and to listen proclaimed 
themselves fully informed and brought charges of ignorance and 
imprudence against us who had hazarded our very heads and reputa- 
tions to declare officially and with the utmost energy that we ought 
not to go to war and that, if the squadron went to the West Indies, 
Spain would be left to the mercy of the enemy. And in view of this 
brutal law of the majority, who know nothing about the world in 
which they live and who drag the country to an abyss, at the bottom 
of which it will be dashed to pieces, it is useless to expect considera- 
tion, and still less justice. For the solace of our own consciences, even, 
we have to: turn our eyes sadly to foreign countries to read, among 
others, in the foremost engineering review of the world, in an article 
on the Spanish-American War, these words: ‘‘/f Spain were as well 
served by her statesmen and public officials as she vs by her sailors she 
might yet be a great country.” 














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